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Preface: Th e Motion of Inquiry
I began the work that led to this book amid breakdowns connected to the notion 
of human dignity and to the politics of intrinsic worth that have accompanied that 
term since the mid-twentieth century.
Despite what some have suggested, these breakdowns have not been primarily 
discursive—though ever since the global expansion of human rights discourses in 
the 1970s, one prominent response has been a multiplication of talk about human 
dignity and its discontents. Th ese breakdowns, rather, have been taking place at 
other critical junctures. Most importantly, they have been taking place at those 
junctures where the question of how to talk about human dignity has become 
bound up in the problem of how to turn it into a practice.
spiritual politics
In the postwar era, human dignity began to be fashioned as the anchor point for 
what might be called a “spiritual politics”: spiritual in that the politics of human 
dignity have been indexed to something “essential” about human life that needs to 
be made the norm of material existence, political in that human dignity has become 
the animating concern of sustained eff orts to rethink dominant modes and forms 
of power.
Despite being elaborated across diverse venues, the spiritual politics of human 
dignity have been fashioned in a remarkably consistent manner. In the fi rst place, 
human dignity has been fashioned as intrinsic. It has been talked about, acted on, 
and instituted as though “grounded” in nothing other than itself. It is for this rea-
son, for example, that the authors of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
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simply declaimed dignity and never directly explained what they meant by the term. 
Dignity, rendered in a declamatory style, can be thought of as self-justifying.
In the second place, dignity has been put forward as a matrix of human worth 
par excellence. Human dignity (to put it in negative terms) has not been cast as one 
aspect of human worth alongside others—and certainly not as an aspect of human 
worth derived from other features of human life, such as the capacity for reason 
or self-governance. It has been fashioned, rather, as original and defi ning. Human 
dignity has been styled as primordial.
In the third place, while fashioned as intrinsic and primordial, human dignity 
has also been cast as vulnerable, threatened by distinctively modern forms of power. 
Concerned actors have insisted that under the shadow of modernity something un-
equivocally valuable and vulnerable is at stake. Dignity, thus styled, must urgently 
be defended.
Th at today all three of these characteristics are treated as self-evident by pro-
ponents of “dignitarian politics”—and dismissed as self-evidently problematic by 
critics—is testament to the ubiquity of dignity’s postwar elaboration. In what fol-
lows I will unpack how this self-evidence was achieved. Th e point I want to draw 
out here is simply that whatever one makes of this fi gure of human dignity—as self-
justifying, primordial, and vulnerable—it stabilized and became dominant in the 
postwar era. In recent decades, however, it has been destabilized, and its dominance 
has been put to the test.
biopolitical tests
Over the past three decades, the fi gure of human dignity has been mobilized as 
a guiding norm for governing the biopolitical body. By biopolitical I mean those 
dimensions of human vitality that since the nineteenth century have been made the 
target of sustained political energies—from how grain is grown and circulated to the 
economy, of birthrates, morbidity, and mortality, to city planning and the spread 
of infectious disease. It is within the space of these mobilizations—within these 
eff orts to govern the politics of human vitality in the name of human  dignity—that 
the ethics and politics of intrinsic worth have begun to break down. Th ey have be-
gun to break down in the sense that previous ways of acting, relating, and thinking 
can no longer be taken for granted.
Th ere are, no doubt, countless local and circumstantial reasons for this break-
down. But at the heart of things lies a tension of conceptual and operational logics. 
To put simply here what I will detail further on: the logic of biopolitics and the logic 
of human dignity are sharply contrastive. Th e fi rst is relative and ameliorative, the 
second intrinsic and invariable.
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Th e biopolitical operates through mechanisms of normalization. It seeks to de-
termine what is biologically “normal” for a given population in order to infl ect 
those norms—the World Health Organization’s “Millennial Development Goals” 
is a prominent example. In the postwar period, the politics of human dignity were 
made to operate on an orthogonal logic to such normalization. One might say that 
since World War II, the term human dignity has been used precisely to name that 
feature of human life that cannot and should not be normalized. In this light, it is 
not surprising that the answer to the question of how to govern human vitality in 
the name of intrinsic worth remains elusive.
But there is a twist. Despite apparent tensions, over the past few decades a het-
erogeneous range of actors, concerned in one way or another with the health and 
well-being of various populations, have pressed forward with the work of giving 
form to an ethics of intrinsic dignity enacted through the strategies of biopolitical 
reason. Th e intriguing feature of these eff orts is not actually the seeming incom-
mensurability of logics. Th e intriguing feature, rather, is that this seeming incom-
mensurability has proven highly generative. For better or worse, the troubled eff orts 
to govern human bodily life in the name of human dignity have issued in a vast 
expansion of ethical, political, and biological practice.
Th is successful expansion has itself proven problematic. While generating new 
practices, the interplay of human dignity and biopolitics has produced indetermi-
nate eff ects, with the attendant states of uncertainty that such eff ects bring in their 
wake. No determinative resolution is in sight. Th is indeterminacy and uncertainty 
can be seen, for example, in the now decades-long eff ort to discern universal ethical 
signifi cance in “the human” of human genomics even while major players continue 
to leverage genomics for addressing the health needs of specifi c populations. Th ey 
can be seen in attempts, in multiple countries, to shift grounds for asylum from 
political to biomedical vulnerability. Th ey can be seen in the failed attempts in 
international law to discern the biological meaning of genos in cases of genocide, in 
attempts in global health to quantify care for human dignity by counting calories, 
in disjunctive eff orts to combine state-assured healthcare with practices of biomedi-
cal abandonment, and in the ad hoc eff orts of some medical practitioners to inter-
articulate an ethic of self-determination with an ethic of intrinsic worth in cases of 
physician-assisted suicide.
Th e list could go on. In all cases, the question of what human dignity means 
as a guide to biopolitical action remains far from clear. Still, attempts to meet its 
demands continue apace.
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one site of breakdown
For my part, I fi rst encountered the discords of human dignity in a zone of biotech-
nology. In the early years of the 2000s, I was working as a research assistant to the 
Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) of a Bay Area biotech company called Geron. At the 
time, Geron held a monopoly on the intellectual property needed for commercial-
izing human embryonic stem cells, including the technologies for embryo cloning.
Geron exemplifi ed Silicon Valley’s culture of salvational promise. Th e company 
had been founded on a research platform dedicated to “radical” life-extending cel-
lular technologies. Its founders had been proponents of the proposition that age-
related death is linked to a failure of individual cells in the body to rejuvenate 
themselves. Geron’s founders convinced investors that if Geron could learn how to 
control the mechanisms of cell regeneration, the company might be able to extend 
biological life, perhaps even (in their more utopian declarations) indefi nitely.
In 1997, a research team from the University of Wisconsin, led by the biologist 
James Th omson, announced that they had successfully generated human embry-
onic stem cells. Th omson’s work was funded by Geron. Th ree days later, the U.S. 
Senate held hearings to parse the ethical and economic signifi cance of the work. 
Richard Doerfl inger, a political journeyman from the U.S. Council of Catholic 
Bishops’ Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, was asked to testify. He rehearsed a now-
familiar Roman Catholic position: “there is no distinction between defending hu-
man life and promoting the dignity of the human . . . every human life is sacred 
from conception to natural death.” Th e extraction of human embryonic stem cells 
destroys the developing embryo. Because of this, Doerfl inger concluded, the re-
search violates human dignity.
Th e research catalyzed the Vatican’s politics of intrinsic worth and indexed those 
politics to the task of protecting the integrity of the biological body. In so doing, 
it brought to sharp articulation an ontologically fraught question that politically 
could no longer be avoided. Th e question was this: is it possible to identify a specifi c 
point along an embryo’s developmental pathway when human life—which is bio-
logically context dependent and relational—can be said to become the bearer of an 
intrinsic and unchanging dignity? Th e question generated the notorious impasses 
of stem cell politics.
For a time, the Geron EAB remained blocked by this intractable question. All its 
members, including its Catholic members, initially supported Geron’s research—
albeit for diff erent reasons and with varying degrees of reservation. Th e question, 
then, was how to move forward given the theological-political dilemmas put in 
play by Doerfl inger’s testimony. In the end, the EAB formulated a joint position in 
support of research, supplemented by minority statements. Th e joint position reso-
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nated with a 1984 report on research with human embryos in the United Kingdom 
known as the Warnock Report. Th e Warnock Report argued that a minimal mark 
of personhood, even potential personhood, is strict individuation—a legal criterion 
that would seem to have a biological correlate.
With the publication of their position paper, the EAB tried to set aside the ques-
tion of intrinsic dignity and focus on Geron’s ongoing research. But if they believed 
they had earned the right to move on, almost no one else did. Th e logic of the 
Warnock Report satisfi ed virtually no one—least of all those with views consistent 
with the U.S. Council of Catholic Bishops. Th e EAB remained caught in a tortured 
game of defi nition and counterdefi nition, a game whose stakes turned as much on 
securing the capacity to govern the ethical imaginary of biotechnology as it did in 
clarifying the interrelations of dignity, science, and the body.
I remained in an adjacent position to these micropolitics. I was close enough to 
the center of things to observe the binds that were entangling fi rst-order players. 
But I was not far enough outside to avoid being caught in those binds myself. Amid 
these tangles, I took up what seemed to be an urgent task: namely, the work of 
articulating an outside to the dominant subject positions on off er—an ontological 
as well as ethical outside that might be more concordant with the contingencies of 
biological and historical life and with a religious ethos worthy of the name. Work-
ing alongside bioethical and theological colleagues, I tried to frame human dignity 
in what could be glossed as eschatological terms: a view of dignity adhering in the 
making of a just future rather than in an a priori philosophy of nature.
To put it plainly: I found the dominant renderings of human dignity to be intel-
lectually unsatisfactory, pragmatically unhelpful, and, in a normative sense, untrue. 
Add to this that I found the possibility of establishing a counterposition to the pre-
vailing politics to be seductive and the combative game of trying to displace those 
politics to be a pleasure. But operating within this space of refusal, seduction, and 
combat I was insuffi  ciently attentive to the ways in which my eff orts to formulate a 
normative outside to the politics of intrinsic worth actually reproduced the dynam-
ics of a situation I otherwise knew to be blocked.
I had not yet begun to take seriously enough that human dignity, understood as 
self-justifying, primordial, and vulnerable, had become a constitutive and institu-
tionally secure feature of late modern politics. Th at means I had also not yet grasped 
that a primary ethical task consisted not so much in redefi ning human dignity but 
in trying to get clearer about the manner in which this fi gure of intrinsic worth has 
been brought into being, made to operate, and set into motion in the world.
Said diff erently: in my eff orts to elaborate an outside to the politics of intrinsic 
worth, I had not yet internalized Nietzsche’s insight that “unspeakably more de-
pends on what things are called than on what they are” and that “only a fool would 
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think it was enough to point to this misty mantle of illusion in order to destroy the 
world that counts as essential.”
conceptual and ethical equipment
I began the labor of extracting myself from Nietzschean foolishness by stepping 
back from bioethics and concentrating on the broader landscape of political theol-
ogy within which debates over stem cell research were playing out. Given how the 
debates had unfolded, this decision seemed self-evident. I remained vocationally 
and intellectually uneasy, however. It’s not that I found the texts and problems of 
political theology defi cient. It’s that I did not know how to put them to work in the 
world as a means of contextualizing the critical limitations of religious bioethics and 
its uses of human dignity.
Th e terms of my uneasiness were partially clarifi ed by way of an encounter with 
Michel Foucault’s now infamous notions of biopower and biopolitics. Given my 
prior entanglements, these notions initially seemed apt. Th ey had, after all, become 
terms of art in contemporary theory, taken to be defi nitive of the excesses of the 
modern age. I became convinced, however, that whatever Foucault had meant by 
these terms, he did not intend anything as epochal or nefarious as leading theorists 
were proposing. He had introduced the terms as part of his eff ort to distinguish 
one distinctive economy of modern power among others. For me this meant that 
the terms did not so much provide answers as indications. Th ey indicated the need 
to specify the economies of life and power proper to the politics of intrinsic worth.
I began to look beyond political theology and bioethics for conceptual and ethi-
cal equipment. I eventually found that equipment in anthropology. Th rough a series 
of fortuitous opportunities, my turn to anthropology eventually led to a multiyear 
collaboration with two anthropologists, Paul Rabinow and Anthony Stavrianakis. 
Within this space of collaborative inquiry, I began to reformulate my project. I be-
gan to shift my attention away from the question of philosophical and theological 
defi nitions per se and toward an examination of the specifi c venues within which 
human dignity has been redefi ned and mobilized.
Th is reformulation opened up a diff erent relation to the politics of intrinsic 
worth: I undertook the work problematizing human dignity as an artifact of the 
recent past and of facing the existential diffi  culties of rethinking my relation to 
that past. I recast my project as a kind of “discourse of modernity on modernity,” 
positioning dignity less as the kind of thing one might be for or against and more as 
an event in the recent history of relations between the body and human worth, one 
in need of further investigation.
F6671.indb   xiv 9/16/15   10:38:56 AM
  Preface: Th e Motion of Inquiry xv
political spirituality
My reformulation was oriented, in part, by my rereading of Foucault’s 1981–1982 
lectures at the Collège de France. Th e lectures deal centrally with the problem of 
how to think about shifting relations of knowledge, capacity, and care—relations 
that have been vital to the history of human dignity as well as to my own eff orts to 
engage that history.
In the lectures, Foucault proposes a conceptual distinction between philoso-
phy and spirituality and their relation to Antique notions of care—care for oneself 
and care for others. Foucault asserts what other historians have argued: that for 
the Antique philosophical schools and the early Christian monastics, philosophy 
was distinguishable but ultimately inseparable from spirituality. “Philosophy” was 
understood to be a form of life that asks “how can truth and falsehood be distin-
guished?” “Spirituality” concerned the question of what needed to be done in order 
to gain access to the truth. To quote Foucault, spirituality concerns “the set of these 
researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifi cations, ascetic exercises, 
renunciations, conversions of looking, modifi cations of existence, etc., which are, 
not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be 
paid for access to the truth.”
Hence care. In order to gain access to the truth one had to learn how to care for 
oneself—how to attend to oneself and how to direct one’s attention—as well as how 
to care for others—how to constitute ethical communities with others such that a 
life dedicated to truth might become mutually salvational.
For the primary actors considered in this book, the question of how to care for 
human dignity—of how to speak and act in the name of human dignity—required 
tending to this same set of distinctions. It required determining the conditions 
under which one can have access to the truth about human worth and vulnerabil-
ity as well as weighing the costs one might have to pay in gaining access to those 
truths, costs measured in institutional transformations, political renunciations, and 
religious modifi cations.
Th e theme of spirituality and care actually appeared in Foucault’s work two years 
earlier, during a decisive transition from a sustained investigation of modernity, 
turning on biopower, to truth, politics, and subjectivity, turning on ethics. In a 1978 
roundtable with historians, Foucault explained that he had been haunted “from the 
fi rst” by the problem of how certain modes and forms of truth speaking—“regimes 
of veridiction”—and modes and forms of governance—“regimes of jurisdiction”—
had come to defi ne the history of the West. Among other diffi  culties, this conjunc-
tion of veridiction and jurisdiction puts in question the practice of history itself, 
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given that the historian’s tools—the historian’s own modes of truth speaking and 
forms of governance—are implicated in the very histories under investigation.
Foucault proposed that this historical problem and this problem of history con-
stituted a “decisive arrangement”: the challenge of discovering new ways of distin-
guishing true and false is linked to the challenge of discovering new ways of govern-
ing oneself and others. Th is decisive arrangement, he suggested, can be thought of 
as the political problem in its most general form, a form that brings the object and 
subject of thought into the same frame. He concluded by asking: “[what should we 
call] the search for a new formulation of each of these practices, in itself and in rela-
tion to the other, the will to discover a diff erent way of governing oneself through a 
diff erent way of dividing up true and false?” His answer: “political spirituality.”
practicing political spirituality
Th e concept of political spirituality is not an answer to the problem of human dig-
nity. It is an indication of possible analytic variables, which can be used to specify 
elements that have shaped human dignity as well as one’s relation to those elements. 
Th e use of these analytic variables set my project into motion. Equally important, it 
helped me begin to exit the fi rst-order binds characteristic of the debates over stem 
cell research.
Meditating on the games of truth and power entailed in those debates was clari-
fying. I was better able to see that my work might actually be more fruitful—for 
myself and others—as an inquiry into how the politics of intrinsic worth were made 
and how the terms of this fabrication ultimately produced critical limitations. Such 
an inquiry seemed more salient than yet another contribution to the normative 
redefi nition of the dignifi ed human.
Equally important, I was able to actively accept and pursue what had become 
the de facto ethical status of my work. My work had become marked by what might 
be thought of as a Deweyan sensibility. Th e American pragmatist John Dewey ar-
gued that the task of thinking begins in an indeterminate or discordant situation 
and strives to work through the elements of that situation in order to move toward 
greater determination and greater concord. If one is successful, one might fi nd a 
way of turning breakdown into an opportunity for insight and response.
For Dewey, the work of ethics—the ethics of thinking—does not require an 
explicit further step beyond the intellectual labor of scientifi c inquiry, that is, be-
yond the critical investigations entailed in the work of moving from lesser to greater 
determination in a troubled situation. Th at intellectual labor, after all, already re-
quires the thinker to discern and formulate those aspects of the situation that count 
F6671.indb   xvi 9/16/15   10:38:57 AM
  Preface: Th e Motion of Inquiry xvii
as signifi cant and, in so doing, open up the possibility of a diff erent relation—a 
reconstructed relation—to the present and the near future.
Th e motion of inquiry became clear to me: the movement of thought from a 
situation of breakdown to a range of possible solutions not only constituted some-
thing to be studied “out there” in the world. It also constituted a practice for the 
thinker embedded in the troubled situation. In other words, it became clear to me 
that the work of thought on human dignity required conceptualizing the history of 
how human dignity had been fi gured—and that this might already constitute an 
ethical contribution.
In this light, it bears stating that my work on human dignity and my attempt 
to bring to articulation a more satisfying account of this fi gure of anthropos did not 
constitute an exit from bioethics or political theology. Rather, it constituted an at-
tempt to secede from the dominant modes of practice in those domains as well as 
the norms and forms of subjectivity mandated as part of those modes. Secession, in 
this sense, consists of committed adjacency whereby insight is generated by motion 
into and out of a particular situation.
I am not sure what others would call this motion of critical adjacency, but an-
thropology seems apposite. Or perhaps, as one of the reviewers of this book put it, 
the position of adjacency articulated in this book can be thought of as an experi-
ment in “theologizing the theologians.” Either way, what follows is a theologically 
infl ected anthropology of the ways in which the fi gure of human dignity has been 
imagined and made into a practice over the past half-century, an examination con-
ducted with dedicated attention to the interconnections of truth, power, and care 
entailed in the question of political spirituality.
Over the course of this examination, I have actually moved closer to the stakes of 
the domains under investigation than I was when directly engaged in the fi rst-order 
games of defi ning human dignity and the biological body. Putting the games of 
defi nition, counterdefi nition, denunciation, and counterdenunciation into anthro-
pological and theological perspective has opened up the possibility of rethinking the 
historical contours of a problem as well as my own unsettled relation to it.
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My aim in this book is to off er a more anthropologically satisfying account of hu-
man dignity—or at least the minimal archaeological elements needed for such an 
account. By human dignity here I don’t mean that universal feature of human real-
ity that has been enshrined in political, religious, and ethical discourses, practices, 
and institutions. I mean, rather, human dignity, the notion and phrase—the fi gure 
of speech—which animates those discourses, gets turned into those practices, and 
gets incorporated in those institutions. My attention in this book is captured by a 
curious fact: namely, that since the middle of the twentieth century heterogeneous 
actors (from ambassadors, doctors, and activists to priests and popes), working in 
only loosely related venues (international governance, faith-based missions, bio-
ethical commissions), have employed this formerly philosophical and theological 
term as though its political meanings and obligations are obvious. Th e results of 
this practice have been remarkable: the creation of a new universal fi gure of the in-
trinsically dignifi ed human. Th is fi gure of human dignity—that is, the conception 
of human dignity as politically self-evident—has arguably shaped all subsequent 
F6671.indb   1 9/16/15   10:38:57 AM
2 Introduction
formulations and uses. Its political forms, force, and fl exibility are such that it has 
subsequently been mobilized in response to a still-growing number of problems and 
has been made the central object of an ever-diversifying range of institutions. To 
put all this diff erently, I begin in this book from a point of engaged curiosity: I want 
to understand how it is that the fi gure of human dignity has, since the late 1940s, 
become a commonplace of political, ethical, and religious discourse and practice. 
Th ough human dignity is often talked about as self-evident, its installation as the 
centerpiece of the global politics of intrinsic worth is not.
In an eff ort to understand better the terms of that installation, I have undertaken 
an inquiry into how human dignity, in the post–World War II era, has been reimag-
ined. I have proceeded by way of an examination of the key documents in the key 
institutions through which human dignity has been articulated and turned into a 
practice. To put it a bit formalistically, I have proceeded on the assumption that the 
postwar formulation of human dignity constitute a threshold event in the history 
of truth and power. It is an event in which concerned actors, responding to a con-
fl uence of historical forces, have struggled to connect truth speaking (logos) about 
themselves and their situation (anthropos) with strategies for governing themselves 
and their situation. It is in this sense that I think a more satisfying anthropological 
account of human dignity is needed. My use of the comparative here might suggest 
that other anthropological accounts currently exist, accounts I fi nd to be unsatis-
factory. As it turns out, they don’t—at least not in any systematic form. Th ere are 
several worthwhile anthropological works on the problem of the universal notion 
of humanity in twentieth- and twenty-fi rst-century discourse and politics and a 
signifi cant corpus on human rights. Despite sharing a semantic fi eld with human 
dignity, however, these works do not directly address the problem I take up here. 
My use of the comparative, in other words, does not refer to existing anthropologi-
cal work on human dignity; it refers to a lack of it.
human dignity as event: a figure of truth, power, and ethics
Over the past half-decade, human dignity has introduced a shift in relations among 
ways of reasoning about human worth, normative terms for the governmental and 
nongovernmental regulation of conduct, and new possible modes of existence. Th is 
shift has been defi ned by novel conceptions of intrinsic worth as well as by vocifer-
ous debates about what these conceptions demand, ethically and politically. Yet 
despite all the talk about human dignity, this event remains underexplored and 
underexplained.
Since the middle of the twentieth century human dignity has served as the ob-
ject and anchor point of arguably the only religious and secular counterpolitics with 
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anything like the broad legitimacy and proliferative capacity to weigh against the 
dominant logics of national sovereignty, capitalist expansion, and scientifi c trium-
phalism. In retrospect, it might seem that given the horrors of World War II the turn 
to human dignity as a foundation for political thinking—the proposal that universal 
human dignity can provide the warrant for new regimes of governance and care—was 
an obvious one. Th e excesses of that war, after all, have rightly been cast as the par-
oxysmal form of the pathologies of modern power. Add to this Hannah Arendt’s fa-
mous dictum that in modernity being stripped of offi  cial attachment to a nation-state 
leaves one in the most vulnerable of political positions, and dignity’s logic of universal 
political inclusion appears altogether apt. But how this has taken place and what it 
means for the creation of new political and ethical practices is far from obvious. We 
shouldn’t forget that the post-war formulation of human dignity as self-evident re-
quired considerable political and conceptual labor, as I will show. Th e institution of 
dignity as self-evident is itself an artifact of the politics of intrinsic worth.
Humanist discourses have been around for centuries. Yet it’s not until the mid-
twentieth century that the notion of human dignity is articulated as an extradis-
cursive practice and norm of institutional formation. Where human dignity was 
previously conceived as a potential in need of cultivation, it began to be cast as a 
given in need of recognition and protection. Adjusting Paul Rabinow’s provocation 
regarding human rights, one might ask: if human dignity is “natural, or God-given, 
or merely self-evident, then how is it that protection at the scale of ‘humanity’ has 
not been previously invented?” Rabinow’s provocation should not be mistaken for 
a simple expression of anthropological skepticism. Th e point is not to insist, yet 
again, that representations of anthropological universals are always inevitably his-
torically and politically particular. Th e provocation, rather, is a call to inquiry. How 
is it, exactly, that programs for governance in the name of human dignity came 
to be articulated as urgent and necessary? What has the institutionalization and 
declaration of dignity’s universality and self-evidence actually done, politically and 
ethically? What kinds of specialists and specialized techniques have been brought 
into being as a means of actualizing dignity’s protection? In short, how has human 
dignity been reimagined such that it could become an anchor point of contempo-
rary counterdiscourses and counterpolitics?
Th e most intuitive place to begin answering these questions might be human 
rights, which, in the end, constitute the most widely recognized form of dignitarian 
counterpolitics. Inquiry in this direction might reasonably begin with the United 
Nations and the monumental 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Th e 
animating problem for the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), who drafted 
the declaration, was how to respond to the failures, intransigence, and excesses of 
national sovereignty. Following the CHR’s initial formulations it would take almost 
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another quarter-century before human dignity and human rights were made practi-
cable: it was not until they became a guiding rationale of nongovernmental organi-
zations that the terms took on their familiar operational meanings. Since the 1970s, 
regimes of humanitarian intervention have continued to expand, with global health 
and international development being primary drivers. Supporters as well as critics 
have put human rights to myriad strategic purposes, infl ecting and further trans-
forming their meaning along the way. Th e fact of this conceptual and pragmatic 
proliferation casts clarifying light back onto the way in which the notion of human 
dignity was formulated at the United Nations. Specifi cally, it throws into relief the 
way in which talk of human dignity was initially disconnected from politically and 
legally binding obligations and made weak in relation to the de facto sovereign 
power of member states. No less signifi cant, however, is the fact that, although po-
litically limited in this original setting, the notion of dignity shaped at the United 
Nations ultimately provided the conceptions of intrinsic worth that would be taken 
up and advanced by a subsequent generation of countersovereigntist political actors 
from Oxfam to Lutheran World Relief.
Less widely recognized but arguably no less infl uential is the place of human dig-
nity in the political theology of the twentieth-century Roman Catholic Church and 
the counterdiscourses this has enabled. Since at least the 1930s, human dignity has 
been mobilized as part of the church’s internal struggles with modernism—that is, 
its theological and ecclesial struggles concerning how, and to what extent, Catholics 
ought to valorize the fi gure of the modern over the fi gure of tradition. Th ose who 
were initially accused of being modernists advanced human dignity as part of their 
diagnosis of the anomie and social breakdown of the modern world. In something 
of a theopolitical reversal, at the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s, this same 
view of human dignity was taken up by church offi  cials. Dignity was put forward 
as an answer to the problem of how the church should relate pastorally to the secu-
lar world. Appealing to its teaching authority, the Council Fathers proposed that 
the church was uniquely positioned to discern dignity’s meanings and interpret its 
requirements. Th eir turn to dignity brought with it a call for the invention of new 
pastoral practices. It also raised the question of whether human dignity, framed as 
intrinsic and universal, could be recognized and understood apart from the church’s 
theological vernacular and doctrinal commitments. Th e answers given to that ques-
tion triggered multiple ramifi cations. In the global south, for example, they further 
justifi ed the political engagements of liberation theology while simultaneously in-
spiring the Vatican’s juridical response to those engagements. Similarly, in the global 
north, the notion of human dignity was made the crux of the church’s response to a 
range of developments in the life sciences: to questions of the technical meanings of 
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life and death in the 1970s; in vitro fertilization, genomics, and cloning in the 1980s 
and 1990s; and stem cell research in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Given the central place of Catholic thought in the history of its development, 
it’s not surprising that bioethics has been the scene for the emergence of yet other 
dignitarian counterpolitics. In the early 2000s, the U.S. President’s Council on 
Bioethics, directed by a group of self-styled counterestablishment bioethicists, pro-
posed making human dignity the guiding term for the governance of science. Th ey 
began with the proposition that life, understood as the object of the biological and 
biomedical sciences, needed to be understood in terms equivalent to life fi gured in 
bioethics. Th ey reasoned that if bios, the object of both biology and bioethics, can 
be characterized in terms of human dignity, this is because the dignifi ed human is 
a living being. Th is conceptual a priori required the President’s Council to dem-
onstrate exactly how human dignity, which had been framed in political-spiritual 
terms in other venues, could be identifi ed with embodied human life and with 
humanity understood as a living population. Members of the President’s Council 
thus put themselves in the position of having to speak as specialists of a distinctive 
sort: technicians capable of articulating a program whereby notions of intrinsic 
worth could be made the absolute norm of otherwise relative biomedical practices. 
Whereas at the United Nations and the Vatican the notion of human dignity was 
mobile and expansive, in bioethics the defi nitional motion became centripetal: the 
question of the relation between human dignity and biotechnical practice was posed 
in increasingly tighter terms. Th is circumspection ultimately served to undermine, 
within bioethics, the previously generative and expansive character of the term. In 
the end, it opened up ethical and political problems beyond both human dignity 
and its biopolitical object of critique.
In view of these developments, one could argue that human dignity is one of 
the more important recent examples of what Michel Foucault described as “those 
innumerable intersections between jurisdiction and veridiction that is undoubtedly 
a fundamental phenomenon in the history of the modern West.” In the name of 
human dignity a fl exible and heterogeneous collection of political interventions and 
truth claims have been brought together, legitimated, and put to work in the world. 
In the midst of this eclectic collection, technicians of human dignity have struggled 
to fi nd strategies for managing contradictory conceptual and pragmatic demands. 
Proponents have insisted that human dignity is threatened by its own successful his-
tory: the worldwide elaboration of dignitarian politics has left those politics without 
coherence or self-consistency. Critics have insisted that the notion suff ers concep-
tual “thinness.” Th is, they argue, issues in delocalized and ungrounded political 
practice, a fact taken to be especially problematic in the justifi cation and application 
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of human rights. Lost in the mix has been suffi  cient examination of human dignity 
as a historical event of anthropological consequence, one in which the incessant re-
defi nitions and denunciations themselves constitute important aspects of the term’s 
social life. Taken in this sense, the politics of human dignity constitute less the sort 
of thing one would be for or against and more a dimension of our historical being 
as late moderns in need of elucidation.
One strategy for pursing that elucidation consists in establishing an analytic of 
truth, power, and ethics in relation to which the primary source materials might be 
taken up. Th at analytic might then be used to think through how the key actors in 
select venues defi ned human dignity and worked to articulate new modes of gover-
nance and care. Th e analytic might need to be adjusted and perhaps even set aside 
as inquiry proceeded and material details tested its limitations.
With regard to this book, I have sought to establish a rhythm of recursive move-
ment between analytics and source materials pertinent to the three cases of coun-
terpolitics just outlined. I have given critical attention to signifi cant episodes within 
the life of each of those cases, episodes through which the terms of human dignity 
were articulated, put into play, and contested. I have examined the key documents 
that resulted from those episodes, with an eye to how the logic of human dignity 
formulated therein established parameters for subsequent practices.
Th e book begins with a close reading of the theological politics of the Vatican and 
the transformation of these politics during the Second Vatican Council. Beginning 
with Vatican II rather than, say, the United Nations is analytically useful for several 
reasons, as I will explain at more length in the next chapter. Among other reasons, it 
helps clarify the distinctive conceptual problems introduced by the notion of human 
dignity conceived as an intrinsic and defi ning feature of humanity. Th e vehement 
debates among the Council Fathers exemplify how the turn to dignity as a response 
to modernity ultimately constitutes a pastoral problem—even for those working in 
secular settings. Having introduced the terms of that pastoral problem, the book 
then shifts to the United Nations and the foundational work of the Commission on 
Human Rights. It examines the commission’s attempt to articulate a framework for 
international human rights articulated as an expression of human dignity. It focuses 
on the circumspect micropolitics through which it was proposed that the appropri-
ate response to human dignity is “declaration and recognition.” Th is turn to “mere” 
declaration was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Th e third 
case, U.S. federal bioethics, gives close attention to the framing of human dignity 
in the writings of the President’s Council on Bioethics in the early 2000s. It gives 
particular attention to the ways in which the President’s Council attempted to use 
the notion of human dignity as a means of moving bioethics beyond what might 
be called a biopolitical frame of reference. Th is move was ultimately elaborated as a 
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strategy for supervening on biopolitics and fostering a culture of scientifi c practice 
indexed to dignity. Th e eff ect of that strategy—comparable to developments in 
other domains—was to introduce a seeming incommensurability between a bio-
technical logic keyed to normalizing bodies and populations and an ethical logic 
keyed to protecting the inviolability of dignity.
In each of these cases, my analysis has been guided by two central, if broad, 
hypotheses. First: the notion of human dignity, which has had a long and varied 
history in philosophy and theology, only began to coalesce and take on seemingly 
singular and coherent political and ethical forms within and through these three 
venues. Second: human dignity only became a problem when the actors in these 
venues tried to transform it into the object and objective of new ethical and political 
practices and strove therein to establish themselves as specialists uniquely equipped 
to care for it.
I use the term venue here rather than, say, institution or organization. Taken in 
the sense of a scene or setting in which an event takes place, the term venue signals 
the fact that the Vatican, the United Nations, and the President’s Council served 
as settings for, and thereby facilitated, dignity’s reconceptualization and pragmatic 
reworking. Th is facilitation involved the creation of a distinctive kind of special-
ist—an extraphilosophical expert on human dignity. I use the term specialist to 
designate the fact that the actors involved were put in a distinctive and privileged 
position. Th ey were positioned to establish the technical terms according to which 
human dignity would be allowed to be discussed and interventions imagined. Bor-
rowing a term fi rst proposed by Paul Rabinow, one could say the specialists involved 
in the formulation and elaboration of human dignity were technicians of general 
ideas: they set out to defi ne the broad terms in relation to which it might subse-
quently be possible to invent practices of care and governance. In this way, they 
also established the programmatic outlines according to which subsequent actors 
could take up human dignity in a technocratic manner, that is, could make use of, 
and work to maintain, the ethical and political equipment for protecting human 
dignity fi rst imagined through these venues. In the case of the United Nations, for 
example, the members of the CHR engaged in extensive debate concerning whether 
or not recognition of human dignity in human rights ultimately required the cre-
ation of international courts located within, but not under the jurisdiction of, all 
UN member states. Th ough the debates were ultimately settled in favor of preserv-
ing national sovereignty, these discussions indirectly contributed to the creation of 
human rights observers in humanitarian organizations who, in the name of human 
dignity, could reject the ultimate priority of national sovereignty.
To say that the participants involved were positioned as technicians of general 
ideas is to highlight the fact that their primary task was to carry out the work of fi gu-
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ration: imagining the fi gure of human dignity as a response to perceived breakdowns 
in modern regimes of power. Th is task consisted of putting together an other wise 
discordant ensemble of ways of thinking, acting, and relating (for example, philo-
sophical notions, political institutions, ecclesial precedence, norms of research, etc.) 
and conceiving of that ensemble as a conceptually and functionally coherent whole. 
Th is ensemble could then be talked about as an integrated and even singular object 
by using the term human dignity. Put the other way round: when these participants 
said “human dignity,” the referent consisted of a complicated assemblage of ways of 
thinking, acting, and relating. In this way, these specialists opened up the possibility 
of discerning what it is about the world that puts human dignity at risk and what, 
technically and bureaucratically, needs to be done to protect it.
Th e terms of this practice of fi guration were not especially complicated: human 
dignity needed to be cast as the central element in a diagnosis of the excesses and 
defi ciencies of modern power. To that end, it was conceived as a uniquely valuable 
and vulnerable object of care. Th is object was positioned as urgently in need of pro-
tection in the face of the secularization of the primary spheres of life, the dominance 
of state sovereignty, and the unguided power of the biological sciences. Specialists 
reimagined their respective venues as distinctly responsible for—and uniquely capa-
ble of—caring for human dignity. Th is imaginative task was not, as it were, strictly 
discursive. It consisted, rather, of the more diffi  cult labor of articulating a logic of 
governance and care that could subsequently be turned into infrastructures and 
practices. Said diff erently, in each of these venues the specialists involved undertook 
the work of reimagining and redescribing their respective institutions as venues 
dedicated to the care of human dignity.
It bears noting that in practice actors in all three venues took human dignity for 
granted, in the sense that dignity was more premise than problem. Human dignity 
was simply announced as the object and objective of their respective venues. Th is 
act of announcement, however, opened up a more fraught problem: specifying what 
they meant, exactly, when they used the term—what it referred to in the world 
and what obligations would fall (or not) to their respective institutions. Th eir task, 
in sum, was to fi gure human dignity in such a way that it could be discursively 
taken for granted. Only then could it be considered as an object whose character 
and vulnerabilities formed the programmatic rationale for political governance and 
ethical care.
truth: humanity, intrinsic worth, and the archonic
In one of the most lucid reconstructions of his own work, Michel Foucault de-
scribed his general project as a “history of thought,” distinct from either “the his-
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tory of ideas” or the “history of representations.” A history of thought consists in 
the study of “the focal points of experience” (foyers d’expérience) characteristic of 
modernity and late modernity. Famously for Foucault, these included the study 
of madness, incarceration, sexuality, governmentality, and political spirituality. Th e 
question was how to approach these focal points of experience. Foucault proposed 
proceeding by way of three constitutive aspects: the possible forms of knowledge 
that take shape within these focal points, the normative frameworks of behavior 
which govern them, and, in view of these fi rst two, the potential modes of existence 
that are either opened up or closed down.
Meditating on the fi rst of these, Foucault explained that he had consistently 
sought to move away from more familiar modes of historical practice, such as cri-
tiquing the content of ideas, discerning the “mentalities” that accompany actual 
behaviors, or assessing the representational value of systems of thought. Th e rea-
son for this move is that it allowed him to study experience as a matrix through 
which new forms of knowledge production become possible, thus reconfi guring 
experience. In the case of his work on madness, for example, Foucault sought to 
investigate how, through multiple forms of knowledge (psychology, psychiatry, so-
ciology, etc.), it became possible to grasp “madness” as a singular and fundamental 
experience. It thereby also became possible to institutionalize norms of behavior 
and normative modes of subjectivity. Inquiry into focal points of experience thus 
required paying careful attention to a vital relation: the relation between actual dis-
cursive practices (how things are said or not said) and what Dreyfus and Rabinow 
called “possible serious speech acts,” that is, the rules of authorized knowledge that 
determine which statements are allowed to count as true and false and which ac-
tions can thereby be talked about as necessary and urgent. As matrices of possible 
forms of knowledge, actual discursive practices could then be analyzed as regulated 
forms of “veridiction.”
Even a passing examination of the ways in which theologians, humanitarians, 
and bioethicists have talked about human dignity indicates that regulated forms 
of veridiction are in play. Th e diff erence with dignity is that the regulative ele-
ment of discursive practice does not seem to turn on epistemic rules that structure 
thought—as Foucault had speculated early in the development of his work. Th e 
debates at the United Nations about the legal requirements of rights, for example, 
were conducted using markedly diff erent modes and forms of reasoning than, say, 
the bishops’ debates over the relation between dignity and the teaching authority of 
the church. With dignity, the regulative element seems to lie, rather, in what might 
be called an ontological rule. Th e specialists in these venues shared a convergent 
sense of the way in which human dignity exists in the world. In each case, human 
dignity was talked about in terms that seem to take as a given that human dignity is 
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intrinsic, inviolable, and vulnerable. In other words—and to introduce a technical 
term central to this book—human dignity was talked about as existing in the world 
in a fashion that can be called archonic.
Th e term archonic is derived from a combination of two Greek terms: arkhē, 
meaning “the beginning or the primordial,” and arkhōn, meaning “the ruler or 
the judge.” It was coined as part of philosophical and theological debates dur-
ing the last quarter-century, which critically revisited nineteenth-century questions 
concerning the nature of causation in history. More specifi cally, it was coined as 
part of attempts to parse the relative signifi cance of theological notions of creation 
and eschatology—that is, theological ideas about how things in the world origi-
nate and culminate—for understanding the historical character of human aff airs. 
In the course of these debates, the theologian Ted Peters advanced the notion of 
the archonic to characterize a particular mode of being-in-history, one that can 
be thought of as ontologically unsettled. Th is is a mode in which the human is 
imagined as a creature whose form of life is contingently elaborated over time but 
whose norm of existence is not. Th e norm of existence, as primordial, is internal 
to historical being and remains unchanged within and across the contingencies of 
life. Th e actualities of historical existence may be variable, but the norm is not. Th e 
primordial origin governs historical existence. Th is mode of being can be said to be 
unsettled insofar as the archonic norm is not identical to the actualities of historical 
being as experienced. Th e archonic, in short, names an internally and permanently 
present (that is, imminent) possibility of historical existence, which is its norm and 
guide but not always its actuality. Charles Taylor has proposed that modern con-
ceptions of moral order almost always begin with descriptions of reality and that 
these descriptions only subsequently take on a kind of normative life to the extent 
that they are used to measure out deviations from “the nature of things.” With the 
archonic, the distance between the descriptive and the normative is collapsed at the 
outset. Th e diff erence, however, is not lost.
Analytically speaking, debates about the archonic do not simply reactivate the 
tired polemics of essentialism versus constructivism. More interestingly, they off er 
insight into one way in which human ontologies and temporalities can be reworked 
and remobilized as a practice of ethical and political critique—the archonic has 
been articulated as a practice of critique. Despite diff erences in self-stylization and 
purported telos, actors in each of these venues formulated human dignity as a de-
scription of primordial human being as well as the norm and metric by way of 
which historical reality should be judged and responded to. Human dignity was 
advanced as simultaneously immanent to historical existence while also being the 
norm of historical being. Th e conspicuous diff erences between historical existence 
and the norms of human dignity were thus reimagined. Human dignity was not 
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thought of as incomplete or in need of further historical development, as though it 
would one day be actualized at the end of a dialectical or evolutionary series. Th e 
diff erence between historical existence and its norm, rather, was imagined as a mat-
ter of violation calling for redress.
Conceived as archaic, human dignity is that which is most fundamental and 
hence most true about human existence. Conceived as archonic, human dignity is 
self-grounding and self-justifying as well. It does not need to appeal to anything 
other than itself in order to establish its political and moral rectitude. It is the 
archonic that constitutes the distinctive shift introduced into the conception of 
dignity in the late modern politics of intrinsic worth. In classical formulations, 
human dignity was thought of as deriving from some particular feature of human 
existence—the fact of being a reasonable being, the ability to cultivate godlike ca-
pacities, the fact of being created in the image of the divine, and so on. As archonic, 
human dignity does not need to be explained or defi ned by reference to anything 
other than itself—it is not derivative of some positive feature of human capability 
or status. Th e answer to the question “what is the source of human dignity?” is 
simply “human dignity.” Th is self-reference may be circular, but it has proven to 
be politically and rhetorically powerful. Take, for example, the notion of dignity 
in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In the declaration human dignity 
is announced as that feature of political existence which needs to be recognized in 
order for political goods to be assured. It is not demonstrated, established, argued 
about, defi ned, or specifi ed. It is talked about as self-evident and prescriptive: hu-
man rights are expressions of dignity’s intrinsic obligations. In the case of Vatican II 
and the President’s Council, the archonic character of dignity is less conspicuous 
but no less forceful. For the Council Fathers human dignity is defi ned in the rela-
tion between the human and the divine. However—and this became a primary 
point of innovation and contention—dignity must nonetheless be conceived as 
fully imminent and proper to the human—the “supernatural” in the “natural.” For 
the President’s Council, the archonic is also conceptually in play insofar as human 
dignity is used to name an unchanging feature of human existence that can be set 
against the changing norms of scientifi c practice. In each case, the salience of the 
archonic for political critique is that when human dignity is said to be at risk of vio-
lation this is not because, say, the autonomy of the person has been compromised or 
God’s creation besmirched. It is because the primordial has passed judgment.
Th e practical question in each of these venues thus became how to interpret 
the unchanging norm of archonic dignity within the changing complexes of the 
modern world. What needs to be known and what needs to be done? On one level, 
the answer is unambiguous and seemingly uncomplicated: human dignity needs to 
be protected. If human dignity is intrinsic, inviolable, and under threat, then the 
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political and ethical stakes consist neither in establishing nor cultivating dignity. 
Th ey consist in protecting it. Th is may seem an altogether banal point—protection 
as a mode of intervention is characteristic of familiar liberal notions about the rela-
tion between the individual and the state. But the fact that archonic human dignity 
entails a specifi c logic of intervention, and the fact that this logic is a protectionist 
one, has proven to be absolutely crucial to dignity’s political fortunes.
Th ough specifi c and unequivocal, this protectionist logic has been highly genera-
tive. Strategies for protecting human dignity have included, among others: interpre-
tive frameworks for monitoring political aff airs and diagnosing their limitations, 
regimes of rights and the institutions needed to act in the name of those rights, 
emergency health interventions into situations where notions of state sovereignty 
need to be ignored or reinterpreted, justifi cations for armed interventions that sim-
ilarly redefi ne the limits of sovereignty, and rhetorical devices for reimaging the 
life sciences and how they fi t within existing national and transnational regulatory 
frameworks. Th ese strategies are heterogeneous in their operational details. But they 
are similar in that each has been promoted as a means of protecting human dignity. 
Saba Mahmood has adroitly pointed out that the dominance of seemingly uncom-
plicated norms often covers over the fact that, in practice, those norms are taken up 
and embodied in multiple and contested ways. If the answer to the question of 
the problem of modern power is “human dignity must be protected,” it is an answer 
that admits to seemingly limitless instantiations.
A protectionist logic assures that the archonic can be directly set against charac-
teristically modern modalities of governmental power. It introduces an invariable 
ethic into an otherwise variable situation. In doing so, it activates and reinforces 
Georges Canguilhem’s incisive distinction between the norm as ideal and the norm 
as statistical mean. Th e logic of modern governmental power links the two sides of 
the norm through processes of normalization. Power works to establish norms and 
in this sense can be said to operate in the name of ideal states. But those ideals are 
formulated and pursued by reference to existing and desired statistical distributions. 
Populations are thus normed in a double sense: measured and ameliorated accord-
ing to a common scale. Th is means that governmental power is relative and does not 
need to be comprehensive or total. It needs to do just enough to get the numbers to 
work. Th is also means—to recast Ian Hacking’s insight—that power doesn’t need 
to help or hurt anyone in particular so long as the norms improve. Or, to borrow 
Foucault’s more provocative formulation, modern modalities of power that aim at 
making some thrive often do so at the price of letting others wither. Archonic 
human dignity, by contrast, is precisely that aspect of things human that cannot be 
normalized. It is primordial, unchanging, and inclusive. Th e form of its demands 
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may vary as circumstances do, but its obligation is the same: protection. Th e ar-
chonic is orthogonal to the governmental.
Th is is not to say that dignitarian politics have not been problematic, exclusivist, 
or violent. It’s to say that the logic of the archonic dictates the terms of political and 
ethical obligation with regard to human dignity. One could put it this way: in view 
of the governmental, dignity tells us what to do. It’s for this reason that situated de-
bates over dignity have almost always turned on the question of what dignity obliges 
rather than on how it is defi ned. Of course, as any number of critics has pointed 
out, in practice this means that a kind of reversal takes place: the particular courses 
of action that are said to follow from human dignity actually lead it. Dignity’s crit-
ics insist that the term thus has no proper, but only derivative, meanings: it takes 
on whatever meaning actors want to give it in order to justify their actions. Th e 
problem with these critiques, however, is that they fail to appreciate the  generative 
and normative character of the archonic as a delimiting source for the imagination 
and articulation of possible modes of intervention. Th ey overlook the way in which 
the notion of protection itself is veridictionally and jurisdictionally determinative. 
Whatever course of action, it must be brought to articulation in the name of pro-
tecting human dignity. Th is is not merely a matter of rhetorical or semantic adjust-
ment. It is also a matter of ethical and political logic.
Th e protectionist logic entailed in the archonic—it needs to be underscored—
constitutes a distinctive moment in the history of human dignity. Previously, hu-
man dignity had almost always been imagined as corresponding to the human abil-
ity to cultivate certain capabilities or achieve a certain status—we might think of 
Pico della Mirandola’s famous image of the dignifi ed human climbing from beast to 
angel. Human dignity in these formulations might be potentially universal, in the 
sense that any given person might one day cultivate those capabilities or realize that 
status. But human dignity was not imagined as being a universal and immanent 
given—a feature of all humans awaiting recognition and protection. Th e relative 
novelty of the archonic is no doubt part of dignity’s rhetorical force and political 
success. Th e diff erence it introduces, however, has also proven troublesome. What 
does it mean, pragmatically and institutionally, to make human dignity an object 
of care if the archonic cuts across familiar modes of exercising power? Dignity, after 
all, not only can’t be normalized; it’s really not even an object of governance—it 
does not need its conduct conducted. What needs to be governed—and governed 
diff erently—are those milieus within which human dignity resides. It shouldn’t be 
overlooked that the actors examined in this book talked at length about caring for 
human dignity but did not actually propose courses of action that would require 
intervening directly on human dignity. Th ey proposed courses of action, rather, 
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that consisted in working on and working over those forces that threaten to violate 
dignity or otherwise keep it from existing as it should.
Th is may all sound perfectly obvious—particularly when considered decades af-
ter the fact. Anyone who has been involved even peripherally with human rights 
and humanitarianism, or who has read statements by the Vatican’s Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith on the aff airs of the modern world, or who has followed 
the now decades-long debates concerning the moral status of the embryo knows 
that human dignity is almost always talked about as that which is under threat and 
needs to be protected. As a number of commentators have pointed out, universal 
conceptions of humanity are often defi ned by way of perceived violations: the posi-
tive features of the human are reverse engineered (as it were) from conceptions of 
breakdown and suff ering. In this sense, the correlation between human dignity 
conceived as archonic and the seeming reasonableness of a protectionist mode of 
intervention might appear unremarkable. It does not follow, however, that this cor-
relation is unimportant. Th e question and challenge is to fi gure out what one ought 
to make of such a seemingly unremarkable fact. In what ways is this situation actu-
ally quite specifi c? What kind of shifts has it introduced relative to prior ways of 
reasoning? And how might reproblematizing this seemingly evident fact—the ar-
chonic character of human dignity and the need to protect it—open up signifi cant 
new insights about the ethical and political topology of our current situation?
power: the archonic, the pastorate, and the salvational
If the archonic implies protection as a norm of power, the analytic question is this: 
what forms of practice have been put forward as appropriate to that norm? In each 
of the three cases examined in this book, the principal actors looked to human dig-
nity to do both critical, that is delimiting, as well as productive work: they advanced 
dignity as a constraint on what they took to be dangerous excesses of power but also, 
and often at the same time, took dignity as a warrant and justifi cation for the inven-
tion of new modes and forms through which power might be exercised diff erently. In 
each case, the key actors advanced dignity as a critical outside to the dominant order 
of targeted modern domains—life in and of the state, life under the presumption of 
secularism, and the life of science. It was a critical outside because it constituted a 
reality more basic and permanent than each of those domains. Th e U.S. President’s 
Council on Bioethics, for example, defi ned human dignity in terms of the enduring 
way in which humans strive to overcome limitations; the aim of bioethical power 
is thus not to aid humans in that striving per se but to discern where and whether 
the biomedical sciences undermine it. At the same time, actors in these venues also 
conceived of human dignity as a point of internal limitation: certain activities and 
F6671.indb   14 9/16/15   10:38:57 AM
  Figuring Human Dignity 15
practices in modern domains were framed as following from and dependent on hu-
man dignity. At the United Nations, for example, political goods such as justice and 
peace were said to depend on the recognition of human dignity. Th ese actors, in 
short, sought something more, something diff erent, from existing power relations. 
Th ey articulated that diff erence in terms of external and internal limits designed to 
reorder domains of contemporary life to meet the demands of human dignity.
Th e challenge of establishing the capacities and practices needed to contribute 
directly to that reordering was institutionally unprecedented. Institutional eff orts 
had been made in relation to other universal notions. Experiments with constitut-
ing the means to act in relation to cognate terms such as the “human person,” “man-
kind,” or the “human creature” had been tried out in the institutional antecedents 
to all three venues. Human dignity, articulated in archonic terms, had not. For 
example, in the case of Vatican II the constitutional documents concerning human 
dignity were replete with formulations from medieval and early Christian theology. 
Despite the use of these sources, and notwithstanding of the performance of theo-
political continuity, the fact remains that no ecclesial body had previously instituted 
human dignity as the basis for a pastoral relation to the modern world.
Th e turn to human dignity and the attempt to institute practices and capacities 
adequate to its protection ultimately reactivated and reconfi gured the seemingly 
intractable problem that Michel Foucault named “pastoral power.” In its classical 
forms, pastoral power was defi ned by a double obligation, which, though conceptu-
ally straightforward, required complex institutional arrangements to put into prac-
tice. Th e pastor was obliged to take care of all the members of the fl ock, as a whole, 
while also taking care of each member of the fl ock individually—omnes et singula-
tim, as the Latin phrase has it. Foucault coined the term pastoral power in order to 
distinguish what he took to be a defi ning aspect of the relation between reason and 
power in the West: the creation of political technologies of individualization, that 
is, techniques and procedures by way of which individuals could be marked out as 
individuals in such a way that they could subsequently be governed in a more or 
less continuous fashion. Foucault used the term pastoral power to track points of 
connection and transmutation between the emerging politics of the modern state 
and those of the ecclesial late Middle Ages. With the development of the modern 
state, Foucault speculated, the pastoral problem of individualization characterized 
by the Christian care for the soul did not so much go away as it shifted locations, 
objectives, and techniques. Th e transition from the late Middle Ages to modernity, 
he provocatively suggested, is not typifi ed by the shift from the church to the state. 
It is typifi ed, rather, by a shift in the venues within which and through which the 
fi gure of the minister conducts his work.
Pastoral power, in short, helps analytically specify key shifts attendant to the 
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obligation of caring “for all and for each one.” Several shifts in particular are per-
tinent to human dignity. First, the problem of pastoral power was given global 
dimensions: the obligation to care, institutionally and directly, for all of humanity 
and for each individual human. Th e technocrats of human dignity were faced with 
the task of turning a pastoral obligation into a global practice. Th is was particularly 
problematic insofar as human dignity was not only a norm of critical judgment for 
the denunciation of power but a term of operational reorientation implying a new 
possibility of universal care. Th e fact that such a universal obligation might be un-
feasible as a practice, and the fact that attempts to incorporate this universal norm 
would inevitably result in exclusion and selection, is, on one level, beside the point. 
Th e key factor here is that the combination of the archonic with the logic of pastoral 
power put these technocrats and these institutions in a posture of absolute responsi-
bility not only for the good—the salvation—of humanity but also for the salvation 
of each and every individual human. Th e fl ipside of the ability to lay claim to the 
primordial nature of human dignity as a critical intervention into, say, the rights of 
sovereignty was that any and all violations of human dignity became potential sites 
of institutional responsibility and scandal.
A second related shift concerned institutional form. Neither the United Nations, 
nor the Vatican, nor federal commissions were operationally suited to the demands 
of pastoral power in any fashion parallel to previous instantiations. Th e medieval 
church’s ability to individualize and govern the soul, for example, or the modern 
state’s ability to individualize and govern the population required the capacity to 
intervene in the quotidian aff airs of everyday life. Th at capacity allowed these in-
stitutions to carry out a kind of direct and sustained cultivational work on indi-
viduals and collectives. Th e classic model is the monastery in which the individual 
monk could be permanently directed through daily routines by a spiritual director. 
Modern institutions like the hospital, the school, or even the plan of the city com-
parably served to give institutional form to norms of social order, operating on the 
presumption that these norms and forms would allow individuals to embody an 
otherwise inaccessible form of life. Th e extension of institutions into the quotid-
ian aff airs of daily life, in other words, facilitated the work of governance. Human 
dignity as archonic, however, did not seem to require such sustained intervention. 
It seemed to require recognition and protection. Th e archonic thus brought with it 
the need for new institutional models.
Th e diffi  culties implied in the reconfi guration of pastoral power were not only 
matters of institutional reach and form. Th ey also concerned the complexity of 
the pastoral object itself. Human dignity is a hybrid object that presumes to draw 
together the two sides of pastoral power—individual humans and the whole of hu-
manity—into a unifi ed object of care. Th e problem of pastoral power gets inverted. 
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Conceptually, and in a nonlinear fashion, human dignity requires pastoral prac-
tices that move from consolidation back toward individualization. Dignity requires 
technologies that bring to visibility humanity in each individual. Only in that way 
can humanity be individualized. In all three venues, humanity was diagnosed as 
fragmented in the modern world. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1965, 
Pope Paul VI expressed this by proposing that the United Nations and the Vatican 
share a common pastoral mission: to bring about the reality of humanity through 
the politics of unifi cation. In the speech, Paul VI acknowledged dignity’s double 
status—that it is both a predicate of humanity and its goal. Dignity does not re-
quire the creation of humanity—as though humanity did not yet exist. It requires, 
rather, doing away with those things in the world that prevent historical humanity 
from existing according to its own inner norm. Humanity—to use the older theo-
ontological formula—is both “already and not yet.” What was new here is that the 
work of actualizing humanity is made the mutual objective of political institutions 
and not just, say, the hope of the church in view of divine grace.
Foucault proposed that in order to understand pastoral power (at least in its 
traditional forms) the observer must make sense of “the force and complexity of the 
moral ties binding the shepherd to each member of his fl ock.” Th e central feature 
of these moral ties is that the salvation of the pastor is bound up (for better or 
worse) with the salvation of the fl ock—a “salvational exchange,” as Foucault called 
it. In this light, one might speculate that part of the diffi  culty with institutional-
izing the care of human dignity over the past fi fty years has been that the actors 
involved were faced with the challenge of inventing new and distinctive “moral 
ties” with their imagined fl ocks and doing so in a fashion that admits of some form 
of salvational interdependence. One could further speculate that this is why over 
the past fi fty years so many actors have found it useful to think about the demands 
of human dignity in terms of emergency intervention. On one level, the universal 
pastoral obligations implied by human dignity might seem to involve a salvational 
exchange whose scope and character is simply not feasible. On that level, the poli-
tics of human dignity, in the end, would be primarily critical and never really pro-
ductive. On another level, that very infeasibility may be part of why human dignity 
gets cast as archonic in the fi rst place. After all, with the archonic, daily governance 
of human dignity is neither the demand nor expectation—protection is. Emergency 
intervention, in the end, might not only be the appropriate response to dignity, that 
is, intervening when human dignity has been violated. But it might also be a kind 
of ethicopolitical triage by way of which those who are responsible for “all and for 
each one” are able to turn a universal pastoral obligation into a seemingly feasible 
course of action.
Th e need to establish a relationship of salvational exchange means that actors in 
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each of these venues had to consider human dignity not only as an object but as 
an objective of care. How they proposed to do this is a question that orients this 
book.
ethics: archonic modes of existence
Th e formulation and use of human dignity over the past number of decades con-
stitutes a fundamental reproblematization of human worth. Th at reproblematiza-
tion has consisted of an attempt to bring into being a diff erent relationship among 
truth speaking, the exercise of power, and possible modes of existence. Th at work 
of ontological innovation remains unsettled and riddled with conceptual incon-
sistencies and practical blockages. In view of these inconsistencies and blockages 
Ruth Macklin—expressing a sentiment shared by other philosophers—notoriously 
concluded that “dignity is a useless concept.” Unlike the posture taken by Macklin 
and other critics, this book does not seek to denounce human dignity—or rectify 
it. It seeks, rather, to make sense of how these inconsistencies and blockages have 
become defi ning characteristics.
Th is book seeks, in other words, to make human dignity into an object of the 
anthropology of ethics—taking the term ethics in its broad etymological sense of 
the study of character, habits, and dispositions in their connections to customs. 
In this sense, the analysis in this book is consonant with the third aspect of the 
general project of the history of thought, sketched above—the study of “potential 
modes of existence for possible subjects.” Th is includes inquiry into the discursive 
and normative matrices through which an individual is encouraged to constitute a 
relation to her- or himself as a particular kind of subject. It also includes inquiry 
into the forms of possible political resistance and ethical practice through which an 
individual might attempt to rethink and rework that relation. With regard to hu-
man dignity, the ethical question is this: how did specialists working in key venues 
create the conceptual and pragmatic means by which a diff erent way of existing 
might become possible, a way of existing consistent with the protection of human 
dignity? Th e twist and diffi  culty in answering this question is that for proponents, 
human dignity is always already given. Th e anthropological question, then, is how 
that given became the reference point for a possible form of life.
Much has been made of the fact that over the past three decades anthropologists 
and philosophers alike have paid increased attention to what is sometimes referred 
to as “virtue ethics,” sometimes “Aristotelian ethics,” sometimes, using Foucault’s 
coinage, “the techniques and technologies of the self.” Foucault’s own intensive 
focus on techniques and technologies characteristic of the Antique world, and his 
elaboration of analytic tools for thinking about subjectivation, has had the posi-
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tive eff ect of opening up a substantial and varied body of work on contemporary 
domains in which practices of ethical autopoesis, self-making, play a vital role in 
establishing and testing the social and political order of things. Th is emphasis 
on ethics as self-formation, however, has had other less salubrious eff ects, as James 
Faubion has pointed out. Principally, it has encouraged anthropologists as well 
as virtue ethicists to overlook the simple but crucial fact that for many Antique 
thinkers, Aristotle in particular, the ethical was not only about self-formation and 
transformation; it was also about maintaining the stability of the polis. If a key di-
mension of the ethical is the free cultivation and exercise of virtue, another is that 
the ethical helps ensure the homeostasis of political life. Ethics, we should recall, 
derives from ethos.
In this view, as Faubion has insisted, the dynamic and homeostatic dimensions of 
ethics are not so much opposed as mutually constitutive. Saba Mahmood has made 
a similar point in her critique of dominant conceptions of agency. Th e notion of 
agency presupposed by much of critical political theory is often characterized by 
the individual’s ability to resist dominant norms. Actors who do not resist are not 
truly agents. Mahmood points out, however, that for individuals in many ethical 
and religious traditions the question of agency is not so much how to resist norms 
or even how to invent new ones. Th e question, rather, is how to embody them. De-
bates and struggles over that question suggest that life lived in relation to dominant 
norms can facilitate agency as much as diminish it. Anthropologically speaking, the 
lesson learned is that suffi  cient accounts of possible forms of existence require giving 
as much attention to aspects of ethical relations that are stable and self-reproducing, 
such as the dominant norms of tradition, as to aspects marked by invention and 
self-making—to say nothing of the complicated relations between them.
In an eff ort to name and pin down analytically the stable and self-reproductive 
dimension of ethics, Faubion has proposed the term “themitical.” Faubion derives 
the term from the Greek themitos, meaning that which is “allowed by the laws of 
the gods and of men, righteous.” Despite the inevitable diffi  culties of relying on a 
neologism, Faubion’s term is warranted by the fact that it calls to mind and names 
the need for a more careful characterization of this somewhat overlooked dimen-
sion of ethics. Likewise the term facilitates more systematic investigation of the dis-
cursive practices, material conditions, and power relations that have allowed those 
dimensions to stabilize. Using Faubion’s term, it is fair to say that human dignity 
has become themitical. It has achieved suffi  ciently widespread stability in its modes 
and forms of operation to have become easily reproduced and reused in and across 
disparate domains of contemporary life and most all quarters the world. Th is book 
provides what might be thought of as an attempt to sketch out the basic elements 
of human dignity in its themitical dimensions.
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It is also fair to say that human dignity has become the stabilizing element of an 
institutionalized apparatus, taking the term apparatus in the technical sense indi-
cated by Dreyfus and Rabinow. First, dignity has become a tool, a device with a set 
of delimited purposes: it has a diagnostic purpose, used in specifying the pathologies 
of power; it has a critical purpose, announcing a feature of intrinsic worth in order 
to cast those pathologies of power as contingent and merely derivative; and it has an 
anchoring purpose, programmatically holding together the elements of a counter-
politics that can be mobilized against those pathologies. Second, and in connection 
to its anchoring purpose, human dignity has become an apparatus in the sense of 
a distributed system or structure with an integrative and coordinative function. In 
the name of human dignity disparate elements—from discourses to institutions, 
experts, laws, political statements, and ethical norms, to rationales for military ac-
tion, ecclesial offi  ces, and justifi cations for scientifi c work—have been drawn into a 
fl exible but coherent and durable constellation. In this way human dignity has also 
become a grid of intelligibility. It allows one to isolate this disparate range of ele-
ments as aspects of a single apparatus and thereby clarify its signifi cance.
To say that human dignity has become stable and reproducible in its modes and 
forms of operation is not to suggest that it has become either homogenous or static. 
One of the defi ning characteristics of human dignity is that the meanings and prac-
tices attached to it are often widely divergent, if not contradictory. A conspicuous 
feature of human dignity today, one that has made it a target of criticism, is its lack 
of conceptual coherence and practical uniformity. Th is lack, however, means that to 
whatever extent human dignity has become stable and reproducible, it has also and 
simultaneously become a site of reinvention and elaboration. Th is reinvention and 
elaboration is currently serving to transform the archonic logic of human dignity, 
even leading in some instances to disorder and breakdown. Moreover, as I will show 
in relation to bioethics, the extension of the politics of human dignity into domains 
where the vitality of human biological existence is at stake—sites of “vital politics,” 
as they’ve been called—has accelerated dignitarian politics toward such breakdown. 
To state briefl y a point that will need further elaboration: the attempt to connect 
the human dignity to governance of the biopolitical body has eff ectively undone the 
archonic settlement. It has undone it insofar as it has required the actors involved to 
specify the material dimensions and limits of dignity. Th e need to connect dignity 
to specifi c interventions into human biological life throws into question the pre-
sumption of dignity’s self-evidence.
Transformations in the archonic logic of dignity have complicated eff orts to 
act in its name. But it is worth underscoring that, far from stemming the use of 
the term, these transformations and complications have opened up new ethical 
and political possibilities. Increasingly, the politics of human dignity are imbricated 
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into other political and ethical discourses and not just mobilized against them. 
One might think, for example, of the eff orts over the last two decades to connect 
UN frameworks for human rights to international frameworks for climate change 
and biodiversity. It seems worth thinking about whether such reconceptualiza-
tions and remobilizations of dignity will ultimately bring into being new fi gures 
of truth and new regimes of ethical and political practice. After all, the turn to 
human dignity itself was a means by which concerned actors addressed previous 
breakdowns in formerly stable ethical and political situations.
I stress this last point in part to situate the work I have undertaken in this book. 
I have not set out to characterize how human dignity became themitical, per se, nor 
how it became settled as part of an institutionalized apparatus. Nor have I devoted 
particular energy to unearthing sources of absolute originality, as though the notion 
of human dignity as fi gured over the past half-century is utterly novel and discon-
nected from older humanisms. Indeed, as I will explore in the next chapter, concep-
tions of human dignity elaborated over the past few decades have consistently relied 
on new as well as old arguments and institutional arrangements. Human dignity in 
the postwar period, however distinctive, is not an achievement of sheer invention. 
Working between the analytic poles of autopoesis and the themitical, I have set out 
to specify institutional situations in which theologians, humanitarians, and ethicists 
reimagined the notion of human dignity and tried to defi ne it in such a way that 
it could be turned into a practice. In this sense, I have turned my attention to the 
formal eff orts to specify the meaning and obligations of human dignity, eff orts 
that established the initial programmatic elements according to which dignity has 
subsequently been taken up, elaborated, adapted, and extended into other domains. 
Th ese elements are programmatic in the sense that they have constituted “reasoned 
prescriptions” in relation to which other institutions and specialists have been able 
to advance their work. With the case of bioethics, I have also turned my attention 
to how these programmatic formulations are beginning to break apart and to how 
institutionalized forms and practices are again being reimagined. It is clear that 
neither the early programmatic formulations nor more recent critical developments 
have produced venues or specialists fully adequate to the ambitious visions for the 
politics of human dignity that originally inspired them. Nevertheless, they have 
provided the basic materials through which human dignity has been rationalized 
and made a major feature of the contemporary political landscape.
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Human Dignity and the Vatican
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Th e Church, the Secular, and Pastoral Power
On October 11, 1965, almost three years to the day after the opening of the Sec-
ond Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI off ered an address to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations. Th e timing of the address was strategically important. It 
was scheduled during the last of Vatican II’s offi  cial working sessions. Th e council 
participants, including some 2,200 bishops, hundreds of theological periti (offi  cial 
expert advisors), and many dozens of outside observers, had met for several months 
every fall since 1962, when Paul’s predecessor, Pope John XXIII, had convened the 
council. Although some of Pope Paul’s allies advised against leaving the Vatican 
during a period of offi  cial convocation, Paul understood the advantages of making 
the trip while the council was still in session: the visibility of his trip to New York 
would be amplifi ed by the fact that television and radio audiences around the world 
were already held in rapt attention by the council’s “elegant, elaborate, colorful, 
and magnifi cently choreographed public ceremonies,” which stood out so sharply 
against the ordinary aff airs of the church.
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Paul’s address came on the eve of his fi nal push to complete and ratify a docu-
ment known as Schema XII—the document that would eventually be known as 
Gaudium et spes (hope and joy) or, more offi  cially, the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church and the Modern World. It would be a mistake to characterize the Pastoral 
Constitution as the culmination of the council: there were simply too many major 
and minor issues dealt with during the four years, from the question of the use of 
Latin in mass, to the church’s relation to non-Christians, to the use of the organ in 
liturgy and the proper clothing for nuns. Th is multitude of issues was enshrined in 
the council’s sixteen offi  cial documents (three other council “constitutions,” along 
with nine “decrees” and three “declarations”). It is fair to say, nonetheless, that Gau-
dium et spes constituted the drawing to a close of several of the council’s defi ning 
themes, not least the question of the Catholic Church and its relation to the politics 
of human dignity.
Vatican II was convened by Pope John XXIII as the twenty-fi rst ecumenical 
council. Like most of the councils since the split between the Eastern and West-
ern Church in the eleventh century, Vatican II’s offi  cial participants, the “coun-
cil fathers,” did not include representatives of the non–Roman Catholic Christian 
world—though many other religious leaders were invited to attend as distinguished 
observers. Like previous ecumenical councils, Pope John’s reasons and timing for 
convening the twenty-fi rst were multiple and divergent and were as much theologi-
cal as circumstantial. Th e principal justifi cations he and his supporters gave for why 
a council was warranted included the need to deal (yet again) with the fact that 
since at least the nineteenth century the Catholic Church had been living in a world 
that sometimes gets glossed as post-Constantinian—a world in which the Catho-
lic Church could no longer take for granted the institutionally privileged place it 
had held in the cultural and political order of Europe since late Antiquity. Offi  cial 
justifi cations also included the need to deal conclusively with the still formative 
eff ects of the Protestant Reformation and the sixteenth-century Council of Trent, 
a council that, though often described as a key to the “Counter-Reformation,” pro-
duced theological and political legacies many in the church (including Pope John) 
believed to be entirely too consistent with many of the Reformation’s defi ning theo-
logical assumptions.
Above all, justifi cations for the council centered on the need (in John’s and 
others’ view) for the church to become forward looking in relation to the mod-
ern world. Th is problem too was multiple. It included the question of what to 
do with the ramifi cations of what O’Malley calls the church’s “long nineteenth 
century”—that is, the place of the church in a world shaped by the cataclysmic 
eff ects (from the Church’s point of view) of the French Revolution, the establish-
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ment of new modes of secular and sovereign national powers, and the church’s 
previously  negative reaction to modernity exemplifi ed by the First Vatican Coun-
cil’s assertion of papal infallibility (to say nothing of the lingering global eff ects 
of World War II, colonialism, postcolonialism, and the intensifying Cold War). 
Th e problem of the modern world also included the need to sort out what the 
church should say and do in relation to specifi c modern technological and indus-
trial transformations: the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the invention of birth 
control, and transformed views of natural history brought about by evolutionary 
biology. And the church needed to deal with its relation to, and participation in, 
the center-periphery eff ects of globalized capitalism and the asymmetries between 
the North Atlantic and the rest of the world with regard to issues of health, pov-
erty, and development.
Bound up in all of these was the question of what to do about the church’s rela-
tionship to non-Christian individuals and institutions: its relation to the ecclesia ad 
extra—those “in addition to the called.” Th is included the church’s relation to other 
religious communities, most contentiously, in view of World War II, its relation-
ship to Jewish communities. Somewhat less contentiously but no less pressingly, 
it also included the question of how the church should relate to modern nation-
states, international corporations, civil society organizations, and, as refl ected in 
Pope Paul VI’s address to the United Nations, institutions of international and 
multinational governance. Th e broadest framing of the ecclesia ad extra, however, 
was “humanity”: the problem of the church’s relation to humanity. Th is framing of 
the question of the church in the modern world elicited perhaps the most diffi  cult 
and pernicious problem (outside of the question of internal church governance and 
authority, which was also on the agenda). Th e problem of the church and humanity, 
understood as the ecclesia ad extra, was central to the church’s salvational and pas-
toral imaginary: to what extent and in what ways should the church imagine itself 
as part of humanity, and to what extent and in what ways does it stand outside of, 
and beyond, humanity?
Th is question is one that many Catholic theologians (including Pope John’s im-
mediate theological mentors) had framed using the classical Christian language of 
the relation between nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, or, as it is 
sometimes put, the relation between the being of the world and the being of God: 
in what ways and to what extent do humans need the grace of God to achieve their 
highest good, understood as the fulfi llment of their own nature? Th e question for 
John (and others)—a question that became one of the defi ning and bitterly dis-
puted aspects of Vatican II—was how to understand the vocation of the church and 
its pastoral practices within this space of nature and grace. If the church’s pastoral 
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vocation included some kind of mediating role between what could be given by 
nature and what was needed of grace, one question was: could and should that 
mediating role be understood as extending to those outside the church? On one 
level the answer to that question would seem, for those involved, to be self-evidently 
“yes”—the church’s doors are open to everyone who is willing to pay the price. 
But the twist here was whether the church could play that mediating role in a 
fashion that did not turn primarily on an older discourse of repentance and return. 
Could the church establish a pastoral relationship to those who continue to stand 
outside the church in a manner predicated on something other than an insistence 
on the diff erence between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, or a call to nonbelievers to 
turn to the life of faith? For John and others the answer was, again, affi  rmative. In 
his opening address, which I examine below, John described the need for the church 
“to be the loving mother of all, benign, patient, full of mercy and goodness toward 
the children separated from her.” Th e answer was “yes,” in other words, because 
the church, along with those “in addition to the called,” formed part of a single 
human family, albeit a family in which the church is fi gured in the role of parent 
and caretaker.
Pope John framed all of this as the pastoral problem of the church in the modern 
world. He cast it as a matter of aggiornamento—of “updating” the church and its 
place in the modern world. Pope John’s critics, however, interpreted aggiornamento 
as code for “reform”—an interpretation that only served to reinforce their fear that 
Vatican II constituted an attempt to adapt the church to the modern world rather 
than off ering a critical repudiation of it. Aggiornamento became a kind of slogan 
for the purpose of the council. As a result, the question of the relationship between 
the relative authority of the new and the old remained pressing throughout. Pope 
John’s and then Pope Paul’s eff orts to update the church in its pastoral relation to 
the modern world was seen by many as tantamount to the innovation of doctrine. 
Th is meant that the problem of elaborating the church’s relation to the modern 
world, to quote from O’Malley’s elegant introduction to Vatican II, “went beyond, 
or might even seem to contravene, previous teachings: in a word, the problem of 
change in an institution that draws its lifeblood from a belief in the transcendent 
validity of the message it received from the past, which it is duty-bound to proclaim 
unadulterated.” Or, to put it diff erently, Pope John’s call for the church to consider 
a pastoral relationship to the modern world in noncondemnatory terms was seen 
by many as a move toward the secularization of the church, taking the term secular 
in its older sense of “ordinary time.” Updating the church’s relation to the modern 
world was interpreted by critics as a move to reform the church according to the 
needs of the modern world rather than the modern world according to the solutions 
of the church.
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humanity and the church: the outlines 
of the pastoral problem
Pope Paul VI’s 1965 address to the United Nations provides a sketch of the problem 
of the church and the modern world as it was framed at Vatican II and of the ways 
in which that problem ultimately induced signifi cant shifts in the church’s ecclesial 
and pastoral imaginary, despite frequent claims that the council provided a more 
authentic relation to tradition.
Th e crux of Paul’s address, and its eventual signifi cance for the politics of human 
dignity, concerns his characterization of the mission of the United Nations, which 
he describes as shared with and parallel to the mission of the Catholic Church. Paul 
proposed that the United Nations is a sort of refl ection, in the temporal order, of the 
defi ning characteristic of the Catholic Church in the spiritual order. On one level 
there is nothing particularly novel about such a framing. A distinction between the 
secular and spiritual orders has been basic to the church’s style of discourse about 
politics and power since the fourth century. Th e diff erence between the church as 
the governor of souls and the empire, the city, the nation, or the state as the gov-
ernor of worldly aff airs was not new. What was new—or at least distinctive—were 
the transitions in the political situation of the modern world, which characterized 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe as well as much of the colonial and 
postcolonial world. Th ese transitions gave a distinctive cast to Paul’s otherwise clas-
sical distinction. First, the diff erence between the secular and religious, for much 
of the modern world, was no longer a distinction of modes of temporality internal 
to the life of faith. It was not a distinction between the ordinary historical time of 
this world (and the material needs of that world, including the exercise of political 
powers) and the religious time of the church (insofar as the church was understood 
to be the mediator and representative of timeless and eternal truths within history). 
Th e church’s theology was anchored in the double notion of Jesus Christ as the 
eternal become incarnate in history and the church as the guardian and represen-
tative of that divine incarnation in an ongoing fashion throughout history. Th e 
church, in other words, understood itself to be the embodiment of the realization 
of a conjuncture between secular and religious temporalities and secular and reli-
gious modes of being. Broadly speaking, with the rise of the modern nation-state 
and the partial displacement of the church from the direct exercise of political 
power in Europe, the relation between the religious and the secular became one 
in which, institutionally and socially, the former became one domain within the 
latter rather than the other way round. Th ere was a sort of inversion of the inside 
and the outside in the order of powers. In describing the United Nations’ mission 
as parallel to the mission of the church in the secular order, Paul evokes an older 
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political imaginary but places it within a frame of reference in which the secular 
has become dominant.
Th e second thing that is diff erent about Paul’s distinction between the United 
Nations and the church as two orders of care in the world is that Paul is actually 
bringing the United Nations’ mission—its secular mission—much closer to the 
church’s own mission than the older language of religious and secular orders usu-
ally implied. Th e older language implied distinctive spheres of activities and even 
diff erent, if complementary, ends—the ordering of worldly aff airs on the one side 
and the care of the soul on the other. In Paul’s address, however, the United Nations 
is called—and is described as being uniquely equipped—to help the church in its 
mission to actualize “fraternal unity” among all people. For much of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, Catholic theologians had striven to diagnose and address 
critically the perceived social fragmentations that accompanied the development 
of modern forms of sociality in Europe and other parts of the world. Th is is most 
conspicuously captured in critiques of political liberalism and the idea of the indi-
vidual as the founding element of social and political existence. Liberalism and in-
dividualism, eff ected through both political and economic developments, was held 
to cut against an older Catholic view of participatory sociality in which individual 
life is predicated on social forms and not the other way round. Against modern 
fragmentations, Catholic theologians identifi ed the problems of unity and unifi ca-
tion as major elements of the church’s critique of, and response to, modernity. Th is 
was sometimes—as it was in Paul’s address—framed in terms of the need to unify 
humanity. Humanity is fi gured both as the premise and object of the church’s work 
in the world: humanity as a unity already given in the singular fact of God as the 
creator of the world. But humanity is also fi gured as in need of full actualization: 
humanity is not only a premise and object of the church’s work in the world, but the 
actualization of humanity is the church’s objective and obligation. Paul describes 
the United Nations as a pastoral partner in this work: in view of humanity’s essential 
unity, it is the obligation of the United Nations, like the church, to make what is 
primordially given actual and to do this by overcoming those factors in the world 
that continue to produce disunity.
Humanity, in its essence and need for actualization, is a common object of re-
sponsibility for the church and for the United Nations. As such, humanity is a com-
mon missional anchor point for the activities of both. Humanity, in Paul’s address, 
is fi gured as obliging care and responsibility for both the church and the United 
Nations. In its intrinsic but not yet actual being, humanity calls both the United 
Nations and the church to account. Th e ontology of humanity is, one might say, 
“nomic” in that it exists like a law that obliges response and care. Th e church and 
the United Nations are both responsible to humanity but also for humanity.
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According to Paul, humanity’s nomic mode of being is one side of a shared 
mission. Th e other side is closely connected. It consists in the fact that the United 
Nations and the church together are part of, even as they are exceeded by, humanity. 
On the surface this may sound self-evident. But theologically it is not at all obvious 
that Paul would assert such a thing about the nature of the church. It is not obvious 
for two reasons. Th e fi rst reason is that it can be interpreted as refl ecting a view of 
the church’s relation to the world characterized by what Charles Taylor has referred 
to as a nonmediated view of social reality. Taylor understands such a view to be one 
of the defi ning features of a modern social imaginary, one of the diacritics that cuts 
across, links, and distinguishes modernity in its multiplicity. Th is view of sociality 
can be set against what might be called a hierarchical imaginary, in which one’s 
identity is bound up in various ordered collectives and in which their hierarchical 
relations become the media of one’s relationship to power. In such a hierarchical 
view, the church has often fi gured itself as a kind of crown of an ordered cosmos, 
insofar as the church understands itself to be pastorally responsible for that cosmos 
and insofar as the church understands itself to be uniquely called and positioned 
to serve as the mediator of God’s grace for and in that cosmos. Th e question of 
hierarchy, the distribution of authority, and the ratios of power and service for the 
pastoral vocation of church leaders were all in play at Vatican II insofar as they 
pertained to the church’s internal governance. Paul’s emphasis on the fact of the 
church’s internal relationship to humanity, and the parallel mission it shares with 
the United Nations in being called to help actualize humanity’s intrinsic unity as 
a participating aspect of that potential unity, highlighted questions of hierarchy, 
power, and pastoral service with regard to the church’s external relations.
Th e fi gure of the church as part of humanity and not only external to or above 
it is refl ected in Paul’s characterization of a two-part concern of the council fathers. 
Th e council fathers, he suggested, are thinking about the church and its own aff airs 
and so are addressing themselves to the church in its internal relations. Th ey are 
also, however, thinking about how the church can address itself rightly and eff ec-
tively “to the entire world.” Th e church needs to address humanity as an “expert on 
humanity.” Th e church is an expert on humanity not only because it understands 
itself to be the guardian of eternal truths about the human condition. It is also an 
expert on humanity because it is part of humanity and can therefore speak in the 
voice of humanity as humanity’s representative. It speaks to and for humanity. Paul 
attributes this ontological doubling—this mode of existence by way of which the 
church is capable of speaking both to humanity and as humanity—to the United 
Nations. Th e church and the United Nations are both immanent to humanity, 
even as they can take responsibility for its actualization. Th e church and the United 
Nations both provide a kind of refl exive pastoral care. Th ey are responsible for 
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and to that of which they constitute a part: to humanity, for humanity, as human-
ity. Retrospectively, it is fair to say that at Vatican II the supposition, articulation, 
and disagreement over the terms of this series—the church to, for, and as human-
ity—constituted a fundamental reproblematization of the church, those outside 
the church, and the possibility of a relation of pastoral care between the two. Th e 
factor that held these elements together and off ered one possible solution to this 
reproblematization—and this is the factor that bound the United Nations and the 
church into a shared pastoral mission—is, as I’ll explain, human dignity.
It bears noting that Pope Paul’s address did not elaborate any of this in theo-
logical or anthropological detail. Th e shared mission of the church and the United 
Nations in caring for humanity’s unity, in the name of a shared responsibility for 
human dignity, was simply declared—as if it could simply be taken for granted. It 
bears noting because this declarative mode was not only rhetorically strategic—
which to some extent it no doubt was. It bears noting because it represents one 
outcome of several years of intense theological negotiations and struggle among the 
council fathers concerning four interconnected questions. (1) What is humanity 
such that the church should think of itself as responsible for and to it? (2) What is 
the church such that it should think of itself as responsible to and for humanity as 
an object of care? (3) Can the relation between the church and humanity be formu-
lated in such a way as to provide a basis for clearly discerning as well as organizing 
appropriate pastoral interventions? (4) And can these pastoral interventions—this 
pastoral obligation—be formulated, explained, and justifi ed in such a way that the 
relation between the church and humanity can be accepted and understood by both 
the ecclesia interna as well as the ecclesia ad extra? Th ese interconnected questions—
humanity, church, pastoral relation, and mode of formulation—were consolidated 
and responded to at the Second Vatican Council. A critical element in drawing 
these questions together and in formulating a response to them was the notion of 
human dignity. Said another way, human dignity, formulated in quite precise terms, 
was put forward as an answer to the pastoral problem of the church and its relation 
to humanity.
the world of today
I proposed in the introduction that the concept of human dignity as an institutional 
object of care only began to coalesce and take on a kind of singular, coherent, and 
operable status within and through a series of specifi c twentieth-century venues and 
events. I proposed that this coalescence, this status, and these venues and events 
were pastoral in character—albeit in a contemporary and restylized form. Th is 
fact—the fact of the pastoral restylization and its connection to the emerging coher-
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ence of the politics of intrinsic worth—seems to me to be crucial to understanding 
the forms and functions of the notion of human dignity today. It is for this reason 
that I think it is important to begin my inquiry into the contemporary politics of 
human dignity with the Second Vatican Council, despite the fact that Vatican II is 
chronologically preceded by the second of my three cases, that is, the formulation 
of the concept of human dignity within the United Nations through the early work 
of the Commission on Human Rights. At Vatican II, the bishops and theologi-
cal experts took up in an explicit and sustained manner a series of key diffi  culties 
and questions connected to human dignity crucial to understanding all three cases. 
Another way of saying this is that the pastoral problem of human dignity, which 
preceded the Second Vatican Council, is nonetheless most clearly articulated at the 
Second Vatican Council.
One of the principal diffi  culties concerning human dignity at Vatican II, which 
became a vector of controversy, is whether or not—or the extent to which—the 
turn to human dignity as an object of pastoral care constitutes a sharp break with 
prior modes of ethical and political reasoning. In the case of Vatican II this ques-
tion of continuity and discontinuity was taken up with regard to the question of 
doctrinal precedent. Th e term human dignity is clearly part of a longer tradition 
of theological and philosophical reasoning within the church. But at Vatican II 
and (in a legal rather than doctrinal register at the United Nations) the question of 
precedent, and the relative authority of precedent, became a signifi cant one. To put 
it in other terms: the American philosopher Richard McKeon frequently reminded 
his students that when studying intellectual history it is vital to keep in mind that 
a term is composed of a word plus a concept plus a referent. Over time, words stay 
the same; concepts and referents change. Th e question for the council fathers at 
Vatican II was whether the term human dignity as it was being used to think about 
the church’s pastoral relation to the modern world brought with it new concepts 
and new referents.
Despite talk of aggiornamento, of renewing the church, it was vital to the council 
fathers that they be seen as conducting themselves in continuity with previous ways 
of thinking, acting, and relating—even if their deliberations were being carried out 
in the name of the church’s relation to the “mundo huius temporis,” a phrase that 
literally means “the world at this time” but that was often translated during the 
council as “modern times” or “the modern world.” In his opening address, for ex-
ample, Pope John encouraged the council fathers to proceed in “perfect conformity 
to authentic doctrine” while also encouraging them to keep in mind the need to 
articulate doctrine in a manner consonant with “the methods of research” and “the 
literary forms of modern thought.”
Th e diff erence between the literal and interpretive translations of “mundo huius 
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temporis” is worth thinking about in light of the challenge the council fathers faced 
in maintaining a sense of continuity with tradition even while taking seriously non-
traditional methods of research and expression. In the more biting and polemical 
moments of dispute, the critics of Pope John’s vision for the aggiornamento of the 
church held that the council fathers were allowing forms of modern thought to de-
termine (and even dominate) the substance of doctrine. Th e modern, as fi gured in 
these criticisms, was cast as an attitude that valorizes the new over the old. Against 
John’s call for renewal, these critics appealed to an ideal of tradition. Th ey did this 
in a fashion that, one could argue, merely inverted the terms of their critique of 
the modern. Th ey expressed and advocated an ecclesial and conciliar attitude that 
valorized the old over the new: theological responses to the modern world could 
be considered legitimate only insofar as they could pass the test of being judged 
against the standards of tradition. It is fair to say that everyone involved, even those 
who were in favor of using the council as a venue for innovation, knew to speak 
their theological truths in the name of tradition. Th e vital political question was a 
familiar one: whose interpretation of tradition and traditional veridictional modes 
would ultimately govern the council’s proceedings and legacy?
Despite the rhetorical weight of tradition, it is nonetheless also fair to say that 
the deliberations at Vatican II were, in fact, neither modern nor traditional. Th ey 
were—to use a technical term—contemporary. Th e problem of human dignity as 
they approached it is, in a strict sense, a contemporary problem. If the modern is 
thought of as an attitude that valorizes the new over the old and tradition an at-
titude that valorizes the old over the new, the contemporary names an attitude in 
which elements of past confi gurations are reconfi gured with new elements in such 
a way that the resulting form and its signifi cance are neither reducible to those past 
confi gurations nor the new elements but to the stylized relation between them. A 
contemporary attitude indexes signifi cance neither to continuity or discontinuity 
with the new or the old. It indexes its signifi cance, rather, to the production of 
forms of discourse and practice that are taken to be adequate to dealing with situa-
tions of breakdown, uncertainty, or discord.
At Vatican II, the contests and struggles over the relation of the church and 
the modern world, and the characterization of humanity and human dignity as 
part of that relation, was enacted and narrated as though these characterizations 
were traditional. Even the supporters of aggiornamento insisted that their eff orts 
to speak to the needs of the modern world were, in fact, anchored in the church’s 
doctrinal legacy in a fashion that was not only fundamentally consistent with that 
legacy but more consistent with that legacy than the positions of their detractors. 
Th e question and struggle for the council fathers turned on which version of tradi-
tion would, in the end, be made to count as authoritative. However, when closely 
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examined, it is clear that the substance of these struggles—for the critics as well 
as the supporters of aggiornamento—can more adequately be described as con-
temporary. Th e task was to reconfi gure traditional theological concepts and argu-
ments in a fashion that made them adequate to the pastoral challenge that Pope 
John placed before the council. Despite talk of tradition and continuity, what the 
fathers said and did had the eff ect of introducing important transformations into 
prior formulations, sensibilities, and modes of action—without abandoning those 
prior formulations, sensibilities, and modes of action. Th e ramifi cations of these 
transformations for the politics of intrinsic worth connected to the fi gure of human 
dignity are still being contended with today, theologically, politically, institution-
ally, and pastorally.
mother church and the modern world
Th e notion of universal humanity and the relation of the church to universal hu-
manity has been a major theme of Christian life from the fi rst century c.e., appear-
ing in Christian doctrine, practice, scripture, and theology. Th is theme, and the 
question of the ecclesial practices connected to it, was reconfi gured in the council’s 
struggles over the question of the church in the modern world. From the outset—
and to considerable consternation on the part of many of the council’s more wary 
participants—the question of universal humanity and the church was put forward 
as a pastoral problem, and, as a pastoral problem, it was ultimately shaped by the 
related question of how the church ought to account for (think about and adjust 
itself to) the exigencies and conditions of the modern world.
Th e problem of church and humanity thus entailed a reassessment of the church’s 
pastoral rationality. Th e root of the term rationality is the Latin ratio. Th e term ratio 
refers to a system of relationships that serve to establish the metrics or standards 
according to which comparisons and judgments can be made among multiple vari-
ables, comparisons and judgments that allow for those variables and their relation-
ships subsequently to be adjusted. In this way, the ratio calibrates the logic on the 
basis of which particular relations can be constituted and ordered in an ongoing 
fashion. Th e problem of the church and humanity, as a pastoral problem, required 
participants in Vatican II to revisit the logic on the basis of which the church might 
constitute and order its relationship to the modern world as well as the regime of 
practices and roles consistent with that logic.
In a connected fashion, it might be said that the problem of the church and the 
modern world likewise required the council fathers to rethink the church’s pasto-
ral techniques (tekhnē) and equipment (paraskeuē)—to introduce two other classical 
designations. In the domain of pastoral practice and directed spiritual care, tekhnē 
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can be thought of as referring to those studied arts that inform and are expressed 
through a practice in such a way that the practitioner can successfully conduct 
the spiritual life. A technique both calibrates and embodies a mode of practice. 
Tekhnē is, in this sense, a modal term connected to the practice of an art. Th e art of 
pastoral and spiritual care in the Christian church, and especially in the Christian 
monasteries, borrowed from the tekhnē tou biou, the “arts of living,” fi rst formu-
lated and exercised within the Greek and Roman philosophical schools. Similarly, 
in this context, paraskeuē (literally “preparation”), equipment can be thought of as 
the forms of practice by way of which one spiritually prepares oneself for life in an 
uncertain world. Classically it was understood that in the conduct of the spiritual 
life one needs equipment, which can then be exercised as part of the arts of spiritual 
practice. In this way one can move toward the ability to free oneself from prior hab-
its and dispositions and constitute, in one’s very being, new habits and dispositions 
understood as new capabilities: equipment was exercised as part of the struggle one 
undertook to become the subject one believed one needed to be. If the question of 
humanity and the church was to be considered as a reconsideration of the logic of 
a pastoral relation with the modern world, the church would need to rethink tech-
niques and equipment, modes and forms of practice, adequate to such a pastoral art 
carried out as part of that relationship. It is fair to say that at Vatican II the council 
fathers were confronted with the problem of how to constitute a contemporary 
logic, technique, and equipment for a pastoral relation between the church and the 
modern world.
Th e pastoral problem of the church and the modern world defi ned a signifi -
cant part of the council agenda from the opening session, and the elements of that 
problem can be usefully summarized through a reading of Pope John’s opening ad-
dress to the council participants. A more thorough investigation of the complexities 
of the problem and how those complexities were managed by the council fathers 
would require a sustained investigation of the multiple interconnected issues raised 
during the four years of the council, as well as of the strategic constitution (and 
tactical reconstitution) of the various subcommittees that dealt directly with those 
issues, and, perhaps most importantly, a careful review of the development of the 
schema (the background papers, which served to structure and guide the produc-
tion of the council’s fi nal documents) prepared in advance for the council—espe-
cially those schema that dealt directly with the church’s relation to non-Christian 
religious traditions, nation-states and other political institutions, and to the other 
specifi ed instances of the ecclesia ad extra. Keeping this in mind, one can nonethe-
less see retrospectively how John’s opening address gave articulation not only to his 
aspirations for the council but to the conceptual and pragmatic elements that would 
continue to occupy the council fathers, even after John’s untimely death at the end 
F6671.indb   36 9/16/15   10:38:58 AM
  Th e Church, the Secular, and Pastoral Power 37
of the council’s fi rst year, and how these elements would be assembled such that 
the concept of human dignity might be put forward as a privileged answer to the 
church’s pastoral problem.
On October 11, 1962, more than three thousand offi  cial participants, including 
nearly 2,500 bishops in their formal robes and miters, processed through a crowd 
of tens of thousands in St. Peter’s Square into the basilica to open Vatican II. Fol-
lowing the mass, Pope John off ered what, for many outside observers, seemed a 
rhetorically simple and theologically understated exordium. However unadorned 
and declarative, his address subsequently became a touchstone both for the council’s 
supporters and its critics. In addition to laying out many of the defi ning themes, 
Pope John brought to articulation what would amount to the council’s unoffi  cial 
(though forcefully, if tacitly, maintained) disposition toward the modern world. 
Th is disposition would prove as crucial for delimiting the council’s approach to the 
pastoral problem as any of the more theologically explicit aspects of his address. Th e 
disposition toward the modern world is captured in the title of John’s address: Gau-
det Mater Ecclesia—“Mother Church rejoices”—named (in offi  cial church fashion) 
after his address’s fi rst line. Although the joy expressed in the title actually refers to 
the fact of the opening of the council per se, which John had been working to con-
vene for several years, it also captures John’s sense that the church and the modern 
world found themselves in an auspicious moment, a moment in which—for all of 
modernity’s other shortcomings—John saw the possibility for new, mutually en-
riching forms of pastoral care, care that the council might bring into being.
John began his address in an unassuming fashion: “In calling this vast assembly 
of bishops,” he intended “to assert once again the magisterium, which is unfailing 
and endures until the end of time.” Th e line is unassuming in that it is the kind of 
rationale that might be put forward for any type of ecumenical council. If unassum-
ing, however, John nonetheless immediately signals a fi rst signifi cant feature of the 
mode of pastoral relation he envisions, namely, that it will be a mode of practices 
predicated on the church’s magisterium, that is, the authority vested in the pope 
and the bishops to determine what counts as the church’s authentic teaching. Th e 
pastoral relation that John envisions with the modern world is fi rst of all a teaching 
relation, a relation constituted by the church in its capacity as a teaching author-
ity. John articulates what his fellow council fathers would have already taken for 
granted: the idea that the church’s teaching authority is defi ned by a kind of histori-
cal permanence—that although the magisterium may be given multiple forms in 
and across history, its substance endures in an unchanging fashion across history. 
John reminds his listeners of the fact that the magisterium has a two-sided tempo-
rality. On the one side, the pope and the bishops are endowed with the task of, and 
ability to, safeguard truths that are unchanging and even eternal. On the other side, 
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in exercising their teaching authority they speak to and must account for a histori-
cally determined and situationally defi ned world, a world whose specifi c contours 
require constant assessment and reassessment: how does the world exist in this place 
and this moment? What is the world of today? Or, as the council fathers would put 
it, using a biblical designation, how should the church read the “signs of the time”? 
On one side, the magisterium draws on and safeguards eternal truths for history, 
and, on the other side, it takes account of history in the articulation of those truths. 
Th e double temporality of the magisterium is vital to the church’s pastoral rela-
tion to the modern world, and it is the fi rst element of the pastoral problem of the 
church and the modern world John calls to mind. Th e church’s teaching authority 
and its double temporality has traditionally been oriented toward those within the 
church, or perhaps to those who have deviated from the church—taking account 
of historical deviation in a bid to cultivate an eternally informed order. John’s open-
ing lines signal what he will later make explicit: in his view, the magisterium is also 
pastorally central to the church’s relation to the contemporary world.
John immediately signals a second signifi cant feature of the pastoral problem, 
which can be thought of as the other side of the fi rst. John explains that in conven-
ing the council he is calling the enduring magisterium to take account of “the er-
rors, the requirements, and the opportunities of our time.” If the church is to have 
a pastoral relation with those beyond the church, it is a relation that must be ap-
propriate to the world of today. Th e term “our time” holds together a series: errors, 
requirements, opportunities. Nothing in this series would have seemed remarkable 
to those in attendance, and not one was unique to the Second Vatican Council. 
Councils have always been justifi ed as responses to historically specifi c errors and 
opportunities. But this fact of timeliness is no less signifi cant for being typical. 
Its signifi cance lies in two conditions. Th e fi rst is that contemporary problems—
taken again in the technical sense of the term—involve a certain temporality without 
thereby suggesting history. Th e contemporary is a moving ratio of the recent past 
and the near future. John’s address is calling the church to a contemporary prob-
lem, which is, by defi nition, singular in certain respects. Apart from this singularity 
a council would not be needed, after all. Th e second condition of signifi cance is 
that the contemporary world is not being addressed simply as a site of doctrinal 
controversy. In the case of doctrinal dispute, the task of the church is to reassert 
the “unfailing and enduring” authority of the magisterium against history. In this 
way, the contemporary world as a site of deviation or failure can be rectifi ed and its 
deviations overcome. But something else is going on here. Th e magisterium is be-
ing called to pastoral account. It is being called to care for the contemporary world 
beyond the condemnation of its errors. In this light, the character of the contem-
porary world becomes much more problematic. Caring for the contemporary as a 
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noncondemnatory form of the pastorate is something quite distinctive: it raises the 
question of a possible mutual adjustment between the historically enduring and the 
historically specifi c, an adjustment that risks unsettling the ostensible timelessness 
of the magisterium.
Th e contemporary world, John says, should be taken account of so that the 
church’s teachings “might be presented in exceptional form to all men throughout 
the world.” Here is a third signifi cant feature of John’s address: he calls the bishops 
to exercise their teaching authority in relation to a particular audience: the ecclesia 
ad extra. (I will come back to this idea of an “exceptional form.”) By calling the 
council fathers to address themselves to “all men throughout the world,” John sig-
nals that they will not only be responsible to and for the souls of the faithful. Nor is 
he calling them together to address those outside the church as lost sheep in need of 
returning to the fold—a century before, the First Vatican Council had responded to 
the problems of modernity precisely by telling the world to return to the authority 
of the church. Th e call to repentance is not the reason why John has convened the 
council. Rather, John convened the council so that the bishops as the keepers of the 
church’s magisterium could exercise their authority in a fashion that treats the world 
as that which is simultaneously internal and external to the church.
John recognizes that this task means presenting the church’s teachings in an 
“exceptional form”; this task requires the invention of new forms. Th e bishops must 
fi nd ways to give the magisterium form suited to the task of addressing “all men 
of the world.” If the bishops are to give form to a pastoral relation with the ecclesia 
ad extra by way of the church’s magisterium, then the magisterium will need to be 
presented in and through a form appropriate to “all men of the world.” A challenge 
was laid before the council fathers: to fi nd a way of speaking the truth—a veridic-
tional mode—that is appropriate to (coherent with, operable within, and taken to 
be plausible by) the world of today. What this means is that even before the work of 
the council began, a crucial question had been put on the table, a question whose 
answer would deeply shape the legacy and politics of the post–Vatican II church. 
Th e question is this: is an ecumenical council the kind of venue that can give excep-
tional form to the church’s teachings and speak the truth in a way that can be taken 
seriously by those who do not convert to the church, that is, by the ecclesia ad extra? 
Can the enduring and timeless teachings of the church be given a form that can be 
taken seriously by those who do not otherwise share the church’s faith? John’s crit-
ics would add: and does a council betray itself by even attempting to take up such 
a demand? Is a council the appropriate venue through which to mold the church’s 
teaching authority to the needs and care of the contemporary world? Ecumenical 
councils had traditionally been a venue of ecclesial governance through which os-
tensibly timeless questions of dogma were taken up and only applied in judgment 
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to historical questions, limitations, and deviations, and then later to the pastoral 
question of how best to act in view of such judgment. Should a council articulate 
the church’s teaching authority in terms and modes that will be taken seriously by 
the world of today? Th is question would become a major blockage point for many 
of the council fathers and for many of those in the Catholic Church observing the 
proceedings. Th e appeal to human dignity would ultimately form part of a strategy 
for moving past such blockages. But this is to jump ahead. Th e point here is that the 
demand John is placing upon the council fathers involves converting the church’s 
magisterium into a mode of truth speaking that will be suitable to establishing a 
pastoral relation with an object of care that is not in the fi rst place lost sheep, or 
fallen souls, or those in theological error. Rather, the object of the pastoral relation 
is, in the fi rst place, “all men” of a world of today, with its errors, requirements, 
limitations, and opportunities.
A key analytic question is this: how does Pope John position and justify his 
pastoral expectation? He proposes that the church should be future oriented and 
that it should face the future without fear and with optimism. Th e signifi cance of 
this posture of optimism about the future of the modern world and the church’s 
relation to it needs to be read against the church’s “long nineteenth century,” that 
is to say, against its relative displacement, beginning with the French Revolution, 
from the center of political aff airs in Europe and elsewhere. During much of the 
nineteenth century, the Vatican responded to the institutionalization of a secular 
political imagination, through, alternatively, a repudiation of modernity and an in-
tensifi cation of claims to infallibility. John specifi cally positions himself against the 
mood and style of Vatican I, in which the modern world was fi gured in primarily 
negative terms: “we must disagree with those prophets of gloom.” Th is posture, as I 
have already noted, proves to be crucial. A pastoral relation calibrated to the care of 
a world whose future is taken to be favorable and whose faults are taken to be mat-
ters of limitation and incompletion requires diff erent modes and forms of pastoral 
activity than those indexed to a world whose future is taken to be dire, perverse, or 
apostate. John’s optimism about the future, it bears underscoring, is not simply a 
variant of progressivism or an alternative philosophy of history. Indeed, he explicitly 
sets himself against progressivism of a secular sort, which he casts as unguided and 
incapable of orientation to humanity’s highest goods. Th e future of the modern 
world is bright not because it is destined to unfold in an ameliorative fashion. It is 
bright because of what John sees as the possibility that humans in the modern world 
will learn to actualize a set of defi ning and intrinsic capacities: namely, human-
ity will actualize its essential unity, and therein its essential dignity, insofar as it is 
guided by the church. John voices optimism about the church’s ability to facilitate 
humanity’s actualization within, and partially as a result of, the modern world.
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John projects two favorable outcomes of the council’s optimistic approach to 
the future. Th e fi rst is favorable for the church itself. By “bringing herself up to 
date,” the church will gain in “spiritual riches.” Th e church will gain in spiritual 
riches because it will become more capable of fulfi lling the sort of pastoral vocation 
that John has indicated. Th e modern world as a pastoral opportunity is an occa-
sion for the church’s spiritual enrichment. Th e other outcome favors the ecclesia ad 
extra. If the council fathers direct the church’s teaching authority toward the needs 
and opportunities of the world, “men, families, and peoples” will be oriented to 
those spiritual things (activities, relations, aspirations) in relation to which they 
can ultimately be made “humanly complete.” A startling diagnostic begins to take 
shape at this point in John’s address: the claim that the council should face the 
future with optimism is warranted in part by the character of the modern human 
condition. Th e modern human condition is a point of conjunction in the relation 
between the church and the world. Th e modern world, John says, has demonstrated 
“humankind’s ingenuity.” Th e twist and the tragedy is that modern ingenuity is 
not oriented toward the fulfi lment of humanity’s highest good—its summum bo-
num. John invokes and reconstructs St. Augustine’s classic response to the “cities 
of the world.” Th e cities of the world, in Augustine’s estimation, were good—even 
marked by God’s grace insofar as humans remain capable of cultivating their own 
goods. But those goods, on Augustine’s view, are ultimately incomplete unless and 
until they were oriented toward humanity’s highest good, namely, participation in 
what Augustine calls the order of the spirit. With these Augustinian echoes, John 
insists that the modern world, marvelous in its human achievement, requires proper 
orientation—proper reorientation. Th e church as an expert on humanity’s highest 
good is capable of providing that reorientation.
Here John gives things what might be called a Th omistic twist. Th omas Aqui-
nas, following Aristotle, proposed that humanity’s highest good, which he took to 
be contemplation of God, is intrinsic to its nature as a rational being, even if the 
fulfi llment of that highest good (that is, God) is not intrinsic. If humanity in the 
modern world needs orientation to its highest good, that highest good is nonethe-
less proper to its own being. Th is means that the church’s capacity for the pastoral 
orientation of the world is actually a matter of the church pointing out to humanity 
its own proper, that is, intrinsic ends. Th e pastoral orientation is fi tted to the nature 
of human nature: the human, like the church, is a being whose most signifi cant 
capacities are proper to it. Th e actualization of those capacities—the actualization 
of the anthropological summum bonum—requires a working out of what is, in fact, 
always already humanly available. John signals that the pastoral problem of the 
church and the modern world coincides with the longstanding theological question 
of nature and grace: how do things natural participate in and become defi ned by 
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things supernatural? Are the goods implied in the participation of the natural and 
supernatural (that is, in the human participation in the being of God) immanent to 
nature and hence require the church’s cultivation and assistance, or do they, because 
of human evil and fallenness, ultimately lie beyond human nature per se and hence 
require the church to serve as a spiritual bridge between the being of the world and 
the being of God? What does the church need to be in order for the human to at-
tain to its highest good? And, however these questions are answered, how might the 
church’s teaching authority need to be reimagined if it is to become the source of a 
pastoral relation? On John’s view, the teaching authority needs to be reimagined as 
the means by which each human and all of humanity actualize a naturally inherent 
capacity for the supernatural. Optimism about the future of the modern world and 
the church’s pastoral capacities turns on a vision for humanity in which its highest 
good constitutes a realization of itself. Th is is the fi rst and most basic supposition of 
John’s vision for pastoral power and the church’s aggiornamento.
A second and equally important supposition of John’s vision for the church’s 
pastoral relation to the modern world has already been suggested. John presumed 
a certain ontological and temporal adequacy between the church, especially in its 
teaching authority, and humans as objects of pastoral care. John’s presumption of 
an ontological and temporal adequacy is classic and basically Th omistic, and it 
touched on a source of considerable Roman Catholic theological dispute concern-
ing modernity that had existed for more than a century before Vatican II.
First the ontology: John speaks about things human in a manner that refl ects his 
sense that humans are naturally oriented to the supernatural. John’s optimistic read-
ing of things human in the modern world suggests, tacitly, that human nature can-
not be adequately accounted for without reference to the supernatural. As a “whole 
man” composed of body and soul, he says, the human “tends toward heaven.” In 
this affi  rmation, John follows the lead of the so-called integralist theologians: in 
humans one fi nds an integral relation between the natural and supernatural. Th e 
so-called integralist dispute, the dispute over the relation of nature and the super-
natural, or nature and grace, shadowed all of the proceedings at Vatican II and par-
ticularly the work on human nature and human dignity. Th e dispute, which John 
and his theological mentors argued went back to the Middle Ages, centered on the 
question of whether human sinfulness and disobedience to God totally separates 
humans from God in their very being: does human sinfulness produce a radical 
ontological break between the divine and the human, the supernatural and the 
natural? Much of Reformation and Counter-Reformation theology presumed that 
it in fact did and proposed that such a break was the ontological predicate of the 
gratuity of God’s salvation of humans in Christ: salvation can be thought of as 
entirely a free work of God on behalf of humanity precisely because humans after 
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“the fall” were no longer in a place, ontologically speaking, to participate in bring-
ing about their own highest good, that is, their salvation, through the cultivation 
of their own Godlike potentials. Th e integralist theologians set themselves against 
both the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Th ey ar-
gued that the church did not need to presume such an absolute ontological break 
in the relation between nature and the supernatural in order to affi  rm and assure 
the “pure gratuity” of salvation. Th ey argued that the presumption of a fully secular 
domain of “pure nature” (that is, a domain devoid of participation in the divine life 
resulting from human sin) as a warrant and guarantee of “pure gratuity” introduces 
a fundamental departure from classical thought. Th ey argued, moreover, that the 
presumption of “pure nature” had facilitated the generation of many of the ills 
of the modern world precisely because it (in their view) allowed for the corollary 
presumption that the being of the world was characterized primarily by games of 
power and not by participation in the life of God. I will say more about this dispute 
and its conceptual and practical ramifi cations for thinking about human dignity in 
the next chapter. Here it is enough to signal that by eff ectively (and by no means 
naïvely) taking up an integralist ontology as predicate of the pastoral relation, John’s 
address established a very specifi c set of parameters within which a pastoral relation 
between the church and humanity might be imagined and worked out. In short: 
the notion that the human by nature tends to the supernatural calls for a diff erent 
pastoral use of the church’s teaching authority than an anthropology predicated on 
the notion of complete depravity. In the former the church needs to care for and 
tend to what is properly human. In the latter the church needs to function as an 
exclusive mediator of an otherwise inaccessible supernatural grace.
John’s optimism about the future did not only turn on a Th omistic reading of 
human nature, however. It also turned on his sense of “the present order of things.” 
If part of the rationale for the council is to bring the church into a new pastoral 
relation to the world, the question can rightly be asked: why now? What is it about 
the “present order of things” that makes such a council appropriate? John proposes 
that a new order of human relations is near at hand, an order that calls for a shift 
in the church’s pastoral relation to the world. Th is new order will be produced by 
what he refers to as the concert of Divine Providence and human eff ort. Th e role of 
the church is to provide orientation in this concerted eff ort. Humanity by nature 
tends to the supernatural; humanity oriented by the church and facilitated by Divine 
Providence will attain to the supernatural.
But again the hanging question was: why now? What is it about the modern 
world that makes such a fulfi llment a possibility? Multiple answers are suggested in 
John’s address—but only suggested. For example, John refers to current positive re-
lations of ecclesial and nonecclesial powers and a current human disposition to the 
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idea of a unifi ed humanity. But John does not really provide a clear and  satisfactory 
answer. Th e assertion of such an auspicious present order of things, however, turns 
out to be generative despite (or perhaps because of ) his lack of a clear answer. It 
introduces an interpretive task for the council fathers: a need to understand the 
world of today in such a fashion that the church’s relation to it can help facilitate 
the actualization of humanity’s intrinsic potentials. Th is task was given form as a 
question: what are “the signs of the times,” and how might they be read as pasto-
rally auspicious? As I will discuss in the next chapter, Gaudium et spes, the Pastoral 
Constitution, is formulated precisely as an answer to this question. Needless to say, 
not everyone was satisfi ed either with the question or the answer. In any case, John 
asserts the auspicious character of the modern world and links it with the ontologi-
cal question of the relation of nature and the supernatural.
Th e ontological axis nature/supernatural implies and involves a temporal axis: 
historical/eternal. Like the fi rst, the second axis, in various forms, has been the 
subject of theological debate for millennia. And again, like the fi rst, the pastoral de-
mand put to the council gives the temporality of the relation of the natural and the 
supernatural—framed as the relation of the historical and the eternal—distinctive 
form and signifi cance. If, ontologically, the human is by nature oriented to the su-
pernatural, what is the temporal mode of this ontology? Is the fulfi llment of the 
natural in the supernatural a question of this-worldly or other-worldly salvation (to 
use Max Weber’s distinction)? Th e answer is precisely that the distinction between 
this-world and other-world needs to be problematized. Temporally, the human is 
historical but oriented in history to eternity. But what does this mean conceptually 
and pastorally? How do the historical and the eternal intersect if not orthogonally? 
What does it mean that the human is a continuum or even coincidence between 
the historical and the eternal? What is the human such that it fi nds its actuality in 
eternity and such that the temporal mode of eternity plays a defi ning role for the 
historical? John’s address states about the human that “since he [sic] is a pilgrim on 
this earth, [his nature] commands him to tend always toward heaven.” Th e question 
is: what does this mean for the church’s pastoral relation to humanity? What is the 
church such that it might be capable of off ering care to humanity marked by this 
temporality? Th ese questions will be taken up in terms of the church’s own double 
temporality. Like the church, the defi ning features of humanity are both within and 
beyond history. As I will explain in the next chapter, this doubling—the temporal-
ity and ontology of humanity and the temporality and ontology of the church—
coincides at human dignity.
So, John’s optimism about the modern world is carried by the presumption of 
an ontological and temporal adequacy between things human and things ecclesial. 
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A further question follows: what is the mode according to which this pastoral rela-
tion can be established and made to operate? John’s answer is: the eff ective teaching 
of Christian doctrine in light of contemporary needs and conditions. Much has 
been made of the fact that John called the council to a pastoral and not only a 
doctrinal set of tasks. Th e council’s written constitutions (the documentary legacy 
of the council’s work) are, in fact, distinguished according to their status as either 
doctrinal or pastoral. Emphasis on the strict distinction between the pastoral and 
the doctrinal, however, obscures the integral relation of teaching and care in the 
pastoral mode to which John calls the church. Th e pastoral relation that John em-
phasizes and to which he calls the church is a teaching relation. Th e mode of the 
pastoral relation is not the shepherding of the fl ock or the conduct of souls. Rather, 
it is a matter of guarding the “sacred deposit of Christian doctrine” and fashioning it 
in such a way that it can become the basis of a pastoral relation between the church 
and the world. Th ree things must be mutually adjusted: the church, humanity, and 
teaching as a mode of pastoral practice. John’s challenge to the council is to give 
form to this mode and to give form by way of the magisterium.
Th e problem that John presents is thus not a matter of discriminating between 
doctrinal and pastoral concerns and of constituting a relation between the two in 
which the latter is the application of the former. Rather, the problem is precisely a 
matter of converting “authority in truth,” that is, converting the authority of the 
magisterium from an instrument of doctrine within the church to a mode and form 
of pastoral care for what is beyond the church, the ecclesia ad extra. It is worth quot-
ing John at length here. His phrasing throws into relief the problem of linking the 
pastoral and the doctrinal:
Our duty is not only to guard this precious treasure, as if we were concerned 
only with its antiquity. . . . Th e salient point of this Council is not, there-
fore, a discussion of one article or another of the fundamental doctrine of the 
Church . . . [but] a step forward toward a doctrinal penetration and formation 
of consciousness . . . through the methods of research and through the literary 
forms of modern thought. Th e substance of the ancient doctrine of the deposit 
of faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented is another. And it is 
the latter that must be taken into great consideration with patience if neces-
sary, everything being measured in the forms and proportions of a magisterium 
which is predominantly pastoral in character.
What kind of practice could this consist in—the church’s teaching authority car-
ing for the human in the modern world? John’s answer is that the church must show 
humans how mortal life is to be properly ordered. Crucially, John’s emphasis is not 
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placed on the conduct of that ordering, per se. Th e church’s pastoral relation to the 
world does not consist in ordering, but in the demonstration or indication of right 
order. Given the status of humanity, as that creature who lives on an axis of nature and 
the supernatural, this proper ordering consists in indicating how to fulfi ll “our duties 
as citizens of earth and of heaven.” Such ordering, John says, entails tending cease-
lessly to the attainment of eternal happiness, and doing so by coordinating earthly 
goods to that end. John stresses that in this ceaseless attainment the church needs 
to be “useful to society today.” Th is usefulness consists in the church helping guide 
humanity in the pursuit of its proper ends. John’s critics took this call to usefulness 
to be an inversion of authority: why should the church need to prove itself useful to 
a secular world? Th e answer, articulated by Paul in his address to the United Nations, 
is that the church needs to be useful because it is internal and not merely external 
to humanity, internal and not merely external to history. If the call is for the church 
to be useful, in other words, this is not a call for a departure from its own nature—a 
reduction to mere “utility.” At the level of proper order, the capacities of the church 
and the world may not overlap entirely, but their purpose and goal is shared.
John’s presumption of an ontological and temporal adequacy of the church in 
its pastoral relation to humanity raises the question of practice in relation to truth. 
How is the church’s teaching authority to be put to work as pastoral equipment? 
How can doctrinal authority be given form as a mode of pastoral care between the 
church and the world? Th e church’s usefulness to society insofar as doctrine “infl u-
ences the numerous fi elds of human activity” requires that the church, while not 
departing from “the sacred patrimony of truth . . . must ever look to the present, 
to the new conditions and forms of life.” John’s wording presumes the possibility 
of preserving eternal substance in new forms, a presumption that was not at all 
obvious to his detractors. In this, John again introduces a dilemma that will remain 
unresolved throughout the council’s proceedings: according to what rationality, cal-
culation, or type of thought can the pastorate guide humanity to its proper ends 
within the framework of the teaching authority of the church?
Prior councils have converted doctrine to power through condemnation, judg-
ment, and even persecution. Although acknowledging the failings of the modern 
world (“fallacious teachings,” “dangerous concepts”), John explicitly rejects con-
demnation as unnecessary and as veridictionally inappropriate to the circumstances 
at hand. It is unnecessary because, John says, humans today are already inclined to 
condemn these errors themselves. Humans today are inclined to condemn these 
errors themselves because they are, he insists, “ever more deeply convinced of the 
paramount dignity of the human person and of his perfection as well as of the du-
ties which that implies.” In particular, humans realize that violence cannot solve the 
“grave problems which affl  ict them.” In his address John may have been stylizing 
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his point for rhetorical eff ect and to set out a pole in relation to which the council 
would have to orient itself. However—and this point must be kept in mind—the 
supposition that the world to which the church addresses itself is basically good 
and, indeed, in terms of the nature of humanity, is defi ned by an intrinsic potential 
for the supernatural functions to parameterize the logic of pastoral practice put 
forward during the course of the council, as well as the way in which the object of 
that practice—human dignity—will be imagined.
Th e crux of a pastoral relation with the modern world, for John, lies in this: “Hu-
mans today are convinced of the paramount dignity of the human.” Th is means, 
in John’s view, that the church does not need to convert its teaching authority to 
pastoral practice through condemnation. Rather, the church needs to calibrate its 
practices of truth speaking to the task of orienting the modern world toward a 
proper relation to human dignity. Th e fact that the modern world already recog-
nizes human dignity and thereby also recognizes the authoritative status of dignity 
in guiding human aff airs means that the world is also prepared to be shepherded 
by the church. Th e dignity of the human is paramount and calls for a response in 
terms of the orientation of human aff airs: the world recognizes it, and the church is 
uniquely positioned to articulate the terms of that response. Th e magisterium needs 
to be mobilized in view of, and in response to, the need to articulate the meaning 
and demands of human dignity.
It is at this conjuncture of a shared persuasion, between the church and the 
modern world, that human dignity needs to be cared for that the magisterium 
fi nds that it can be fi tted to a pastoral logic for the ecclesia ad extra. Equipped by an 
understanding of the natural and the supernatural, the magisterium is able to read 
the signs of the times in such a way as to discern what the dignity demands in rela-
tion to the particular contours of modern situations. And by articulating what the 
church understands and discerns about human dignity and its demands, it will be 
able to “raise men” to the actualization of their proper dignity. It is in this way that 
doctrine can become “life giving,” even for those outside the church. It follows for 
John that the modern world itself, for all of its failings, is marked by a “lofty dig-
nity.” Th is dignity occasions an ensemble of elements that will be defi nitive of the 
logic of the church’s relation to the world: dignity is properly human (“a more hu-
man life”), life is ordained by God (“in the life of Christ”), and it is the responsibil-
ity of the church to connect these together (“her life-given doctrine . . . effi  cacious 
in promoting concord, just peace, and the brotherly unity of all”).
Doctrine, taken up as a mode of pastoral care for the world, will need to be 
rendered as a mode of truth speaking by way of which the world can come to un-
derstand how to live in a manner such that human dignity can be actualized. Th e 
church can shepherd the world. It can shepherd the world not because it is able 
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to submit the world to its internal mechanisms of discipline or governance. It can 
shepherd the world through its insights and sense of proper human orientation con-
cerning a shared object of concern. Dignity is, after all, proper to the human, and 
humans will be capable of fully actualizing this properly human dignity if, amid the 
vicissitudes of modern life, they are properly guided. John is not calling the church 
to cultivate dignity through the direct formation of the world or to off er dignity to 
the world by mediating grace. Rather, he is calling them to illuminate the character 
of dignity and clarify its requirements for the modern world.
John’s address culminates with a question: “What is salvation?” He answers: it is 
the will of God for all humanity. And what is the will of God? Th e orientation of 
human nature to the supernatural. Th is is not just a directive for individual human 
life; it is also a destiny for humanity as a universal collective. John puts it this way: 
God wills salvation for all. Salvation, salutis, the good, will be realized in the form 
of “complete and fi rm unity of minds.” Salvation is the peace of unity. Th is is a clas-
sical proposition, and John cites Augustine in making this concluding point. What 
is distinctive here, what makes John’s assertion contemporary and not merely tradi-
tional is that salvation understood as human unity is connected to the work of the 
magisterium as an organ of pastoral direction for human minds and to a moment in 
the history of the world in which “humanity” has come to recognize its own unity 
in dignity. Th e goal of salvation, understood as the actualization of human unity, 
can be achieved through knowledge of how to live in the modern world. In assert-
ing the church’s ability to provide that knowledge, John borrows Augustine’s classic 
distinction: “in order that the earthly city may be brought to the resemblance of 
that heavenly city where truth reigns, charity is the law, and whose extent is eter-
nity.” Th e pastoral relation of the church and the world has as its aim the work of 
helping to bring the earthly city to a resemblance of the heavenly city. Moreover, 
as Augustine fi rst suggested, such a resemblance can be read as the actualization in 
the earthly city of the order that was fi rst proper to it—the innate dignity of hu-
mans and the possibility of the historical fl ourishing of dignity understood as the 
actualization of humanity. Th is is a central purpose of the Second Vatican Council, 
according to the opening address. Th is, for John, was a structuring rationale for 
the council: the salvation of humanity through right knowledge of the truth of its 
unity in dignity.
John closes with a summary diagnosis: the church as a pastorate is well fi tted to 
the needs of the modern world. Th e ecumenical council is called to order not only 
for the sake of the church, per se—though the rethinking of doctrine, liturgy, the 
role of laity, etc. also forms part of the rationale for the council. But most centrally 
and above all, the council is called to order by the needs of the modern world and 
the capacity and responsibility of the church, as a teacher, to meet those needs. Th e 
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church, of course, has always understood itself as being responsible for all: the mis-
siological impulse is basic to the Christian affi  rmation of a gospel. What is distinc-
tive about John’s vision for Vatican II is the proposition that the world of today is 
neither fi gured as existing outside the church as that which is estranged and in need 
of return, nor is it fi gured as within the church as if a deviant or lost sheep to be 
reprimanded and redirected. Th e world is portrayed neither as having fallen to the 
exterior nor as being in tension with the interior. Rather, and quite distinctively, the 
world is fi gured as sharing an identity with the church without therein coinciding 
with the church. Th e world and the church stand together, in some sense, at the 
intersection of “heaven and earth.” Th at intersection is named using a moral reper-
toire whose coordinating term is human dignity.
John’s opening address framed Vatican II as a venue within which the junction 
between heaven and earth can be rethought and as a venue through which the 
proper means of inhabiting that junction can be brought to articulation: “We might 
say that heaven and earth are united in the holding of the Council—the saints of 
heaven to protect our work, the faithful of the earth continuing in prayer to the 
Lord, and you, seconding the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in order that the work 
of all may correspond to the modern expectations and needs of the various peoples 
of the world.” Salvation of humanity may, on the surface, not seem to be a need of 
the church, strictly speaking, but rather a need of the world, a need for which the 
church must be made responsive and adequate. But, as I will discuss in the excursus 
later in this book, the salvation of the pastor is always caught up in and determined 
by the salvation of the fl ock. In calling the council to think about the church’s pas-
toral relation to the modern world, John is also calling the church to rethink the 
terms of its own good, its own salvation. Th e church’s own salvation turns in part 
on its ability to refashion doctrine as an art of care for human dignity.
On a rhetorical level all of this is put forward as if it is longstanding and simply 
in continuity with the history of the church’s exercise of pastoral power. And indeed, 
many of the elements invoked have been part of theological and ecclesiastical refl ec-
tion since the early church. But in John’s address these elements are reworked, con-
nected with new elements, and rendered as a timely and not a perennial problem.
John’s statement of a fortuitous convergence of humanity and the church in the 
modern world proved to be a major source of contention throughout the coun-
cil—as did the connected formulation of the mode by which the church plays a 
vital role in the actualization of humanity’s immanent capacities. John placed at 
the center of the council’s deliberation a theological contest that, for many of the 
bishops and theologians present, including John and John’s theological mentors, 
comprised a bitter struggle over the question of the nature of sin, history, and the 
church, which had been a defi ning feature of the longstanding fi ght over the appro-
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priate role of the church in a post-Reformation world. John’s implied position on 
this controversial set of themes—a sense that the church’s vocation lies in orienting 
nature to its supernatural ends—would itself prove controversial, in part because it 
seemed to be a central theological warrant for his affi  rmation of the modern world 
and for a posture of openness and mutual enrichment in the church’s relation to 
the modern world. Some of John’s critics—the critics of aggiornamento—saw in this 
affi  rmation unwarranted doctrinal innovation and an inversion of authority. It was 
doctrinal innovation because it seemed to make the “fallen” world less dependent 
on the mediating authority of the church in matters of salvation. It was an inversion 
of authority because it seemed to place the world at the center, making its needs 
defi nitive for the church’s pastoral practices. John and his supporters off ered the 
rebuttals that had been articulated by their theological teachers, who similarly had 
been accused of introducing a nouvelle theologie: they argued that a more integral 
view of nature and grace had, in fact, defi ned the church’s understanding of its 
pastoral role prior to the modern world and was therefore actually less modern than 
the “traditional” views of their critics.
Equally important and vehement were the criticisms of those who repudiated 
John’s optimistic view of modernity not so much in the name of a diff erent theology 
of grace, or a contrastive theory of the church’s status, or its authority to mediate 
salvation. Rather, these critics understood modernity to be defi ned by the creation 
of new forms of exploitation, domination, and alienation. Like the disputes over the 
accusation of “new theology,” these criticisms of optimism could not be avoided. 
Immediately following his opening address, John’s theological advisors set to work 
composing and circulating a statement underscoring the desire of the pope and the 
other councilors to address themselves and their work to the suff ering and hope-
less, those impoverished and diminished by the modern world. Th e twist—and the 
continued justifi cation off ered for John’s affi  rmative pastoral disposition toward the 
world’s future—was the proposition that the global community, despite pervasive 
violence and exploitation, had actually begun to develop in such a way and to such 
an extent that the possibility of global human unity, the possibility of the actual-
ization of humanity, was within reach, albeit not without the church’s orienting 
pastoral care.
schema xiii
If one can see, retrospectively, how John’s opening address gave articulation to 
his aspirations for the council and to the conceptual and pragmatic elements that 
would continue to occupy the council fathers, as well as how these elements might 
be assembled such that the concept of human dignity could be put forward as an 
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answer to the problem of the church’s pastoral problem to the modern world, the 
document known as Schema XIII, which would become Gaudium et spes, can be 
seen as the council’s most sustained and direct response to John’s call for reformula-
tion and renewal. Initially drafted in preparation for the council, Schema XIII 
was fi rst taken up and debated by a subcommittee of council fathers during what is 
typically referred to as the “third period” of the council—October and November 
1964. Th e theological, political, and pastoral diff erences over the schema would not 
be resolved that fall, and the need for further work on it was part of a justifi cation 
for the addition of a fourth counciliar period slated for late 1965. Given its direct 
relationship to the stated rationale for Vatican II, work on the schema received 
considerable attention. Offi  cial participants, as well as Christian and non-Chris-
tian observers, came to look at the schema as a defi nitive response of the church 
to the political and social challenges of the twentieth century (from poverty and 
capitalism to biology and birth control) and as an indication of the role the Ro-
man Catholic Church planned to take with respect to these challenges. One of the 
principal theological participants in the development of the schema was the theo-
logian Yves Congar, who also played a signifi cant role in the political negotiations 
that fi nally brought it to completion. Congar described the schema as the council’s 
“promised land.”
Th e political path that the schema followed to its fi nal form need not be re-
counted in detailed fashion. A brief sketch of the practical diffi  culties facing the 
members of the subcommittee assigned the task of reworking it, however, reinforces 
the point that very little about the schema could be taken for granted as obvious or 
self-evident—despite the declarative tone of the document in its fi nal form. Like 
all of the council’s constitutions, the development of Schema XIII was marked by 
contests, diffi  culties, and rivalries as well as by patience, labor, thought, and nego-
tiation. From 1962 to 1965 the elements that would make up the schema passed 
through multiple preparatory commissions: a mixed commission of members from 
the Doctrinal Commission and from the Commission for the Lay Apostolate, with 
its own various and multiple subcommissions, and it was reviewed during the ple-
nary periods with the entire body of council fathers. Th e schema was revised doz-
ens of times in response to the theological and pastoral disagreements of commis-
sion members, advisory theologians, and unoffi  cial redrafts submitted by national 
groupings of bishops. At several junctures political diff erences among commission 
secretaries, the general secretary of the council, and the Holy See threatened to table 
the schema altogether. Commission participants, council fathers as well as theologi-
cal consultants, were eliminated from the process or strategically added. Th e fact 
that the drafting of the schema was fi nished at all and subsequently voted in by the 
council fathers as one of the four Constitutions of Vatican II is a tribute to the pro-
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ductive organizational machinery of the council and belies the fi erce disagreements 
that emerged—and persist today—concerning its meaning and requirements. It is 
more striking still that Schema XIII was successful in addressing the core problems 
articulated by John in his opening address, despite subsequent diffi  culties in turning 
that articulation into practice.
A principal outcome of these diffi  culties, which I will focus on here, is the way 
in which “humanity” was ultimately fi gured in connection with “dignity,” and in 
connection with the church as a venue called to a pastoral responsibility for dig-
nifi ed humanity. Th e core problem was, of course, felt throughout the council. 
Schema XIII is distinctive in that it took up the pastoral problem of the church and 
the modern world explicitly and directly and in that it generated pressures for how 
this external relation would aff ect the church in its internal relations. Schema XIII, 
in this sense, is not only signifi cant as a textual artifact of the council’s work—a 
major theological document and reference point in contemporary canon law. It is 
certainly this, too; dozens of subsequent statements made by the Vatican concern-
ing the view of the church on, say, scientifi c and technological developments cite 
the Pastoral Constitution as a theological and pastoral warrant. Th e schema is also, 
and equally, signifi cant as a point of convergence or consolidation at which a set of 
problems set into motion well before Vatican II were further sharpened, combined, 
and given focused articulation. Schema XIII in this sense can be thought of as a vec-
tor point at which a number of prior problems converged, were given synthetic and 
operable form, and from which a set of relatively manageable solutions have subse-
quently been derived. Th ese solutions are ultimately anchored in a single pastoral 
object: dignifi ed humanity—an object that could then be referred to as self-evident 
and as self-evidently in a pastoral relation with the church.
In the process of the schema’s formulation and drafting three practical diffi  cul-
ties were encountered, strategically and theologically conceptualized, and made the 
object of argument and political maneuvering. Th ese diffi  culties were encountered 
by the fi rst subcommission in the spring of 1964, and they exercised an ongoing 
infl uence on the commission’s deliberations and drafting. Th e fi rst of these dif-
fi culties concerned the audience for the schema. Who was it actually addressed to? 
On some straightforward level the answer was “the world.” Th e schema, after all, 
was a response to John’s call for the council to inaugurate a renewed pastoral rela-
tion to the modern world. But it was not at all clear what, practically, that could 
mean in terms of the work of the subcommission: was the schema written “for the 
world” as an instruction to the pastorate or the laity, or was it to be directly ad-
dressed to the ecclesia ad extra, and hence did it need to be formulated in terms that 
those beyond the church could take seriously? John called the church not only to 
“shoulder responsibility” for the problems of the modern world but to do so “before 
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the world.” If expectations were high for the outcome of Schema XIII, this was in 
part because the challenge put before the council was not simply to act as an organ 
of the internal magisterium of the church, not simply to debate the church’s internal 
self-understanding and self-direction, but also to rise to the challenge of giving form 
to the teaching authority in and for the world. Th e pastoral relation between the 
church and the world might thereby be facilitated. As Paul VI would put it in his 
encyclical Ecclesiam suam, which he delivered on the eve of plenary consideration of 
Schema XIII, the church must engage in “dialogue” with the contemporary world 
to the end of “serving” the world. So, a fi rst practical diffi  culty faced by the sub-
commissions composing the schema was the problem of audience: who or what is 
this “world” to whom they would be off ering this schema?
Th is fi rst practical diffi  culty was given articulation by the infl uential French Do-
minican Marie-Dominique Chenu. If the diffi  culty was the audience, the ques-
tion was: is the church speaking to something outside of itself? To what extent 
does the church, in its pastoral vocation, address that which is outside of it, strictly 
speaking? A predicate of much of the council’s refl ections on the modern world 
was that the church exists in solidarity with the human race. Lumen gentium, the 
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, which was considered in the same session 
as Schema XIII, stated that the church is the instrument and sign of salvation for 
“the whole human race.” Chenu wanted to know: what should the council fathers 
make of this? Th e problem turns, in part, on the conception of the church’s tem-
porality, that is, its relation to history. John had already indicated that the church 
involves a double temporality. Th e question here was pragmatic: how is this double 
status to be parsed, which aspects are to be emphasized, and how should it inform 
the style of the Pastoral Constitution? Chenu and others, including Pope Paul, held 
that the church existed as part of and therefore within the history of the world’s 
salvation. Th e church is part of that history in its concrete form. Th e church can 
thus be thought of as the collection of believers who bear witness to a salvation to 
which all are called and thus who also share in the world’s situation. Th e church 
shoulders responsibility for the world’s needs because it shares in those needs; they 
are its own needs.
Chenu’s position carried signifi cant pastoral implications. If the church consid-
ers itself as having its actuality within the history of salvation (which of course it 
must, at least in part) then Schema XIII should call for and enable a regularized 
practice of critical theological self-adjustment: the world of today needs to be char-
acterized and recharacterized as it changes, and the church needs to think continu-
ally about how to adjust its modes of action and understanding to those needs. It 
is not surprising that some council fathers worried that the worth and authority of 
the church under these conditions would ultimately be overly determined by its re-
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sponsibility to the world in its inner-historical life and struggles. Th e concrete chal-
lenges of the world would be defi nitive for the church’s pastoral responsibilities and 
thereby its pastoral self-constitution. Th ese diffi  culties ultimately carried through 
beyond Vatican II, evidenced by the still unresolved and divisive debates over the 
status of Liberation Th eology, which draws on an understanding of the church’s 
inner-historical character to identify with the political aspirations of the Catholic 
and non-Catholic poor. Against the position staked out by Chenu and others were 
those who placed emphasis on the supernatural and eternal characteristics of the 
church as “the bride of Christ” and as the inheritor of Christ’s extraworldly author-
ity. Th ese critics conceived of the church as being especially graced by a divinely 
secured position across history and in this sense “outside” of the modern world. Th e 
church’s teachings and its judgments are not fi rst of all calibrated to the concrete 
challenges of a given situation, even if fi nally directed to that situation. Th ey are 
defi ned, rather, by its “sacred deposit” of revelation and the authority to interpret 
that revelation. Th e distinction is, of course, one of emphasis. But emphasis infl ects 
ramifi cations. To the extent that the church thinks of itself as a historical reality, its 
pastoral relation to the world is constituted from within. To the extent the church 
considers itself a supernatural reality, its pastoral relation to the world is constituted 
from without. One might say, then, that the persistent practical diffi  culty concern-
ing audience, with all it entails rhetorically and philosophically, was formulated as a 
problem of how to map the church on an axis of exteriority/interiority with regard 
to its relation to the world’s history.
A second practical diffi  culty, closely related to the fi rst, concerned the obvious 
tensions between the church’s address to “humanity,” understood as a unifi ed real-
ity, and the actual historical and moral fragmentation of people in the world. A 
challenge for the members of the subcommittee working on schema XIII consisted 
in proclaiming the unity of the church and the world in a bond of pastoral care 
while accounting for and being realistic about the needs created by the world’s ac-
tual disunity. Is the world’s disunity a false appearance, covering over the essential 
and timeless unity of the human family? Is disunity one of the evils of the modern 
world that needs to be overcome? Or, put the other way, the question was: how 
should the subcommission conceptualize the unity of humanity? Is it a hoped-for 
reality only to be achieved in the fullness of time? Is it actual already but just not yet 
complete? Is it a primordial truth or a teleological vision? All these framed the prob-
lem of the extent to which, or the fashion in which, all of “humanity” was real as a 
unity because of a “common and integral human vocation.” Put diff erently, there 
was no question of disputing the essential unity of humanity, per se. Th e question 
was: how it should be conceptualized, how should the church interpret the notion 
of a common calling, which makes humanity unifi ed? On some level this was not, 
F6671.indb   54 9/16/15   10:38:59 AM
  Th e Church, the Secular, and Pastoral Power 55
theologically speaking, a new problem. Christian thought is rife with discussions 
of realities that are “already” but “not yet.” A particular diffi  culty here, however, 
was that the schema was not intended to be a theological treatise but hortatory and 
thereby pastoral. Moreover, part of John’s reading of the auspicious character of the 
modern world was that, for all of its failings, it had created the planetary condi-
tions under which a theological vision for a unifi ed humanity might be practically 
realized. Being pastoral and situated, the schema was not any less conceptual, and 
the stakes of its conceptualization were all the higher for not being able to rely on 
the relatively esoteric luxuries of a theological treatise. Th eological negotiations had 
to be distilled and given form as an instrument susceptible of being turned into 
practice. Th e phrasing of Gaudet Mater Ecclesia typifi ed the problem: doctrine must 
function to help humans “understand well what they really are, what their lofty 
dignity and their purpose are,” and doctrine must do this so as to “infl uence the 
numerous fi elds of human activity.”
Th e question of how the relation between a unifying lofty purpose and a diver-
sity of human practices ought to be articulated was pressed with intensity in the 
spring of 1964 during the early drafting of the schema. Among others, the German 
Jesuit Karl Rahner found the treatment of this question profoundly inadequate. He 
found the distinction between the natural and the supernatural aspects of human 
vocation confused and argued that clearer defi nition was needed. In September 
1964, one month prior to the fi rst plenary debate on the schema, two new subcom-
missions were formed to respond to Rahner’s and others’ persistent dissatisfactions 
with the draft. Th e fi rst subcommission took up the question of how the church 
should go about constituting the forms of expertise needed to “read the signs of the 
times,” which I will describe below. Th e second subcommission was given the task 
of working on the problem of theological defi nitions, especially as they pertained to 
the question of human vocation. Rahner was appointed to this second commission 
and undertook the task of reconceptualizing nature and the supernatural.
As I described above, the integralist controversy—the controversy over how to 
interpret the relation of nature and the supernatural, the relation of nature and 
grace—formed a crucial part of the immediate theological background to deci-
sion to convene Vatican II. Arguably the most important fi gure in that controversy 
was the Jesuit theologian Henri de Lubac. De Lubac’s writings on the relation of 
nature and the supernatural had strongly emphasized the ways in which this rela-
tion critically informs the role and function of the church, especially at the level of 
how pastoral work is organized and justifi ed. Indeed, throughout his theological 
labors, de Lubac devoted considerable energy to demonstrating the mutually con-
stitutive links between theological anthropology and ecclesiology. Th is critical and 
constitutive relation became central to the unfolding debates over Schema XIII and 
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were framed using John’s language of human vocation. Rahner and others felt the 
shadow of de Lubac’s work and insisted that the anthropology-ecclesiology formula 
be dealt with in precise terms.
Th is eff ectively meant two things. First, they insisted that the task of clarify-
ing nature and supernatural dimensions of human vocation depended, in part, on 
determining which modes of reasoning and analysis would be included in the dis-
cussion and therefore which theological and nontheological consultants would be 
invited to contribute to the subcommission’s formulations. Second, they insisted 
that the task of clarifying nature and the supernatural also depended in part on how 
evil was (and was not) being conceptualized as essential to the constitution of the 
modern world. Th e subcommission needed to decide on the mode and extent to 
which the evil of the modern world should be included in their characterization of 
human vocation. Th e problem was easy enough to frame, theologically and ecclesi-
ally. It was, however, politically diffi  cult to resolve. In thinking about the human, 
the church, and the world of today, to what extent should the excesses, exclusions, 
injustices, and other evils of the modern world be defi nitive for characterizing the 
logic of the church’s pastoral relation and the object of the church’s pastoral care? 
Bishops from South America, Africa, Asia, and from communist parts of the world 
argued vehemently in favor of including a strong emphasis on evil in defi ning the 
character of the modern world. Political, social, and economic developments of the 
twentieth century had, of course, been devastating for much of the world. John’s 
optimism about the modern world, which was central to his vision for and justifi ca-
tion of the council, was fl atly refused and contested. Th ese bishops argued that the 
schema on the church and the modern world should be oriented less by an ideal 
vision of a common and integral human vocation and more by the eff ort to under-
score the myriad ways in which such a integral vocation is actually and actively vio-
lated, fragmented, and rendered increasingly unlikely in and by the modern world. 
Th eologically speaking, Th omistic refl ections on “human nature” were basically pit-
ted against Augustinian tropes of a world enslaved to sin. Th at John optimistically 
framed the world as being on the threshold of transformation was taken by some to 
be at best naïve and at worst deceptive and debilitating of any meaningful pastoral 
relation to modern power.
John’s critics argued that the more the evil of the world is emphasized in the 
church’s understanding of the modern world, the better able the church will be 
to position itself outside of that evil and thereby constitute itself as solace to those 
exploited by the world’s injustices. Th e more the potential goodness of the world is 
emphasized, by contrast, the more likely it is that the church will position itself as 
responsible for simply facilitating the unfolding of otherwise natural human capaci-
ties, which, however distracted by false desires or perverted by evil, basically just 
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come down to an issue of proper guidance. To put it simply, John’s critics prob-
lematized the unity of humanity’s vocation in relation to the question of how to 
think about humanity’s need for radical critique, repentance, and transformation. 
Th e question of the evil of the modern world would never be satisfactorily sorted 
out, as attested to by the still-lengthening history of debates between Liberation 
Th eology and its Vatican critics. But the problem of how to account for evil in the 
pastoral relation to the modern world contributed directly to the form ultimately 
given to the church’s anthropology of the dignifi ed human and its understanding of 
the church’s responsibility for that dignity.
Th e third diffi  culty, connected to the other two, concerned the question of ex-
pertise. Th ose involved in drafting schema XIII understood their task as centrally 
involving the biblical injunction from the book of Matthew to “read the signs of 
the times.” Th ey framed this injunction as a hermeneutical challenge: the question 
of how to interpret the needs and diffi  culties of the modern world in light of the 
magisterium’s patrimony of eternal truths. Th e practical diffi  culty was whether and 
how nontheological forms of expertise were needed in providing a satisfactory ac-
count of the aff airs of the world. What forms of expert knowledge were needed for 
the church, in the modern world, to take up successfully and eff ectively its long-
standing hermeneutic labor? To what extent and in what ways could the modern 
world be satisfactorily described by theology, the church, and the life of faith, and to 
what extent were the resources of other modes of insight and inquiry needed—from 
philosophy, the social sciences, biology, and so on? Th e question of expertise was 
more or less latent in John’s formulation of the challenge to the magisterium to take 
seriously the modes of reasoning characteristic of the modern world and in that way 
give “exceptional form” to the church’s doctrinal truth as its pastoral mission. Fol-
lowing the fi rst sustained round of drafts in spring of 1964, this question was put on 
the table in terms of who should be invited to provide advice to the council fathers: 
to what extent should the schema be informed by the theological sciences alone, or 
by the social and human sciences as well? Th e fi rst half-dozen drafts of the schema 
testify to the subcommission’s inability to resolve this question to everyone’s satisfac-
tion. Th e drafts were alternatively characterized by lesser and greater philosophical 
and sociological emphases. By the summer of 1964 a pragmatic and structural reso-
lution was proposed whereby the introductory sections of the schema were almost 
exclusively theological and philosophical. Th e subsequent sections, including the 
appendices, presented the church’s position on specifi c modern challenges (marriage 
and the family, culture, economic and social life, promoting solidarity, war and 
peace, and the like). Th ese subsequent sections included diagnoses of the modern 
world framed using the analytic terms of the human sciences.
Th is partition of the report was partially helpful in addressing the veridictional 
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question. But it left unanswered the underlying conceptual diffi  culties concerning 
the place of modern modes of reasoning and truth speaking in helping the church 
read the “signs of the times” and in formulating the terms of its pastoral relation 
to the modern world. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the council fathers put 
themselves in something of a double bind. On the one side, their diagnosis of the 
modern world turned on the notion that scientifi c knowledge per se could not tell 
us how to live our lives. As such, the modern world, in which the sciences had be-
come dominant, was proceeding in an unguided fashion and therefore away from 
the actualization of human dignity. Th eir diagnosis, one might say, accepted Max 
Weber’s dictum that the modern sciences “cannot tell you what to do.” On the other 
side, however, the council fathers’ feel for the social and economic ills of the modern 
world depended in part on insights articulated by sociologists and others. Th e ques-
tion, then, was how to incorporate these modern understandings of the modern 
world in such a way as to account for the fact that they could not “tell one what to 
do.” Th e bind was obviously not unique to deliberations over the schema. Not only 
was it immanent to John’s rationale for the council; it had been a major topic of 
theological dispute since at least the middle of the nineteenth century. In fact, many 
of the theologians whose work informed the rationale for the council—de Lubac, 
Congar, and others—had been deeply formed by eff orts since the late nineteenth 
century to formulate theologies that explicitly rejected the terms of the modern 
separation of “natural philosophy” from theological reasoning. Th ese debates now 
needed to be transformed into equipment for pastoral care. In the view of many 
participants, the material problems and needs of the modern world simply could 
not be suffi  ciently well understood and eff ectively addressed without making some 
use of extratheological modes of reasoning.
Th ose who held that the church’s “patrimony of truth” was suffi  cient appealed 
to something of a form-substance distinction: the substance of doctrine needed 
only to be faithfully rendered in a form indexed to the modern world. But this 
formulation seemed to suggest that the problem was simply a diagnostic, rhetorical, 
and communicative one. Th e question of the signs of the times was, however, more 
profound than this and entailed the question of the extent to which the church 
would allow for the reformulation of its self-understanding, implicit in the pastoral 
challenge of Schema XIII, to be shaped by the use of distinctive and diff erentiated 
modes of reasoning. Th e question thereby consisted of the extent to which the 
conceptions of the world produced by those modes of reasoning should be incor-
porated into the church’s understanding of its objects of pastoral care and thereby 
how they might weigh on the question of how that object should be cared for. Th e 
diffi  culty, in the end, pivoted on the pastoral question: if the needs of the world 
contribute to defi ning the pastoral vocation of the church, then in what ways and to 
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what extent should those needs be articulated by modes of reasoning other than the 
theological? To what extent will the exceptional form of the magisterial pastorate 
consist of knowing and speaking the truth in extratheological terms?
Work on the schema took the form of a kind of combative but forward-moving 
set of exchanges between natural law and the sciences, deductive and inductive 
exercises, historical and ahistorical ontologies. But if one tracks the interactions and 
negotiations it is clear that drafts of the text progressed without really resolving the 
underlying question of who ultimately should be allowed to contribute to interpret-
ing the signs of the times. Th e question of expertise was taken particularly seriously 
by Chenu and theologians of so-called nouvelle theologie, for whom the rejection of 
a presumed split between nature and the supernatural carried with it a rejection 
of a presumed split between natural and supernatural knowledge. But even these 
theologians could not really, in the end, simply dismiss out of hand knowledge of 
the world produced by the modern social sciences, and so the practical diffi  culty 
stood. Th e answer to it would determine such matters as who would be invited 
as contributing consultants (for example, the bishops of South America wanted 
more representatives from Th ird World countries, French bishops wanted experts 
on current trends in humanist philosophy, Polish bishops wanted experts capable of 
sustained analysis of state-sponsored communism, etc.). Th e question of whether or 
not signs of the times would be taken seriously as loci theologici, resources for theol-
ogy and not just objects of theological refl ection, needed to be resolved.
Th rough the fi rst plenary work on Schema XIII and during the third council pe-
riod and the ensuing year of revision, formal and informal debate over the question 
of the signs of the times remained in play. Th e issue, sharpened to its fi nest point, 
was articulated as a problem of conciliar genre: which type of document would the 
schema be in its fi nal form, and, hence, what kind of lasting authority would it 
have? Could an ecumenical council, a venue traditionally used to consider ques-
tions of doctrine taken to be universally valid, produce a constitutional document 
pastoral in character? Conciliar constitutions were taken by many to be reserved for 
the formulation of doctrine. Pastoral matters were taken to be matters of the ap-
plication of doctrine. Doctrine was timeless, pastoral concerns timely.
As late as the weeks prior to the fi nal council period (September 1965), German, 
French, and Italian bishops were calling for the schema to be tabled and left to a 
postconciliar commission. And if not tabled, they asked for the schema to be re-
duced to the status of a “letter” and not a constitution—a political resolution to the 
problem of authority and genre. Th e requests were ultimately rejected, and the ar-
gument was made that even with these tensions unresolved, the schema constituted 
an important instrument of reorientation for the church’s future pastoral relations 
to the world. Moreover, the claim that the Pastoral Constitution represented a 
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fundamental betrayal of conciliar genre depended on a prior presumption that the 
doctrinal and pastoral needed to be strictly distinguished and even separated. But 
such a separation would have put in question the basic rationale for the council 
itself as articulated by John XXIII, which, of course, in some minds it did.
toward pastoral equipment
Th e eff ort to divide doctrine and pastoral power—to position one as upstream and 
conceptual, the other as downstream and practical—can be thought of as a rejection 
of the design parameters for pastoral power that John fi rst put in place in his opening 
address. He had given the council fathers the diffi  cult charge of constituting Vati-
can II as a venue for the doctrinal work of the magisterium as well as a venue for the 
elaboration of new pastoral practices. In setting out his designs for the council, John 
introduced the problem of pastoral power in such a way that there could be no clean 
or total separation of the doctrinal from the pastoral. Th e veridictional character 
of the former and the jurisdictional demands of the latter needed to be interfaced, 
mutually adjusted, and combined into a distinctive mode and form of care for the 
world. John’s call for such a mode and form was predicated on his sense of a kind of 
ontological and temporal parallel between things human and things ecclesial, a paral-
lel in which humanity and the church are taken to be pastorally fi tted to each other.
John’s expectation that pastoral power could be made something more, some-
thing other than just the direction of the fl ock or the condemnation of errors, that 
it could also be constituted as care for “all men” of “our times,” was based on the 
presumption that the council fathers could convert the church’s doctrinal authority 
into a form of pastoral practice adequate to, and capable of, caring for the world 
of today. Th e task consisted in designing modes of reasoning and acting by way of 
which the timeless doctrine of the church could be rendered as a response to and 
clarifi cation of the problems of the modern world. To meet the demands of this 
task, the council fathers would need to connect and resolve the series of ontological, 
methodological, and philosophical problems that I’ve outlined in this chapter: what 
is the church such that it is capable of caring for the world? What is the world such 
that the church is susceptible to being cared for by the church without ceasing to be 
the world? How is the pastoral venue of the church to be related to its object of care? 
And how is all of this to be articulated through the magisterium yet in such a way 
that it is acceptable “before the world”? Th ese problems required the council fathers 
to specify the object of refl ection and concern in relation to which each of these 
questions could be worked out as a single ensemble. Th at object and ensemble, as I 
will explain in the next chapter, was the fi gure of human dignity.
Two orienting diagnoses can be ventured at this point. Th e fi rst reiterates a point 
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I made in the introduction. Whatever the function and signifi cance of the fi gure of 
human dignity today, that fi gure has been brought to articulation in part by the fact 
that it off ered an answer to a constitutional, or reconstitutional, diffi  culty for several 
venues charged with the task of caring for the aff airs of the modern world. In the 
case of Vatican II, this constitutional diffi  culty was framed as the challenge of giving 
form to a pastoral relation to the modern world. Th is challenge was taken up as the 
labor of imagining the church as a pastorate for and to those beyond the church. 
Th e object and objective of that pastoral relation is human dignity. Human dignity 
was made the object and objective insofar as it provided a term that answered the 
council fathers’ work on the problem of the pastorate, grace, and the modern world. 
Another way of saying this is that human dignity as it is named and talked about 
today is, in part, an artifact of a response to these problems.
Th e conception of human dignity that emerged from Vatican II was character-
ized by a relative singularity and coherence despite the problematized fi eld of rela-
tions within which it was brought to articulation. Th is singularity and coherence is 
remarkable in that it was fashioned through the theological and political negotia-
tions of more than two thousand council fathers and four hundred advisory theo-
logians, the diversity and number of theological contests inherited, in part, from 
a century of debates set in motion by the fi rst Vatican Council, and through the 
strictures, mandates, and consequences of the council as a unique class of ecclesial 
event with a specifi c doctrinal and pastoral authority. Th e singularity and coherence 
of the formulation of human dignity is signifi cant not simply because it indicates 
theological or ecclesiological novelty. It is signifi cant because it brought to order a 
range of longstanding problems and because of the mode of pastoral intervention it 
facilitated in view of those problems.
Th e second orienting diagnosis is that at Vatican II human dignity was made 
into an object for the reconfi guration of pastoral power. Th e broader signifi cance of 
this reconfi guration will form the substance of this book’s “Diagnostic Excursus.” 
Here it is enough to reiterate three important characteristics of this reconfi guration. 
First, in his address to the United Nations Paul VI suggested that the church and 
the United Nations share a kind of defi ning pastoral mission: they are both pasto-
ral venues of a sort. Paul certainly did not mean that the United Nations should 
concern itself with the shepherding of the fl ock or with the daily conduct of souls. 
Nor did he mean that the church should stand alongside other sovereign powers 
as an organ of international government. Rather, what Paul indicated by this char-
acterization is that both the church and the United Nations are venues in which a 
mode and form of power is called for that allows them both to sort through a classic 
pastoral dilemma: omnes et singulatim. Th e United Nations and the church must 
fi nd a way to care for all humanity and each human.
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Th e second characteristic is that this reconfi guration of pastoral power is to be 
carried out without recourse to familiar and longstanding instruments of gover-
nance—whether ecclesial or political. Th e church was already equipped with a 
plurality of mechanisms for conducting daily conduct at the level of the souls of 
individual Christians, congregations, and the Roman Catholic Church taken as 
a whole. But the demand made by John that the council fathers constitute a new 
form of pastoral relation is predicated on the notion that the church can form a 
kind of pastorate for the ecclesia ad extra. So, whatever it means to take up the 
mandate of caring for all and each one in relation to humanity and humans, it must 
be taken up without direct recourse to the church’s familiar instruments of spiritual 
government. Th is second characteristic, as I try to show in the next chapter, justifi es 
the design of what could be called hermeneutic equipment: equipment for the in-
terpretation of the modern world by way of which the magisterium can help orient, 
even if not directly conduct, the life and actualization of humanity.
A third characteristic, which I have not really unpacked but which is the subject 
of the next chapter, is that the object of this reconfi gured pastoral power is human 
dignity. More specifi cally it is human dignity conceived as archonic—as intrinsic, 
primordial, and commanding. Th is conception of things human proves to be a use-
ful response to the two-part demand of omnes et singulatim and the relative absence 
of mechanisms for the pastoral conduct of “all and each one,” when taken up at the 
scale of humanity and every human. Dignity as primordial, as archonic, is not the 
kind of pastoral object that requires vigilant and continual cultivation. It is, after all, 
given. Dignity, however, can certainly be violated or compromised and, under the 
sign of the modern world, may in fact be quite vulnerable to violation or compro-
mise. Whatever form of pastoral practices are needed, they do not need to consist 
in generating dignity, per se. Rather, they need to consist in guarding dignity from 
violation and compromise by providing humanity with a better understanding of 
its own ends, and in this they can help cultivate a life calibrated to its proper ends 
without disruption, misdirection, or blockage. Th is does, of course, raise the prac-
tical question: to what extent is the human capable of actualizing its own proper 
ends without the church’s intervention? Th is question will continue to trouble the 
church well after the close of the council. Whatever a pastoral relation with the 
world consists in, it must take account of diffi  culties connected to the relation of 
nature and grace, the relation of nature and the supernatural, and the church’s role 
in mediating that relation. In any case, given the implications of the papal address 
and the initial work on Schema XIII, human dignity in the “world of today” re-
quires a venue through which practices of care, consisting in interpreting the mean-
ing and challenges of the modern world, can be formulated and facilitated.
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Th e Ontology of Vocation:
Gaudium et spes
Everything we have said about the dignity of the human person, and about the human 
community and the profound meaning of human activity, lays the foundation for the re-
lationship between the Church and the world, and provides the basis for dialogue between 
them.
—Th e Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World
In the last chapter I began to characterize one of the key themes and sites of con-
testation at the Second Vatican Council: the demand for a new kind of pastoral 
relation between the church and the modern world. I gave particular attention to 
the main predicates of this demand as they were set out in Pope John XXIII’s open-
ing address: an ontological and temporal conjunction between the church and the 
modern world in the fi gure of the human as natural but fulfi lled in the supernatu-
ral. Th is is a conjunction that, for John, invites and justifi es a reconfi gured pasto-
ral relation. John expected that pastoral relation to pass through the magisterium, 
the teaching authority of the church as embodied in the council fathers, and pass 
through in such a way that the church’s teaching authority could illuminate and 
orient humanity in its proper orientation to the divine.
I underscored the importance of the fact that the mode of pastoral care called 
for in John’s opening address was directed to “humanity” and not, per se, to the 
soul, the fl ock, the sinner, Christendom, or another fi gure of the ecclesia ad interna. 
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Th is proposition that the church can have a pastoral relation to the contemporary 
world that centers on and takes as its object “the human” or “humanity” became a 
vector point for working out a number of questions: what is the church such that 
it can have a pastoral relation to “humanity” in the contemporary world? What is 
“humanity” such that it is in need of such a relation? And what kinds of practices 
can possibly be designed and facilitated in the space of this relation, given precisely 
that “humanity” is considered as that which forms part of, but which also exceeds, 
the church? Th e challenge John gave to the council fathers was to bring to articula-
tion a logic of pastoral care fi t to the needs of the modern world in light of and in 
response to these questions as well as the outlines of the pastoral equipment needed 
to turn that logic into a practice.
In characterizing this theme of, and demand for, a new pastoral relation I also 
pointed to some of the points of blockage that the council fathers began to encoun-
ter in responding to John’s call. Th ere was serious debate concerning the anthropo-
logical optimism fi gured in John’s address. Can the church be so optimistic about 
the human condition in the modern world, and what is it about the modern world 
that changes the classical proposition that the human, in its very nature, tends to 
the supernatural? And how might such an integralist position be articulated in such 
a way as to serve as a basis for a relation to those beyond the church—how might it 
be brought to articulation “for all men”? My aim in characterizing these diffi  culties 
was to elaborate a series of problems that began to coalesce in such a way that the 
notion of human dignity could be put forward as a response. I have made reference 
to the fi gure of human dignity at Vatican II several times but have not actually 
shown how it was elaborated in relation to the pastoral question. Th at elaboration 
is the goal of this present chapter. I will do this by examining the Pastoral Constitu-
tion Gaudium et spes—the fi nal form of Schema XIII—in order to give a detailed 
account of the politico-theological anthropology developed there.
In off ering this reading of the Pastoral Constitution, I hope to make three things 
clear. Th e fi rst is to show how a specifi c form of hermeneutic practice and equip-
ment was introduced as appropriate both to human needs in the modern world as 
well as to the capacities of the church’s teaching authority to meet those needs. Th e 
second is to show how this practice and this equipment depended on an under-
standing of the human as called, in its very nature, to unity with the divine. Th is 
vocational anthropology, if you will, is central to the defi nition of human dignity 
and the care of human dignity brought forward in the Pastoral Constitution. Th ird 
and fi nally, I will say something about the price to be paid for this conception of 
human dignity. Among other things, this conception of human dignity opened the 
door to the question of the church’s exclusive right and capacity to provide salva-
tional care to the human and to humanity in the modern world.
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the community of the called and the human vocation
Th e fi nal debate on the constitution of the church and the modern world was car-
ried out from October through November 1965. Despite several years of contesta-
tion, reformulation, and challenge, Schema XIII was voted on and fi nally approved 
by the 95 percent needed to establish it as a constitution of the ecumenical council. 
Within just a few weeks fi nal revisions were completed, and the fi nal draft of the 
constitution—Gaudium et spes—was settled and made part of the church. All told, 
as of the closing of the council, four and a half years had passed since John called 
for the church to rethink and articulate the outlines of a reconstituted pastoral rela-
tion to the world.
Analytically, one can say that the fathers’ formulations in the Pastoral Consti-
tution are a response to three questions. Th e fi rst is: what is the contemporary world 
such that it can—indeed must—be the object of the church’s pastoral power? Th e sec-
ond: what is the church such that it can and must take the world as the object of 
its pastoral concern? Th e third: how can the church accomplish this by means of its 
capacities as a teaching authority? At the center of the fathers’ response to these 
questions is a link, an interface, a structural joint between the church and the 
modern world. Th at structural joint is the human cast as inherently dignifi ed. De-
cades of prior theological and pastoral problematization, four years of debate at 
the council among hundreds of theologians, thousands of clergy, announcements, 
negotiations, dealings, intimidations, reasons, and vehement passions were made 
to coalesce into a single anthropological point: human dignity. A defi ning feature 
of this anthropological point is precisely that human dignity is that which speaks 
for itself.
Final work on Gaudium et spes was conducted on the heels of work on Lu-
men gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. Th e opening lines of the 
Pastoral Constitution make reference to something of a linear development in the 
council’s thought and work: having off ered a dogmatic statement on the church 
ad interna, it proposes to turn to the consideration of the church ad extra. Having 
“settled the question of the Church,” the council can now “explain to everyone 
how it conceives of the presence and activity of the Church in the world of today.” 
Th e presumption of a kind of linear move from the formulation of doctrine to the 
pastoral application of doctrine may have conformed to the view of many of the 
council fathers concerning the proper relation of the theological and the pastoral, 
but of course it is neither how things actually progressed, nor is it a faithful reading 
of the relation of doctrine and the pastorate as that relation is actually developed in 
the Pastoral Constitution. A crucial feature of the constitution is that the organ of 
doctrine, the magisterium, true to John’s initial vision for the council, is positioned 
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to serve as a kind of pastoral apparatus. Th e conceptual diffi  culty of Vatican II with 
regard to the question of pastoral power, after all, is not how to apply doctrine in 
pastoral care. Th e question was how to convert the teaching authority into an ap-
paratus of care for the modern world.
In actual fact, work carried out in Gaudium et spes consisted in an exercise of 
what has been called recursive rectifi cation. Work on the constitution passed 
through anthropological questions, ecclesial questions, and questions of pastoral 
practice. With each pass adjustments were made. Th e end result was a rectifi ed set 
of relations in which the human was conceived as that being in pressing need of 
the church’s care and the church as that venue uniquely equipped to respond to the 
needs of the day. Neither in substance nor form was Gaudium et spes merely the 
pastoral application of doctrine.
My analysis here will focus only on Part One of the Pastoral Constitution: De 
Ecclesia et Vocatione Hominis—the Church and the Human Vocation. In Part One 
of the constitution the council fathers develop their conception of human dignity 
as well as their conception of the church’s pastoral relation to human dignity. Part 
Two of the Pastoral Constitution dealt directly with specifi c questions of the day—
war, poverty, family, and technology, among others. In many ways Part Two, being 
more concrete, captured more of the world’s attention. In that part, more than in 
the fi rst, the authors of the Pastoral Constitution had to demonstrate and carry out 
the proposals made in Part One. It is the material of Part One, however, that most 
directly concerns the theme of this inquiry.
Th ree features of Part One are most relevant. Th e fi rst is that the relation be-
tween the church and the modern world is conceived in terms of the relation of 
the church to the human as a vocational being. Th e human is a creature who is 
called, called into being. Th at the concept of vocation should be given central con-
sideration by the council fathers is, perhaps, not surprising. Th e term “vocation,” 
or “calling,” after all, has a complicated and consequential theological and political 
status in the modern world, as Max Weber has famously shown. As conceptualized 
in the Pastoral Constitution, however, vocation arises out of a diff erent theological 
tradition than the one Weber analyzed and has a diff erent political status than it 
does in the largely Protestant emphasis of his study.
Th e second feature that deserves attention is that the church’s relation to the 
modern world is fi gured as passing through dignity. Dignity and human vocation 
are linked. Th e human understood as a being with a dignifi ed calling is the struc-
tural joint between the church and the modern world.
Th e third feature is the ontological parallel or similarity, the analogical participa-
tion established, from the outset, between the church in its being and the human 
vocation (human dignity as a matter of ecclesiological and anthropological par-
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ticipation). Recall that the term vocation—vocatione—is the Vulgate translation of 
St. Paul’s term klēse, calling (from kaleō, to call). Recall also that ecclesia is the Vul-
gate translation of ekklēssia, the community of the called, most often translated in 
English as “the church”—another word arising from the same family as kaleō. Th e 
human, then, is that creature which is called. And the ecclesia is the community of 
those who are called. By way of human vocation the world is ontologically linked 
with, and a matter of concern for, the church.
De Ecclesia et Vocatione Hominis can be thought of as thematically structured ac-
cording to two questions. Th e fi rst is: Quid Ecclesia de homine sentit? What does the 
church think about the human? And Quid Ecclesia venit prout ipsa, in hoc mundo 
existit et cum eo vivit atque agit? What is the church, inasmuch as she exists in the 
world, living and acting with it? Th ese two questions can be rephrased to facilitate 
the analysis of human dignity and pastoral power. First: what is the human such 
that it should be rightly thought of as a pastoral object of the church’s care? Second: 
what is the church such that it should rightly care for the human as its pastoral 
object? Following the structure of Part One of the Pastoral Constitution, I will 
examine these two questions in turn.
quid ecclesia de homine sentit?
What is the human such that it should be rightly thought of as a pastoral object 
of the church’s care? A fi rst answer to the question is indicated by the subsections 
of De Ecclesia et Vocatione Hominis. Th e fi rst subsection considers the human as 
a dignifi ed being. Th e second subsection considers the human as a community, 
that is, as humanity. Th is distinction of “the human” and “humanity” is crucial to 
understanding the object of the church’s pastoral care as imagined in the Pastoral 
Constitution. Insofar as it is an object of pastoral care, the constitution conceives of 
human dignity as a relation. Th e object of the church’s attention is not the human, 
per se, nor humanity, per se. It is the relation human-humanity, with all this implies 
about the ontological and pastoral unity of elements that might otherwise be taken 
up as matters of heterogeneous quality and scale.
An important aspect of taking up things human as a relation is that the distinc-
tion between “the human” and “humanity” is not simply one of the individual and 
the collective. Th e pastorate is certainly responsible for both the individual and 
the collective. But this more or less quantitative and scalar distinction misses the 
proposed integral ontological relation between the human and humanity in rela-
tion to the church. Th e distinction, which opens up two poles or vector points in 
a single relation, is a matter of distinct ontological modes. In the fi rst place, the 
Pastoral Constitution is concerned with the human, taken up in terms of its nature 
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and destiny, its origin and ends. In the second place, it is concerned with the non-
disrupted actualization of that nature and ends as a being-in-unity (“socialization”) 
and, thereby, as a corporate and unifi ed thing (“the whole of humanity”). Th e joint 
that holds these two poles together is human dignity, but human dignity under-
stood through a particular concept. Th at concept is vocation. Th e human vocation, 
understood theologically and thereby anthropologically, is what both defi nes and 
actualizes human dignity.
Vocation
Th e Pastoral Constitution asks: Quid est autem homo? What is the human? In an-
swering, it distinguishes and connects two elements. Th e constitution conceives of 
the human as created—a creature made in God’s image (the classic notion of the 
imago dei)—and thereby capable, by nature, of knowing and communing with its 
Creator. In the imago dei the human creature is ontologically capable of God, as it 
were, because it participates in God’s being. Th e constitution also conceives of the 
human as a creature that is defi ned, in its creation, by a particular end—a destiny 
proper to (that is, characteristic of and belonging to) its origin. Th at end is commu-
nion with God. Th e link that connects these two (origin and destiny) into a single 
being with an integrated nature is vocation. Th e human is called into being; the hu-
man is called to the end of communion with God. Th e dignity of the human, as the 
constitution fi gures it, adheres in this conjunction, this participation, of origin and 
destiny in vocation: “the dignity of the human vocation.” Th e human is dignifi ed 
by virtue of human vocation—vocatione hominis.
Th eologically, the term vocation is drawn from the writings of St. Paul. Th e place 
of this term in the modern world, and its ecclesial and extraecclesial importance in 
the ordering of human life and activity, has been the subject of some dispute. Most 
notable, of course, are Max Weber’s refl ections on the signifi cance of Luther’s no-
tion of “worldly vocation,” connected to his translation of the biblical klēsis as the 
German Beruf and the subsequent connections he makes between the Protestant 
ethic of work, a this-worldly asceticism, and the Geist of capitalism. Less familiar are 
debates concerning the relation of the Pauline notion of vocation and the messianic 
themes that Paul connects to that notion. Th ese connections, and their signifi cance 
for diagnosing the modern world, have been taken up in the political theologies of 
Walter Benjamin, Jacob Taubes, and, somewhat more recently, Giorgio Agamben. 
A brief reminder of Weber’s refl ections as well as those off ered by Agamben will 
serve to situate the distinctive way in which the notion of vocation is taken up by 
the council fathers.
According to Weber, the Pauline concept of klēsis signifi es the calling of God to 
eternal salvation. It is, in this sense, a “purely religious” concept of vocation. Weber 
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argues, however, that in the Pauline texts, klēsis indicates an attitude of “eschato-
logical indiff erence” toward the question of whether some worldly occupations are 
more important, spiritually and salvationally, than others. To quote Weber, “Since 
everyone was awaiting the coming of the Lord, then let everyone remain in the es-
tate in which the call of the Lord has found him, and continue to labor as before.” 
Weber shows how, in Luther, the meaning of vocation eventually shifts. Although 
Luther initially emphasized a kind of eschatological indiff erence in connection to 
God’s call, from the time of the Peasant Revolts, which were quite brutal on all 
sides, he began to connect vocation more directly with a duty to fulfi ll one’s worldly 
profession, whether religious or secular. He formulates a conception of vocation 
defi ned by God’s command to remain in, and fulfi ll the duties of, the worldly posi-
tion one fi nds oneself in. Th is shift from indiff erence to diligence corresponds to 
Luther’s understanding of the spheres of creation and the providential nature of 
politics: one’s position in a worldly order corresponds to God’s calling insofar as that 
order is taken to be necessary to peace and integral to fulfi lling the commandment 
of “brotherly love.” To quote Weber again, “the individual should remain once and 
for all in the station and calling in which God had placed him, and should restrain 
his worldly activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life.” Th e 
point I want to lift out is that in Weber we see a tracing of the meaning of vocation 
from an eschatological attitude of indiff erence to worldly aff airs to an ethic of duty 
in one’s professional station corresponding to the interoperations of the spheres of 
creation in which the spiritual and the secular are distinguished, and therein sepa-
rate, but guided by a common purpose of neighborly love.
Th e key to Weber’s analysis of Luther is 1 Corinthians 7:20: “Let each man abide 
in that calling wherein he was called (en tē klēse hē ēklēthē).” Following the Old 
Testament scholar Adalbert Merx, Weber argues that in this verse the term voca-
tion does correspond more or less to the German concept of Ruf, meaning “stand,” 
referring to status or condition (for example, in a married state, or the condition 
of a servant). Weber in this way reads the verse as indicating something like an 
ontological split between the worldly station one fi nds oneself in and the salvation 
to which one is called. Th e presumption of this ontological split is important and 
should be kept in mind as a background against which the council’s work develops. 
In any case, according to Weber, vocation thus produces ontological separation in 
the name of an eschatological indiff erence. It is precisely this separation that begins 
to get taken for granted, and thereby covered over, in the Lutheran account of vo-
cation. Worldly vocation, which remains a strict duty, begins to be separated from 
one’s salvation in God.
Giorgio Agamben challenges Weber’s reading. Elucidating the signifi cance of 
klēsis diff erently, Agamben asks: “Is it correct to interpret the Pauline concept of 
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the call, like Weber does, as an expression of ‘eschatological indiff erence’ toward 
worldly conditions?” Rather than the eschatological, klēsis on Agamben’s reading 
(following Jacob Taubes) indicates a messianic condition—it is a technical term of 
Paul’s messianic vocabulary. Crucial to Agamben’s analysis is that although klēsis 
puts in question the “factical” and “juridical” conditions of worldly activities and 
stations, it does not thereby point to another identity beyond these in connection 
to which one might take up a posture of indiff erence toward things worldly. Th at 
is to say, in putting things worldly into question klēsis does not therewith open up 
a kind of ontological separation, but rather, in Agamben’s terms, Paul’s messianic 
vocation “hollows out” and “nullifi es” worldly vocations without replacing them 
with something else one might devote oneself to. Th e call puts worldly vocations 
into permanent question, but not in the name of a nonworldly answer.
Agamben interprets 1 Corinthians 7:20 diff erently than Weber’s reading of Lu-
ther. Agamben notes that in the Vulgate, the fourth-century translation of the Bible, 
St. Jerome translates en tēē klēse hē ēklēthē as qua vocatione vocatus est. Th e key term 
here for Agamben is the Greek anaphoric pronoun hē, which Jerome renders qua, 
“as.” Th e crucial function of this term becomes apparent in subsequent verses. In 
29–30 Paul’s text defi nes the messianic life by way of a series of revocations or nul-
lifi cations: “those having wives may be as not having, and those weeping as not 
weeping, and those rejoicing as not rejoicing, and those buying as not possessing, 
and those using the world as not using it up.” Agamben interrogates the relation 
of verse 7:20 to verses 29–30. At the center of these lengthy eff orts is his attention 
to the phrase “as not,” hōs mē. Th e meaning of Paul’s injunction to “abide in the 
calling as that to which one is called” is found in the as not. Th e injunction of verse 
20 has a “peculiar tautegorical movement” that only makes sense in view of the hōs 
mē. One is called to revoke every worldly condition precisely as a means of remain-
ing in that worldly condition while existing in critical tension with that condition. 
One remains in the calling to which one is called in a mode of perpetual critique. 
Vocation names a critical posture: one remains as not remaining.
On Agamben’s reading, the messianic vocation puts into question all worldly 
conditions as a critical act of remaining in those conditions. Vocation is an en-
actment of revocation. Th is is simply to say that, for Agamben, klēsis, vocatione, 
is messianic and not eschatological, understanding eschatological as in some way 
otherworldly. Vocation as messianic vocation “signifi es the expropriation of each 
and every juridical-factical property (circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; man/
woman) under the form of the as not. Th is expropriation does not, however, found 
a new identity; the ‘new creature’ is none other than the use and messianic vocation 
of the old.” In this reading, vocation is neither a state of being nor an orientation 
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to a world beyond the world, nor can it be identifi ed with any specifi c content or 
activity. It is, rather, an ontological disruption, a permanent revocation of the world 
without fl eeing the world.
“Vocatione,” “vocation,” in Gaudium et spes indicates neither the ontological split 
of eschatological indiff erence, nor a coordinated sphere of existence, nor a messianic 
revocation. Vocation is not a call beyond the world, nor is it a call to remain in one’s 
station in order to help fulfi ll the coordinated order of the worldly and the spiritual, 
nor is it a matter of putting the world in question (although an understanding of 
“true human vocation” provides a standard by which to evaluate and reject activities 
in confl ict with such a “true” vocation). Th e ontological character and temporality 
of vocation for the council fathers is diff erent from either the eschatological or the 
messianic. It is archonic. To repeat what I noted in the introduction: combining the 
Greek arkhōn and archē, the term archonic carries a double meaning. In the fi rst place 
it refers to origin, to a primordial origin; in the second place to it refers to judgment 
or governance. To characterize vocation as archonic is to say that its defi nition is 
found in its origin, its primordial origin. Th e meaning of vocation is primordial 
and thereby constitutive. It is not at all accidental, in the Th omistic sense of that 
term. Vocation is not something added on to a creature with an origin. Vocation is 
original. To characterize vocation as archonic is also to say that the principles that 
govern the proper form and ends of the calling are connected to and implied in its 
origins. In his refl ections on the concept of the archonic, the theologian Ted Peters 
notes the subtle relation between origins and destiny at play in archonic conceptual-
ization. To say that the essence of the human is archonic is not to say that it is either 
nonhistorical or static, although in some cases it might be both, as I will explain in 
my examination of the United Nations’ work on human rights. Rather, the archonic 
can be conceived in genetic as distinct from epigenetic terms. Th is means that the es-
sence of things human might include or involve a developmental trajectory, but this 
trajectory is determined and governed by potentials that are inherent in the origin. 
Th e norm and metric of the human is present and set from the outset.
It follows that the concept archonic designates a way of being, an ontological 
mode, in which ends and origins have a synthetic and nonlinear relation to each 
other. Th ey are synthetic in that destiny and origin are folded into each other; 
the one indicates and is constituted by the other. Th eir relation is nonlinear in 
that destiny is not a state subsequent to origins but rather is the actualization and 
completion of the rule anticipated and prescribed in the origin. It is in this sense 
that vocatio in Gaudium et spes is archonic. As archonic it is defi nitive of the human. 
Th e answer to the question Quid est autem homo? is, in the fi rst place, the creature 
who has an archonic vocation.
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Th e Human
Strictly speaking, the phrase “human vocation” in the Pastoral Constitution has an 
ontological referent. It refers to the notion that the human is called to be, is called 
into being. Vocation thus holds within it a double signifi cation. To be called into 
being, of course, means to originate, to have origins. With regard to origins, voca-
tion signifi es a call into being. To be called into being means to be drawn toward an 
end, to be oriented to a purpose. In terms of ends, vocation signifi es that the human 
originates according to a purpose. Th e Pastoral Constitution proposes that the origi-
nal human purpose, the call into being, vocatione hominis, is unity with God. Th is 
proposition is consistent with the classical theological notion of thēosis, or diviniza-
tion, the transformative process by which a human creature is called away from sin, 
from hamartia, literally “missing the mark,” and oriented toward its proper end, 
unity with the being of God. Th e human is called into being by God and needs to 
overcome the tendency to miss the mark in order to realize unity with the divine. 
Th e subtlety that needs to be kept track of is that the telos of union with God is 
proper to human origins and is in this sense properly human. It is a truth, a primary 
truth of things human—the logos of anthropos. Put in terms consistent with the 
writings of Th omas Aquinas, which informed the language of the Pastoral Constitu-
tion, the divine call establishes the inner principle that determines the proper ends 
of the human: that to which the human is, by nature, oriented. Vocation founds 
the nature of the human. Th e reciprocal site of human destiny is human origins. To 
use the more exact theological phrase (which does not appear in the Pastoral Con-
stitution but which is implied throughout): the human is, by nature, called to the 
supernatural. It is for this reason that the human is said to be dignifi ed. And it is for 
this reason that one can say, analytically, that the dignifi ed human is archonic.
It is important to note that the term dignity in the pair human dignity is not, in 
fact, explicitly defi ned in the constitution. It is, however, conceptualized indirectly 
in that it is said to be the character of the human in its archonic vocation. Th is 
explains why the council fathers describe dignity both as a “noble destiny” and as 
“properly human.” It is vocational and therefore original. It is a divine attribution, 
but an attribution bestowed as a calling. Crucially for the council fathers, it is God 
that calls. Dignity is therefore a theological truth about things human in the strict 
sense that it is the logos of theos that establishes dignity. Th is means that dignity is 
not a conditional status or occasional estate—something to be achieved through 
human station. Th e call of the divine takes form in and as human being in its ori-
gins. Human being originates from a dignifi ed destiny. But in this sense, to repeat 
the point, dignity is also properly anthropological: the logos of anthropos is the form 
of dignity. In this sense the human is in its embodied existence dignifi ed—incarna-
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tional in the Christian sense of the divine logos taking on fl esh. Dignity (theologi-
cally and anthropologically) is archonic insofar as vocation is archonic.
Th e logic of all of this is captured by the following quote from the Pastoral Con-
stitution: “Th e root reason for human dignity lies in man’s call to communion with 
God. From the very circumstance of his origin man is already invited to converse 
with God.” Th e archonic is being brought to articulation here. Human dignity, 
the council fathers tell us, has a root. It is the kind of thing that can be described 
by an organic analogy (elsewhere the constitution uses the term “seed”). Th e root 
of human dignity is the call to communion with God. At root, dignity consists 
in the human being united with the divine. Dignity is rooted—and this point is 
crucial to what is being fi gured here—so we must resist thinking that it is extrinsic 
to the human qua human. Dignity is the very circumstance—the event—of hu-
man origins. Dignity is properly rooted in the human while at the same time being 
divinely planted. Vocation is the site at which human origins and destiny are made 
a synthetic unity. Vocation is the site of human dignity.
One problem that arises out of this proposal of the synthetic unity of origins and 
ends will prove particularly troublesome for the council fathers—one could even 
venture that, pastorally and thereby politically and ethically, it is the problem. Th e 
problem is this: if human dignity is original but originates in a divine call, can dig-
nity be recognized, declared, and defended without an appeal to the supernatural? 
Is dignity naturally apparent? Does one need to share a belief in a creating God in 
order to properly recognize dignity? Th e consequences for how this question is an-
swered are high, practically and politically, as becomes clear in multiple subsequent 
post–Vatican II debates. Th e debate concerning whether Christians should make 
cause with non-Christian politics and the debate over the status of human embry-
onic research are two sites of controversy connected to this question. Th e problem 
is that if a divinely planted dignity is properly human, and if it can be recognized 
by those who do not share the faith, then what is the distinctive role and purpose of 
the church in relation to the defense of human dignity?
Th e archonic dignity of the human vocation thus introduces a subtle but dif-
fi cult aspect of the pastoral challenge taken up in Gaudium et spes. Th e challenge, 
as John put it, is to constitute the pastoral relation between the church and the 
modern world in terms that are meaningful and comprehensible to the world—
the veridictional challenge of how to speak the truth in a mode acceptable to the 
ecclesia ad extra. Can the vocational logic of the archonic be formulated in strictly 
anthropological terms, that is to say, terms that sever the theological from the an-
thropological? From the council fathers’ point of view the answer is certainly “no.” 
At the heart of the constitution’s understanding of vocation is a Christological for-
mulation, as I will discuss below. Th is formulation constitutes one proposal for how 
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to think the relation between the properly anthropological and properly theological 
as integral. Nonetheless, the question will be pressed as to whether one needs to be 
Christian to recognize human dignity, in the sense put forward in the constitution, 
and therefore the question of whether the council fathers have actually met the de-
mands entailed in bringing to articulation a fi gure of human dignity that facilitates 
a meaningful pastoral relation between the church and the modern world. Th e 
answer to this lies in how one goes about conceiving the relation of human nature 
and the supernatural.
Joseph Ratzinger, who would become Pope Benedict XVI, insisted during the 
debates that Christology (that is, the doctrine of Jesus as the Christ, the “anointed 
one,” the messiah) is the conceptual space within which the problem of the relation 
of nature and the supernatural has traditionally been taken up by the church—
particularly when that problem is considered with attention to its anthropological 
dimensions. Ratzinger argued that the distinction St. Paul makes in the book of 
Romans between the fi rst and second “Adam,” wherein Christ is “the new human,” 
is a privileged scriptural formula for how the Christological informs, and thereby 
determines, the anthropological. In this way, the Christological also provides the 
basis for understanding the church’s relation to things human; that is, the church’s 
relation to Jesus as the Christ informs the church’s relation to humans per se. Fol-
lowing Ratzinger’s lead, the authors of the Pastoral Constitution ultimately did ar-
ticulate the relation of the church and the modern world using a Christological for-
mula. Th e Christic illuminates and (theologically speaking) justifi es the  archonic. 
Th e constitution reads: “Th e truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word 
does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the fi rst man, was a fi gure of Him 
Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the fi nal Adam, by the revela-
tion of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and 
makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the afore-
mentioned truths fi nd their root and attain their crown.” Christ, one could say in 
reading this passage, is the exemplar of the archonic nature of the human. Christ is 
also the means by which the divinity of the archonic calling is made humanly clear 
and thereby provides orientation and actualization. Simply put: the Christological 
illumines and actualizes the anthropological and thereby indicates what the prop-
erly ecclesiastical relationship consists in. Th e archonic is explained by the Christic 
indicating the ecclesiastic.
Of course the veridictional question remains. In the church’s pastoral relation to 
the world, can the archonic ever be conceptually loosed from its theological moor-
ings and in that way be off ered to the world as anthropological common ground 
for a pastoral relation? To what extent does the Christological only show or dem-
onstrate or even fully clarify that which is otherwise properly anthropological and 
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that which might be recognized or confi rmed on extra- or nontheological grounds? 
Th e Pastoral Constitution does not provide an unambiguous answer, although it 
certainly purports to off er properly anthropological claims about things human. 
But for those outside the church this only begs the question of the necessary relation 
between anthropological and theological claims. Th is point cannot be stressed too 
much in terms of the legacy of pastoral and political diffi  culties this ambivalence 
opens up for the church, as the work of John Milbank and other contemporary 
theologians has subsequently made clear. A basic supposition of the Pastoral Con-
stitution is that it is defi ning the human as the human is in itself and, therefore, in 
the world. Dignity is inherent and intrinsic. Th is is really what is at stake. Th e ques-
tion is: can the human be known and therefore properly cared for in its inherent 
and intrinsic essence without reference to the divine? If not, if dignity is “fully secu-
lar,” how can the church, by way of the magisterium, establish a pastoral relation to 
the ecclesia ad extra anchored in dignity? Once justifi ed and explained theologically, 
can human dignity then simply be declared—or, to use the United Nations’ famous 
formulation, “recognized”—in nontheological terms? Th e problem of the pastoral 
relation of the church and the modern world is predicated on the notion that the 
human such as it is is in need of the church’s pastoral care. Th e question here is: 
how do the council fathers shift from the Christological to extratheological claims 
about things anthropological such that this need for pastoral care is legible on the 
part of the world?
Several answers are given in the course of the constitution, all of which perform 
a similar kind of conceptual work. Th at work attempts to demonstrate that the ex-
perience of being a human in the contemporary world, upon examination, confi rms 
an adequacy, a fi ttedness, a necessary relation, between the nature of things hu-
man in themselves and the pastoral capacities of the church. Moreover, it attempts 
to demonstrate a fi ttedness that overcomes or bypasses the veridictional challenge 
precisely by refusing the idea that there is a meaningful split between the genuinely 
anthropological and the genuinely theological.
Th e principal move in accomplishing this conceptual work involves a turn to 
what the authors of the constitution frame as the universally existential. Th is move 
is not unfamiliar in diagnoses of the modern world and is, in fact, consistent with 
many of the modes of modern reason the constitution took itself to be putting into 
question. Th e authors of the Pastoral Constitution assert that the modern human 
individual, quite apart from the church, senses that it is not only a bodily entity 
existing for the sake of “the city of man,” for “material existence” alone. Th is 
means, among other things, that whatever advances might be made in the “practi-
cal sciences” and in eff orts to control or manage material existence, humans remain 
aware of the fact that intellectual life is not confi ned to “observable data alone.” Th e 
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human, rather, is a creature that can and does “with genuine certitude attain to real-
ity itself as knowable.” By its nature—intellectualis natura—the human can pass 
through visible realities, from what is seen to what is unseen. Th e human is a crea-
ture whose destiny is in its nature, one who “is perfected by wisdom, for wisdom 
gently attracts the mind of man to a quest and a love for what is true and good.” 
Th e human individual in the modern world senses the need for this quest and senses 
that the conditions of the modern world do not provide an orientation to what is 
ultimately true and good beyond the observable.
Th ere is, of course, something classical about this assertion—although this clas-
sical assertion carries an altogether contemporary signifi cance. Speaking in a scho-
lastic vernacular, the council fathers state that the human is a creature of intellectual 
nature that can therefore only fi nd its proper ends in those things that include the 
fulfi llment of its intellectual nature. A certain strategic fashioning or adjusting of 
things anthropological is going on here. Because the conceptualization is scholastic 
and therefore not particularly distinctive, it can slip by without much notice. But 
the authors’ formulation is really quite crucial to how the church justifi es (that is, 
brings into alignment) its relation to the modern world. If the pastoral question is 
what is anthropos such that the magisterium of the church can, as a doctrinal organ, be 
understood as both fi tted and necessary as a pastoral venue for the human qua human?—
then the answer begins: the human is properly and anthropologically a creature of intel-
lectual nature, of an intellectual dignity. In the modern world this intellectual dignity 
is not altogether fulfi lled by material events, needs, or desires. As such, the pastoral 
question is this: what must be done, what is it that is called for, anthropologically? 
Th e church must provide discernment needed to orient human activities toward 
their proper end in the midst of other false ends. Th e magisterium must discriminate 
which activities are appropriate, necessary, and even urgent given the intellectual na-
ture of the human. How can and should such pastoral work be accomplished? In the 
midst of the modern world the terms of the archonic must be clarifi ed. Th e modern 
must be converted—turned—to the archonic so that its excesses and defi ciencies are 
made plain and so that appropriate reordering can begin.
Th e council fathers ask: if the human is called as an intellectual creature, what 
can this mean if not that God wills and makes the human to be a rational soul, 
an anima rationalis? To be human is to be animated according to an intellectual 
vocation. Th is means that the human is also marked with the responsibility and 
challenges of being that creature whose nature is such that it is eminently capable 
of acting against its own nature. As an intellectual animal the human is made to 
be capable of exercising self-control. It is in this way, by taking a hand in its own 
formation, that the human pursues its call. Th e vocation is original; actualization 
involves the exercise of freedom in relation to rational being. Freedom here must be 
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understood as a term of capacity: the capacity of the creature to pursue the Creator. 
Th is capacity requires orientation: knowledge of how that pursuit needs to be car-
ried out. Knowledge of the Creator facilitates and actualizes the capacity to pursue 
the Creator. Th e intellectual soul is called to exercise the capacity of self-orientation 
in the pursuit of God. Th is pursuit thus requires the cultivation of capacity and 
proper knowledge, knowledge of the soul, knowledge of the world in which the 
soul comes into being, and knowledge of God. “Human dignity” the council fathers 
conclude, “demands” (the archonic demands) that the humanae personae act accord-
ing to knowledge and freedom and not according to ignorance or compulsion. Th e 
interface between things human and things ecclesiastical begins to take shape. Dig-
nity is made right when, “emancipating himself [sic] from all captivity to passion, 
[man] pursues his goal in a spontaneous choice of what is good, and procures for 
himself through eff ective and skillful action, apt helps to that end.”
At the interface between the church and the modern world, the human, as a 
vocational being, is in need of apt help. Th e vocational being must procure help in 
pursuit of the “truly human” goal of communion with the divine. Why apt help? 
After all, the human is fashioned for such communion. A Th omistic answer might 
be given: help is needed precisely because the human, oriented to the supernatural, 
is that peculiar animal encumbered by the fact that it is not capable of perfecting 
its own nature. Th e council fathers, however, propose that apt help is needed be-
cause human freedom and knowledge have been compromised by “sin,” hamartia 
“missing the mark.” Because the human has been “damaged by sin, only by the 
aid of God’s grace can he bring such a relationship with God into full fl ower.” 
“Damaged by sin”: this conception of incapacity provoked disagreement among the 
council fathers as well as other church theologians. It suggests that without sin, the 
human called to communion with God would in fact be capable of accomplishing 
such communion. It can be inferred—and such inference has been made to much 
eff ect—that the inability to actualize supernatural ends naturally is not properly an-
thropological; it is hamartiological. Th at is, inability is not a problem of the nature 
of things human; it is a problem of sin. Th is suggests that in the absence of sin the 
human would be that creature, who as such, would be capable of God.
In any case, the human by nature is that creature who by God’s grace is capable 
of bringing a relation with God, that is, a relation of dignity, into full fl ower. Th e 
fi rst pole or vector point of the human-humanity relation is conceived by the coun-
cil fathers in terms both striking and subtle: “vocatio hominis ultima revera una sit, 
scilicet divina”—“the ultimate vocation of the human is in fact one, and divine.” 
Th e ultimate vocation is one: it is defi nitive; it defi nes what it is to be human. Th e 
human is that one with this ultimate vocation. And this ultimate vocation is divine: 
union with God, while nonetheless remaining a properly human vocation. Divine 
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call; human origin. “Such is the mystery of man,” the Pastoral Constitution puts 
it, “and it is a great one, as seen by believers in the light of Christian revelation.” 
Origin and destiny: Christic light, archonic being.
Humanity
Th e human is the creature who has an archonic vocation. Before moving to the 
second half of the pastoral problem, that is, the question of the church as fi tted to 
the human and not only the human as fi tted to the church, I need to examine the 
second pole or element of human dignity: humanity, the human as community.
Th e Pastoral Constitution asserts that the Christian, oriented to God in Christ, 
represents the actualization (“the fi rst fruits”) of that which is defi nitive for all hu-
mans (“the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one”). Th e “one” characteristic of 
human vocation carries a double meaning. Th e fi rst meaning I have already noted: 
that singular condition which specifi es and distinguishes what counts as human. 
Or, in the words of the constitution, it is the feature that indicates the “fully hu-
man.” Th e second meaning concerns the second pole of the object of the church’s 
pastoral attentions: human vocation is only fully actual as human unity. Th e human 
in its full actuality is a “social” reality. Th e ultimate vocation of the human is to be 
one not only with God but with other humans as well. To be fully human is to be 
one with other humans in God.
I explained that according to the Pastoral Constitution’s diagnosis, humans de-
sire more than material comforts. Th ey desire a “full and free life worthy of man.” 
Th is desire indicates, in the fi rst place, a natural, that is to say, inherent longing for 
God in the fulfi llment of the intellectual nature. In the second place, it indicates “a 
kind of universal community”: a natural desire for the fulfi llment of a social real-
ity. If dignity is the unity of the individual human in the integral relation of origin 
and call; it is also the unity of all humans insofar as they all participate in this same 
origin and call.
“For by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates him-
self to others he can neither live nor develop his potential.” In this statement the 
Pastoral Constitution off ers a double allusion, bringing to mind both the biblical 
passage from Genesis 1:27 (“So God created man in his own image . . . male and 
female he created them”) and book 1, chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Politica (“man is by 
nature a political animal”). Th e council fathers propose that the human is created 
with a social nature (natura socialis) and not in isolation. In a similar fashion, the 
human is saved as a social creature and not in isolation. Th e terms of origins and the 
terms of ends again coincide. Th e point of coincidence in this case is community. 
Th is communal coincidence is formulated in terms of the problem of salvation 
(salutis). Understood as a historical reality (historiae salutis), salvation is formulated 
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as the “social” concurrence and coherence of origins and ends—a socioarchonic 
coherence: “from the beginning of salvation history [God] has chosen men not just 
as individuals but as members of a certain community.”
Human salvation is matter of “dynamismo socialis,” social dynamics (sometimes 
translated as “socialization”). In the context of the Pastoral Constitution, social dy-
namics or socialization refers to a process by which humanity’s “innermost nature” 
increasingly comes to historical actuality—“an evolution toward unity.” Th e mod-
ern world, according to the constitution, is characterized by an increase in occa-
sions for socialization. “An evolution toward unity” is facilitated by intensifi ed civic, 
economic, and technological interdependence. Modern dynamics of social interde-
pendence thus share an affi  nity with ontological dynamics of being-in-community. 
Th ey are linked in such a way that occasions of increased interdependence off er 
distinctive forms of, and opportunities for, the salvational actualization of human-
ity. Th e modern world, in this way, is both theologically and anthropologically 
auspicious.
On one level this diagnosis is striking, even perplexing. Much of Catholic social 
teaching in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries portrays the social dynamics of 
the modern world as fragmentary and divisive and not, in fact, as an opportunity 
for the greater unifi cation of humanity. In this light, it is worth underscoring that 
the council fathers’ point here is only that these social dynamics can be cast as 
an occasion for an accomplishing of unity. Social dynamics occasioned by way of 
increased “technological interdependence” can be made to serve as an “aid” to the 
human in “responding to his destiny” and as an “aid” in responding to “his full 
spiritual dignity.” Human dignity is, once again, connected to destiny. Dignity 
and destiny have an inner relation. Th at inner relation, however, does not turn on 
“interdependence,” per se, but on the proper occasions for socialization, an “aid” to 
the proper dynamismo socialis. Human dignity, it thus goes without saying, is not 
accomplished by means of technological interdependence—indeed, dignity is not 
accomplished at all. Dignity is, rather, responded to. It is intrinsic, albeit in such a 
way as in need of actualization. Nonetheless, the portrayal of the condition of the 
modern world in Gaudium et spes is consistent with John’s opening address; that is, 
it is far more positive in terms of the question of the social in the modern world 
than in previous social teachings of the church.
Th e council fathers distinguish human dignity from the dynamics of interde-
pendence characteristic of the modern world while also connecting the possibility 
of actualizing dignity to those dynamics. A conceptual connection is made between 
the modern and the archonic. Th is connection is vital to the logic of the relation 
between the church and the world put forward by the Pastoral Constitution. If the 
church is an apt help to the human with regard to the fulfi llment of the intellectual 
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nature, it is also an apt help with regard to the proper fulfi llment of the dynamics of 
socialization. Th e challenge, of course, is to fi gure out what this means in practice: 
how can the church go about the work of helping to achieve the proper actualization 
of human dignity in the unity of humanity through the interdependencies created 
by the modern world? Such a response, whatever else it consists in, involves facilitat-
ing the actualization of dignity (keeping in mind that facilitation here consists in 
being guided by that which is established vocationally in and as creation, and is, in 
this sense, primordial). Th e creature is called forth. Th e question is how to respond 
to that call in a manner consistent with the human as a social being. Th e twist—and 
this moves us toward the justifi cation for a revised sense of pastoral power—is that 
human dignity as a call to a destiny, a destiny characterized by social dynamics, is a 
call that can be properly as well as improperly responded to. Th e church’s pastoral 
care must consist in helping to determine the diff erence.
Th e Pastoral Constitution tells us that the proper response to the “full spiritual 
dignity,” for which the modern world might be made an occasion and an aid, is to 
cultivate “interpersonal relationships”: relations between persons. Again, on one 
level, this is not a surprising proposition. Since Immanuel Kant the problem of how 
to relate as persons has been put forward as a challenge and task for modern political 
and ethical thought. But there is something unusual going on here under the cover 
of familiar language. Th e human person being imagined here is quite diff erent from 
the Kantian fi gure of the rational and self-governing being. It is a creature called 
to communion with God. Socialis hominis, the social human, is a creature called to 
communion with God and saved as “one family.” Th e human is vocational twice 
over—a double anthropology of the call: by nature called to communion with God, 
by nature called to communion with and as those called to communion with God. 
Klēsis and ekklēsia. Although the modern world off ers opportunities for interpersonal 
relationships, it only off ers opportunities. Technological interdependence facilitates a 
kind of convergence or proximity. It needs to be made interpersonal.
Th e question, the pastoral question, is how to convert interdependence into 
unity, how to make the modern world an occasion for a successful response to dig-
nity. Th e fi rst step is that the archonic vocation of socialis hominis must be discerned 
in the midst of the modern world—the signs of the times must be “properly read,” 
as the Pastoral Constitution puts it. Read correctly, the modern world can then be 
made an occasion of proper response to archonic unity. Th e council fathers propose 
that a kind of ontological conversion is called for. A turn from one ontological 
mode to another: the modern converted to unity in the archonic. Such conversion 
requires discernment. But where can such equipment of discernment and conver-
sion come from? Th e answer, of course, is the church in its own experience of unity, 
in the predicate of its being as catholic, as universal. “Th anks to her relationship 
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with Christ,” the church can exist and act as “a sacramental sign and an instrument 
of intimate union with God, and of the unity of the whole human race.”
Once again the archonic and the Christic are brought into a kind of revelatory 
alignment. Th e church knows what human unity should consist in because of its 
experience of unity in Jesus understood as the Christ. What it knows, what the 
Christic reveals, is again properly anthropological. And the veridictional question 
resurfaces: if the church knows what it knows about the social nature of the human 
theologically (“called and saved by God not as individuals but as community”), can 
this truth be recognized and confi rmed extratheologically, that is, apart from the 
church’s Christocentric vision of things? Th e challenge, after all, is not just to con-
ceive of a pastoral relation between the church and those in addition to the church. 
Simple condemnation could accomplish as much. Th e challenge, rather, is to con-
ceive of a pastoral relation in terms sensible to the modern. Can archonic dignity, 
discerned and experienced by the church Christologically, be justifi ed or confi rmed 
apart from an explicit reference to the Christological?
Th e question ultimately turns on the council fathers’ reading of the biblical com-
mand to love, the biblical confi rmation of God’s love for humanity, and the biblical 
notion of the imago dei—the idea that humans are created in the image of God. 
God, the council fathers state, has concern for everyone. If one is created, one is 
created by God and one is called by God. Furthermore, God in calling humans into 
being wills that all those called should constitute (should act and exist as) a family. 
Family here means “spirit of brotherhood.” Spirit of brotherhood, in turn, means 
mutual communion. God’s will for mutual communion is an ontological predicate 
of the creation of things human. Th is ontological predicate is articulated in terms 
of the imago dei: humans are created in the image of God. Th e God in whose image 
humans are created wills that all humans should share concern for one another. Th e 
vocational, ontological, and ethical converge: “God, Who ‘from one man has cre-
ated the whole human race and made them live all over the face of the earth’ (Acts 
17:26), all men are called to one and the same goal, namely God Himself.” Th e 
biblical commandments to love God and to love one’s neighbor are bound together 
in an archonic knot.
Th e commandment to love is thus, in its turn, connected to human vocation. 
But as a human call, it is a commandment held to be most fully realized by the 
church in Jesus as the Christ. Th e council fathers quote the Gospel of John, when 
Jesus, speaking to God of his relation to God, prays that his disciples “all may be 
one . . . as we are one.” Th e Pastoral Constitution suggests that in this prayer Jesus 
“opened up vistas [otherwise] closed to human reason.” What vistas are these? 
What truth about itself does humanity not know through its own reason? Th e truth 
that it does not otherwise know is that there is an ontological likeness between the 
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union of the divine persons—the Christian belief in the unity of God as the Son 
and the Father in the Spirit—and the unity of humans with one another. Th e fi rst 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that humanity is a synthetic unity of persons. 
Like the Christian trinitarian view of God, humanity is, ontologically speaking, a 
community. Th e second conclusion is that this ontological state of aff airs cannot 
be fully realized (“man cannot fully fi nd himself ”) except through caritas, through 
love, understood as the giving of oneself to another.
Th e council fathers’ Christological claim, as one sees in the relation of origin 
and destiny, is put forward again as a properly anthropological claim. Th is means 
that theology, whatever special province of insight and discourse it might other-
wise claim for itself, really serves to clarify that which is open to experience and 
reason—if only opaquely and ambiguously so. After all, as the council fathers repeat 
at several points in the Pastoral Constitution, the church merely brings to light an 
“innermost truth.” Here, for a second time, the modern world is cast as auspicious. 
Th e increasing interdependence of the world today (“becoming more unifi ed every 
day”) gives rise to an increasing recognition of the truth and importance of caritas, 
charity, the biblical vision of love and care for God and neighbor. What is more, 
charity in this sense is put forward as anthropologically defi nitive. Th e provocative 
language of the Pastoral Constitution reads like this: the fathers surmise that generis 
humani today is characterized by a “sense of responsibility” for existing as universos 
homines; the human species as a universal people. Th e interdependence of the mod-
ern world occasions a reconsideration of the social nature of humanity on a univer-
sal scale. Echoing John’s opening address to the council, Gaudium et spes proposes 
that “Now a man can scarcely arrive at the needed sense of responsibility, unless his 
living conditions allow him to become conscious of his dignity.” What does such 
consciousness of dignity consist in? Th e need to “rise to one’s destiny.” And what 
is this destiny that one rises to in the consciousness of dignity? “Spending” oneself 
for God and for others: caritas is a vector through which human dignity becomes 
conscious and human destiny is actualized.
Th e Pastoral Constitution suggests that humans in the modern world, quite apart 
from the church’s teachings, are in an oblique fashion already on the way to actual-
izing their proper destiny. Given this reading of the modern, it might be fair to ask: 
then why is the church needed? Is it the church’s role only to confi rm that anthropos 
is a creature made for communion and community? Th e constitution gives two 
responses, one following from the other: the fi rst is taken to be evident in itself; the 
second is taken to be evident as an implication of the fi rst. Th e fi rst concerns social 
dynamics and sin. In considering the constitution’s formulation of the human as 
origin and destiny, I noted the problem of capacity/incapacity. I suggested that the 
incapacity to actualize the supernatural ends to which the human is naturally called 
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is not, strictly speaking, an anthropological problem. It is, rather, formulated as a 
hamartiological problem—a problem of sin. A similar kind of formulation bears 
on the relation of modern technological interdependence and the actualization of 
interpersonal community. Th e constitution off ers a positive assertion: the “laws of 
social life” are “written into man’s moral and spiritual nature.” Th e constitution 
also off ers a negative assertion: the capacity to read and interpret rightly and act on 
those moral and spiritual laws has been compromised—“crippled,” to use the con-
stitution’s term. Th e capacity to live by the law of social nature (that is, charity) has 
been crippled by the same modern conditions that occasion socialization. Modern 
technological developments have brought with them “extreme poverty” as well as 
“many of life’s comforts.” Th e modern, however auspicious, is also hamartiologi-
cally marked.
Th e second response to the question “can humanity rise to unity by nature?” 
concerns the question of the extent to which the church’s teaching authority is 
really needed. If humanity is naturally called to community, is the magisterium 
needed only as a kind of emergency measure—as a response to a world crippled by 
sin? To what extent is the capacity for communion proper to humanity but only 
disrupted by the vicissitudes of human sin? To what extent can the terms of such 
disruption be discerned apart from the church and view of salvation history? Is the 
problem modernity? If it were not for sin—occasioned in this case by the modern 
world but not unique to the modern world—would humanity naturally be capable 
of a supernatural unity of persons in God and with one another? Th is string of 
problems emerges forcefully following the council, when the pastoral propositions 
of the constitution begin to be put to work. With regard to the Pastoral Constitu-
tion the question concerns what might be called the design of pastoral equipment. 
With regard to design, the council fathers seem to take it as a matter of course 
that the church’s “apt help” is still humanly required. Th e laws of social life may be 
opaque to the modern world, but they can be read and interpreted rightly by the 
church. Humanity needs to discriminate and order rightly its technological inter-
dependence so that it can be converted to interpersonal unity. It needs equipment 
for the conversion of the modern to the archonic, and this equipment consists in 
discerning and interpreting the ways in which the sin as well as the opportunities of 
the modern world can be made into a reality of human unity. Humanity as a unity 
of humans, like the human as a unity of origin and destiny, is in need of the church’s 
interpretation and orientation.
Th e constitution asks: Quid Ecclesia venit prout ipsa, in hoc mundo exsistit et cum 
eo vivit atque agit? What is the church inasmuch as she exists in the world, living 
and acting with it? Th e church can be thought of as that venue which displays for 
the world the character of authentic human unity, a unity “unbreakably rooted in 
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the Holy Spirit.” To quote again from the constitution concerning the relation of 
origins and destiny: “from the beginning of salvation history [God] has chosen men 
not just as individuals but as members of a certain community.” If the human is 
saved as a social creature, then the object of the church’s pastoral care is the human 
called to be a member of a human community. Such pastoral orientation does not 
supersede what was indicated earlier. Th e object of the church’s pastoral care is also 
the human as that creature called to union with God. Neither the human alone nor 
humanity alone. Rather, elements of diff ering scale: the individual and the collec-
tive are taken up together as the human who by nature is humanity.
what is the church as she exists in the world?
What is human being? A being called to communion with God and unity with one 
another. Origin and destiny: the human is that creature with a call. Th e “supreme 
dignity” of the human vocation establishes the human as an archonic being. Th e 
fi rst half of the problem of the church and the modern world is: what is the human 
such that it is in need of the church? I now want to turn to the second half of the 
problem: what is the church that it is pastorally fi tted to the contemporary world? 
A fi rst answer has already been implied: the church is the ekklesia—a venue of those 
who have been called. But how is it that the Pastoral Constitution imagines the 
church as a venue of those who have been called, and given that humanity is also 
defi ned by a call to unity, how is the church distinctively suited to the pastoral care 
of human dignity?
Th e Purpose of Pastoral Power
Th e Pastoral Constitution puts things human in question fi rst in terms of the hu-
man person, then as the human community. It is in view of the doubling that the 
constitution takes up the question of the church. Anthropology and ecclesiology, as 
suggested by the council fathers’ Christology, are taken to form a connected pair: a 
mutually determinative pair forming a single pastoral ensemble. In view of this mu-
tual determination, the constitution now takes up the problem from the other side: 
“What is the Church inasmuch as she exists in the world, living and acting with it?”
On a certain level and at a cursory glance the question may not be particularly 
striking or, for that matter, engaging for those not part of the Christian ecclesia or 
proximate to it. Moreover, the initial response—Trinitarian and otherworldly—
reinforces the sense that nothing theologically new is in play in the constitution’s 
formulations: “Coming forth from the eternal Father’s love, founded in time by 
Christ the Redeemer and made one in the Holy Spirit, the Church has a saving and 
an eschatological purpose which can be fully attained only in the future world.” 
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But the question is quite striking if we pause to consider the suppositions at work in 
it. Th e church acknowledges about itself that it exists in the world. But what is the 
church as a venue that exists in the world? Th e question was a point of methodologi-
cal and ontological blockage for the committees drafting the pastoral constitution, 
as I noted in the last chapter. Th e church, on the one hand, is founded in view of 
a salvation that can only be experienced “in the world to come.” But that future 
salvation now needs to be considered in light of the fact that the church is actually 
constituted in the world. Th is means, fi rst of all, that the council fathers needed to 
make sense of how it is that the church participates in the very characteristics that 
defi ne things human. Moreover, making sense of this participation would appear to 
solve a number of conceptual problems given the pastoral question at hand—and 
it no doubt does. But it also introduces the diffi  culty of thinking about what the 
church is if it not only off ers a future but also belongs to the world.
From the opening lines of the Pastoral Constitution the church is framed as 
having a participatory being in and with the world. “Why are the joys of the world 
also the joys of the followers of Christ?” it asks. It answers: because the followers of 
Christ are human; that which is human concerns them. Th e church, one is given 
to understand, is bound up with the world—its histories, its ends, and its problems. 
Th e church is a venue that is in the world. Th e proposition is more controversial 
than it might sound. Th ere were, after all, many other answers that could have been 
given. Th e church could be the magisterium as a priestly class. Th e church could 
be that reality to which the world is called, out of itself. Instead the church is said 
to consist of the followers of Christ who are “humans.” Th e church is composed 
of those creatures discussed in the fi rst section of the Pastoral Constitution. It is 
composed of those who are “members of the earthly city who have a call to form the 
family of God.” Th e church is not composed of those who are defi ned in distinc-
tion to the world. Th e diff erence between Christians and others is that Christians 
are cast as those who have formally responded to the twofold call to union with 
God and communion with others and, in this sense, are anthropologically ahead of 
the game (if one can be “ahead” in archonic matters). Th is means that whatever the 
church is, it is not foreign to the world. Th e church has been “constituted and struc-
tured as a society in this world” by Christ and is equipped “by appropriate means 
for visible and social union.” If the church is ontologically suited to pastoral care 
of the world, this is the case in the fi rst place because it is in the world. Th is must 
at least suggest that the church, like the world and with the world, is characterized 
by an archonic mode of being. Its ends must be found in its origins and its origins 
in its ends.
A second supposition of the idea that the church in some sense has its being in the 
world is the idea that the world’s activities, while perhaps distinct from the church’s 
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activities, are nevertheless also in some way the church’s activities. Th e church acts 
with and in the world. Pastorally, what can this mean? What is the church as a 
pastoral venue that acts in the world with the world? Traditional answers might 
include: the church acts in the world to rectify the souls of the deviant and to 
shepherd the conduct of the faithful. But how would such an answer constitute 
acting with the world? From the opening address of the council, John called for a 
quite diff erent form of pastoral relation. Condemnation as a mode of relating to the 
world was more or less taken off  the table, and pastoral care for the modern world 
was basically distinguished as a separate problem from care of the faithful. It was a 
basic premise of the council—disputed and even refused on some fronts—that the 
church could no longer sustain a relation to the modern world in which the world 
was taken as apostate such that it was the church’s primary responsibility to demand 
its return and then vigilantly to guard the fl ock. More important still is the pastoral 
challenge raised by Gaudium et spes itself: the object of the church’s pastoral activity 
in the world is human dignity understood as a primordial call. Th e question “what 
is the church inasmuch as it acts with the world?” can only be answered thus: the 
church, in the world, cares for human dignity. Th is means, among other things, that 
the activity of the world should also consist of care for human dignity. To suggest 
that the human, by nature, is called to the supernatural and that dignity is found 
in that call is also to suggest that humans should, qua humans, care for dignity. Th e 
question of what the church is and does becomes the question of why and how dig-
nity needs to be cared for by the church and why the pastorate is uniquely capable 
of such care.
Th e council fathers propose that the church knows something about the world 
that the world does not know about itself. Th e church knows something about the 
world that the world does not fully know, and where it partially knows, it does not 
yet fully grasp the signifi cance of what it knows. Th e church knows that “Th e earthly 
city and the heavenly city penetrate each other.” In human history this fact remains 
obscure. Sin, the constitution suggests, makes this fact opaque. Th e phrasing here is 
classical; the meaning, however, takes its signifi cance in relation to a contemporary 
problem. Th e notion that the heavenly city and earthly city interpenetrate is a re-
working of the Augustinian insight that human aff airs are created according to a di-
vine order. Th e church has received this notion “in herself.” Th e church has received 
into herself the actualization of participation in divine life as the actualization of an 
anthropological potential. It is in this actualization that it has the capacity to help 
facilitate the actualization of an anthropological potential in the world.
When the council fathers state that the church has a “saving purpose” and that 
this saving purpose is proper to what the church is, it is clear what they are really 
saying: the church is called to communicate archonic life. Recall that in its clas-
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sical theological meaning communicate refers to the Christian sacrament of the 
Eucharist—a ritual held to be an ontological participation with Jesus in the taking 
of the wine and the bread in the Christian Mass. Th e meaning of communication 
is slightly diff erent here while also retaining a sacramental overtone. Th e church’s 
saving purpose in relation to the world is to share the life that is properly anthropo-
logical, though perhaps only potentially and not yet actually so. And how will such 
communication be achieved? In the words of the Pastoral Constitution, it will be 
achieved by casting the “light of that life over the entire earth,” thereby “healing and 
elevating . . . the dignity of the person” and also strengthening “the seams of human 
society.” An archonic light will illuminate the need for and the means of living in 
accordance to an archonic mode of being. “Th rough her individual matters and her 
whole community, the Church believes she can contribute greatly toward making 
the family of man and its history more human.” An unfamiliar, though not totally 
novel, notion in the history of ecclesiology: the church as what makes the human 
more human—and not, strictly speaking, through religious conversion. Th is is the 
purpose of a pastoral relation to the modern world.
Th e Modern World
Th e specifi cation of the purpose of a pastoral relation, however, does not answer 
the questions regarding the mode and form of pastoral practice. How is it that the 
church, acting with the world, actually goes about helping to make human dignity 
actual? Th e Pastoral Constitution’s answer involves three components. Th e fi rst is 
proclamation. Th e church proclaims “the noble destiny of man.” Th e church pro-
claims the dignity of human ends. Th e second is to champion. Th e church cham-
pions “the Godlike seed which has been sown in him.” Th e church champions 
the Godlike origins of the human. Th e third, by way of the fi rst two, is that the 
church off ers honest assistance. Th e church off ers honest assistance in “fostering 
that brotherhood of all men which corresponds to this destiny of theirs.” Th e 
church proclaims and champions the human in its destiny and origin and in the 
integral relation between destiny and seed. It thereby is able to discern what, in any 
given situation, is needed to secure the dignity of humanity.
Th e Pastoral Constitution’s diagnosis of the modern world—its reading of the 
signs of the times—is that human dignity is at risk. One of the curious features 
of the Pastoral Constitution is that the human per se is never really defi ned as a 
creature in need of pastoral care. Th e human creature per se is created in a call from 
God. If the actualization or proper response to that call is lacking, this is not be-
cause the human creature is lacking. Th e problem, rather, is that the archonic, as the 
enfolding of origin and destiny, is blocked or violated. Such blockage or violation is 
not the result of something native to the human. It is the result of sin.
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Sin is treated in a rather precise fashion by the Pastoral Constitution. Whereas 
the human as archonic is primordial and destined and therefore not defi ned by 
the modern world, it nonetheless fi nds itself inhabiting a world that is modern. 
Th is world, which is not primordial or destined, troubles the archonic by creating 
conditions wherein humans “miss the mark.” Th e modern world can be thought of 
as a zone in which the archonic takes form but that is not, ontologically speaking, 
coincident with the archonic. Th e modern world is thus always occasional for the 
archonic in the sense that it is an occasion for the actualization of the archonic and 
it is an occasion for the blockage or deformation of the archonic. Th e problem for 
the human in the world is how to live in such a way as to fi t the demands of the day 
to the demands of the archonic.
As I have already explained, according to the Pastoral Constitution’s diagnosis 
the modern world is auspicious, anthropologically speaking. To be auspicious is to 
be marked by the promise of success, to be favorable, propitious. Th e justifi cation 
off ered by John for holding an ecumenical council was precisely that the modern 
world is marked by the promise of success. It is marked by the promise of success 
on two fronts. It is marked by the promise of success in the human individual’s 
realization of communion with the supernatural. Th ere is a promise of success on 
this fi rst front for several reasons. In the face of rapid and profound technological, 
economic, and civic changes characteristic of the modern world, people are inquir-
ing into the meaning of human life. Despite the tremendous violence characteristic 
of twentieth-century political and economic developments, people are more con-
scious and committed to the dignity of all humans. On a second front, the modern 
today is marked by the promise of success in attaining to the unity of the human 
family, which is defi nitive of human social nature. I have already discussed this 
above, so I do not need to say much here, other than to repeat that in the assessment 
of the Pastoral Constitution technological interdependence appears to be turning 
attention and eff orts to the task of forging a worldwide community. If peace can 
be defi ned as the unity of peoples in the actualization of humanity (which it is in 
the Pastoral Constitution), then the modern is auspicious in that interdependence 
off ers an occasion for peace. Th e modern world is characterized by the occasion 
to become human and to become humanity. On two fronts the modern world is 
anthropologically auspicious.
Th e authors of the Pastoral Constitution could not, of course, overlook the ex-
cesses and defi ciencies of the modern world. If auspicious, the modern world is also 
inauspicious. It is also marked by the possibility that the future is not promising, 
that the occasion will not be found advantageous but will rather prove to be unfa-
vorable and ominous. Were the modern world only auspicious, then the church’s 
pastoral task could be limited to proclamation, celebration, and patience. It may be 
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the case that “stricken with wonder at its own discoveries and power,” humans today 
are raising questions about “the place and role of man in the universe, about the 
meaning of its individual and collective strivings, and about the ultimate destiny of 
reality and of humanity.” It may also be the case that the fact of such questioning 
off ers the promise of success in answering these questions. But it is equally the case 
that whatever else defi nes it, the modern world is a space of life in which humans 
are left asking questions about their place and role, the meaning of their strivings, 
and about their ultimate destiny. Today, the constitution insists, echoing other di-
agnoses of modernity, humans are unsure of themselves.
Similarly, on a social front, the world of today may off er occasions for unity. But 
it is also the case that the world of today is marked by tensions and strife that pro-
vide the warrant for greater unity. As the concrete destiny of humanity becomes “all 
of a piece,” opportunities abound for exploitation and domination. Intensifi cations 
of interdependence are also occasions for the intensifi cation of relations of power. 
All of this means that on two fronts the modern world can also be read as inauspi-
cious, anthropologically speaking: humans and humanity are in need of apt help.
Put simply, the modern world is “at once powerful and weak.” It is powerful 
in that unprecedented dominion is being extended over space and time. Th is do-
minion is being conducted through and facilitated by technological interventions. 
Its zones of application include “biology, psychology, the social, the political, and 
the future.” Such interventions ameliorate health and well-being and function to 
accelerate interdependence. It is weak in that despite having produced the means 
for expanding welfare, the modern world is ignorant “of the terms of true welfare.” 
Scientifi c and technological “strivings to investigate ourselves” leave us “unsure of 
ourselves.” Having probed the depths of “mind and society,” modern humans are 
paralyzed and uncertain with regard to the question of who they are and who they 
need to become. As a result, rapid technological changes, scientifi c and social, have 
begun to “recoil” on the humans who bring these changes about. “Recoil” here 
means that humans, while capable of technological expansion, have become inca-
pable of a corresponding spiritual development. Such a state of aff airs produces a 
“crisis of growth.” What counts as appropriate and worthwhile in terms of “deci-
sions,” “desires,” “thinking,” and “acting” is largely blocked. In short, “man [sic] is 
putting questions to himself.” And the human is putting itself in question.
Of course the problem is not only occasional. “Sin” is not only a matter of cir-
cumstance. All of these diffi  culties occasioned by the modern world are catalyzed by 
a kind of constitutive trouble. In the course of their diagnosis, the council fathers 
invoke a familiar Th omistic-Aristotelian problem: the human is “summoned to a 
higher life”; however, the human also experiences a range of desires, some of which 
correspond to this higher life and some of which do not. Now, with the amenities of 
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the modern world ready to hand, the human experience of multiple desires has been 
amplifi ed. Th e modern human “feels itself to be boundless in desires.” Confl icted 
desire is catalyzed by the multiplication of opportunities to fulfi ll desire. Such a 
state of aff airs, like other ethically fraught arrangements, requires careful discern-
ment, the cultivation of virtue, as well as vigilant denial. Insofar as humans are sin-
ful and ignorant, the multiplication of opportunities for choice and the growth in 
capacity as well as incapacity can leave them further from where they should be: less 
happy, more blind, more divided, more discordant, lacking in serenity and emanci-
pation, convinced that rule over the world and others will satisfy, and so on. What 
does such a state of aff airs amount to? “Many think that human existence is devoid 
of total meaning beyond the ingenuity of the individual alone.”
What is interesting here is the conclusion, which the council fathers draw from 
this state of aff airs, a conclusion that eff ectively splits the diff erence between those 
bishops who embraced John’s optimism about things modern and those bishops 
who insisted on excess and defi ciency as the modern world’s defi ning characteris-
tics. Th e modern human is cast as divided: it experiences an increased capacity for 
technical intervention while also experiencing a decreased capacity to understand 
the signifi cance and to manage the ramifi cations of those interventions. At the line 
of this division a lack of meaning is identifi ed. Th is lack of meaning is taken as an 
indication that, although humans today are putting things human to question, they 
are not fi nding satisfactory answers. Th is lack redounds to an ignorance of human 
origins and destiny. It redounds to an inability to respond appropriately to full hu-
man dignity. Th e human in the modern world does not know what to think or what 
to do. It does not understand how to satisfy its own nature, personally or in terms 
of community. Th e point made is that the modern world, as such, does not indicate 
how to discern the relation and therefore does not facilitate the capacity to respond 
to the relation of natural origins and supernatural ends.
Such capacity requires understanding the archonic human vocation as the in-
nermost truth and innermost good of things human. In principle such truth is 
available to everyone: it is, after all, truth concerning the nature of human be-
ing. Humans in the modern world, however, suff er from vocational ignorance and 
thereby suff er anthropological compromise. Th e modern world, as an anthropologi-
cal occasion, does not illuminate the integrity of origin and destiny. And where the 
modern world functions as an occasion for generating distrust, enmity, confl ict, 
and hardship, it therein serves to obscure the integrity of origin and destiny. Today 
the archonic is obscured. Not absent, but obscured, and insofar as it is obscured, 
compromised.
If the authors of the Pastoral Constitution thought that the archonic was com-
promised in the modern world, they were also convinced that humans today know 
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that something is not right. Hence the world seems to be marked by openness to a 
pastoral relation, and hence despite the diffi  culties and defi ciencies of the modern 
world, it remains auspicious. Following John, the authors of the Pastoral Constitu-
tion proposed that two convictions shape the modern world, and both convictions 
continue to intensify. Th e fi rst is “the conviction . . . that humanity can and should 
increasingly consolidate its control over creation.” Th is conviction, however, is 
coupled with a growing belief that “it devolves on humanity to establish a political, 
social, and economic order which will growingly serve man and help individuals as 
well as groups to affi  rm and develop the dignity proper to them.” Aspiring to tech-
nical control and affi  rmative of a proper dignity. Th e problem is how to interface 
these convictions such that humanity can live by and develop the potential of its 
“innermost nature.” Recall that the term “potential” derives from the Latin potentia, 
power. Th e problem of interfacing the aim of technical control and the affi  rmation 
of a proper dignity consists in fostering the power needed for the human to be actu-
alized. Th e human is archonically potent. Th e problem of the human in the modern 
world is how to make that potential actual, how to conform to (be formed to and 
with) the archonic. Th e challenge is not a matter of knowing how to cultivate or 
establish dignity as if humans did not yet have dignity or did not have enough dig-
nity. Dignity is proper, planted like a divine seed in human origins. Th e challenge 
is how to respond to an original dignity in such a way that the destiny enfolded in 
that origin unfolds. How should humans live and act in the modern world such that 
it becomes an occasion for the actualization of human dignity?
If for the council fathers the auspicious character of the modern world ultimately 
wins out over the inauspicious—and it does—this is because they proceeded in 
the hope that the church off ers pastoral equipment capable of making the modern 
world into occasions of archonic fulfi llment. Th is pastoral equipment consists of a 
triple operation. It is demonstrative; that is, it functions to indicate and point out. 
What it functions to indicate and point out is the relation of the modern to the 
archonic. Demonstration consists of indicating how it is that the archonic is the in-
ner truth of things human in the modern world and how that inner truth is faring. 
Th e pastoral equipment is also pedagogic. Th e church demonstrates the relation of 
the contemporary and the archonic in such a way that humans can become capable 
of discerning proper ends and capable of contributing to their own formation as 
humans. Humans come to know themselves in such a way that they can become 
increasingly capable of responding properly to their “full spiritual dignity.” In this 
way—and this is the third operation—the pastoral equipment converts. It converts 
in the sense of turning to, or changing into, something diff erent. Th e church’s pas-
toral equipment facilitates conceptual conversion of the modern world into occa-
sions for actualizing the archonic dignity of human vocation. It also thereby equips 
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humans to turn away from those things (for example, desires, needs, interpreta-
tions, actions, etc.) that demean the archonic. Th is is what it means to say that the 
church, inasmuch as it is in the world, acts with the world. Humans today, as the 
Pastoral Constitution puts it, require a careful education. Careful education con-
sists in facilitating the human being human. Demonstrative, pedagogic, convertive: 
taken together we can say that the church’s pastoral equipment conforms (in the 
strict sense of being-formed-with) the modern to the archonic. Th is is precisely the 
task to which the Pastoral Constitution insists the magisterium is uniquely and 
pastorally suited.
Th e Christic, the Archonic, the Ecclesiastic
Th e council fathers map things human on two axes. Th e fi rst axis is nature/destiny 
(“from the beginning . . . God has chosen”). Th e second axis is interdependence/
unity (“not just as individuals but as . . . community”). Echoing John’s opening ad-
dress, Gaudium et spes conceives of the modern world as auspicious on both axes—
anthropologically promising. It is promising because the modern world constitutes 
an opportunity for the integration of both axes individually and with each other. 
It also constitutes an opportunity because in the modern world the church is able 
to provide pastoral equipment for conforming human life to the archonic. Insofar 
as the modern is anthropologically auspicious, it is ecclesiologically auspicious. Along 
the fi rst axis: in the world of today “questions of human meaning” are being posed 
quite independently from the church. Th e church is capable of responding to these 
questions, thereby orienting things human in a proper response to proper destiny. 
Along the second axis: in the modern world, technological, political, and economic 
developments have produced a more “interdependent world.” In the midst of such 
interdependence, the church is capable of orienting things human toward the unity 
proper to socialis humani. Th e ekklēsia, the Pastoral Constitution concludes, is a 
“supremely human” venue. It is a venue that facilitates human klēsis.
A question remains: if the church is in the world, acting with the world, how is 
it capable of accomplishing, or contributing to the accomplishment of, things hu-
man, in a way that the world on its own does not? I anticipated the answer above: 
the relation of the church to its doctrinal and pastoral legacy in Jesus understood to 
be the Christ. Th e Pastoral Constitution proposes that the truth of human dignity 
is revealed and fully actualized in Jesus as the Christ. Th e proposition is not surpris-
ing. But it is not for that reason any less important to the logic and legacy of Vati-
can II’s re-visioning of pastoral power. Th e Pastoral Constitution does not propose 
that human dignity is Christological per se (although classical arguments do insist 
that things human are dignifi ed precisely by way of the “doctrine of the incarna-
tion”). Th e Christological, rather, makes plain, and thereby available to thought 
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and action, that which is fundamentally anthropological. Th e Christological reveals 
and makes available the archonic: divine call/human origins. What this means, in 
terms of pastoral equipment, is that the magisterium off ers a kind of Christological 
illumination. In the church and by way of a Christic light, the modern world can be 
made to exhibit the extent of its archonic character. Th e Pastoral Constitution puts 
it this way: scrutinizing the signs of the times in light of the Gospel, the church can 
“respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this present life and the 
life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other.”
Th e fi gure of Jesus as the Christ in the Pastoral Constitution is characterized as 
the one who off ers the human to the human and humanity to humanity. Th us fi g-
ured, Jesus serves as the anthropological light that orients and facilitates the human 
“to measure up to his supreme destiny.” Th is double formulation is taken to validate 
and explain the basis of the church’s relation to the modern world: the human in 
its predicaments and destiny is interfaced with Christ as that one who relieves the 
predicament and actualizes the destiny. Salvation is understood here in anthropo-
logical terms: for the human to be saved is to actualize “his supreme destiny.” Sote-
riology, the logos of sotēria, the truth about the good, consists in bringing together 
the Christological and the anthropological. Th e fusion point is the archonic. Th e 
Pastoral Constitution reads: “Th e Church fi rmly believes that Christ, who died and 
was raised up for all, can through His Spirit off er man the light and the strength to 
measure up to his supreme destiny.” Th e lower case “his” has a blended relation 
the upper case “His.” It is the supreme destiny of the human spoken of here. But it 
is a supreme destiny that is known because it was also His supreme destiny. If the 
church, as a pastoral venue, can be said to have a saving purpose, it is to equip the 
human to be an archonic animal: to measure up to the supreme destiny and thereby 
the full spiritual dignity of things human.
If the axis origin/destiny is actualized in Christ as the model of human dignity, 
so too is the axis interdependence/unity. Unity, the council fathers repeat, belongs 
to the innermost nature of the church. One again fi nds the archonic and the Chris-
tic brought into a kind of revelatory alignment: “thanks to her relationship with 
Christ, a sacramental sign and an instrument of intimate union with God, and of 
the unity of the whole human race.” Th e church, we are told, should be thought 
of as a kind of “soul for human society.” Citing the dogmatic constitution on the 
church, Gaudium et spes proposes that the church’s role in relation to the world is, 
“above all,” to “erase division” so that “the whole human race may be led to the 
unity of God’s family.” Th e warrant for this mode of pastoral power, of course, is 
that humanity today is “increasingly” moving in this direction in the modern world. 
If, as I proposed in the introduction, following Foucault, pastoral power in the 
ancient church was, among other things, a technology of individuation, it is here 
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recalibrated as a technology of unifi cation. Th e unity of the human as origin-call 
and humanity as the corporate actuality of the human. So, although there is the 
familiar language of the genre humain here, the conceptualization has changed. Th e 
human is that which is destined for dignity, called in its origins. It is the dignifi ed 
human and, as such, it is the structural joint between the church and the world.
In the view of the Pastoral Constitution the properly anthropological nature of 
dignity is constituted by “supernatural grace,” to be sure. But this grace is given in 
a call-into-being that is fully actualized a communion of humanity. Such a theolog-
ico-anthropological reality is modeled and made actual in a Christological frame. 
Nevertheless—and this is the key—in the view of the authors of the Pastoral Con-
stitution it is not thereby any less anthropological either in its essence or, for that 
matter, in its veridictional accessibility to those outside the church: the world can 
agree to this common object of pastoral care without signing on to the church’s 
Christology. Th e key is that the object of the church’s care is human dignity under-
stood both in terms of human nature and human unity. Th is relation is taken to be 
modeled, called for, and fulfi lled in Christ. However, it can be known and agreed 
to by those outside the church. Th at is to say, modes of reasoning suited to things 
Christological are consonant with modes of reasoning suited to things archonic. 
It should not surprise us that Pope Paul VI spoke to the United Nations in such 
declarative modes about a shared calling.
From the Christic to the archonic to the ecclesiastic: an equipmental relation 
between the church and the world is fi gured in and with human dignity and thereby 
fashioned as a basis for pastoral practice. Th e church is cast as a venue within which 
a particular kind of equipment can be produced and made operational: equipment 
for the discernment and the conversion of the modern into the archonic. Th is 
equipment is put forward as that which facilitates discernment and actualization 
of human dignity. Human dignity is the object and objective. As archonic, human 
dignity is neither cultivated nor established. Rather it is recognized and conformed 
to. Th e reconfi gured pastoral power, called for by John at the interface of the church 
and the world, is established by way of care for human dignity. Human dignity, said 
the other way round, is cast as simultaneously making possible and thereby opening 
up a new form of pastoral power. Pastoral power in this case, as I have noted, does 
not consist of the conduct of souls, the pursuit of the lost sheep of the fl ock, or in 
the condemnation of the damned. It certainly retains its orientation to the classical 
pastoral mandate to care for “all and to each one”: omnes et singulatim, fi gured here 
as humanity and the human. Th e diff erence here is that the mode of equipmental 
engagement is ontological and temporal conversion: the modern to the archonic.
So, what is the church in the world of today? It is a venue that, through pastoral 
power, facilitates things human in the call to be human. It is a venue of the call, that 
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is, the venue of those that discern how it is that in the modern world the human can 
conform to the archonic. It does this by demonstrating, teaching, and converting 
the modern to the archonic. In more familiar language, it recognizes, pronounces, 
and defends human dignity. Th is form of pastoral work is a kind of assistance or 
facilitation carried out through a hermeneutic practice. Th e magisterium assists the 
human in actualizing its naturally supernatural destiny by interpreting the mean-
ing and demands of human dignity under the conditions presented by the modern 
world. Th e human, particularly the modern human, “is on the road to a more 
thorough development of his own personality.” By revealing the “ultimate goal of 
man,” the church “opens up the meaning of his own existence, that is, the inner-
most truth about himself.” In the end, this is what the church does in the modern 
world: it “fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear.” 
Insofar as the human is that being whose dignity lies in the relation of origin and 
call, and insofar as the modern human experiences disorientation and disruption of 
a movement toward this call, the church’s teaching can be off ered as an anthropo-
logical assistance. So, what is the payoff  of the magisterium’s relation to the modern 
world? It is not the familiar practices of pastoral power: the daily conduct of souls 
and the fl ock. It is, rather, the assurance of human dignity: reoriented and enabled, 
humans can “attain their crown.”
nature and the supernatural: the veridictional 
and jurisdictional price of the archonic
Th e price to be paid for such a proposition, the price to be paid for taking the 
dignifi ed and archonic human as the object of pastoral concern, is that the church, 
conceiving of the human as that being capable of things supernatural, puts its own 
vocation in question. It puts itself in question in the fi rst place with regard to its 
pastoral capacities. It is not only, or not merely, the shepherd of souls. It is a pastor of 
humanity. It facilitates what is proper to the human. Th is pastoral posture reopens 
the question of the extent to which, apart from the church’s mediating interven-
tions, humans are capable of achieving their highest good. Th e church puts itself in 
question in the second place with regard to its own ontological status. By priming 
the notion of the church within history, the Pastoral Constitution begins to color 
the ecclesia in archonic colors. It too can be conceived in terms of origin/destiny, 
interdependence/unity. Th e possible limit that this emphasis on the church-in-the-
world suggests is that to the extent that the church does not exceed or stand outside 
of history, to that same extent it cannot call humanity out of its own limitations and 
into the church. But the point is precisely that humanity does not need to be called 
out of itself and into the church. Th is is the imagined strength of the pastoral equip-
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ment on off er: it proposes to the human an apt help in being human; it proposes to 
humanity to be an aid, ready to hand, in being and becoming humanity.
For critics of the Pastoral Constitution, the other side of this emphasis on the 
role of the church in helping to actualize human dignity was the implication that 
the church might no longer be seen primarily as the exclusive mediator of grace 
between nature and the supernatural. Unlike the idea of a radical break between 
God and the world in “the fall,” the idea of a humanly integral relation between 
nature and the supernatural meant that the church’s Christological function was less 
about a monopoly on the means of salvation and more about its role in discerning 
the appropriate means of living in the world according to an archonic dignity. Th e 
archonic fashioning of things human produced an arrangement in which anthro-
pological factors called for the church to be pastorally present to the world. Rather 
than founding the necessity of the church on an insurmountable break between 
nature and grace, John’s vision for a relation to the modern world grounded the 
church’s pastoral call on the spiritual clarity of the church’s teaching and the opac-
ity of the world: the church discloses the demands of human dignity. But this shift 
had the eff ect of opening up a fi eld of contestation, which, in the years follow-
ing Vatican II, became increasingly crowded with combatants: might a theologico-
 anthropological truth of things human, the archonic in the midst of the modern, 
have the indirect eff ect of marginalizing the church in the world? In what ways 
might Christians make common political and ethical cause with non-Christians 
precisely because the archonic, once theologically clarifi ed, can speak for itself as a 
primordial human truth? Such a possibility seems consistent with John’s opening 
address to the council as well as with Paul’s speech to the United Nations. How else 
could Paul speak so freely and easily about the pastoral coincidence of the Vatican 
and the United Nations other than by way of the presumption of a shared object of 
care: the human in its archonic dignity? Th e church may cast Christological light, 
but it casts it on an anthropological object that could conceivably be taken seriously 
and recognized without that light.
Two decades after Vatican II, in a book titled Brief Catechesis, the French Jesuit 
Henri de Lubac examined the legacy of the council with regard to the question of 
human nature and the pastoral obligations of the church. In a short appendix to 
that short book de Lubac proposes that the success of Vatican II must ultimately 
be judged on its treatment of the supernatural. Th e appendix is interesting for a 
number of reasons, but most striking is its tone, which is not quite triumphant, but 
almost. It conveys a mood of earned satisfaction. In the appendix de Lubac asks: 
how did Vatican II formulate the relation of human nature and the supernatural? 
(Th e question was a deeply personal one for de Lubac, as I will describe below.) De 
Lubac responds to his own question by fi rst telling the reader that those who say 
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“the supernatural” was not mentioned in the constitutions of the council are “not 
quite right.” Th e word, he admits, was only used once. Th is relative absence of the 
term, he suggests, is a refl ection of the council fathers’ understanding of their mod-
ern audience. Th e concept of the supernatural—or, more precisely, the conception of 
the relation of the supernatural and human nature as a unifi ed reality—is, however, 
“found everywhere in the Council texts,” even if found “in other terms and under 
many aspects.” Th e anthropology at work in the council texts, de Lubac forcefully 
insists, is never brought to expression using the familiar language of a Reformation 
or post-Reformation “two orders”—whether understood as the separation of God 
and the world, the religious and the secular, the ecclesial and the political, or nature 
and the supernatural. Rather, the anthropology expressed in the texts is one ex-
pressed in terms of a divine vocation and of the world’s participation in the being of 
the divine. Th e human, in other words, is not conceived in terms of “the hypothesis 
of ‘a purely natural order,’ complete in itself,” one standing outside of and in coun-
terdistinction to a supernatural order. Th e human is conceived and talked about as a 
being created in the goal of unity with God in Christ. “Th e two notions of creation 
and of vocation to divine communion are always associated.”
Th e signifi cance of de Lubac’s review of Vatican II’s anthropology for my analy-
sis of human dignity and pastoral power is that it helps mark the fact that at the 
council the church undertook a basic rethinking of its anthropology and its pastoral 
vocation. Th e consequential character of this rethinking is captured in de Lubac’s 
own biography. Prior to the council, de Lubac’s work had become central to the 
long struggle, across late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, theol-
ogy, and anthropology, to put in question the presumption of an ontological split 
between nature and the supernatural and to formulate a theological anthropology 
predicated on diff erent ontological terrain. Th is conceptual and pragmatic struggle 
involved, in one way or another, an august cast of major French philosophers and 
theologians from Maurice Blondel to Henri Bergson to Etienne Gilson, to French 
anthropologists and historians such as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Michel de Certeau. 
Th e question of the human and the supernatural, for many of these thinkers, marks 
precisely that point at which a kind of anthropological, ethical, and theological 
excess had begun to overfl ow the limitations of modern thought.
On August 12, 1950, Pontiff  Pius XII published an encyclical titled Humani Ge-
neris. Th e encyclical was a key event in the history of the Vatican’s struggles with 
“modernism.” It constituted a point of consolidation in the church’s antimodernist 
eff orts and served as a point of contrast in relation to which some of the key ele-
ments at play in Gaudium et spes can be traced. Th e encyclical was also, as John 
Milbank has put it, a key event in “the personal drama of the life of Henri de 
Lubac.” De Lubac and his work formed a signifi cant part of a theological  pathway 
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in France, which, with some adjustments in emphasis and orientation, ran from 
the early part of the twentieth century to its closing decades. Th e pathway origi-
nated in a rejection of so-called Neo-Scholasticism, particularly in its Counter-
 Reformation and speculative bent, and ran to a call for a constructive return to me-
dieval and patristic theological sources—a movement of resourcement, re-sourcing, 
as it was often referred to. Th is return was a constructive one in that the medieval 
and patristic sources were used to elaborate a distinctive theological grammar. Th e 
theological grammar was distinctive in that it consisted of elements of classical and 
medieval thought restylized in response to contemporary blockages and problems. 
In this sense, although the modes of refl ection and productivity were largely his-
torical (many of the resourcement scholars worked professionally as academic histo-
rians), the outcome of these historical engagements—their eff ects in the life of the 
church—were far reaching both theologically and ecclesiastically.
Two of de Lubac’s works catalyzed and exemplifi ed the work of resourcement, 
or nouvelle theologie, as it was sometimes dubbed by its detractors. Th e two works 
put in place a kind of double “paradoxical” axis. Th e fi rst book, Catholicisme, 
published in 1938, articulated the fi rst axis. In it de Lubac argues that the nature of 
the human, and therein the nature of the church, is fundamentally and defi nitively 
social. He argues that the church is not a venue for the salvation of individual souls. 
It is, rather, the universal community of humanity “in embryo.” Th e word “catho-
lic” expresses this social nature. “Catholic” indicates that there is a universality to 
things human. Th is universality is predicated on the imago dei, the image of God, 
believed to be present to and in all humans. Divine grace is thus, in de Lubac’s view, 
all-encompassing, extending “beyond the explicit profession of Christianity.” How-
ever, the word also refers to a universality whose full meaning is “only spelled out in 
the life of the incarnate Logos.” Th is paradoxical axis is captured in the subtitle of 
the book: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man.
Th e second book, entitled Surnaturel, followed in 1947. Surnaturel was a direct 
confrontation with Neo-Scholastic conceptions of nature and grace and thereby 
a challenge to conceptions of the relation of modes of theological reasoning and 
ecclesiastical governance that had come to dominate the church since the Council 
of Trent in the sixteenth century. Th e book puts in question Neo-Scholastic theol-
ogy in two respects. First, the volume purports to off er a historical recovery of the 
“authentic” elements of tradition and not to off er a constructive metaphysics or 
theology. Th is mode of production turns the antimodernist critique back on it-
self: turning the attacks of a post-Tridentine theology back on the post-Tridentine 
church by arguing that the church had, for several centuries, been living in a dis-
junctive relation to tradition. Second, and more to the point here, de Lubac off ers a 
reading of the relation of nature and the supernatural that confronts what he takes 
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to be the core supposition of modern thought, a supposition that had become char-
acteristic not only of Catholic theology but of secular philosophy. De Lubac refused 
the supposition of “ontology” as “a purely philosophical classifi cation of being, cog-
nitively prior to a consideration of the divine.” He thereby contested the notion 
of an ontological fi eld of purely immanent being (“pure nature,” as he referred to 
it) proper to things human or things natural and separate from this divine or things 
supernatural. He refused what he took to be the ontological premises of a “purely” 
secular world. He refused the proposition that the purely natural, understood as the 
purely secular, was the other of, or independent from, the supernatural.
De Lubac argued that theology must reject the notion of an ontological divi-
sion of nature (particularly human nature) and the supernatural (and must above 
all reject the idea of a “supernature” as a metaphysical reality outside of the natural 
proper only to God). Here is where his second paradoxical axis comes in: human 
nature is always intrinsically “raised above itself ” to the divine, to the supernatural. 
Th e fi rst side of the paradoxical structure is that nature, in its most ordinary and 
basic character, points beyond itself to the supernatural. In this way the natural is 
elevated beyond itself toward the supernatural but is not in this way either surpassed 
or destroyed. Th e second side of the paradox is that the human’s elevation to the su-
pernatural, which is defi nitive of human nature, can, in his words, “only be received 
from God as a gift.” Nature is, by its nature, graceful.
Above all, de Lubac’s two paradoxical axes constituted a challenge to reigning 
Neo-Scholastic understandings of the nature of grace and therein the relation of the 
church as a mediator of divine grace to human nature. He puts in question what 
he saw to be the church’s tactic of trying to preserve the pure gratuity of commu-
nion between the divine and the human as well as the pure gratuity of communion 
among and between humans in the divine by way of an appeal to the existence of 
two ontological orders—a pure nature and a pure supernature. Th e existence of 
the two orders could then be invoked as a justifi cation for the unique role of the 
church as a mediator. By contrast, de Lubac argued that the human can only be 
properly understood in the tension of the claim that the human is constituted in its 
very being by this double communion with God and as humanity. If the church is 
instrumental in the divine’s off er of grace, this means that the church contributes to 
the actualization of the supernatural calling of nature. Put in condensed form, de 
Lubac’s argument was this: that the call to humanity’s highest good is characteristic 
of all beings with an intellectual soul. Th e gratuity of the divine must be thought 
without appeal to an ontological segregation of nature and the supernatural; nature 
must be conceived as constituted by grace, that is, by its elevation to, in, and by the 
supernatural.
Since the Council of Trent, de Lubac argues, the church had come to see its rela-
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tion to the world in terms consistent with the Protestant Reformation—which the 
Council of Trent had supposedly repudiated. Th is relation had been formulated in 
terms of the doctrine of original sin, and the doctrine of original sin, in turn, had 
been formulated in terms of the strict break between the supernatural and nature. 
Given this longstanding presumption, it is not altogether surprising that de Lubac’s 
anthropology, with its ecclesiological entailments, came under attack. Th e most sig-
nifi cant form of this attack was the encyclical Humani Generis. Th e encyclical makes 
clear the Vatican’s rejection of de Lubac’s propositions concerning the supernatural. 
It reads: “Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, 
cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatifi c 
life.” In 1950, in conjunction with the publication of the encyclical, de Lubac was 
removed from his post as a professor of theology in Lyon and relieved of his other 
offi  cial church duties. He was asked to leave the province of Lyon, and his books 
were removed from all Jesuit libraries. Both he and his work would be reinstated 
in 1958. His commitment to the agenda of constructing a post-Tridentine theology, 
however, was never really revitalized, despite what many saw as his vindication at 
Vatican II.
Fifteen years after the publication of Humani Generis, Gaudium et spes inverted 
the Vatican’s earlier conclusions. Th e Pastoral Constitution argues that the human 
is created as an intellectual being naturally ordered and called to the beatifi c life. 
Th e natural is not ontologically separated from the supernatural; human nature is 
enfolded into the supernatural as an integrated archonic vocation. De Lubac strenu-
ously argued that this enfolding did not lessen the gratuity of the whole aff air—the 
human may be oriented to the divine by nature, but that nature could never achieve 
its proper ends without divine elevation. As Milbank has put it, the position that de 
Lubac developed, a position consonant with the prior work of Maurice Blondel, can 
be thought of as a position of integralism. Th is designation is meant to indicate 
that the human in its nature is destined to be “supernatualized.” Such a position, in 
Milbank’s view, is distinct from the work of other Catholic theologians, such as the 
German Karl Rahner, and from the work of post–Vatican II liberation theologians, 
wherein the supernatural is, as it were, “naturalized”—a position Milbank refers to 
as “integrist.” In the former position human nature is never hypostasized and so 
never secularized, as Milbank suggests it is in the latter.
Th e theological and pastoral stakes of the diff erence between these two positions, 
however seemingly a matter of the theological esoteric, turn out to be quite high. 
Th ey have issued in quite diff erent political theologies and thereby diff erent theolo-
gies of political and pastoral action. Integralism refuses the notion that humans 
and human actions can rightly be understood as existing in an autonomous secular 
sphere of creation. Th ere is according to this position no “pure nature” that can be 
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understood on its own terms apart from the divine. Th e secular as an ontologically 
distinct space to which the church must relate is fl atly refused by the integralist 
position as a fi ction (however powerful and eff ective) of modern liberalism and as 
an artifact of Reformation struggles over church authority. Th e integrist position, by 
contrast, eff ectively naturalizes the supernatural—places the characteristics of the 
supernatural within the natural. It can, thereby, grant the human an autonomous 
sphere of existence as always already “grace imbued” and can therefore think about 
and engage with that autonomous sphere in a pretheological or even extratheo-
logical manner. As a consequence, the political theology of the integrist variety can 
make common cause with the secular and even found itself on nontheological social 
theories, themselves predicated on the notion of the autonomy of the secular. To 
put a point on it—and I will return to this in the Diagnostic Excursus below—the 
diff erence between naturalizing the supernatural and supernaturalizing the natural 
turns on diff erent visions for political salvation and pastoral power. If, in the hu-
man, the supernatural is naturalized, a form of salvation and pastoral power can 
be elaborated in which the ostensible end is the protection of the archonic. If, on 
the other hand, in the human, nature is supernaturalized, then the church remains 
ontologically and metaphysically central to all things human as the mediating factor 
in communion with God and in the socialization of humanity.
Th e formulations introduced in Gaudium et spes opened as many questions as 
they resolved at the level of integralist and integrist theological anthropologies and 
political theologies. Th is, I think, was the price to be paid for fi guring a theological 
anthropology in an archonic mode. In any event, the archonic fashioning of human 
dignity as a solution to the problem of the church in the modern world, quite de-
spite itself, opened the possibility of a kind of anthropological secularization twice 
over. For the integralists among the council fathers human dignity, though consti-
tuted as a supernatural call, could nonetheless be known as properly and originally 
anthropological—a fi guration that took as its predicate that human dignity could 
be intuited in history and by way of “natural reason.” What they hoped to add to 
this was the notion that such secular recognition would always remain incomplete 
without the interpretation and direction off ered by the magisterium’s teaching. 
For the so-called integrists, on the other side, if the supernatural were imagined to 
be folded into the natural, dignity likewise could be recognized as immanent and 
proper. Th at immanent dignity could, in principle, be recognized and protected 
quite apart from the magisterium, even if the magisterium retained a privileged 
capacity to interpret things rightly. In either case, however, pastoral practice appears 
as a kind of hermeneutic engagement: off ering an interpretation of the meaning of 
historical life as an aid to clarifying the intrinsic and primordial demands of human 
dignity.
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Th e diff erence between the two positions seems to turn on degrees of exclusiv-
ity and authority with regard to the church’s authority. Th at diff erence, of course, 
is not nothing; it subsequently informed a restructuring of the Vatican’s curia and 
its mechanisms for testing the orthodoxy of the faithful and for “reading the signs” 
of the modern world. Th is restructuring was not only institutional but also created 
a new web of theological fault lines. It contributed—to pick one poignant inter-
personal example—to a parting of ways between Henri de Lubac and his onetime 
student and friend Michel de Certeau. De Lubac would remain dedicated to the 
proposition that the church retains a privileged position in the mediation of the 
divine life; de Certeau, who by the time of Vatican II was already a noted scholar 
of Christian and non-Christian mysticism, embraced the council’s anthropology as 
further theological warrant for taking seriously the spiritual practices and experi-
ences of non-Christians on their own terms. For de Certeau this never amounted 
to an abandonment of his faith. It did, however, contribute to the dissolution of a 
friendship—a dissolution not at all unusual across the church in the wake of the 
council.
For what it’s worth, the council fathers seemed to have resisted any secular read-
ings of their anthropology and were, in fact, eager not to be interpreted in some-
thing like an integrist fashion: “we are not saying that the meaning of temporal 
aff airs does not depend on reference to the Creator.” If the question is put in terms 
of the equipment they off ered, their resistance can be justifi ed. Th ey cautioned: 
“When God is forgotten . . . the creature itself grows unintelligible.” Th e task of the 
church is to proclaim and champion the “dignity of the human vocation.” Yet the 
object of pastoral care is human. So the equipmental question works both ways. A 
secular or, at least, an extraecclesial response to things human is certainly opened up 
by the anthropology off ered in Gaudium et spes. To the extent that human nature 
really is defi ned by the supernatural, it would seem one does not need to accept the 
church’s propositions of faith, per se, to agree with the form of pastoral care on of-
fer. By fi guring the human in archonic terms, the council fathers both respond to 
the problem of the church’s pastoral relation to the modern world and fashion an 
object of pastoral care that might be addressed otherwise. It is in this sense not at 
all surprising that, in the midst of the debates over Schema XIII, Paul spoke of the 
cooperation of the Vatican and the United Nations in terms of a common pastoral 
interest.
Gaudium et spes proposes to answer the core pastoral problem of Vatican II. In 
doing so, at least three signifi cant outcomes can be pointed to. Th e fi rst is that a 
concept of human dignity is fashioned as the pastoral and structural juncture point 
of the church and the modern world. Th e second is that, in this conception of 
human dignity, multiple lines of theological contestation concerning the church’s 
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pastoral power and teaching authority coalesce as a single ensemble. Th e third is 
that all of this is given archonic and vocational form. Let me return to two questions 
I posed earlier. Th e fi rst: what is the human such that it is in need of the church’s 
pastoral care? Th e human is a creature dignifi ed in its origins by a supernatural voca-
tion. It is thereby primordially dignifi ed. It must live in proper response to this dig-
nity, a response both opened up and threatened by the contemporary world. And 
the second: what is the church such that it is capable of caring for things human? It 
is that venue oriented to the care of those who are called. It does this by conforming 
the modern into the archonic.
In closing, it seems appropriate to quote once more from the Pastoral Constitu-
tion. Today this quote may strike some as unremarkable. Despite the familiarity 
of the rhetoric, the practical and pastoral orientation expressed in this quote is, 
historically and ecclesiastically speaking, quite unusual. Th e Pastoral Constitution 
reads: “Th e Church guards the heritage of God’s word and draws from it moral 
and religious principles without always having at hand the solution to particular 
problems.” Th e church guards an inheritance of divine truth. What does this issue 
in? Th e condemnation of the deviant? Th e pursuit of lost souls? Th e conduct of the 
faithful? It is not quite any of these—though these modes of pastoral engagement 
remain part of the church’s self-care and were addressed at length in other schema. 
Th is guardianship, rather, issues in principles for, and not solutions to, particular 
problems. Th e magisterium is not fi tted to the daily conduct of conduct in the 
modern world, per se. Rather, the magisterium is put forward as capable of adjust-
ing the truth of doctrine in such a way as to discriminate among the demands of 
human dignity. Th e “path that humanity” takes in the modern world need “not be 
a dark one.” Th e magisterium will illuminate the archonic for the modern world. 
Th e mode, the tekhnē, off ered by the church will be hermeneutic. Th e form, the 
paraskeuē, will be the conformation of the modern to and with the archonic.
Broadly speaking, then, to the question of human dignity we can say that 
through Vatican II human dignity is fashioned as the structural joint of pastoral 
power, holding together the church and the modern world. Th is structural joint 
is archonic, which means that it is immanent and primordial for all and for each 
one. Th is also means that it commands: all and each one must be cared for. But 
this mandate—omnes et singulatim—is no longer connected to a mechanism for 
the governance of conduct. After all, this is a mandate that applies to the church 
in its relation to the ecclesia ad extra, the world beyond the church in relation to 
which the church is in no position to wield the tools of governance. What’s more, 
the archonic is not the kind of object of care that calls for active governance, per se. 
Given that the archonic consists in an integral and genetic relation between origins 
and destiny, it is not surprising that care for human dignity will be articulated in 
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terms of “developing,” or “perfecting,” or “fulfi lling” human dignity. But the pattern 
and norm of this development is primordial and inherent. It is in this sense then 
that the art of pastoral care must consist, fi rst of all, in discernment—discerning the 
true nature of things human amid the conditions of the contemporary world—and, 
second of all, in protection—understanding which forms of life to guard against so 
as to facilitate the unfolding and actualization of the human vocation. Th e extent to 
which these dynamics are in play in political as well as ecclesial venues will be the 
subject of the next case.
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Politics, Sovereignty, and Human Rights
In short, in relation to his sovereignty, and in relation to the pastorate, something more is 
demanded from [the sovereign], something diff erent, something else. Th is is government. It 
is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something 
other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which must fi nd its model, 
is the art of government.
—Michel Foucault
In the previous chapter, I began to specify some of the critical elements that were 
brought together and that contribute to the form of human dignity as an object of 
thought and care in relation to the problem of pastoral power. I also attempted to 
specify the kind of pastoral equipment that the council fathers proposed would be 
appropriate to this fi gure of human dignity. Th is pastoral equipment consisted in 
the obligation to care for humanity and each human by interpreting the terms of 
a primordial calling amid the fl ux of the modern world and by speaking the truth 
about the demands of dignity in light of that fl ux. Care for human dignity was 
constituted as a hermeneutic and truth-telling practice.
All of this concerned one particular venue and one particular event: the Roman 
Catholic Church at Vatican II. Th e extent to which the characteristics of human 
dignity formulated and problematized at Vatican II can be generalized to other ven-
ues remains to be seen. Nevertheless, I have tried to show how during Vatican II, 
and through the work on Gaudium et spes in particular, the council fathers ad-
dressed the challenge of reconstituting the church’s object and objective of pastoral 
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care in the modern world as a problem concerning human dignity. In working on 
that problem, the council fathers contributed to the form of a distinctive mode of 
pastoral and ecclesiastical intervention, a mode of veridictional intervention for the 
care of human dignity.
Th e problem taken up at Vatican II was a problem without a model, ecclesi-
astically speaking. Th at said, several of the aspects of the problem were shaped by 
ecclesial and nonecclesial histories of discourse and practice connected to the uni-
versal fi gure of the human. Th e human conceived universally had been a consistent 
theme of theological reasoning for centuries, questions of the church in relation to 
modern political and social projects had been debated in various forms for more 
than a century, and the authority of the magisterium in relation to the problem of 
historical change was a constant theme of twentieth-century church politics. All of 
this had been in play before the council. But the confi guration of it all, put together 
as an ensemble that could be thought of as a single, if complex, problem (the pas-
toral problem of the modern world) and anchored in a single, if complex, object 
(archonic human dignity): this did not have a model.
It did have prior indications and relative precedents. Human dignity had func-
tioned as a constitutional object for at least one other signifi cant venue and as a 
calibrating factor in that venue’s designs of modes and forms of practice. I opened 
Chapter 1 with an account of Pope Paul VI’s address to the United Nations, an 
address in which Paul off ered a series of remarkable statements concerning the con-
sonance between the ministry of the Roman Catholic Church and the ministry of 
the United Nations. Th e statements certainly had strategic intent—both in terms 
of the internal politics of Vatican II and in terms of the need to open up a connec-
tion between the Vatican and the United Nations. All the same, Paul was indicating 
something that, although asserted as self-evident, was in fact quite strange: the idea 
that the United Nations and the church minister to the same object. Diff erences 
abound, and other objects of concern and other instruments of care are not shared. 
Th e church, for example, continues to minister to the souls of the faithful, and 
the United Nations organizes itself in view of the interests of its member states. 
Nonetheless—and in addition to all these diff erences—the United Nations, like the 
Vatican, had conceived of and had worked to constitute itself in view of a responsi-
bility to and for human dignity.
the universal declaration of human rights
With all of this in mind, I propose to examine a second case—a second venue 
and event: the formulation of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. Th e declaration, and the micropolitics of its development, occupies 
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a signifi cant place in the history of the United Nations’ self-conception and self-
constitution and thereby a signifi cant place in the history of eff orts to think about 
and carry out the politics of human dignity. What is crucial about work on the 
declaration is that it marks the point at which the United Nations attempted to in-
vent for itself a mode and form of political practice predicated on something other 
than, or in addition to, the sovereignty of its member states. Regardless of what 
one makes of the outcomes of these eff orts—and there is much to be said about its 
relative failures and successes—work on the declaration is an event of considerable 
consequence for the politics of intrinsic worth: an eff ort is made to design a political 
practice anchored in and focused on human dignity.
As with the council fathers, the authors of the declaration faced the task of 
responding to a demand for something more from power. Th is something more 
included some of the familiar features of political humanism—the call for a univer-
sal political ethic, the question of where and how to set limitations on the excesses 
of sovereign forms of power, as well as the relative absence of a model and form 
of power predicated on care for a universal and seemingly self-justifying object. 
Th eir task, in part, was how to articulate a mode and form of political power that, 
on the one side, is oriented toward this-worldly problems and this-worldly goods 
but that, on the other side, is anchored in and justifi ed by a transcendent or tran-
scendental logic of care. Th e council fathers at Vatican II dealt with this problem 
in terms of the relation between nature and the supernatural, in which the human 
was understood to be a creature that is, by nature, called to unity with the divine 
and with other humans. Th e members of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
(CHR) dealt with this problem quite diff erently. Although for a short time they 
dealt with it through philosophical debate over the defi nitions and source of dignity 
and over the political requirements implied by diff erent defi nitions, the dilemma 
was ultimately resolved procedurally: debate was simply cut off , and human dignity 
was asserted as given, as this-worldly, and as defi nitive for legitimate and eff ective 
political action. Dignity was, in other words, simply declared. Conceptually, the 
result of this procedural resolution was the production of a fi gure of the human 
whose worth is self-referential, whose moral rectitude commands without an ap-
peal to other sources of authority, and whose recognition is, per se, the guarantee 
of human good. Th e result was, in other words, the production of another archonic 
fi gure of human dignity.
In light of the challenge and demand that the CHR articulate a mode of political 
practice beyond the perceived limitations of state sovereignty, it is worth saying a 
word or two about why I am concentrating on the Universal Declaration and not 
on some other aspect of the United Nations’ self-constitution, such as the formula-
tion of the UN Charter, which also connects the United Nations to care for human 
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dignity. Th e choice to concentrate on the declaration is not as obvious as it may 
seem. Broadly speaking, the UN Charter has arguably played a more signifi cant 
role in determining the character and actions of the United Nations and its mem-
ber states than the Universal Declaration. Th e declaration does not have the legally 
binding status of the charter, and its infl uence on the actual practices of sovereign 
member states arguably remains (at best) inconsistent. Th e charter, fi rst and fore-
most, established the terms of the UN Security Council, a body that has never been 
overly determined by the politics of intrinsic worth implied in the contemporary 
notion of human dignity. A study examining the UN Security Council’s rationales 
for action compared the relative frequency with which concern for human dignity 
and human rights has been propounded as an orienting principle in contrast to the 
relative infrequency with which these principles have been put to work in any direct 
and eff ective manner. Another study concluded that it is impressive to think “how 
these powers managed to separate the promotion of human rights principles from 
their ineff ectual and selective enforcement without discrediting the universal basis 
of the entire human rights project.”
More than one author has remarked on the fact that the twentieth century was 
characterized by forms of political violence more widespread and more brutal than 
perhaps any other. Genocide, others have proposed, is its most notorious inven-
tion. Whether it is singular in its scale of human grief might be arguable; that such 
grief was one of the twentieth century’s defi ning features, however, is not. In seem-
ing contrast, the twentieth century also saw the rise of the fi gure of human dignity 
and the global expansion of human rights. Some scholarly attention has been paid 
to the relation between these two contrastive characteristics, and it has been argued 
that the two are mutually generative and represent two faces of a single political 
logic and epoch. I will examine these proposals in the Diagnostic Excursus fol-
lowing this second case. Less scholarly attention has been paid to a question that 
is actually more historically concrete and, in my view, equally signifi cant: namely, 
how it is that the politics of human dignity has not been capable of stemming the 
excesses of political violence, despite the institution of venues, such as the United 
Nations, ostensibly designed in response to such excesses. Normand and Zaidi, call-
ing into question the political worth of the Universal Declaration, put it bluntly: 
“the persistence—some would argue increase—of persecution, exploitation, and in-
equality since the triumphant arrival of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948 raises serious questions about the value added to [the] ongoing 
struggle for justice.” It seems to me that more attention needs to be paid to the 
question of how the politics of human dignity were actually designed at the United 
Nations and how talk of human dignity and human rights were eff ectively separated 
out from the institution of eff ective practices connected to such talk. A related ques-
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tion concerns how it was that human dignity was conceived such that this separa-
tion was not only possible but even actively facilitated. In the examination that 
follows, I will propose that a kind of practical incapacity was actually designed into 
the declaration from the outset, and that in connection to this built-in incapacity, a 
conception of human dignity emerged that subsequently became a model for other 
venues, venues that, in various ways and to various degrees, began to overcome this 
incapacity. Said diff erently: if talk of human dignity and human rights at the United 
Nations entailed a kind of incapacity by design (and I will argue that it did), it is 
striking that these designs have nonetheless proven generative for the proliferation 
of relatively more eff ective practices connected to human dignity and human rights 
in other venues.
A fi nal word on why I have selected the UN Declaration and not the UN Char-
ter as the point of orientation for thinking about human dignity. It is important to 
keep in mind that the Security Council was the fi rst and central body established 
by the UN Charter and that the permanent members of the Security Council con-
sisted of those “great powers” that animated the United Nations in the fi rst place. 
Given this centrality and this membership, it is not surprising that whatever else the 
UN Charter accomplished it did not off er designs for modes or forms of political 
practice that would place any substantial restrictions on existing power relations. 
Human dignity, taken as a central object of political concern, would seem to require 
such restrictions. Th e Security Council was constituted in a manner partially insu-
lated from the demands of a politics of human dignity. Th e term “human dignity” 
does appear in the preamble to the charter, but the key terms of the charter—the 
operative terms—are all basic to familiar and well-established economies of state 
sovereignty: peace, social progress, security, and so on. It is on the basis of these 
terms that the charter constituted the initial relations of power and their rationale 
for the United Nations and its members. An analysis of these relations of power 
and of how they structure the problem space within which work on the declaration 
proceeded will be part of this chapter.
All of this indicates a key point: the constitutional terms of the UN Charter do 
not (yet) require anything more of power, they do not call for new modes of power, 
and they do not demand anything more beyond better coordination of existing 
apparatuses. Th ey may require new interfaces as well as new forums and forms for 
international aff airs—which certainly cannot be taken for granted. Th ey may also 
initiate new terms for moral legitimacy in international and even intranational af-
fairs. But they do not determine or set out concrete proposals for a shift in power or 
for the rationality on the basis of which such a shift could take place. Th is is why it 
is no small thing that the obligation to think about what it means to govern and act 
in the name of human dignity and human rights is a problem explicitly excluded 
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from the UN Charter. It is no small thing that this problem was deferred: Article 
68 of the charter hands this task over to the Commission on Human Rights. Th e 
work of formulating the terms of human dignity, its ethical and political import, 
and the modes and forms of practice it calls for fell to the CHR and its work on 
human rights.
three points of reference
Th ree points of reference bear noting from the outset. Th e fi rst concerns the promi-
nence of discourse concerning human dignity and human rights today. A number of 
thinkers, in fi elds ranging from theology to law to anthropology, have commented 
on the fact that no other discourse has anything like the widespread moral author-
ity of the discourse on human rights; the discourse on human rights is premised on 
human dignity, variously conceived. Th e extent to which such claims about hu-
man rights discourse and their relative signifi cance in term of political and ethical 
practices continues to hold true is a question I will return to in the conclusion. At 
a minimum, however, it is fair to say that talk of human rights and human dignity 
remains a central term in a highly mobile and global discursive apparatus. Th is fact 
needs to be kept in mind when examining the work and legacy of the CHR.
Th e second point of reference concerns the mandate given to the CHR and the 
work carried out in response to that mandate. Th e CHR’s mandate was twofold: 
to formulate a jurisdictional framework for human rights premised on the notion 
of universal human dignity and to design means for the implementation and en-
forcement of such a framework. Th e commission successfully achieved the fi rst 
part. After a short period of intense work the CHR produced a draft of a declara-
tion, composed as the orienting principles that would inform further work on the 
question of enforcement. A good portion of this initial success, however, can be 
attributed to an explicit and repeated emphasis on the fact that the declaration 
itself was not legally binding for the member states signing on to it. Th e question 
of how the declaration came to be nonbinding and why it is signifi cant for the 
legacy of thinking about human dignity will be considered in this chapter and the 
next. For now it is enough simply to note that although the CHR was successful 
in articulating a framework of principles for the protection of human dignity by 
way of human rights, they were unsuccessful in producing eff ective jurisdictional 
mechanisms connected to it. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that they were 
successful in failing to produce jurisdictional mechanisms; the jurisdictional inca-
pacities of the United Nations with regard to establishing eff ective forms of practice 
under the sign of human dignity were not arrived at through accidental turns. As 
such—and this is really the crux of the second point of reference—the legacy of the 
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CHR’s work includes a built-in asymmetry between the fi gure of the dignifi ed hu-
man at the heart of the declaration, with the notion of human rights as the practical 
elaboration of that fi gure, and the jurisdictional mechanisms connected to that 
fi gure and those practices.
A third point of reference follows from the second and brings us back to the fi rst. 
Taking into account some notable exceptions—not least of which is the Roman 
Catholic Church—I echo at least one scholar of human rights when I say that the 
conception of human dignity elaborated in the Universal Declaration has become 
predominant in national and international legal and moral schemas concerned with 
such matters. Th is means that even though the jurisdictional mechanisms sketched 
out by the CHR have remained basically ineff ectual (at least in terms of their origi-
nal designs), the fi gure of the human that they elaborated and put into play and the 
regimes of universal rights they articulate as the primary means of rendering that 
fi gure susceptible to political care have continued to be mobilized as the object of 
concern and rationale of practice across multiple and varied institutional settings.
fragmenting truth and power
Article 68 of the UN Charter called for the creation of a Commission on Human 
Rights as part of the work of the UN Economic and Social Council. Th e article 
reads: “Th e Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and 
social fi elds and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as 
may be required for the performance of its functions.” Th e CHR was subsequently 
established in 1946 and charged with a dual mandate: to design a framework within 
which human rights could be “promoted” as well as the equipment “required for 
the performance of its functions,” that is, equipment for the implementation and 
enforcement of human rights.
Sixty years later, in 2006 the CHR was dissolved and its mandate reconstituted 
under the aegis of the Human Rights Council, coordinated by the UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. A central reason given for the dissolution was the 
long history of the commission’s inability (and therein the United Nations’ inabil-
ity) to design and implement eff ective instruments for the enforcement of human 
rights. It was widely determined that the CHR had failed in realizing the better part 
of its mandate. Th at the commission should be judged incapable is unsurprising. 
Th at it took sixty years to rectify a shortcoming present from the outset turns out 
not to be surprising either, when one considers the players and stakes involved.
In their book on the history of the United Nations Normand and Zaidi of-
fer what would seem to be a self-evident statement: during and immediately after 
World War II there was tremendous energy and enthusiasm for establishing interna-
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tional political mechanisms calibrated to a universal humanism and oriented by the 
concept of human rights. Th e statement is no doubt basically correct. One could, 
for example, construct a fairly thick catalogue of prominent thinkers—principally 
European and American but not exclusively so—whose work turned to the practical 
and conceptual problems of humanity, politics, and the modern state during those 
years. More telling still are the thousands of individual petitions from around the 
world concerning human rights violations that fl ooded the United Nations even 
before the fi rst offi  cial meeting of the CHR.
A conclusion that we should resist drawing from this, however, is that the in-
tense attention given to the problem of human worth as a problem of human rights 
was either a natural or obvious outcome of the ravages of World War II. Th e war 
was undeniably the major catalyst. But for the sake of analytic clarity it is impor-
tant to keep track of the fact that the claim to the self-evidence of human dignity 
and human rights as the means of addressing and redressing questions of human 
worth and state sovereignty was itself an important outcome of the formulations 
and practices developed in postwar politics and ethics. A more analytically useful 
inference to draw at this point is that the fl ood of energy and excitement connected 
to the work of the CHR and the Declaration of Human Rights is evidence of the 
intense demand for political institutions and mechanisms beyond existing norms 
and forms of state sovereignty.
Part of the attention paid to the work of the CHR came from the fact that in the 
late 1920s the League of Nations had inaugurated a practice of receiving individual 
complaints of violations of human rights. Th e expectation was that the CHR would 
carry this practice forward, and that they would address the fact that sovereign states 
were basically immune to such complaints, goes some way to explaining the scru-
tiny under which the CHR’s work proceeded in its initial phases. It also goes some 
way to explaining the widespread hope and even expectation that the commission 
would approach its mandate as a largely pragmatic aff air. With regard to human 
dignity and human rights, the pressing question was how, and if, any meaningful 
instruments and practices could be put into place to redress violations, not whether 
such practices were needed. Th e commission, in short, was expected to create a 
venue capable of facilitating human rights.
From the outset there were indications that such a pragmatic demand would not 
be satisfactorily met. Th e council was certainly given considerable latitude in for-
mulating the content of human rights and establishing priorities among them. But 
in view of the twofold fact that the commission was made up of representatives of 
member states with strong interests in protecting existing power relations (many of 
whom had already been accused of human rights violations) and that expectations 
among these member states were sharply dissonant, there was some question as 
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to whether eff ective jurisdictional standards and practices would ever be designed, 
let alone implemented. Nonetheless, the hope was held out that the commission 
would articulate the mechanisms by way of which the United Nations would be-
come a venue capable of redressing the violation of human rights. To this end, the 
CHR undertook the conceptual, organizational, and political work of inventing an 
art of political care for human dignity.
In the early days, critics of the CHR’s work complained that the United States 
had a disproportionate infl uence on the proceedings. Th e complaint has been bol-
stered by subsequent statements made by U.S. State Department offi  cials that, in 
fact, in the lead up to the ratifi cation of the declaration, all U.S. demands were 
met. No other country could reasonably make such a claim. Th at said, the sig-
nifi cance of the complaint can easily be overinterpreted. Th e declaration was the 
product of considerable negotiation. If major components were shaped and secured 
by the United States and its allies, while being unsuccessfully criticized or blocked 
by others, this only partially diminishes the fact that the work of the commission in 
other ways proceeded in inventive and even unexpected directions. Th e fi nal draft 
of the declaration carried the imprint of the challenges and protests raised by non-
U.S. members of the CHR, an imprint that shows itself in the way in which the 
concepts of human dignity and human rights remained somewhat fragmented and 
inconsistent within the declaration.
Th e CHR was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, representing the United States. 
Seventeen other countries also held seats. Given her position as chair, as well as 
her close relation to the U.S. State Department, Roosevelt was the most infl uential 
member of the commission during the time when the declaration was being com-
posed. Other members who signifi cantly shaped the declaration included Colonel 
William Hodgson, the Australian delegate, a strong advocate of internationalism; 
Charles Malik of Lebanon, a Th omist and pragmatist who pushed for a workable 
set of rights; and Peng Cheng Chang of China, a pluralist in his approach to rights 
and a key player in negotiating deadlocks over the nature and origin of human 
dignity. It is perhaps not incidental that although the CHR had several prominent 
members from non-Western countries, most were educated in Western philosophi-
cal traditions and took the mandate of the commission, the promotion of human 
rights, to be self-evident.
Th e commission’s fi rst order of business was to draft an International Bill of 
Rights. Under Roosevelt’s leadership this task was conceived as consisting of three 
components: identifying which rights to recognize and deciding how to prioritize 
those rights, proposing a framework for legally formalizing the relation between 
these rights and the obligations of individual member states, and developing an ef-
fective means of political enforcement. A triple problem: moral, legal, political.
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No element of this problem was straightforward, though the second and third 
elements were clearly more fraught than the fi rst. On one level, no member of the 
commission could aff ord to be against—or even be suspected of being against—
developing a means of implementation. On another level, virtually all members 
actively protested the various means of implementation actually on off er. Knowing 
how diffi  cult the problem of implementation would ultimately be, most members 
supported the idea of establishing a single comprehensive instrument in which all 
three problems would be taken up together. In this way, the more diffi  cult chal-
lenges could not be bracketed off  from the work of accomplishing the relatively 
less diffi  cult. Th e idea was that if the commission was to propose solutions to any 
of the three problems, they had to propose solutions to all of them. Normand and 
Zaidi point out that for many members, “human rights were above all a matter of 
practice, not theory, and that it made little sense to proclaim recognition of human 
rights in grandiose terms if neither the political will nor the practical machinery 
existed to bring the concept down to earth.”
In the end, however, the United States and the Soviet Union joined forces to 
block any attempt to take up all aspects of a Bill of Rights as a single integrated 
instrument. Th ey thereby eff ectively blocked eff orts at connecting declaration to 
implementation. It goes without saying that neither country explicitly rejected the 
idea of implementation, per se; too much was at stake in terms of moral credibility 
to take such a position. But both were active in generating procedural obstructions 
to the creation of any serious mechanism of implementation.
In the face of U.S. and Soviet resistance, the drafting committee for the Bill of 
Rights proposed two alternative ways forward. Th e fi rst option was to present the 
General Assembly with a legally binding convention in which human rights and the 
means of their enforcement would be spelled out. Such a legal convention would 
mean that both the framework for human rights and some machinery of enforce-
ment would be in place from the outset. Th e second option would be to present 
the General Assembly with a “Declaration” on human rights, a documentary form 
that was not legally binding and that therefore could consist only of a statement of 
moral principles and intentions.
Th e U.S. representatives insisted that the fi rst of these two options was simply 
not workable. Given the complexity of the threefold task, they argued, bundling 
them together would mean that no one part would ever be completed. Th ey ar-
gued that mechanisms for enforcement should be designed on the basis of a clear 
defi nition of human rights and hence should be deferred until such a defi nition 
was in place. Th ey further argued that the question of moral defi nition should be 
disconnected from legal and political questions and worked on separately until the 
disagreements over issues of implementation were resolved. Roosevelt in particular 
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insisted that the commission proceed in a somewhat staged and procedurally struc-
tured fashion.
Th e resistance of the Soviet members to issues of implementation was more 
fundamental and connected to the political and anthropological bases on which the 
work of the commission was proceeding. I will take up the anthropological con-
cerns in the next chapter. Politically, the Soviet members rejected the idea of imple-
mentation on the basis of their claim that a multinational organization was simply 
the wrong venue for guaranteeing human rights. Human dignity and human rights, 
they argued, should not be set against the sovereignty of individual nation-states. 
Modern political experience, they argued, had taught us that human dignity can 
only be eff ectively realized within a just social and economic order. Such an order, 
in turn, could only be eff ectively realized within the state. So, while the Soviet 
representatives did not disagree with the need for a declaration identifying human 
rights nor disagree with the need for the implementation of such rights, they did 
disagree with the notion that the United Nations needed to invent a mode and 
form of jurisdiction distinct from the existing sovereign jurisdiction of the member 
states. In their view, it was enough to ask the member states to implement their own 
measures to protect human dignity.
Under the infl uence of pressure from the U.S. delegation, applied with the sup-
port of the Soviets, work on a Bill of Rights was ultimately divided into moral, 
legal, and political components. In a coordinated fashion, the Belgian representa-
tive proposed that the CHR set up its work according to three stages and three 
working groups. Th e fi rst working group would address itself to the question of 
a general declaration. Th e second would take up the task of developing a legal 
convention. Th e third would focus on the question of possible strategies and ap-
paratuses of implementation. Although this proposal moved work forward, it also 
created procedural insertion points that could be used to block attempts to move 
toward implementation. By formally separating out work on a declaration from 
the other aspects, member states could eff ectively endorse a set of orienting truth 
claims about human dignity and human rights, thereby retaining moral legitimacy, 
while simultaneously putting off  or refusing attempts to turn those truth claims 
into binding political practices.
Th is procedural fragmentation was considered by some on the commission, as 
well as by some outside observers, to be “far and away the most damaging deci-
sion for the long-term viability of the human rights system.” Members of the 
CHR voiced concern that the drafting of a declaration without legally binding 
requirements would do irreparable harm to the political usefulness of the concept 
of human rights, turning human rights and with it human dignity into objects of 
discursive and moral concern without also making them objects of legal and politi-
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cal intervention. Th e British delegation derided the idea of a simple declaration as 
“nothing more than a document of propaganda.” In terms of the United Nations’ 
capacity to solve the practical problem of designing a workable mode of power cen-
tered on human dignity and human rights, such judgments would, in retrospect, 
seem to have been warranted; the CHR, after all, would not have a legally binding 
convention in place for another thirty years.
Implementation fared even worse than the elaboration of a legal framework. 
Recommendations from the subcommission on implementation, which included 
facilitating individual petitions from nonstate entities and the creation of a jurisdic-
tional apparatus that could function within the borders of, but in an independent 
capacity from, individual member states, would be basically dropped. Although 
many of these proposals would resurface in other forms, subsequently they were 
only taken up in a fragmented and ad hoc manner.
Th e judgment that the breakup of human rights work into separate moral, legal, 
and political stages was “the most damaging decision” for the long-term viability of 
human rights practices may be warranted. It needs to be understood, however, not 
only in light of the persistent eff orts on the part the U.S. and Soviet delegations 
to encumber serious implementation but in view of the genuine tensions between 
a political logic anchored in human dignity and human rights and the logic of 
state sovereignty—tensions that were unlikely to be overcome in a multistate venue 
such as the United Nations whose power basically derives from the power of its 
members. It is certainly fair to say that the procedural fragmentation of the CHR’s 
mandate contributed to the United Nations’ lasting diffi  culties in shifting from 
designs for a mode of jurisdiction to eff ective equipment of implementation. But 
it is also fair to say that this fragmentation is exemplary of a deeper problem con-
nected to human dignity and human rights, a problem sharpened by the CHR but 
that has proven persistent in other human rights venues: how to constitute institu-
tions capable of turning discourse on human dignity into equipment and capable 
of facilitating the eff ective use of such equipment. Perhaps more importantly, what 
critics at the time could not have accounted for is how the procedural fragmenta-
tion of the CHR’s mandate would actually ramify. Ultimately, it contributed to the 
way in which human dignity would be fi gured and how other actors in other venues 
would subsequently take up the language of human dignity and the challenge of 
turning dignity into a practice.
One of the curious features of the CHR’s work is that, despite its other failings, 
it actually proved quite capable of producing a conception of human dignity and 
human rights. Moreover, by formally separating out the problem of articulating 
truths about the worth and rights of humans from the problem of jurisdictional 
implementation, the commission produced a legacy of conceptualization whose 
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defi ning features include the fact that it could be detached from any specifi c logic of 
implementation and thereby mobilized in diff erent forms in other situations. Th ey 
contributed to the work of formulating human worth as a problem of dignity and 
rights in such a way that subsequently a wide range of possible solutions could be 
off ered. Th e fact of this double legacy—an inability to formulate means for eff ec-
tive practice as well as the conception of humanity formulated in the declaration—
should give us pause in drawing the conclusion that the concept of human dignity 
in the declaration appears to be anthropologically and philosophically thin. A rela-
tive lack of defi nitional substance that might direct a more consistent set of practices 
has actually served to facilitate the mobility of the notion of human dignity and hu-
man rights, allowing the notions to work for the elaboration and justifi cation of a 
seemingly never- ending series of practical actions. Whatever the CHR’s limitations 
with regard to the question of implementation, it is worth keeping in mind that 
(somewhat despite themselves) they were able to produce quite a specifi c political 
anthropology, one that, though troubled by the politics of implementation, has 
continued to have signifi cant ramifi cations for how human dignity is talked about 
as an object of international political concern.
In any event, the commission’s mandate to contribute to the constitution of the 
United Nations by formulating a framework for human dignity and human rights, 
a framework that might serve as the object and anchor point for a new mode of 
exercising political power, was, in the end, carried forward as a three-part series. Th e 
declaration and the conception of human dignity formulated in it, a formulation 
that has had such a signifi cant discursive legacy, was, from the outset, decoupled 
from the question of political practice. Other venues have partially overcome this 
decoupling. Multiple and diverse humanitarian organizations and other multina-
tional NGOs, both secular and religious, have been able to take up the basic con-
ception of human dignity and human rights fashioned by the CHR as the basis and 
object of their political, ethical, economic, or media interventions. Th e question 
then is this: what is it about the conception of human dignity developed through 
the commission’s work on the declaration that is simultaneously susceptible to an 
announcement of moral rectitude but is underdetermined with regard to its suscep-
tibility to being turned into a practice?
Once the question of implementation was taken off  the table, the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration moved ahead fairly rapidly. A fi nal draft was completed 
and ratifi ed within the fi rst years of work. Th roughout this early period of work, 
Roosevelt continued to emphasize the nonbinding nature of the declaration while 
at the same time suggesting that it nevertheless had signifi cant worth as a new artic-
ulation of international morality. Her optimistic assessment is certainly debatable. 
Th e fragmentation of the commission’s work into moral, legal, and political com-
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ponents may have facilitated work on the declaration, but on the level of practice, 
on the level of workable equipment, this fragmentation left at least a partial legacy 
of incapacity. Yet what the CHR accomplished was nonetheless a major event in the 
history of contemporary political and moral discourse. It was a major event in that 
it put into play a new conception of human dignity and a reworked rationale for 
the politics of intrinsic worth.
the politics of dignity: state sovereignty and truth
In the next chapter I will examine the work of the subcommission on the declara-
tion in more detail and turn to an examination of the declaration itself. Before that, 
however, I think it is worth stepping back and trying to get a clearer sense of the 
political problem space within which the commission was taking up its charge. I 
propose to do this by trying to establish an analytic diff erence between the politi-
cal logic of human rights and human dignity and the economy of power relations 
into which this logic was being articulated. Th e contrast is ideal-typical—in Max 
Weber’s sense of drawing historical distinctions and sharpening contrasts. Th e pur-
pose in establishing and sharpening analytic contrasts is twofold. First, it will help 
pick out the distinctive characteristics of human dignity as a political fi gure and of 
human rights as political equipment. Second, it will contribute to greater clarity 
about what was at stake in proposing human dignity as a new rationale for political 
order and practice. Clarity about these stakes goes some way toward indicating why 
the CHR was blocked in their eff orts to turn moral declarations into jurisdictional 
practice.
I will proceed by off ering a brief and ideal-typical sketch of prior relations be-
tween state sovereignty and the question of the limits and obligations of sovereign 
power, such as those implied by the introduction of the concept of human rights. 
Th is sketch will orient my reading of the declaration in the next chapter and mark 
out a series of analytic points to which I will make reference. It is important to say 
that these prior relations are, of course, not the point of my analysis. Th e point is 
to make sense of human dignity at the United Nations. One of the suppositions 
of my analysis, however, is that the work on human dignity at the United Nations 
was an event in the history of truth, power, and ethics that, although framed by a 
certain prior history, cannot be reduced to that history. Th e factors contributing to 
this event are numerous and can reasonably be taken to range from the intensifi ca-
tion of eugenics by National Socialism, to the development of state-centered com-
munism in the postwar period and its infl ections within the Soviet Union, to the 
hybridized relations between market liberalism and constitutional government in 
the United States. In other words, to borrow an investigatory rule of thumb from 
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Michel Foucault speaking in relation to the rise of liberalism, the multiplicity of 
causes is such that “I do not think we need to look for—and consequently I do not 
think we can fi nd—the cause” for the constitution of human dignity and human 
rights as objects of concern at the United Nations. As such, I will not present any-
thing like a thoroughgoing history of the development of political rights, the range 
of their prior justifi cations, and the ways in which they did or did not contribute 
to the form of power being articulated in postwar international politics. Th e task 
here is simply to off er up enough of an analytic contrast between sovereigntist and 
dignitarian politics to gain analytic purchase on the signifi cance of human dignity 
as it developed at the United Nations.
Th ere are obviously diff erent ways such a contrast could be elaborated. I propose 
to do it by contrasting modes and forms of power at play in modern state sover-
eignty with what was initiated by the Commission on Human Rights. What I off er 
is brief and schematic and to that extent less than suffi  cient. But it is quite impor-
tant that one get a sense for how the logic of what is produced by the CHR calls for 
a diff erent set of practices than what was characteristic of prior arrangements.
As something of a strategic device for characterizing the political problem space 
within which the CHR took up their mandate I propose to borrow from the analy-
sis of “the art of government” elaborated by Michel Foucault in two of his lecture 
courses at the Collège de France, those of 1977–1978 and 1978–1979. Th ere Foucault 
addressed the emergence and development of what he referred to as the “general 
economy of power” characteristic of and particular to the modern nation-state. 
Foucault produced a striking and provocative reassessment of the character of modern 
power and its relation to shifts in modes of reasoning about the objects and objectives 
of state power. Th is reassessment off ers a set of analytic points of reference I consider 
useful for thinking about the signifi cance and distinctive character of the relation of 
care and human dignity at the United Nations. In this sense, though several of his 
specifi c points have subsequently been challenged by both historians and political 
philosophers, the broad schematics of Foucault’s analytic approach help facilitate a 
diagnosis of why the politics of dignity proved so signifi cant and problematic.
Th e Art of Government
Foucault referred to what he took to be a typically modern “general economy of 
power” using various terms. In the introduction to the fi rst of the two courses 
(1977–1978), he tells us that what he is setting out to examine is “biopower” (a 
term that has since become notoriously clouded, as I will discuss in my Diagnostic 
Excursus). In the introduction to the second course (1978–1979), he tells us that 
what he has been trying to work through over the course of several years is an analy-
sis of “the art of government,” or “governmentality.” In other places, his analysis 
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narrows in on the “rationality” of the art of government, the “raison d’état,” and 
even more sharply on the liberal refi nements of the raison d’état that took place from 
the eighteenth century forward.
Approached schematically, Foucault’s conception of the art of government marks 
out three useful points of distinction: (1) an answer to the question of what the art 
of government is and is not, (2) a description of the kind of limitedness and unlim-
itedness characteristic of the modern state under the art of government, and (3) an 
assessment of the role of truth practices in the art of government.
Briefl y recapitulated, the fi rst of these is the most straightforward. Th e art of 
government characteristic of the rise of the modern state is a distinctive jurisdic-
tional mode that cannot be reduced to prior modes of either aristocratic sovereignty 
or pastoral power, although it overlapped with and shared elements of these prior 
modes. From the sixteenth century forward a mode of governmental power begins 
to emerge, not replacing previous modes, but repositioning them in relation to a 
new set of problems and demands. Foucault writes: “in relation to his [the sover-
eign’s] sovereignty, and in relation to the pastorate, something more is demanded 
from [the sovereign ruler], something diff erent, something else. Th is is government. 
It is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is 
something other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which 
must fi nd its model, is the art of government.” Although the development of this 
“something more,” and the arts connected to it, took place across and through a 
range of venues, Foucault was particularly interested in the state as a distinctive 
kind of political institution. He summarized this “something more” as a question 
of how the political sovereign came to be responsible for and capable of governing 
the “conduct of conduct”: “guiding men, directing their conduct, constraining their 
actions and reactions, and so on.” Power was not a matter of the sovereign enforce-
ment of law, exercising divine right, protecting the body of the king, or directing 
souls toward heaven. It was a matter of the conduct of conduct—this is the fi rst 
point to note about the art of government.
Th e second point is that the art of government was characterized by a particular 
rationality, the raison d’état, which reconfi gured the question of the relative limita-
tions and unlimitedness of the state’s exercise of power. Foucault emphasizes that 
his study of the raison d’état should be distinguished from a study of the particular 
situations, problems, tactics, and instruments of the art of government addressed 
or taken up by specifi c states. His examination, rather, consists in studying the rise 
and elaboration of the question of “the reasoned way of governing best” as the key 
problem for political rule, a problem connected to “refl ection on the best possible 
way of governing.” Th e object in relation to which the problem of the reasoned 
way of governing best was posed was the nation-state, considered both in terms of 
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a political entity that actually exists and therefore needs to be worked on and im-
proved and the imagined state that does not exist yet but that ought to be brought 
into being. “Raison d’état is precisely a practice, or rather the rationalization of a 
practice, which places itself between a state presented as given and a state presented 
as having to be constructed and built.” Th e state is the object of the raison d’état 
and its objective. And what is the state that ought to be built, the state that is both 
object and objective? It is the state characterized by the interdependence of wealth, 
health, and, above all, by the security of the population.
Foucault suggests that the modern state, considered as the object and objective 
of the raison d’état, is given form according to a double and mutually reinforcing 
condition: strict limitation with regard to its external relations and objectives and 
unlimitedness with regard to internal relations and objectives. First the state’s ex-
ternal relations. Th e raison d’état is a political rationality that separates out the state 
as an autonomous reality, existing only for itself and through itself, and thereby po-
sitions the state amid a plurality of other states. Foucault proposes that government 
according to the raison d’état has nothing of the imperial impulse of the medieval 
sovereign, in which power takes as its objectives an unlimited horizon constituted as 
a kind of eschatological theophany. Rather, and in contrast to this, each state “must 
limit its objectives, ensure its independence, and ensure that its forces are such that 
it will never be in an inferior position with respect to the set of other countries or to 
its neighbors.” Th e objective of mutual self-limitation, and therefore of autonomy, 
is characteristic of the raison d’état in Europe from the seventeenth century forward. 
Generally speaking, from this point forward a style of military-diplomatic policy 
emerges according to which the claim that states are entitled to their own domain 
of sovereignty and autonomy is no longer simply a matter of divine right or the 
right of individuals to self-governance (though it may be these as well). It is, rather, 
a matter of the raison d’état.
Th is autonomy in international relations has a correlative: the absence of limi-
tation in the exercise of power within the state. Th e raison d’état is characterized 
by unlimited objectives with regard to the conduct and regulation of the activity 
of groups, institutions, orders, and individuals within the state. Autonomic, the 
state rules itself without limit, per se—per se, because obviously sovereign powers 
governing according to the raison d’état cannot actually do whatever they want; the 
state is still conditioned by a number of limiting factors: divine laws, moral sensi-
bilities, natural laws or natural rights or the rights of man, and so on. Th eology and 
philosophy, Foucault reminds us, were often called upon to fi x the limitations of 
raison d’état even with regard to the internal aff airs of government. Th ese conditions 
and principles of limitation, however, were not intrinsic to raison d’état. We might 
say that these conditions and principles formed part of a juridical rationality and 
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not the rationality of the conduct of conduct, a juridical rationality that could be 
brought into an orthogonal relation to the governmental rationality of the raison 
d’état. (Th is point is crucial and, as I will explain in the next chapter, bears directly 
on the diffi  culty of bringing the politics of human dignity into a nonorthogonal but 
nonetheless delimiting relation with state apparatuses.) Th e eff ectiveness of these 
limiting conditions was precisely that they were extrinsic to it. Th ey marked out 
points beyond which the state could not exercise its power: the state may rule up to 
this point, in these ways, and under these conditions, but not any further. By way 
of contrast, Foucault notes that in the Middle Ages royal power multiplied itself 
by way of judicial institutions and a judicial mode: fundamental laws, divine laws, 
natural laws, and contracts between sovereign and subjects served to justify and 
extend royal power, and, most importantly, they were also intrinsic to royal power. 
In relation to raison d’état, these fundamental laws were extrinsic to and not at all 
intrinsic to rational political order. Raison d’état indicates the unlimitedness of the 
states’ power with regard to its internal objectives—how to govern in a rational 
manner—even if this unlimitedness in actual practice continues to be challenged 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the appeal to a juridical rationality 
of one kind or another.
So, to recapitulate, the fi rst observation is that the art of government can be 
thought of as a particular economy of power that is concerned with the state beyond 
and in distinction from either juridical sovereignty or pastoral power. Th e art of 
government concerns the conduct of conduct. Th e second observation is that the 
art of government was, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, con-
stituted by a particular rationality, the raison d’état, which had the eff ect of creating 
strict limitations with regard to the external objectives of the state and that opened 
up a kind of unlimitedness with regard to the state’s internal objectives.
Now the third characteristic of the art of government: Foucault tells us that over 
the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the art of government begins 
to undergo a development in its logic of self-limitation, a development altogether 
diff erent from the external juridical limitations of natural or divine law. It is a de-
velopment in self-limitation that is precisely not constituted in opposition to raison 
d’état but is a further refi nement of its inner logic—it is for this reason that it should 
be called self-limitation. Th is practice of self-limitation takes multiple concrete 
forms depending on particular circumstances and particular developments but is 
nevertheless quite general. Th is general practice of self-limitation is constituted by 
the establishment of a diff erent type of political reasoning, a diff erent mode of 
reasoning about what counts as the proper objective of political thought, within 
and as part of the operations of government. Th e shift can be characterized in this 
way: rather than centering on the juridical question of legitimacy, on the question 
F6671.indb   124 9/16/15   10:39:02 AM
  Incapacity by Design 125
of where, how, and whether sovereign power has the right to exercise power accord-
ing to fundamental laws, political reasoning becomes a matter of discerning what 
might be called the empirical diff erence between “what must be done, and what it is 
advisable not to do” to ensure health, wealth, and security. Political reasoning, the 
mode or style of reasoning connected to the art of government, concerns political 
prudence and not political rights, strictly speaking. And the question of political 
prudence, in principle, will be determined entirely by the consideration of the na-
ture of the object being governed.
Th e rationality of government begins to concern itself with a particular kind of 
object according to whose nature or naturalness the technologies of government 
will need to adjust themselves. Foucault puts it like this: rather than concerning 
itself with the discovery of rights, in the name of which it would act, under the sign 
of the raison d’état the state discovers “a certain naturalness specifi c to the practice of 
government itself.” Th e challenge of government becomes how to understand this 
“naturalness” and how to design, develop, and adjust the mechanisms of power in 
order to regulate this naturalness. Th e object in relation to which government must 
adjust its understanding and regulation of naturalness is, to be more specifi c, “a 
milieu.” Th is political milieu is both given and produced; its nature is precisely that 
it is both natural and cultivated. Th is milieu consists, in the fi rst place, of popula-
tions of bodies, humans as living entities, interacting and constituted with and by 
not only other natural elements but also with the institutions, mechanisms, and 
practices of government.
In its liberal forms, this milieu, this relation of the living and cultivated hu-
man, is constituted as “society,” and the exemplary form of reasoning connected 
to the governance of this objectifi cation of the milieu is political economy. It is 
plausible to argue that there are illiberal forms of the art of governance as well, in 
which the idea of society is rejected in favor of attention to the material elements 
that are taken to be the compositional things within a milieu. In either case, what 
is crucial is that the object at stake can be conceived as a multiplicity of elements, 
which can be identifi ed, assessed, and arrayed as a series in relation to which cer-
tain regular patterns can be identifi ed and certain probabilities can be calculated. 
To say this diff erently, the objects at stake in the refi nement of the raison d’état are 
constituted and conceived as objects that are susceptible to statistical reasoning. 
Th is means these objects also have a particular mode of being in the world to which 
government will have to attend: they exist for the mechanisms of government as 
probabilistic series in relation to which desirable and undesirable norms of health, 
wealth, and security can, in principle, be discerned, established, or avoided. If 
the objects of concern for an art of government are probabilistic in character, then 
a central feature of governmentality follows: power can no longer concern itself 
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primarily with matters that are taken to be unchanging, timeless, or otherwise tran-
scendent or absolute. It is not the soul of the believer, the creature of natural law, 
or the divinely appointed sovereign in relation to which certain fundamental rights 
or laws need to be discerned and obeyed. Such objects are, as it were, fi gures of 
anthropos without a political nature that can be normalized. Th ey are too absolute; 
they fall outside the mode of reasoning characteristic of the art of government. Th e 
measures of good governance in the refi nement of the raison d’état state, by contrast, 
are made to turn on a logic of minimization and maximization: the question is how 
to intervene in the naturalness of the object in such a way that the goods of wealth, 
health, and security can be maximized and those things that impede wealth, health, 
and security, minimized. Th e practice of self-limitation characteristic of a refi ned 
raison d’état is constituted in terms of minimization and maximization: how to not 
to govern too little nor too much but rather according to the nature of the object 
of government.
Th e characteristic of the relation of truth practice and the art of government 
that needs to be underscored here (and this characteristic marks the point at which 
the sharpest diff erence from human dignity is perceived) is that the raison d’état 
demands a diff erent mode of reasoning from either royal sovereignty under juridical 
regimes or the power of the church under pastoral regimes. In this mode of reason-
ing a diff erent class of truth claims is called for and taken seriously. In the case of 
juridical modes of power those truth claims were taken seriously that demonstrated 
or followed from matters of fundamental law, whether natural or divine. In the 
case of pastoral power (which I will return to at some length in the Diagnostic 
Excursus), only those truth claims could be taken seriously that contributed to the 
direction of souls and the salvation of the fl ock. In the art of government, those 
truth claims will be taken seriously that bear on the nature of the object to be 
governed—verifi ed claims about the nature of the political milieu. And of all the 
things that might enter into this particular class of truth claims, only those will 
receive careful attention that are likely to contribute to the governmental work of 
regulating and normalizing political milieus. In other words, a mode of reasoning is 
called for that can contribute to normalization as a mode of political intervention. 
Foucault takes political economy as a privileged example of this mode of reasoning, 
although it is fair to say that all of the human sciences and functionary practices that 
leverage statistics—“state numbers”—to the end of ameliorating the health, wealth, 
and security of society will be both central to, and a product of, the coupling of 
knowledge and power in the art of government.
Foucault refers to this mode of reasoning using various terms. It is typifi ed by 
what he calls “the analytic of fi nitude” but that might also be called a “verifi cational-
ist” mode of reasoning. As a mode of reasoning, an analytic of fi nitude stands in 
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an uneasy tension with, and constitutes a key part of the background to, the kinds 
of nonchanging and absolute truth claims that the CHR will make about human 
dignity and human rights. Moreover, as I will show in the third case taken up in 
this book, bioethics, it is a mode of reasoning that will continue to trouble the 
question of how or whether one can demonstrate the origin, nature, and material 
dimensions of human dignity as well as the question of what modes of care are ap-
propriate to it.
With this in mind, let me summarize the key features of this verifi cationalist 
mode of reasoning. Once again, it bears acknowledging that this is all schematic 
and ideal-typical, put in the service of emphasizing distinctions so as to establish 
a kind of grid of analytic variables. Th e mode of reasoning, which becomes typi-
cal of the nineteenth-century human sciences, operates according to a strict logic: 
only those truth claims will be taken seriously which can be verifi ed through the 
process of reducing particulars to calculable regularities. Th e art of government re-
quires an ever-expanding collection of facts and an ever-receding attempt to ground 
that collection of facts in defi nitive calculations about the relation of governmental 
practices and the populations that need to be normalized. Th is incessant move-
ment between the accumulation of data and the attempt to verify it systematically 
through calculable regularities provides the basis upon which the question con-
cerning whether or not government is asserting too much or too little power, in 
an appropriate or inappropriate manner, can be eff ectively settled. Of all the truth 
claims that can be generated by an analytic of fi nitude only those will count for the 
art of government that can contribute to the work of discriminating the border, the 
distinction, between governing in the right way, under the right conditions, and 
not governing too much or too little. Since milieus will never be static, and since 
regularities are likely to change over time, the task of discerning truth and the task 
of discriminating which activities will be appropriate is a never-ending one, and the 
unlimited mandate of raison d’état will only ever be limited by the reciprocal rela-
tions of the knowledge and the mutual adjustment of governmental practice and 
the analytics of fi nitude—the biopolitical goods of wealth, health, and security, and 
the apparatuses of power within the state.
One orienting conclusion suggested by this is that the art of government char-
acteristic of modern governmental power will attempt to limit itself on the ba-
sis of the discrimination between true and false within a verifi cationalist mode of 
reasoning—and not, for example, on the basis of claims about fundamental laws 
and rights. Of course such rights and laws, where enshrined, may continue to check 
power, but they are not a principle of self-limitation, a principle internal to the 
mechanisms of the governmental power of the state per se. Th is point bears repeat-
ing because one of the questions about human dignity and human rights is whether 
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or not they are simply a reiteration or reproduction of the juridical tactic of using 
fundamental laws as a negative limit on normalizing state power. Th e challenge 
for the CHR, however, is diff erent than this prior juridical challenge. Th e chal-
lenge for the CHR is this: how to reformulate the notions of dignity and rights so 
that they not only provide a point of limitation but also function as the positive 
criteria for a new mode of political practice and power beyond either the juridical 
or the governmental, a mode that can somehow interpolate itself into, or otherwise 
positively interface with, the governmental logic of the sovereign state. Th is chal-
lenge, the attempt to facilitate this shift, goes some way to indicating why the task 
of implementing and not only declaring human rights remained so diffi  cult within 
the United Nations.
So, a number of elements formed part of the immediate background to the work 
of the CHR and can be used as points of analytic contrast between governmental 
power and human dignity as it was formulated at the United Nations. Th e fi rst is 
that the mode of power characteristic of modern states, of the art of government, 
is distinctive and not reducible to the juridical and pastoral modes prior to it. Th e 
second is that raison d’état establishes a hinge between the limited character of state 
sovereignty in relation to other states and its unlimited character with regard to its 
internal objectives. And the third is that although apparatuses of self-limitation be-
gin to emerge within the state, these are calibrated to the nature of the object to be 
governed and not to fundamental laws. “In short,” to quote Foucault again, “there 
is the simultaneous entry into the art of government of, fi rst, the possibility of self-
limitation, that is, of governmental action limiting itself by reference to the nature 
of what it does and of that on which it is brought to bear, and second, the question 
of truth.” Of course I am only identifying and highlighting elements that will help 
me position the work of the CHR and thereby indicate those points at which the 
introduction of new forms of political practice are likely to be particularity diffi  cult. 
I am interested in drawing an analytic contrast between the mode of governmental 
power characteristic of modern regimes of state sovereignty and the mode of politi-
cal practices, practices that might be glossed as a politics of intrinsic worth, as called 
for in the Universal Declaration. I think these schematic and strategically selected 
elements give a sense of the diffi  culties attendant to advancing a new fi gure of an-
thropos, one that will require a diff erent veridictional and jurisdictional mode.
Human dignity, after all, like the art of government, functions according to a 
particular mode of reasoning and is constituted by particular kinds of truth claims. 
We saw this with Vatican II. Likewise, it requires the discrimination between what 
should be done and what should not be done. But where a verifi cationalist mode of 
reasoning will only admit as true and false those claims that are useful (or not) in 
regulating political milieus, the practices that center on the care of human dignity 
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will admit only those that bear on an absolute: namely, those that either violate or 
conform to a metric of dignity.
At the CHR, the challenge was subtle and diffi  cult. Th e commission’s mandate 
did not consist fi rst and foremost of the work of putting the legitimacy of sovereign 
states into question. Such work would amount to a reproduction of juridical limita-
tions of the raison d’état. Th e mandate, rather, was a matter of discerning a diff erent 
kind of alignment of governmental practice with a series of goods according to the 
metric of dignity. Th e situation at the United Nations was not one, as it would be 
thirty years later, in which nongovernmental organizations—nonstate actors—put 
the sovereignty of state government in question through a discourse of human dig-
nity and human rights. Rather, the members of the CHR were representatives of 
sovereign states and so were put in the diffi  cult position of having to rethink the re-
lation of an absolute metric to the nonabsolute practices of government and to give 
form to that relation in such a way that the United Nations might establish itself as 
a venue capable of facilitating human rights in the name of human dignity.
A last word on the politics of dignity before shifting to an analysis of the Uni-
versal Declaration: the range of actual governmental practices, and the forms these 
practices took, varied considerably across the member states who had delegates on 
the commission—the United States, the Soviet Union, Latin American countries, 
colonial Britain, etc. Th e analytic contrast I propose to draw between the art of 
government and developments at the United Nations concerning human dignity is 
a general one and is put forward as a strategy of orientation and clarifi cation. But it 
is a generalization that I think applies fairly well to the major powers at the table at 
the CHR. Certainly it applies to the attitudes and positions staked out by the U.S. 
and Soviet delegates: a presumption that sovereign states only need to be limited in 
the conduct of conduct according to a mode of reasoning that adjusts the practices 
of government to the nature of the object to be governed and that does this to the 
end of maximizing what might be called the biopolitical goods of wealth, health, 
and security. Obviously the particular elements to be governed, a sense of their na-
ture, and an answer to the question of “too much” or “too little” government varied 
according to diff erent delegates. But in most cases what these states had in common 
was a sense that as sovereign nations they had the right to govern in such a way that 
the objects of government could be maximized and minimized.
Certainly in practice negotiations at the CHR as to how to navigate the diff er-
ences between sovereign power and the demand for a human rights apparatus had 
as much to do with the play of interests and micropolitics as it did with contrasting 
rationales for government. Yet despite this—and here is the analytic point I would 
like to make with regard to what I will examine in the next chapter—many of the 
member states argued vehemently for the retention and protection of basic limita-
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tions and unlimitedness characteristic of state sovereignty under the raison d’état. 
Certainly not all members explicitly used the rhetoric of state sovereignty. Indeed, 
many explicitly argued that the privileges of state sovereignty had to be adjusted in 
favor of the more basic claims of human dignity and human rights. Given that these 
members were basically unsuccessful in their eff orts to produce means for imple-
mentation, however, such critiques of sovereignty did not matter much in the end.
truth and the archonic
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the Commission on Human Rights 
had a double mandate: to articulate a framework for the promotion of human rights 
and to design and propose mechanisms for implementation and enforcement. Th e 
mandate represented a kind of deferral on the part of the General Assembly con-
cerning the problem of how to respond to the demand for something more from 
power. Th e rationale for the United Nations, after all, was in part that it could facili-
tate modes and forms of political practice that were diff erent from, and hopefully 
better than, the politics of national sovereignty that had shown themselves to be so 
problematic over the course of the two world wars.
Th e demand for something more from power, however, was a confl icted proposi-
tion. Th e United Nations really had no source of power other than what would be 
off ered up by its constitutive members. And though its charter explicitly mentions 
a commitment to human dignity and human rights, it also carries forward and 
internalizes familiar tropes of state sovereignty. I have suggested that, analytically 
speaking, this amounted to a situation in which the CHR had to take up its man-
date within and against the rationality of the raison d’état. Given this situation, it 
is not at all surprising that the commission found it much easier to deal with the 
moral and veridictional aspects of their mandate in a manner decoupled from the 
political and jurisdictional aspects.
With pressure from both the U.S. and the Soviet delegations it was proposed 
that the CHR should take up their mandate in terms of three diff erent tasks, each 
assigned to a diff erent working group. As I have already noted, the working group 
charged with implementation fared the worst. At the group’s fi rst meeting, the 
Ukrainian representative, Klekovkin, opposed any implementation measures at all. 
He argued that equality between autonomous nations was the only mechanism 
needed for enforcement. His arguments did not carry the day, but they did set the 
tone. More important, his arguments were indicative of the fate of implementation. 
Th e working group proposed multiple measures, including the establishment of a 
series of courts and local agencies by way of which human rights as a political mode 
of care for human dignity could be given form.
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No one at the CHR took the commission’s challenge to be one of inventing 
a mode of political action; human rights were presumed and mandated from the 
outset. Th e challenge rather was at the level of equipment: how to give form to 
this mode as a practice. On one level the diffi  culties faced by the CHR were not 
altogether diff erent from those faced by the Vatican. Th e council was inaugurated 
with a demand for something more from ecclesial power, and with the supposi-
tion that this “something more” would pass through the teaching authority of the 
church. Th e commission was inaugurated with a demand for something more from 
political power, and with the supposition that this “something more” would pass 
through human rights. In the case of the Vatican the demand and the mode sug-
gested more or less from the outset that the new form of pastoral practice was likely 
to be of a truth telling, that is, veridictional, sort. Th e church’s equipment was never 
really designed to be connected to any jurisdictional mechanism, per se. Th e form 
of practice was not going to be a matter of the conduct of conduct but only of the 
discernment and orientation of conduct.
It is at this point that the problem faced by the CHR looks quite diff erent from 
Vatican II. It is, in fact, not presumed from the outset that the mode of political 
equipment, human rights, will be disconnected from mechanisms of implementa-
tion. Such mechanisms may not be governmental in character, strictly speaking, but 
they would clearly need to have something more than an orthogonal relation to the 
governmental. Th ey would need to be capable of reordering states’ internal relations 
through a diff erent logic of self-limitation. Th e working group on implementation’s 
proposed system of courts and agencies was one proposal for interfacing dignity 
with the sovereign power of states. Th e courts would be international and supervi-
sory. Th e agencies would be located within sovereign nations but would answer to 
the United Nations. Across the course of the next half-century some of the working 
group’s proposals were ultimately taken up. Th ese eff orts, however, positioned hu-
man rights equipment as external to the logic of the sovereignty of the nation-state 
while also operating within the internal spaces of the nation-state. To the degree 
that this double positioning has been eff ective, it has been thanks as much to the 
leverage of individual nations as it has been to the authority of any reliable human 
rights apparatus. In any case, as we will see in the next chapter, the proposal of a 
kind of independent relation of human rights to the self-limitation of sovereign 
power was ultimately blocked at the United Nations. As a result of this blockage, 
the United Nations ultimately formulated an understanding of human dignity that, 
much like the Vatican’s formulations, called for a mode of intervention and care 
predicated less on the conduct of conduct and more on recognition and protection. 
Th at is to say, the formulations were, in the end, archonic.
It bears noting that from the outset of their deliberations the Commission on 
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Human Rights did not spend much time defi ning human dignity, its sources, its 
character, its conceptual structure, or its referent—though they did give more atten-
tion to these questions than most subsequent philosophical analyses of the declara-
tion itself credit. As Shultziner has shown in a helpful article on the status of human 
dignity in spheres of legal discourse, the phrase “human dignity” has, more or less 
from the declaration forward, functioned more as a justifi cation for various claims 
about rights and duties and less as a coherent and fundamental anthropology. As a 
result of this so-called founding function, the content of claims about rights tends 
to diff er from context to context while nonetheless appealing to universal human 
dignity as a kind of “a priori bedrock truth justifi cation.” Th e strategic use of dig-
nity, as Shultziner explains, simultaneously anchors diff erent concepts and views 
of rights and their requirements in it. One result of this, of course, is that human 
dignity seems to lack any fi xed or genuinely universal content and thus any circum-
scribed course of action following from it.
As I will discuss in the next chapter, however, Shultziner tells only half of the 
story. It is certainly the case that substantive debate about human dignity was lim-
ited at the CHR. Th is is not to say that it was not discussed at all—indeed, several 
members of the CHR proposed language that would have provided explicit concep-
tual grounding for human dignity: grounded in reason, in the nation, the race, in 
the divine, and so on. Nevertheless, as Shultziner notes, these proposals all sparked 
dissent and were ultimately rejected in favor of simply leaving the phrase under-
defi ned. Th e point I will argue in the next chapter is that the primary outcome 
of this practice of leaving the term underdefi ned is not only that human dignity 
can therefore be mobilized as the anchor point for a wide range of concepts and 
referents. Th e primary result of the underdefi nition, rather, was a kind of indirect 
generation of a fairly stable and specifi c anthropology. Human dignity was con-
ceived as archonic. If at the Vatican the archonic was generated through a debate 
over the relation of nature and the supernatural, here it is generated by the fact of 
a procedural intervention, that is, the cutting off  of debate on the question of dig-
nity’s source and meaning.
Th e reasons for ultimately failing to articulate a systematic philosophical ground-
ing of human dignity were straightforwardly pragmatic. Th e ramifi cations, how-
ever, were conceptual and ontological. Cutting off  philosophical debate in favor of 
simple “recognition” meant that the conception of human dignity actually put into 
play in the declaration (that is, dignity as an object that should be “recognized”) was 
a conception that was eff ectively self-referential and self-justifying. It also meant 
that the ontology of human dignity called for a mode of care calibrated more to 
protection than to creation or cultivation. Th is calibration proved to be both re-
markably resilient and remarkably adaptable, as can be seen in the range of actors 
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who have subsequently made use of the notions of human dignity and human 
rights, while at the same time accommodating the continued predominance of state 
sovereignty. While acknowledging all of the obvious contradictions and failures of 
the CHR, this archonic rendering of human dignity admitted to a mode of political 
practice that might occasionally stand in contradiction to the exercise of sovereignty 
predicated on the raison d’état, but only occasionally.




Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights
“Yes,” they said, “we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why.”
—Anonymous, UNESCO National Commission, 1947
In the previous chapter I tried to identify some of the signifi cant characteristics of 
the political problem space within which work on the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights was carried out. Th e problem consisted of a demand for something 
more from power: political relations and practices calibrated to universal human 
dignity and carried out by means of human rights. I tried to show how the chal-
lenge of constituting the United Nations as a venue capable of formulating and 
facilitating human rights equipment was taken up against the background of the 
raison d’état and the interests of state sovereignty. In short, the Commission on Hu-
man Rights faced a particular and peculiar diffi  culty: how to give form to a human 
rights mode of jurisdiction within a structure that depended on existing modes and 
forms of state power. Th e commission, and thereby the United Nations, proved to 
be a venue quite capable of formulating a conception of human dignity and human 
rights but not quite capable of overcoming blockages to implementation. Nonethe-
less, and this is the curious twist, the fi gure of human dignity that was so diffi  cult 
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to turn into practice within the United Nations has subsequently served to facilitate 
a proliferation of practices in other venues, a fact that raises interesting questions 
about the exercise undertaken by the CHR to bring human dignity into a produc-
tive relation to state sovereignty.
It is worth noting that this troublesome relation between the discourse of dignity 
and extradiscursive implementation surprised almost no one. Indeed, it was explic-
itly anticipated by the American philosopher Richard McKeon and other observers 
before work on the declaration really got going, as I will explain below. One of 
the questions taken up in this chapter will be how and in what ways the tradeoff s 
between conceptualization and political implementation is particular to the situa-
tion and limitations of the United Nations and in what ways these tradeoff s seem 
to be connected to an archonic fi gure of human dignity in relation to politics more 
broadly.
Th e core of this chapter will consist of an analysis of the text of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, with a focus on the way in which human dignity is 
fi gured therein. I will also give attention to how the attempt to bracket the ques-
tion of the substantive defi nition of human dignity actually, if indirectly, produced 
a signifi cant conceptual and political legacy. Th is legacy includes the fact that the 
conception of things human at play in the declaration was subsequently taken up 
as the object and objective of other human rights venues, governmental as well as 
nongovernmental. Insofar as that conception implies a particular ontology and 
demands a particular mode of intervention, it is fair to say that work on the declara-
tion contributed to the circumscription of the logic of ethical and political practices 
that would be linked to human dignity.
What I am interested in providing here is an analysis of the logic at work in the 
declaration and how that logic is anchored in and serves to inform human dignity. 
To this end, I will pick out and focus on those elements that I think contribute to 
the defi nition of that logic, so as to think through their relations and signifi cance. 
Th is means that my analysis will say less about the practical outcomes of work on 
human dignity and human rights in the decades following the work of the CHR 
than would probably be helpful. I am focusing more on what was taken to be the 
most favorable—or at least most politically acceptable—way of talking about hu-
man dignity and forms of possible political practice and less on the mobilization of 
these forms in particular situations, the diffi  culties encountered in those situations, 
and the instruments and tactics subsequently invented in response to those diffi  cul-
ties. In this sense I am focusing on the art of caring for human dignity at the level 
of the design and fi guration in the constitution of venues and practices rather than 
at the level of their actualization or implementation.
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Part of my task will be to analyze how the CHR dealt with the problem of giv-
ing form to the politics of human dignity. One of my tactics for carrying out this 
task will be to review the assessment of the notion of universal human rights and 
human dignity off ered by Richard McKeon at the time of the commission’s work. 
McKeon’s assessment is interesting in that it serves as a kind of second-order obser-
vation of the work of the CHR as it unfolded. His assessment is signifi cant in that 
he suggests that the task of giving practical form to human rights might require 
tradeoff s between philosophic coherence and political unanimity. My analysis fol-
lows McKeon’s up to a point: the crucial components of work on human dignity 
and human rights for the CHR did, in fact, generate such tradeoff s. For reasons 
of expediency the commission limited eff orts to discern and articulate the truth of 
human dignity and human rights in something like a philosophic mode. Th ey also 
limited discussion of which political activities are appropriate to and follow from 
such philosophic defi nition. As Schultziner notes, the task, in the end, was a mat-
ter of grounding a series of heterogeneous rights and duties on and in the phrase 
“human dignity.”
What I propose to add to McKeon’s analysis is this: the philosophic and political 
tradeoff s found in the declaration facilitated, albeit indirectly, the production of an 
archonic fi gure of human dignity. Th e signifi cance of this fact needs to be examined 
in light of what Klaus Dicke has called the “founding function” of human dignity. 
Th e negotiation, coalescence, and mutual adjustment of philosophic and political 
elements gave rise to a reworked form of what I have referred to as pastoral power. 
One of the tasks of this chapter will be to specify that form and to connect it to 
the formulation of human dignity and form of equipment produced at Vatican II. 
A more thoroughgoing comparative analysis will be the subject of my Diagnostic 
Excursus. And all of this has direct bearing on my third case on human dignity and 
bioethics.
pragmatics and the archonic
Th e CHR’s mandate was to produce a conceptual framework for human rights as 
well as the jurisdictional mechanisms for enforcement and, of course, to establish 
the means by which these two would interface and connect. Th ree components: 
work on a nonbinding declaration, work on the machinery of implementation, 
and work on a legal covenant to connect them. Th e decision to work on these three 
separately and to form working groups for each was made at the fi rst session of the 
CHR in 1947. At that fi rst session the CHR also requested that the UN Secretariat 
provide them with preparatory materials consisting of an outline of candidate rights 
that might be included in an initial draft of the declaration. Th e CHR requested 
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that these preparatory materials be drawn from existing collections and statements 
and presented to the members of the commission in time to be reviewed and edited 
by a drafting subcommittee before the CHR’s second session, to be held in the fall 
of 1947.
Th e task of preparing the materials fell to a Canadian legal scholar, John Hum-
phrey, who in 1946 had been appointed “director of the United Nations Division 
of Human Rights” by the Offi  ce of the Secretary-General. Th ree things are worth 
noting about the materials Humphrey prepared. First, he did not merely prepare an 
outline of possible rights to be included; rather he produced an entire working draft 
of the declaration. Second, his draft drew much of its material from existing state-
ments of rights, most of which were of European or American origin. Th ese existing 
statements were strongly liberal in character, which is to say that they emphasized 
the rights of individuals in the face of the possibility of excessive governance. Th ird, 
much of Humphrey’s working draft would ultimately pass into the fi nal version of 
the declaration.
Humphrey submitted his work to the drafting committee in June 1947. Th e 
drafting committee reviewed the work and assigned the French legal scholar and 
commission member René Cassin the task of revising it. Cassin, like Humphrey, 
retained an emphasis on individual rights. His work passed through several reviews 
and revisions before being presented to the full CHR at the second session. NGOs 
who held consultative status with the commission, as well as other NGOs and 
individuals, also submitted drafts and comments. At the second session an eight-
member group reworked Cassin’s materials to produce what became known as the 
Geneva draft. Th e Geneva draft was adjusted to the other submitted materials and 
packaged as a single report, to be debated, revised, and ratifi ed at the third session.
Initial work on the declaration proceeded relatively quickly. As the third ses-
sion approached things became more diffi  cult. Work on the legal covenant and on 
implementation was beginning to stall out. Th e members of these two working 
groups faced a diffi  culty, which would become acute for the working group on the 
declaration as well. Analytically speaking one can say that the diffi  culty was anthro-
pological, although these diffi  culties took form in and through the micropolitics of 
positioning and counterpositioning between representatives of the major powers. 
Th e challenge of forming the notions of human dignity into legal and political 
equipment for the implementation of human rights threw into relief a series of basic 
diff erences about what is meant by the dignifi ed human and how it is that rights 
and dignity should be conceived and connected. Th e core diff erences among the 
participants were neither new nor unfamiliar. Th e particularities of their resolution 
nonetheless proved consequential.
Th e principal blockage point was the question of whether to include those 
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classes of rights that were understood to be economic and social, or whether the 
commission should concentrate only on matters of civil freedom and political pro-
tection. Th e former, of course, included rights whose guarantee would require the 
active exercise of governmental power by states in the production of new condi-
tions within those states, an exercise that could be contrasted to a mode of exercise 
indexed to the protection of dignity against possible violations. Th e latter included 
only those rights that are ostensibly amenable to the defense and safeguarding of 
individual freedoms and in that sense are governmental only insofar as they cohere 
with and reinforce certain kinds of limitations on the exercise of power. Th e diff er-
ence between these classes of rights was fi rst raised as a problem by self-identifi ed 
communist countries as well as several Latin American countries who also insisted 
on the inclusion of economic and social rights in the legal covenant. With regard 
to the declaration, the question was pressed and sustained by the primary Soviet 
representative, Koretsky. Koretsky insisted that insofar as that the declaration was 
designed to orient and calibrate legal and political practice, the question of political 
anthropology needed to be resolved.
Th e question as Koretsky and others pushed it turned on two familiar points. 
First was the basic approach initiated by Humphrey and Cassin. Th e early drafts 
framed human rights and their connection to human dignity as matters requiring 
the active intervention of the United Nations in the aff airs of individual states inso-
far as those states have been found to have violated the rights of its citizens qua hu-
mans endowed with dignity. Th e violation of dignity in this case was understood to 
show itself through the violation of certain inalienable rights. Th is framing, in other 
words, tacitly distinguished between the individual as citizen and the individual as 
human. Th e human as the bearer of dignity and rights was qualitatively antecedent 
to and more basic and universal than the citizen. Th e human therefore served as an 
external principle of limitation for the state. Th e second point followed: the posi-
tioning of human dignity and rights as basically antecedent to the state suggested a 
particular rationale for the United Nations: insofar as the United Nations is to be 
constituted as a venue responsible for human dignity and human rights, it would 
need to reserve the right to act to protect individuals from the violations brought 
about by their own governments. Again, all of this was more or less familiar.
However—and this was Koretsky’s point—if dignity is constituted by, rather 
than threatened by, the bonds of social life, and if the bonds of social life need to 
be established and cultivated in part by governmental apparatuses, then the art of 
caring for human dignity and human rights is not primarily a matter of “mere” 
protection. It consists, rather, in the active fostering of an economic and political 
order wherein things human could be made to fl ourish. Given this, Koretsky ar-
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gued against the design or development of any jurisdictional mechanisms by way of 
which the United Nations might claim the right to intervene in the relation of the 
state to its citizens and thereby assume for itself a kind of governmental indepen-
dence from the power and sovereignty of the individual member states.
Koretsy called for an alternative mode of action. Rather than providing means 
for the protection of humans from excessive government, the declaration should 
include language that requires signatories to implement their own state-facilitated 
measures to create the economic and social conditions through which human rights 
(produced through economic and social intervention) and the rights of the citizens 
could be seen as coincident. Otherwise said, Koretsky, by way of the notion of hu-
man dignity, argued in favor of retaining state autonomy, autonomy characterized 
by external limitation relative to other states and internal unlimitedness. Human 
dignity and human rights should be fully synthesized with the dignity and rights of 
citizens and thereby function as aspects of governmental self-limitation.
As I noted in the last chapter, the United States slowed work on legal and po-
litical enforcement of human rights on procedural and pragmatic grounds. Th ey 
off ered no in-principled reasons why the United Nations should not constitute 
itself as a political venue capable of acting on the basis of objectives, objects, and 
practices distinct from, if connected to, those of its individual member states. On 
the anthropological and practical point pushed by the Soviet delegation, the U.S. 
representatives, Roosevelt in particular, fl atly refused the inclusion of any language 
that would impose requirements on sovereign states to develop economic and social 
mechanisms for the cultivation of human rights through state apparatuses.
A twofold resolution was proposed. In the fi rst place the United States and its 
allies agreed to the inclusion of certain rights designated as economic, social, and 
cultural. Th e inclusion, however, was predicated on a tacit hierarchy according to 
which these rights would be placed in the document following statements concern-
ing the protection of civil and political rights. All parties understood that this tacit 
hierarchy carried with it the suggestion that civil and political rights were more 
basic and more urgent than social and economic rights. Th ere was also a suggestion 
that the latter actually followed from the former. Th e heterogeneity of the collection 
of rights, and its possible anthropological contradictions, was not commented on 
or problematized. On the surface of things, the so-called civil and political rights 
would seem to function according to a juridical and absolute metric. And, on the 
surface of things, the economic and social rights would seem to function according 
to a governmental and normalizing metric. One could hardly be said to follow from 
the other. Despite this implicit heterogeneity, however, a kind of anthropological 
distance between the human as the bearer of dignity and the human understood 
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in other modes either as the fi gure of foundational natural or divine law, or, as a 
governmental population, was indirectly opened up and stabilized. Th is anthropo-
logical distance was marked out by and as the archonic, as I discuss below. What 
is important to note here is that the familiar parsing of things, by which “liberal” 
rights were placed above and over “social” rights did not, in actual practice, hold.
Th e second part of the pragmatic resolution—and this proved all the more sig-
nifi cant for the legacy of the fi gure of human dignity—the anthropological and 
practical diff erences between the United States and the Soviet Union were resolved 
not only by way of a tacit hierarchy of rights but also by way of a certain set of 
exclusions. During the drafting process, an initial challenge concerned the question 
of the source of human dignity and how certain terms, such as “person” or “crea-
ture,” carried with them implied answers to that question. What is it that makes 
the human distinctively human? Where does dignity derive from? How is dignity 
grounded? Does human dignity derive from God (are humans in the fi rst place 
creatures made in the image of God)? Does human dignity derive from conscience 
and reason (are humans in the fi rst place Kantian persons)? Does it derive from 
nature (are humans in the fi rst place part of “mankind,” or participants in the “the 
human race”)? And what are the modes of reasoning by way of which these ques-
tions can be debated?
Th e question of the source of human dignity obviously carried with it forma-
tive implications for human rights as a mode of jurisdictional practice. What are 
the criteria according to which appropriate and inappropriate political activities 
can be discriminated? Which ethics follow from which truth claims? Th e question 
of source also bore on matters of venue: given this source of dignity, what kind of 
venue is needed for the protection and care of human rights? Is the United Nations 
appropriately suited to human dignity? Is “the human” a kind of object that is 
susceptible or in need of care or protection from an international governing body? 
Problems of origins, practices, and venue were linked.
Th ese questions were never resolved, strictly speaking. Th e delegates were not 
capable of meeting the philosophic demand for a shared formulation of the origins 
and substance of human dignity. No one tradition of political, philosophical, or 
theological reasoning proved suffi  ciently acceptable to all participants to overcome 
their diff erences. Th e delegates could not agree to the standards by way of which 
statements regarding the origin of human dignity could be assessed as true or false, 
good or bad, better or worse. Th e delegates were veridictionally blocked. Th ey could 
not speak a shared truth, as it were. Th ey could not even agree to formulate their 
diff erences as shared problems to which convergent solutions might eventually be 
proposed.
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In the end, the philosophical blockage was overcome procedurally. Because the 
delegates could not agree on the origins of human dignity, the chair, Roosevelt, 
simply closed discussion. Th e question was set to the side. It was decided that no 
explicit mention of the source of dignity would be off ered in the declaration and 
that language that seemed to favor one philosophical position over another would 
be removed. Th e logic of this decision, to quote one thinker who puts it nicely, 
turned on the idea that the problem could be resolved “by simply allowing silence 
to speak for all viewpoints.” Th e phrase “human dignity” was decoupled from 
any explicit referent, concept, philosophical explanation, or political justifi cation. 
It was simply declaimed. Given that all parties agreed that human dignity and hu-
man rights were of unique worth and of central concern, and given that all parties 
agreed that human rights follow from and are grounded in human dignity, human 
dignity was put forth in a purely formal way. Procedurally speaking it was simply 
taken for granted that the referent of human dignity was obvious and stable and 
could simply be “recognized” in the world. Strategically speaking, the declaration 
would be crafted so as to allow for variable concepts to be attached to the term and 
thereby to the referent. In cutting off  debate, the members of the commission knew 
what they were doing. It is not clear, however, whether they understood how what 
they were doing would ramify.
the formalization of dignity
Th e fi nal wording of the Universal Declaration has become familiar. It does not 
strike us as particular and certainly not peculiar—if it ever did. Th e wording is simi-
lar enough to both previous and subsequent political formulations that its subtleties 
easily can be passed over as though the declaration were simply the latest variation 
on the long history of humanisms in the West. However, both ontologically and 
anthropologically—not to mention ethically and politically—the wording and its 
function warrants careful attention.
Several lines are particularly signifi cant. Th e preamble tells us that the declara-
tion is premised on “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and in-
alienable rights of all members of the human family,” that such inherent dignity and 
rights are “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” and therefore 
that the abuse or refusal of dignity and rights results “in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind.” Th e preamble affi  rms “faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” and pledges commit-
ment to “the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights.” 
Article 1 then asserts that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
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rights.” It tells us that humans are “endowed with reason and conscience” and that 
they should thereby act in “a spirit of brotherhood.”
What is human dignity then? Whatever else it may be, human dignity is that 
which is inherent and it is that which can be, and must be, recognized. It is the kind 
of thing that one can have faith in. It does not need to account for itself by pointing 
beyond itself to a feature of human nature, reason, or the divine. It is not derivative 
of these features, nor is it cultivated or produced. It is, rather, what defi nes humans 
as part of the human family. Moreover, and in addition to all this, it is the source 
of political goods. Th e recognition of dignity issues in freedom, justice, and peace, 
and its violation brings with it outrage and disunity.
A number of years ago, the legal scholar Klaus Dicke published an essay that, 
among other things, off ers a meditation on the signifi cance of the fact that human 
dignity in these passages is set forth in a strictly formal manner. Th is formalism, 
Dicke suggested, was elaborated in a threefold manner. First, dignity was fi gured 
as a given. Second, it was fi gured without explicit substantive defi nition—at least 
insofar as the question of origins is concerned. Th ird, it was fi gured as the source 
and guarantee of human good. Human dignity, as a given, is also a moral man-
date and places an absolute obligation on conscience and thereby political action. 
However, in the course of the declaration, human dignity does not remain a matter 
of pure form. Where explicit substantive defi nition might be lacking, tacit and op-
erational defi nition quickly fi lls in. It fi lls in by way of something like retrodiction. 
In the declaration, human dignity is declaimed as the ground for human rights. 
What proves to be the case, however, is that human rights, which are subsequently 
elaborated, eff ectively defi ne the substance of human dignity. Dignity is only a 
guarantee of goods to the extent that the rights that adhere in it are assured. Dignity 
and rights share a mutually formative and constraining relation, and that relation 
defi nes what it means to be human, politically speaking. Among other things, all 
of this means that, in the declaration, a heterogeneous and novel anthropology is 
synthesized.
Several aspects about this anthropology are particularly crucial. First, the hu-
man is that being whose dignity is immanent and inherent. It is immanent in 
that dignity does not point beyond itself to another source. It is inherent in that 
dignity is coincident with being human, per se, and is therefore an essential truth 
about human being. And insofar as it is coincident with the actuality of being 
human, dignity is self-referential. I do not mean to say that the delegates to the 
CHR proclaimed dignity to be self-referential; the debate over sources indicates 
that most delegates conceived of dignity as grounded in origins of one sort or 
another. In the course of these debates dignity was not taken to be self-referential. 
Nevertheless, human dignity, as formulated in the declaration, simply refers to 
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itself; it is self-grounding. Th is is a fi rst crucial anthropological artifact of the 
pragmatic and procedural solution to the problem of origins: self-referentiality 
and self-grounding.
Th e second artifact concerns the mode of reasoning proper to a self-referential 
dignity. Terms such as “recognition,” “faith,” and of course “declaration” are not 
incidental but rather indicate that the speech-acts that can be taken to be true 
about human dignity are those produced and authorized in a declamatory fashion. 
I think it is reasonable to suggest that this conception of the human, this immanent 
form of dignity, would not have been put in play and would not have come to be 
commonplace in discussions of human rights if any of the alternatives in the debate 
over the question of the source of dignity had been found acceptable: reason, God, 
nature, or the like. Neither these terms nor the modes of reasoning recommending 
them  carried the day. Instead, human dignity was simply declaimed. Consequently, 
the human was enshrined as that being whose truth could be conceived through 
a mode of reasoning that was neither theological nor scientifi c, neither demon-
strative nor  verifi cational, but declamatory. Th e second anthropological artifact 
of the  declaration is that the human is that being whose dignity must simply be 
declaimed.
Th e third artifact concerns the mode of jurisdiction appropriate to, even pre-
scribed by, human dignity. Th e declaration states that human dignity is inherent, 
and, as inherent, it is the guarantee of human goods. It is morally non-negotiable. 
As a guarantee of human goods it functions as both absolute and transcendental. 
It is therefore inviolable: violations of dignity result in outrageous and barbarous 
acts. It is also demanding: given the fact of past barbarism and the constant threat 
of further outrage, human dignity prescribes what must be done. And what is it 
that must be done? Insofar as human dignity is inherent and absolute, it is not 
susceptible to the play of minimization and maximization. It does not derive from 
a capacity or a characteristic that could be variable or cultivated. Human dignity 
does not require the daily conduct of conduct either toward the governmental ends 
of wealth and security or toward ethical ends of virtue and justice (although dignity 
will certain provide the metric according to which governance and ethics might be 
rightly aligned). Rather, dignity requires protection, reorientation, and redress. Dig-
nity must be protected against violation. Dignity must reorient those practices that 
threaten to violate it. And dignity commands us to redress those situations where 
dignity has been compromised. Th e third anthropological artifact, then, is this: in 
relation to human dignity practices of protection, reorientation, and redress are 
uniquely appropriate and urgently needed. Human dignity is simultaneously the 
guarantee of peace and the warrant for emergency intervention where peace has 
been compromised.
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In Gaudium et spes human dignity is not, strictly speaking, self-referential (af-
ter all, the challenge there was to show how such inherent dignity is ontologically 
established by the supernatural as cause and aim of humanity), and the goods it 
ensures are not only this-worldly (the challenge, of course, was to show how the 
goods of this world can be put in continuity with eternal goods). At the same time, 
the fi gure of the human in the declaration is not altogether inconsistent with the 
fi gure produced at Vatican II. Th e dignity of the human is constitutive, essential, 
available to declamation, and in need of protection. It is archonic. Human dignity 
in the declaration is primordial; it thereby governs what must be done.
Let me return to Dicke’s “founding function” of dignity for a moment. Although 
human dignity is not given substantive defi nition by the CHR, it is given formal 
defi nition. Th e declaration defi nes the substance of dignity indirectly by elaborat-
ing the forms that it takes in human life. Dignifi ed human life is marked by certain 
characteristics, certain goods, such as freedom, equality, and participation. Th ese 
goods, in turn, are given defi nition by the collection of specifi c rights and duties 
attached to them (for example, the right to life, equality before the law, freedom 
of religion, etc.). Two key defi nitional claims follow. Human dignity is actual as 
a set of goods. Th is set of goods takes concrete form in specifi c rights and duties. 
Th e subtlety of these two claims is that they are presented in the declaration as 
though specifi c rights and duties, via goods, are deduced from human dignity. In 
fact, within the content of the document, quite the opposite is the case—a point 
made by Schultziner. Even a brief survey of the range of rights that were included in 
the declaration suggests that the fi gure of the human, insofar as it is taken to be the 
object and anchor of all of these rights, must be something of complex and possibly 
inconsistent being. What counts in the end, however, is not whether this complex-
ity or inconsistency can be philosophically or legally justifi ed. Rather, what counts is 
whether human dignity as fi gured in the declaration is ontologically capable of syn-
thesizing and fi xing these rights without regard to their relative consistency. Again: 
a reciprocal relation is produced. Human dignity receives its substantive defi nition 
from rights and duties. Rights are the form of the primordial and the outward sign 
of its status. Th e archonic grounds and synthesizes while being defi ned and given 
form by the derivative and heterogeneous.
One of the crucial accomplishments of the Universal Declaration is that it suc-
cessfully specifi es a rationale and a mode according to which mechanisms of juris-
diction can be fashioned and implemented. Put in general terms, the declaration 
determines a concrete, if complex, problem within a broader problem space. And 
it articulates a possible solution to that problem. Th e broader problem space con-
sists in the question of the worth of human beings and the limits and failings of 
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existing modes and instruments of power relative to that worth—a question taken 
to be particularly acute in the wake of World War II. Th e concrete problem that 
it determines is how to make recognition of inherent human dignity the guaran-
tor of core human goods—freedom, justice, peace—and the failure to recognize 
 human  dignity the cause of outrage and atrocity. Th e outward sign of that recogni-
tion or lack of recognition is the support for or violation of fundamental rights. 
A series of indeterminations, diffi  culties, and blockages are taken up through the 
declamation of human dignity and framed as a problem of the violation of inherent 
rights.
As a result two possibilities emerge. First, the archonic can function as an 
absolute and primordial ground. Second, through human rights, the archonic, 
which otherwise is not available to intervention and could not otherwise be 
worked on, becomes available to equipmental intervention. What’s more (and 
this is the subject of the concluding section of this chapter), a mode of jurisdic-
tion is designed that appears to be amenable to being interfaced with, and where 
needed reordering of, existing modes of state power. Th is mode is emergency 
intervention. Th e violation of human dignities constitutes an exceptional cir-
cumstance, in the sense that the goods of political order otherwise arise out of the 
recognition of dignity. Human rights are one type of equipment for intervening 
in the internal life of sovereign states, but only where dignity is being violated. 
Th e notion of a “humanitarian crisis” won’t be articulated for another twenty 
years, and even then by NGOs and not by the United Nations. But the idea that 
the violation of human dignity and human rights is an exceptional circumstance 
calling for and justifying intervention is already in play with the declaration. Hu-
man dignity is not the kind of thing that needs to be managed as a matter of the 
daily conduct of conduct. It needs protection. Of course, the declaration does in 
fact call for the guarantee of certain positive rights and duties—rights to marry, 
to change  nationality, etc. Th ese rights and duties would seem to indicate a mode 
of intervention beyond protection, one moving in the direction of cultivation 
or development. It is important to note how these rights are framed, however. 
Th eir actualization does not amount to the cultivation or development of hu-
man dignity. Rather, these rights, with the others, indicate that human dignity is 
being recognized, that is, guaranteed and protected. Th e commission’s work was 
certainly not the fi rst attempt to connect the protection of dignity to the guar-
antee of rights. It was exemplary, however. Moreover, given that the major world 
powers were crafting the declaration, it was also constitutional both in terms of 
the United Nations and in terms of the history of discourse on rights. In short, 
human rights functioned as a pragmatic means of transforming human dignity 
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into the concrete problem of violation such that a set of possible practical solu-
tions could become available.
In the end, such practical solutions were not forthcoming. As Charles Malik, 
the delegate from Lebanon put it: “the crux of the whole question of human rights 
lay in the implementation of measures for their protection.” On this score, work 
on the declaration was initially seen as only a modest success. Th e fact that other 
venues, such as NGOs and other religious and secular humanitarian organizations, 
have taken the conception of human dignity as developed in the declaration as the 
object and warrant for their interventions changes the assessment.
Th e third session of the CHR took place from September to December 1948. 
During this session delegates held eighty-fi ve meetings to discuss the declaration. 
Th e fi nal draft submitted by the subcommittee was passed by the full CHR 29–0. 
Th e declaration was sent on to the General Assembly. Th e CHR decided to forgo 
also sending recommendations on the covenant or on implementation; too little 
progress had been made on those fronts. Debate at the General Assembly echoed 
that in the commission: the hierarchy of rights, the question of origins, instruments 
of implementation, and so on. Nonetheless, on December 10 the declaration was 
passed by a vote of 48–0, with multiple abstentions.
As Normand and Zaidi underscore, the vote was far from the global consensus 
that has subsequently been claimed for the declaration. Th e Soviet delegation as 
well as many Latin American countries continued to insist that their amendments 
and vision for the relation of human dignity to national sovereignty were unfairly 
blocked. A few of these were among those who abstained. Nevertheless, even these 
countries were happy to take credit for the signifi cance of what had been accom-
plished. Perhaps Roosevelt overstated that signifi cance when she said that the dec-
laration would “serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all 
nations.” She was, after all, among those who failed to facilitate any serious mech-
anism for implementation. Nevertheless, by bracketing the question of the source 
of human dignity and by fragmenting the relations between moral declaration, legal 
convention, and political implementation, human dignity was ultimately fi gured in 
archonic form, a form ratifi ed by almost all involved, a form that has subsequently 
proved generative as an anchor point for a wide range of humanitarian practices. 
It is no small thing that through negotiation and compromise, reformulation and 
omission, a distinctive mode of talking about things human was put into political 
play. Th e question remains, however, as to why it is that the United Nations had 
such a diffi  cult time making itself into a venue capable of taking up human dignity 
as an object of active care and therein making itself capable of turning talk of hu-
man rights into a practice.
F6671.indb   146 9/16/15   10:39:03 AM
  Dignity and Governance 147
richard mckeon and the problem of universal human dignity
At more or less the same time as the formation of the CHR, the United Nations 
Educational Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) convened a parallel 
project on human rights and human dignity. Th is project focused on philosophical 
issues and practical dilemmas likely to be encountered in the work of producing a 
universal declaration on human rights within the sort of international setting found 
at the United Nations. Participants in the UNESCO project included an array of 
seminal thinkers including, among others, the British international theorist E. H. 
Carr, the French Th omist philosopher Jacques Maritain, the revolutionary leader 
of the Indian nonviolence movement Mohandas Gandhi, the Indian poet and phi-
losopher Humayun Kabir, and the American philosopher Richard McKeon. Th e 
project was overseen by Julian Huxley, who, at the time, was serving as  UNESCO’s 
director general.
Th e project served to provide second-order observation and analysis of the com-
mission’s work as it unfolded. Th e participants took up the question of rights and 
dignity without the burden of the commission’s own fi rst-order constraints, that 
is, having to produce practicable and politically negotiated results, and therefore 
they were able to make the CHR’s work and deliberations part of their own object 
of analysis. Th e results of the UNESCO project are striking in that many of the 
challenges of producing the Universal Declaration were anticipated and analytically 
parsed. Th e project is also noteworthy in that its diagnoses, off ered in what amounts 
to real time, remain pertinent.
One contribution is exemplary in this regard: an essay by Richard McKeon en-
titled “Th e Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man.” 
Th e essay, completed in advance of the CHR’s fi nal session of work on the declara-
tion, anticipates what was subsequently confi rmed: that the diffi  culties faced by the 
CHR in constituting a venue centered on a universal conception of human dignity 
and the transformation of human rights talk into nondiscursive practice are prob-
lems more basic than micropolitics between delegates of member states. McKeon’s 
essay proposes that the double work of philosophical and moral formulation on the 
one side and of legal and political implementation on the other inevitably involves a 
series of tradeoff s between conceptual clarity and pragmatic headway. Th is means 
that the anticipated goods associated with the formulation of a Declaration of Hu-
man Rights come at a cost, a cost that one must be willing to pay either in terms of 
truth or power. Th e procedural fragmentation played out by the CHR, while by no 
means inevitable, can be understood as a strategy for managing the types of tradeoff s 
McKeon describes. Th e fact that the CHR was not, in the end, willing to pay the 
F6671.indb   147 9/16/15   10:39:03 AM
148 Human Dignity and the United Nations
full price of such tradeoff s, one that might have led more directly to implementa-
tion, is clear. Th at eff orts were made in this direction, however, is signifi cant.
McKeon’s essay centers on a pragmatic question: in a multinational context such 
as the United Nations, what is the worth of a declaration of human rights, and how 
can such a declaration be made workable? Th e answer to the fi rst is given in straight-
forward terms: a declaration, rightly conceived, can produce a frame “within which 
men may move peacefully to a uniform practice and to a universal understand-
ing of fundamental human rights.” Note the double supposition: both a uniform 
practice and universal understanding are lacking. Uniformity and universality are at 
stake. Th e answer to the second question is more complicated and forms the core 
of McKeon’s essay.
McKeon’s proposal for developing a workable declaration begins with a two-part 
diagnosis. First is that the problem of developing a bill of rights in the postwar 
world is not at all the same thing as constituting a bill of rights in other centuries 
and under other political arrangements. If a workable declaration is to be produced, 
this fi rst point must be understood: the problem has changed. Second is that a 
workable solution depends on “the possibility of separating the political from the 
philosophical question.” Th e task of formulating a universal declaration can be 
conceived either as a matter of elaborating philosophic solutions from which an 
agreed-upon list of rights could be derived. Or it can be conceived of as a matter 
of elaborating a political frame within which common actions and common ends 
can be specifi ed and philosophic diff erences more or less bracketed. “Th e utility of 
a declaration of human rights,” says McKeon, requires more than the distinction 
of these two approaches. It depends on a kind of strategic separation—recognizing 
points of connection and interdependence—according to which the two problems 
are related to each other in a recursive and not sequential manner. A workable dec-
laration depends on understanding that the problem has changed and that philo-
sophic and political aspects of the problem need to be taken up recursively.
McKeon elaborates this two-part diagnosis in three sections. In the fi rst section 
McKeon argues that the problem of creating a bill of rights has changed in two 
basic respects, which map onto his separation of the philosophic and the political. 
With regard to the philosophical, it has come to be taken for granted, McKeon pro-
poses, that the world is basically divided into two mutually opposed and confl icting 
ideologies—socialism and liberalism. Th ese ideologies draw together and synthesize 
a range of philosophical, political, religious, and economic diff erences and serve to 
reduce an otherwise complicated array of variables into two sets of simple opposi-
tions. Whether or not the world really is divided in this way, and whether or not the 
synthesis of all diff erences into prevailing ideologies is philosophically defensible, 
matters less than the objective fact that those working out a world declaration take 
F6671.indb   148 9/16/15   10:39:03 AM
  Dignity and Governance 149
this division and this synthesis to be real and defi ning. In addition, and equally im-
portant, this division appears amenable to resolution only through the emergence of 
a new single philosophy that reconciles and absorbs both, a philosophical reconcilia-
tion that is likely not forthcoming, or, much more likely, through all-out war.
McKeon suggests that this philosophic or ideological blockage needs to be re-
solved through agreement on courses of action calibrated not to a universal phi-
losophy but to the identifi cation of shared values and ends. A commitment to 
common action and shared values takes form and is stabilized in the fi rst place by 
constitutional frameworks, like that of the UN Charter. Specialized agencies, such 
as the United Nations’ commissions, furnish the means by which such agreement, 
common action, and the equitable solution of common problems can be reached. 
Th e focus can thus be on a commitment to facilitating human welfare and the 
common good and perhaps, along the way, on the achievement of common moral 
understandings. Th e formulation of a declaration of human rights will be basic to 
establishing a pragmatic way forward. But the declaration will need to be rooted in 
practical and not philosophic unanimity.
Th e second section: If the problem today is diff erent because the world is philo-
sophically divided, it is also diff erent because the meaning of key terms, such as 
rights, freedom, or democracy, has also shifted. Such shifts carry with them con-
siderable implications for political practice. McKeon tells us that these diff erences 
and implications become most apparent in the introduction of a new class of rights. 
 Eighteenth-century formulations consisted principally of the elaboration of those 
rights “inherent in the nature of man” and that function to set the limits on the 
excesses of governmental interference. Rights set the external boundaries on gov-
ernmental power in the name of fundamental laws, natural or divine. As I proposed 
in the previous chapter, fundamental laws, natural and divine, in the Middle Ages 
served as the basis and multiplier of sovereign power, sovereign power as juridical 
power. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, these fundamental 
laws were reconceived not as sources of power but as checks on the new govern-
mental modes of power characteristic of the raison d’état. However—and this is 
the point McKeon draws our attention to—at the time the CHR was beginning 
its work on the Declaration of Human Rights, rights were no longer restricted to a 
negative limit on the state. A new series of rights has been placed alongside rights 
protecting the individual from governmental interference. Th ese rights demand 
something from government. Th ey demand the cultivation of opportunities and 
conditions that can only be secured by governmental action: economic and social 
rights, the right to education, the right to work, the right to a fair share of the gains 
of science and civilization. Rights are not just a matter of limitation but call for a 
new mode of power to be exercised.
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With the introduction of this new regime of rights, unanimity of action was 
likely to be diffi  cult. Th ese diffi  culties are familiar, and McKeon merely abbreviates 
the challenges. Th ese economic and social rights suggest a very diff erent political 
anthropology than the fi gure of the human at work in classical renderings of the 
“rights of man.” Th e “human” of social rights depends on a certain ordering of 
material circumstances in order to fl ourish, where the human of individual rights 
stands before a contracted social order as its end and limit. All of this is well known. 
Th e distinctive point that McKeon wants to make is that because of these changes in 
the meaning and situation of rights the attempt to solve the philosophic problem by 
way of a political mechanism cannot be straightforward. Th e ways in which rights 
are conceived carry with them anthropological and ontological dimensions that 
encumber the task of selecting out and agreeing on common courses of action—
especially insofar as those dimensions are connected to existing institutions and 
practices. Th e veridictional dimensions and the jurisdictional dimensions continue 
to form part of a conjoined problematic.
Th e third section of McKeon’s essay concerns the question of what, then, to do. 
If the problem today is such that neither an exclusively philosophic nor a politi-
cal solution is available, a strategy needs to be identifi ed by way of which the two 
can be sorted out in relation to each other. McKeon suggests one possible way 
forward. Th e separation of the philosophic and political aspects of the problem, 
and the characterization of the diff erences and dependencies between those aspects, 
opens up a third problem space, within which work on a declaration might be 
conducted. If the philosophic, in McKeon’s formulation, concerns the relation of 
“men” to “governments” and the political concerns “governments” to one another, 
this third problem space concerns “the relation of groups of men and of states to 
one another.” Th is third problem space is given form within venues such as the 
United Nations in which a constitutional frame facilitates the creation of new meta-
state or interstate agencies and provides the structures within which the practical 
relations between these agencies and states can be worked out. It is here, in this 
space between  agencies and states, that McKeon thinks that “a world declaration of 
human rights” can be eff ectively elaborated. Among other things this space focuses 
energy and attention on the real stakes of the matter: the negotiation of modes and 
apparatuses of power and the terms of mutual adjustment that such apparatuses 
require.
Th e challenge in activating a declaration will not merely consist in “the recogni-
tion of agencies” within which a declaration of human rights can be worked out or 
even in the empowerment of those agencies to implement and carry forward such 
a declaration—although obviously neither of those can be taken for granted. Th e 
challenge, rather, is to establish a relation between the agencies and states, to work 
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out the power relations and sites of exchange between them in such a way that the 
philosophic and political problems can be addressed in a case-by-case fashion. In 
something of a circular procedure, such a case-based approach entails at least two 
requirements. In the fi rst place it requires that all parties recognize that the legal and 
political implementation of rights and the philosophic interpretation of rights will 
vary under diff erent circumstances, among diff erent sovereign nations, and, likely, 
within diff erent UN agencies depending on their missions. In the second place, it 
obviously also requires the creation of administrative, legislative, and judicial mech-
anisms by way of which and within which such a broad range of interpretations can 
be worked through. In this way, a catalogue of practical defi nitions will begin to fi ll 
in the spaces between divergent philosophies, and a history of practical actions will 
begin to align practices.
According to McKeon’s proposal the promulgation of a universal declaration—or 
“world declaration” as he refers to it—will, in the end, depend on tolerance for 
defi nitional ambiguity and the political equipment needed to work through such 
ambiguity while still enforcing human rights. One must be realistic about the fact 
that ambiguities will remain with regard to the question and problem of a uniform 
administration of human rights. Th ere is no single basic philosophy that could 
rationalize such administration from the outset. One must also be realistic about 
the fact that ambiguities will persist with regard to philosophic matters. Without 
accepting ambiguity on this count, administrative practices cannot begin to move 
forward on a case-by-case basis. Th is double realism about ambiguity might allow 
concerned actors to eliminate enough of the sharp diff erences between them to al-
low for a single declaration of rights to be produced and for action on those rights 
to begin. At least this is what McKeon proposes as a possible means by which “men 
may move peacefully to a uniform practice and to a universal understanding of 
fundamental human rights.”
What does McKeon’s proposal add to our analysis of human dignity? First of 
all, as I have already noted, it suggests that the procedural fragmentation and the 
pragmatic closure of the conversation over the source and nature of human dig-
nity, though enacted through the micropolitics of the CHR, could never be reduc-
ible to those micropolitics. Th e problem of fashioning a human rights apparatus 
predicated on human dignity but carried out by and in relation to sovereign nations 
includes the usual conceptual diffi  culties attending any political problem, but it ad-
ditionally includes diffi  culties pertaining to the work of unsettling and readjusting 
relations of power. Moreover, McKeon’s proposal reminds us that the problem is 
not just the intransigence of power, per se, but the host of specifi c veridictional and 
jurisdictional encumbrances connected to introducing shifts into the general logic 
of power. It suggests that the veridictional and jurisdictional elements of the situa-
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tion not only need to be analytically distinguished (which, on some level, is evident) 
but that they also need to be historically contextualized and brought into an under-
determined and mutually adjusted relation. Modes and forms of truth production 
need to be brought into relation with modes and forms of governing in a recursive 
and mutually rectifying manner. Hence the need for tolerating a certain measure of 
ambiguity in the formation of both the defi nition of rights and the administration 
of the mechanisms of enforcement. Crucial to this is that the work of forming the 
relation between the philosophical and political needs to be facilitated by the cre-
ation of new venues. In the case of McKeon’s proposal, these would be venues that 
take philosophic coherence and uniformity of political action not as givens but as 
outcomes to be generated through case-based processes.
Needless to say McKeon’s proposal was not carried forward. Nevertheless, the 
declaration does exhibit characteristics not wholly unlike what McKeon anticipated. 
Th ree diff erences between what McKeon recommended and how the CHR actually 
proceeded are worth attending to. Although the CHR separated the philosophic 
and political problems, they never brought them back into a sustained recursive 
relation, whether through the implementation of case-based mechanisms such as 
those McKeon proposed or some other mechanism. Th e second diff erence, which 
on some level is more interesting, is that the separation of the political and the 
philosophical at the CHR did not so much result in a tolerance for underdefi nition 
or ambiguity but actually served to produce a positive conception of human dig-
nity that not only has endured and has even become predominant in the history of 
human rights but that was characterized by a coherent, if tacit, anthropology. Th is 
conception carries with it a quite specifi c set of parameters for formulating which 
political actions can be considered necessary and even urgent. Which is to say, al-
though the CHR may not have produced a workable form of political equipment 
for the care of human dignity, they certainly determined a logic and mode accord-
ing to which such equipment might be elaborated. Th e third diff erence is simply 
that the declamation of human dignity in the Universal Declaration served to insert 
an object of political care as well as a metric of political rationality into the heart 
of a political problem space otherwise defi ned and dominated by the apparatuses 
of state sovereignty. Although this insertion did not immediately produce a shift 
in practice, it nevertheless introduced the design parameters for a style of political 
reasoning that is not reducible to prior models. In this sense, and perhaps only in 
this sense, the CHR made good on the demand for something more from power: 
a form of care for human dignity. Whatever else McKeon’s analysis foresaw, it did 
not anticipate the eff ects of a pragmatic tradeoff  between the veridictional and the 
jurisdictional at the level of refi guring political rationality or how the invention and 
elaboration of such a refi gured rationality might prove to be signifi cant.
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pastoral power and the politics of dignity
Along the course of analyzing the development of modern arts of government, Fou-
cault took time to clarify the stakes of his experimental inquiry. “Th e point,” as he 
described it, “is to show how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth 
form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power that eff ectively marks out in re-
ality that which did not exist and legitimately submits it to the division between 
true and false.” Such a division requires both a metric and a mode. Th e metric, 
in the case of the raison d’état, is normalization: privileging attention to things in 
the world that can be measured, arrayed, and normed. Its mode is regulation: the 
work of appropriately minimizing and maximizing governmental practices. Th e 
question of appropriateness, in turn, becomes a matter of constant adjustment and 
calibration in terms of knowledge of the nature of the object being governed and in 
terms of the presumed naturalness of the governmental practices themselves.
Human dignity and human rights likewise mark out in reality that to which 
governmental practices need to be submitted in terms of the division between true 
and false. But, of course, human dignity calls for a diff erent mode and a diff erent 
metric and therefore a diff erent coupling of practices and truth into a diff erent sort 
of apparatus. Th e metric is precisely that which cannot be normalized. And the ap-
propriate mode called for cannot be a matter of minimization and maximization of 
governmental practice, per se (it is not a question, for example, of normalizing free-
dom of speech). However—and here is the twist and the point of distinction from 
the older juridical rights and their external limitation of the art of government—
the question of appropriateness in the case of human dignity does remain, and it 
remains as a matter of knowledge of the nature of the object being governed and 
thereby a matter of the naturalness of the practices of power.
Th e declaration, after all, asserts that unless governments recognize human dig-
nity, they cannot achieve the goods of peace and freedom. A truth claim about ap-
propriate practices is being made here. Th e problem is how to adjust or reconcile the 
metric and mode of human dignity with the metric and mode characteristic of the 
biopolitical state. What is more, the problem is not simply that human dignity sets 
an outside limitation on state power. Th e Commission on Human Rights consisted 
of nothing more than delegates from sovereign states. Th e Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights serves as a stent by way of which human dignity is inserted not 
exactly into governance but into the fi eld of political practice inside of state sover-
eignty. It is inserted into the body of sovereignty, if you will, although it is not inte-
grated into it. Human dignity is formulated in an adjacent position to state power, a 
position neither entirely internal nor external to governmental apparatuses but that 
connects governmental apparatuses to a new apparatus of knowledge-power.
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Said diff erently, human dignity as fi gured by the commission introduces a dif-
ferent logic of limitation into the raison d’état. Th e moral variable, which had been 
partially removed, is reinserted and combined with the veridictional calculus of gov-
ernance. It takes the moral question of the right to govern and connects it with the 
scientifi c question of how to govern according to the nature of political objects. Th e 
question of the nature of peace, justice, and freedom, however, is said to turn on 
the political ontology of human dignity rather than on milieus made up of markets 
and populations. In this way human dignity functions to reintroduce the question 
of moral limitations back into the game of governance, but precisely as a matter of 
political reason and not only political right. Of course, it is not inserted as the object 
to be governed—human dignity is certainly not to be governed—but rather as a 
determinant of the fi eld of relations within which governance takes place.
It should be said straightway that on a formal and binding level, the price to be 
paid at the United Nations would appear not to be that high for the insertion of this 
determinant. As Eleanor Roosevelt reminded the General Assembly, the declaration 
entailed no legal or contractual obligations of any kind on the part of governments 
actually to guarantee human rights. Despite this limitation, the fact that the decla-
ration included language of pledge and promise is not nothing. As I have already 
noted, several scholars have argued that in international politics today almost no 
discourse has the moral legitimacy and traction of the discourse of human dignity 
and human rights. Th e Universal Declaration undoubtedly set one trajectory for 
this rise to prominence. But it is worth asking: is adjustment to the “soft power” of 
moral legitimacy the only price that sovereign states were asked to pay with regard 
to human dignity and human rights, which certainly do extract a cost at this level? 
As Foucault pointed out, the rationality of the art of government entails as a shift 
away from the question of legitimate/illegitimate rule to the question of eff ective/
ineff ective. Th e question then is this: does human dignity, taken up in an archonic 
mode, ask anything more of power in terms of its calculation of eff ectiveness and 
ineff ectiveness, or does it only work as an external principle of limitation on ques-
tions of moral legitimacy?
I think this question can be responded to by running through a course of dis-
tinctions similar to those laid out in the last chapter regarding the art of govern-
ment. Recall fi rst that the mode of power characteristic of modern states, of the art 
of  government, is distinctive in that it is not reducible to the juridical and pastoral 
modes that are prior to it. Second, raison d’état establishes a hinge between the 
 limited character of state sovereignty and its unlimited character with regard to 
internal objectives. Th ird, although apparatuses of self-limitation begin to emerge 
within the state, these are calibrated to the task of governing according to the na-
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ture of the object to be governed and the naturalness of the practice of government 
itself.
In a kind of parallel fashion, several distinctions can be made with regard to 
human dignity as it is fashioned in the declaration. Th e fi rst point I want to be 
absolutely clear about is that human dignity is the anchor point for a distinctive 
jurisdictional mode. It is a central hypothesis of this book that this mode cannot 
be reduced to prior modes of power, generally speaking, and cannot be reduced to 
governmental, juridical, or pastoral modes in particular—though it overlaps with 
and shares elements of all three of these modes, particularly the pastoral. Th is means 
that whatever is signifi cant about it, human dignity does not mark out the opening 
of a new political epoch or the exit out of a prior epoch. Apparatuses of human dig-
nity today exist alongside of and in interconnected assemblages with other modes.
With this in mind, it is nonetheless clear that human dignity is not governmen-
tal. Whatever else we say about the archonic, it is not susceptible to normalization. 
Th e claim that it is not juridical is not as clear, however. Human dignity shares some 
resemblance to juridical modes in their classical forms. Foucault is clear that even 
with the emergence of the raison d’état nation-states do not abandon their relation 
to the juridical apparatuses characteristic of the late Middle Ages. A prominent 
feature of the development of modern states is the pressures generated by claims to 
divine law or the law of nature or to fundamental rights, which are regularly put 
forward as key limiting factors. Th e raison d’état in the seventeenth century may 
not be characterized by any mechanism of self-limitation, but it is often limited by 
appeal to the external and absolute character of fundamental laws and rights. Th e 
question is: is human dignity simply an appeal to such strategies of external limita-
tion? It certainly must be this in part. Human dignity as archonic does establish 
criteria of limitation in terms of that which cannot be violated. However—and this 
point is absolutely crucial—human dignity is put forward by the CHR not just as 
an external limitation on governmental power. Rather, it is put forward as an inter-
nal factor that contributes to a positive form of government. Th e declaration claims 
that the worldly goods with which member states are concerned are predicated on a 
certain positive agenda: faith in and recognition of human dignity. What is more, 
the archonic does not only tell us what must not be done or what lines must not 
be crossed. It also tells us what must be done: human dignity must be protected, 
and political equipment that would facilitate such projection must be developed. 
So, human dignity may function as a principle of delimitation, but it is not simply 
a principle of external juridical limitation, and for this reason it is not only the re-
mainder, the reciprocal face, or outside of governmental power.
Th us, working typologically, one can conclude that, although human dignity 
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interfaces with governmental and juridical modes and shares elements with both, 
it is not reducible to either. However, as I have already proposed, human dignity 
is in some ways closely aligned with pastoral power. Actually, the claim is not en-
tirely my own. Foucault speculated that as long as forms of humanism persist as a 
positive political agenda, the modes of power once associated with the Christian 
pastorate would continue to operate even in political venues, and that their relative 
lack of prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should not lead us 
to assume that pastoral power was somehow merely a remnant of a prior epoch. 
Th e conception of human dignity put forward in the declaration purports to be 
universal, which is obvious by the declaration’s title. Th is universality is not simple, 
but synthetic. A read through of the list of human rights included in the declaration 
indicate a very particular obligation: these are the rights of individual humans as 
well as the rights of humanity. Th ere is an inner link between humans and human-
ity that overcomes the scalar diff erence between individuals and collectives. What 
this means, among other things, is that the declaration, as a pledge on the part of 
the member states to care for humans as members of the human family, invokes the 
classical mandate of the Christian pastorate: omnes et singulatim, care “for all and 
for each one.” Th e archonic is not susceptible to cultivation or to normalization, at 
least not directly. So, although human dignity invokes the classic mandate of the 
pastorate, the mode of intervention appropriate to it is not that of the shepherd, 
either as the conductor of souls or the conductor of populations.
A fi rst conclusion one can draw about human dignity, then, is that it is not re-
ducible to prior modes of power even while being connected to them. Th e second 
is that it troubles the dynamics between the limitedness of external objectives and 
the unlimitedness of internal objectives characteristic of raison d’état, even in its 
later and more refi ned manifestations. I said in the last chapter that the declaration 
functioned as a device by which human dignity passes beyond a relation of external 
limitation to the raison d’état (such as was characteristic of previous juridical limi-
tations) to something like a position inside of the raison d’état, inside in the sense 
that it is proposed as a positive variable in state practices of self-limitation. I also 
said that in doing this, human dignity does not actually become an integrated part 
of the raison d’état. Human dignity does not refi ne the conduct of conduct. It does 
not become a further refi nement of governmental rationality. Rather, what human 
dignity does (or one thing that it is proposed that human dignity can be made to 
do) is reconfi gure the dynamics according to which the state calibrates the logic of 
its relative limitations and unlimitedness.
On the one side, with regard to external relations, where peace had been a mat-
ter of mutual respect for autonomy among a multiplicity of states and where the 
raison d’état had set strict limits on states’ external objectives, it is now asserted 
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that peace is founded on a faith in human dignity and that states must take as an 
unlimited obligation to recognize and promote human dignity. On the other side, 
where the raison d’état had called for near-unlimited objectives within the life of the 
state, objectives only limited by the nature of the objects being governed and the 
biopolitical goods to be achieved through such governance, it is now asserted that 
the realization of better standards of political life depends on states checking their 
governmental practices against the claims of human dignity. Moreover, the declara-
tion indicates how this adjustment of limitedness and unlimitedness should be ac-
complished: through the recognition, protection, and redress of human rights. If in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the art of government had been refi ned by 
attention to the nature of the object to be governed and by attention to the natural-
ness of government to that nature, with the Universal Declaration the art of govern-
ment must recognize that it is responsible to another object and therefore must take 
stock of the nature of that object in constituting the terms of its self-limitation.
So, human dignity is not just a juridical limitation on governmental practice. It is 
also a positive mode of jurisdiction. And this positive mode of jurisdiction troubles 
the relative limitedness of the external objectives and unlimitedness of the internal 
objectives of the state. With human dignity a distinct metric and mode of reasoning 
enter into the calculation of political practice. If the problem for the art of govern-
ment is how to act in accordance with the nature of the object it governs, then the 
nature of human dignity does not so much require a diff erent political problem as 
a diff erent style of reasoning, one appropriate to an object with a diff erent nature. 
Th is is the third conclusion one can draw about human dignity. It is a conclusion by 
which the diff erence between human dignity and human rights on the one side and 
the art of government on the other becomes clearer still. It also indicates the point 
where the problem of interfacing human dignity with governmental modes of politi-
cal power and making that interface into a practice becomes most diffi  cult.
Th e members of the CHR could not settle on a mode of reasoning—philosoph-
ical, theological, or legal—according to which human dignity could be defi ned 
and justifi ed and according to which specifi c rights could be shown to reasonably 
follow. Th ey did, however, agree on a metric according to which truth claims could 
be picked out and included in the declaration. Th e metric, of course, was dignity. 
Dignity was asserted as the defi ning feature of the human and the human fam-
ily without reference to origin, source, or ground. It was thus put forward as if 
self- referential and archonic. Where the commission members had been unable to 
formulate a shared veridictional mode about the nature of dignity, their simple as-
sertion of human dignity and the need to recognize dignity brought such a mode 
tacitly in tow. Th is veridictional mode can be called declamatory. Where the ana-
lytic of fi nitude will only admit as true or false those claims that are susceptible to 
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a metric of normalization, the politics of human dignity, operating according to a 
declamatory mode, will only admit as true or false those claims that concern the 
violation or protection of an absolute metric, dignity.
Foucault experimented with an analytic exercise helpful in thinking about dig-
nity as a metric for the ordering of truth claims. He showed how a series of ques-
tions about power get infl ected as new “regimes of truth” and enter into the art 
of governing. From the juridical to the governmental, he wrote, the question “Am 
I governing in conformity with fundamental divine or natural law?” shifts and 
 becomes “Am I governing between the maximum and the minimum fi xed for me 
by the nature of things?” With the assertion of archonic human dignity, a three-
fold shift comes into play: “Can I govern in such a way that human dignity will be 
secure; can I intervene where it is being violated; and can I reorient other fi elds of 
activity so that dignity can be said to be recognized?” Th ese questions do not turn 
on  matters of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of power, although this might be im-
plied. Rather, they turn on the question of how political equipment should be cali-
brated. Which activities should we care about, and which practices should be 
blocked or  facilitated? In this way the notion of human rights becomes critical. 
How will we know if human dignity is being violated and if peace and freedom 
are being put at risk? We will know because human rights are not being protected 
or ensured.
One can see that the challenge faced by the Commission on Human Rights was 
both diffi  cult and subtle. Th e challenge did not consist, fi rst and foremost, in elabo-
rating new criteria of legitimacy or in establishing external limitations and in that 
way blocking the excesses of state sovereignty. Nor did the challenge consist in reca-
librating the instruments of governmentality so as to cultivate human dignity better 
through the creation of economic and social conditions, as the Soviet delegation 
had called for. Th e challenge for the CHR consisted, rather, in fi guring out how to 
position governmental practice and this-worldly goods within the purview of the 
metric of dignity and how to invent and facilitate practices according to which such 
alignment can be implemented. At the CHR sovereign member states were eff ec-
tively put in the position of having to rethink the relation of the absolute and the 
governmental and to give form to that relation such that the United Nations could 
constitute itself as a venue capable of facilitating the recognition of dignity and the 
elaboration of human rights.
Th e point of transforming the metric and mode of human dignity into political 
practice, however, was the point at which the CHR became blocked. Th e question 
of how human dignity can be institutionally connected to a mode of practice and 
put into play in the fi eld of governmental relations was never satisfactorily resolved. 
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Th is juncture point between the conceptual and the equipmental is the point at 
which—to use McKeon’s terms—the philosophic problem was bracketed out in 
favor of the political problem. One can credit the CHR for what it did accomplish. 
It did in fact contribute to the problem of “the reasoned way of governing best” 
with regard to human dignity.
Perhaps more important, other organizations have subsequently taken up the 
fi gure of human dignity put forward in the declaration and have elaborated prac-
tices of intervention taking that fi gure as a warrant and point of reference. If the 
conception of things human off ered in the declaration has worked better for, say, 
NGOs, this may be because, in the end, NGOs are not faced with the question of 
inventing modes of sovereign self-limitation. Th e problem for the CHR was pre-
cisely how to interface the demands of the art of governance and the demands of 
human dignity within a single venue: member states were asked to sign on to the 
proposition that they could and would recognize the humanity of their citizens as 
a source of political goods and thereby govern in accordance with that recognition. 
How to assemble the archonic and the biopolitical, and the extent to which such 
assemblage is possible, remain open questions. As we will see in the third case, this 
is a question that bioethicists, among others, have had to confront.
A crucial outcome of the CHR’s work was that the conception of human dignity 
and human rights they articulated could be used by subsequent actors to calibrate a 
mode of jurisdiction that is, in fact, orthogonal to the internal lives of states, if not 
altogether orthogonal to the art of government. Th e archonic, after all, is precisely 
that which cannot be cultivated, maximized, or minimized but only violated or pro-
tected. And it is not surprising that human dignity has been turned into a practice 
most eff ectively in situations cast as emergencies or crises. Such as it is, the human 
is dignifi ed. As the declaration puts it, the human is born with dignity even if, at 
times, that dignity relies on a particular national or international order to be sus-
tained. Where that order is taken to be lacking and human dignity is under threat, 
actors operating in the name of dignity take it as their right to cut across the claims 
of sovereignty and intervene in the internal aff airs of nations. If human dignity is 
a matter of protection under emergency conditions, then human rights equipment 
requires a range of strategies and instruments. It requires vigilant monitoring to 
determine the extent to which governments are recognizing human dignity. Where 
human rights and therein human dignity are found to be violated, equipment is 
needed to intervene, to rectify, and to redress. Th e forms of this rectifi cation and re-
dress often incorporate techniques and technologies that might otherwise be part of 
“biopolitical” apparatuses—as can be seen in almost any situation of emergency aid 
where aid organizations are stepping in to fulfi ll what might otherwise be thought 
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of as the obligations of the state, from providing clean water to basic healthcare. It 
is for this reason, I suspect, that many scholars studying global public health and 
other humanitarian aid have found the concept of the biopolitical to be illumina-
tive. In any event, whatever equipment was or was not elaborated by the United 
Nations, the orthogonal character of human dignity, exercised through human 
rights, has been a key to turning human dignity into a practice of care in the face of 
the perceived excesses and defi ciencies of the art of government.
Th ere is a price to be paid for this orthogonal relation to governance. And it is 
a price that for some will begin to seem too high, as I hope to show in the case of 
bioethics. Th e price to be paid is that human dignity, whatever the CHR imagined, 
has never really been made an integral part of governmental instruments. A relation 
of critical tension remains between dignitarian and biopolitical reasoning. If human 
dignity is not the kind of thing amenable to cultivation, this means, on the one 
side, that the archonic can put into question the excesses of biopolitical pursuits of 
wealth, health, and security. On the other side, this nonintegrated position means 
that human dignity is less useful for promoting, orienting, and supporting prac-
tices (whether scientifi c, political, or ethical) designed to increase such biopolitical 
goods. Th e archonic will retain a diffi  cult relation with apparatuses of government. 
Whatever forms the art of caring for human dignity might take, when advanced in 
an archonic mode it remains in that strange and unresolved adjacency to govern-
ment in which the CHR put it.
Th is indicates a second price to be paid for conceiving of human dignity in an 
archonic mode. To the extent that human dignity calls for a new mode of politi-
cal practice, the question remains: what types of venues are actually capable of fa-
cilitating such practice? Th e answer will turn on two further questions. Th e fi rst is 
methodological. How does one constitute a venue such that it is capable of bringing 
a new mode of power into relation with human dignity as the object of care and 
concern? Th is constitutional question obviously raises other diffi  culties, as we have 
seen. Which activities are appropriate to a given mode of power? Which are neces-
sary, and which are urgent? And how will one know that these activities are urgent 
and necessary? Which truths about human dignity will need to be settled before 
equipment can be designed through which such activities can be facilitated? And, 
of course, what then does the venue in question need to be in order to facilitate 
these activities? What kind of equipment is to be facilitated in the name of protect-
ing human dignity? Will the equipment be articulated as human rights? Will there 
be apparatuses of emergency intervention? Will the equipment be used to curb the 
excesses of government or to redress violations? Th e question of the capability of 
venues has everything to do with the challenge of turning truth claims about hu-
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man dignity into practices. Th is question of how to constitute a venue capable of 
caring for human dignity becomes increasingly crucial as the discursive apparatus 
of human dignity begins to circulate into ever wider and more diverse domains. 
What is more, as this circulation increases and fragments, the problem of defi ning 
the terms of human dignity becomes more acute. Th e demand for better defi nitions 
gets made on all sides.
If the price to be paid on the side of human rights apparatuses for an orthogonal 
relation to sovereignty is a diffi  culty in access to governmental instruments, the 
ultimate price to be paid for state sovereignty is, of course, having its power limited. 
Th e diffi  culty at the United Nations was precisely how to reconcile all of this. Th e 
commission was expected to bring human dignity into zones of activity otherwise 
taken as proper to the exercise of state power. Th is insertion was largely discursive—
declarative to be more precise—but the insertion was made nevertheless. Although 
human dignity as the CHR imagined it has not been integrated into state appara-
tuses, it was not conceived by the CHR as simply an external and limiting principle, 
either. Th is means, at the level of the CHR’s proposals, that the state could no 
longer exercise power only according to a metric of maximization and minimiza-
tion. Analytically, one can say that with the declaration member states were put in 
a position in which they had to say to themselves and to other members: we are 
responsible for this object that cannot be normalized and that is not reducible to 
the unlimited exercise of power under the raison d’état; we must govern within view 
of this thing that we cannot violate and that we might have to protect. Th e declara-
tion, after all, asserts that the guarantee of worldly goods not only requires the art 
of government but also the recognition of the archonic.
political equipment and human dignity: 
liberalism and socialism
Normand and Zaidi make a claim about the work of the CHR, which on the sur-
face of things does not seem problematic. Th e claim is a sort of summary diagnosis 
of the CHR’s early work. Th ey tell us that, in the end, the majority of the delegates 
to the CHR rejected any fundamental challenges to “the predominance of a West-
ern liberal frame for thinking about rights.” Such a diagnosis has a certain truth 
to it, as far as it goes. Th e commission members did in fact make a distinction 
between so-called civil and political rights, which are ostensibly attached to indi-
viduals without reference to their group identifi cations, and economic and social 
rights, which ostensibly could only be realized when a certain order of things was 
put into place governmentally. But such a diagnosis, suggesting that at the end of 
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the day the work of the CHR amounted to a kind of standoff  between “liberal-
ism” and “socialism,” covers over as much as it explains. As McKeon suggested, the 
presumption that the world is divided into two philosophical camps is itself one of 
the historical peculiarities of the modern situation. Th at is to say, the presumption 
of the analytic salience of this dyad does not take seriously enough the fact that the 
historical circumstances under which these designations are produced cannot be 
taken for granted. Th e fact is that member states on all sides resisted giving form to 
practices for the care of human dignity in a mode of human rights, insofar as these 
practices stood in tension with the regnant modes of exercising power characteristic 
of existing regimes. An emphasis on confl ict between liberalism and socialism also 
covers over the ways in which, in an attempt to negotiate philosophic and political 
impasses, a distinctive fi gure of political thought and action was introduced into the 
world. Whatever the terms “liberalism” and “socialism” might refer to in regard to 
the work of the CHR, a signifi cant outcome was the insertion of the archonic into 
governmental apparatuses, an insertion that cannot be reduced to either tropes of 
juridical limit or a biopolitical remainder.
Th e question, I think, is not whether liberalism or socialism wins out with hu-
man rights. Th e question is: what mode of political practice did the declaration rec-
ommend? As a kind of summary we can enumerate several elements. Th e fi rst is the 
most apparent. Th e political practice recommended by the declaration is that which 
gives attention to and turns its activity toward human dignity. Human dignity is 
what needs to be cared for. Th e problem is not just that human dignity is at risk of 
violation and that such violations are scandalous. In addition, the declaration tells 
us that the goods of peace, justice, freedom, etc. depend on a proper recognition 
of dignity. What, then, would proper recognition consist in? What tekhnē, what 
art of care, is appropriate to it? What techniques are appropriate to the archonic? 
Th e forms of practice one might foster as a means of realizing the protection of 
the archonic are no doubt numerous. But what all practices would need to have 
in common, a shared calibrating factor across all of them, is that they would need 
to take up a vigilant relation to possible excesses of other modes and relations of 
power. Th e crucial activities would not be those that orient other modes of power, 
per se. Nor would they be those that limit other modes in a kind of regularized and 
constitutive sort of way. Rather, they would need to be practices that remain close 
enough to other forms of power so as to infl ect or reorder them when the occasion 
is called for.
We might say that the equipmental mode recommended by the archonic con-
ception of human dignity is moderative. As a verb, the term “moderate” refers both 
to an adjustment in quantity, intensity, or portion, as well as to exercise control or 
infl uence over something, to preside. As an adjective, the term can mean to avoid 
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excess or extremes of conduct. Moderative practices for the care of the archonic 
would neither be an outside limitation on state power, nor would they form part of 
the raison d’état as that object whose nature one would need to attend to in order 
to know whether or not one was governing too much. Th e care of human dignity 
is not about the governmental conduct of conduct, per se. Rather, human rights 
equipment would need to be positioned alongside state power. In this space, neither 
outside nor inside of the art of government, two things could be facilitated. Th e fi rst 
is that the United Nations could watch over human dignity and intervene at those 
places where rights were being violated. Th e second is that governments could oper-
ate with human dignity just in view as the source and guarantee of certain kinds of 
worldly goods. It bears noting that it is here that we see the clearest deviation from 
classical modes of juridical reason. Where fundamental rights had previously been 
a matter of limiting the space of government, and therefore letting sovereignty be 
within its proper sphere, human dignity will not limit sovereignty but will seek to 
moderate sovereignty within its own sphere.
Th e extent to which the United Nations has been successful in implementing 
equipment of this sort is obviously open to question. It is clear that other organiza-
tions have found means of animating the vigilant observation of the governmental 
activities and strategic interventions involving, among other things, both the work 
of making violations visible and, where possible, intervening in an emergency and 
limited fashion. Th e fact that these eff orts have been increasingly entangled in gov-
ernmental and military apparatuses of multiple sorts, all in the name of human 
dignity, is a topic that warrants still more attention than it is currently receiving. 
Th e militarization of humanitarian work is yet another zone in which new problems 
and new modes and forms of practice are reconfi guring the ways in which we think 
about and intervene on things human.
Whatever the pragmatic outcome, it is fair to say that in a fashion not altogether 
dissimilar to the Vatican, the CHR proposed a reconfi gured and restylized form of 
pastoral power. It was oriented by an updated form of the classical mandate of om-
nes et singulatim. Despite being composed of sovereign states, the United Nations 
had presumed to constitute itself, by way of human rights, as capable of a mode and 
form of political practice calibrated to the care of “the human family,” all and each 
one as dignifi ed. In this sense, what the United Nations was attempting to do—
again, not unlike the Vatican—did have a kind of rough precedent, insofar as they 
did not invent the general logic of pastoral power as a mode of exercising power. 
But by interpolating that logic into a new problem space, it opened up a diff erent 
range of practices and a diff erent range of ramifi cations. As with the Vatican, one of 
the challenges was to take up this demand without direct access to the mechanisms 
of government, ecclesial or political. And as with the Vatican, the conception of 
F6671.indb   163 9/16/15   10:39:04 AM
164 Human Dignity and the United Nations
human dignity formulated by the CHR calls for a mode of care that recognizes 
and protects human dignity. Th is means that human dignity itself does not need 
to be moderated. It means that those practices that bear on human dignity, those 
practices that constitute or violate human rights, need to be moderated in the name 
of human dignity.
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diagnostic excursus Economies of Life and Power
In the early 2000s, at their annual meeting, the American Academy of Religion con-
vened a session on the now well-worn theme of “philosophy’s return to religion.” 
Th e session brought together a slate of thinkers that included, among others, the 
theologian John Milbank, the cultural critic Slavoj Žižek, and the philosopher Alain 
Badiou (who failed to attend). On one level, those present in the overfi lled hotel 
ballroom could have been forgiven thinking this group a rather peculiar collection, 
considering the sharp intellectual and dispositional divergences among them. John 
Milbank had become the central fi gure of the self-named “Radical Orthodoxy” 
theologians; his antisecular and antiliberal vehemence was almost as polarizing as 
his eff orts to revitalize the notion that theology is the “queen of the sciences,” en-
joying a comprehensive, and to that extent superior, analytic position relative to 
other modes of thought. Žižek, of course already a highly visible critic, had in 
the previous half-decade captured the attention of religious scholars, who did not 
know whether to be drawn to or repulsed by his sardonic writings that both praise 
and parochialize Christianity. Alain Badiou in his counter-Nietzschean writings on 
St. Paul had made sure that his readers did not overlook his credentials as an atheist 
and that he was only taking religious themes so seriously because of their crucial 
conceptual ramifi cations. On another level, of course, no one in the room took 
this particular collection of participants as anything but obvious and propitious, 
if potentially polemic. In the previous few years each had produced much-debated 
works on the question of “religion” and its philosophical “excesses”—to say nothing 
of the fact that each of them was simply, in their respective niches, academic stars, 
stars whose profi les had risen, at least in part, as a result of their work on questions 
of power and the contemporary fate of religion.
F6671.indb   165 9/16/15   10:39:04 AM
166 Diagnostic Excursus
One thing immediately clear to those in the room was that the polemics that 
had attended some of the previous exchanges between some of these thinkers had 
very little to do with why they were fi nding it fruitful to interact with one another 
on this particular day. Th e energy in the room was generated by something else, 
namely, a shared diagnosis of the character of “the problem with the world today,” 
particularly with regard to the question of the religious and the political. To sim-
plify, though not to misrepresent, the diagnosis these thinkers seemed to share was 
that the ills and evils of the modern world could in one way or another be traced 
back to the dominance of the “liberal political imaginary” and its “biopolitical” 
formations. Th e shared diagnosis is familiar and not particularly complicated: the 
problem with the relation of politics and religion today is that governmental forms 
of power in the “West” tend to be predicated on the questionable idea that politics 
is a way of giving order to a world otherwise dominated by nefarious power and 
that the state’s monopoly on intervening into these fi elds of power is predicated 
on the presumption of an ontological distinction between the secular and the re-
ligious. Th ese two notions are, of course, at the heart of what is presumed to be 
a more or less unifi ed political logic operating under the sign of liberalism. And 
liberalism—or neoliberalism—is ostensibly the defi ning rationality of the age. Poli-
tics, under this (counter)liberal vision, is constituted by and of the never-ending 
management of violence, and the ontological reality (and therefore political neces-
sity) of the secular allows the state to establish an order of things in which spheres of 
existence, which might otherwise be the source and warrant of violence, can be kept 
apart. Everyone in the room seemed to agree that the heart of the problem today is 
that liberal regimes cannot understand, let alone curtail, the multiple ways in which 
their disciplinary and normalizing regimes are actually the structural source of the 
violence that they purport to stand against. Th e work of thought, it is taken to fol-
low, consists in exposing the pathologies of secular liberalism so as to put them into 
question. It was taken as evident that such critique constitutes a uniquely pressing 
demand of the day. In this way, the shared diagnosis in the room could be cast as 
something of an inversion of what is promulgated as the “dominant” critique of 
religious politics by avowed secularists, namely, that religion remains a dangerous 
anachronism whose continued presence in the modern state needs to be judged “a 
stain on what should be a more spotlessly secular present and future.”
At the time of this encounter, I had just begun to work in earnest on the themes 
that would eventually generate materials for this book. Th e exchange on philosophy 
and religion proved both troubling and catalytic. It was troubling for the simple rea-
son that the critique of liberalism circulating among and between these thinkers—a 
critique consistent with a range of counter- and postliberal projects in philosophy 
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and the human sciences—functions analytically to reduce the fi gure of human dig-
nity, as well as the venues and practices connected to it, to nothing more than a 
residue of liberalism. It was catalytic in that this session was the fi rst time I had 
gotten clear, for myself, about a fact of the contemporary academic world and its 
reigning analytical doxa that I should have been clear about from the outset of my 
project. Despite the fact that human dignity and the apparatuses connected to it, 
especially human rights apparatuses, are clearly a predominant feature of the world 
today, there is in certain philosophical circles something of a disdain for thinking 
seriously about them on their own terms. Th e disdain is articulated diff erently, but 
the core rationale is more or less consistent: human dignity, and human rights in 
particular, are only the latest manifestation of a long history of humanism, a history 
whose modernist variants, whether liberal or Marxist, have played themselves out 
either as a source of interest or political possibility. Th ey have played themselves 
out because, despite the fact that they are often articulated in a mode of resistance, 
they are part of the logic of the political worlds they claim to resist and therefore 
part of the political failings of modernity. Human dignity and human rights, in this 
view, are taken to be exemplary of the turn to a kind of anthropological universal 
in politics that can only issue in the kind of violence identifi ed by the philosopher 
Carl Schmitt, wherein the universally human provides the justifi cation for casting 
one’s enemies “outside” of what counts as human. Th ey are likewise taken to be 
exemplary of the problematic turn to a kind of universal individualism—the no-
torious universal autonomous subject of liberalism—which is neither empirically 
nor ethically tenable. In any event, it was not until I attended this session at the 
AAR that it became clear to me that for many of those at the putative vanguard 
of cultural criticism the question of human dignity really held no serious interest. 
It held no serious interest because if something more is being demanded of power 
in a liberal age—and it certainly is—then a response keyed to human dignity can 
only be, at best, to quote Giorgio Agamben, “a dream of peace,” which allows the 
worst excesses of liberalism to be covered over in the ethics of the “human family,” 
for which there will always be a permanent “exception to the rule.” Or, at worst, 
the turn to dignity and human rights is taken as no more than one more universal 
mode of self-justifi cation taken up by those instituting “the bloody mystifi cation of 
a new planetary order.” In any event, the idea that secular liberalism is the secret 
clue to understanding the essence of a nefarious modern political epoch means that 
anyone persuaded that human dignity is nothing other than a residue of the liberal 
will fail to take seriously the possibility that it constitutes anything like a signifi cant 
event in the relations between truth and power—except as a failed attempt to infl ect 
those nefarious relations that have come to dominate the modern.
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As I explained in the preface, my reasons for beginning the project on human dig-
nity were basically pragmatic: I had been working as a junior bioethicist when the 
political-theological debates in the United States and, then, in a reconfi gured fash-
ion, in many other parts of the world, concerning human embryonic stem cell 
research, fi rst exploded. I had been working with and studying the Geron Corpora-
tion, which had funded Jamie Th omson’s successful derivation of human embry-
onic stem cells, and I had been directly caught up in the ensuing politics. One of 
the twists of that politics was the way in which it seemed to transform the practice 
of bioethics, for a few years, defi nitively shifting moral attentions to the question 
of human dignity—a shift that proved as consequential for the fi gure of human 
dignity as it did for bioethics, as I will discuss in the next chapter. For my part, I 
contributed to the eff ort, taken up by many bioethicists, to articulate defi nitions 
for human dignity that might help make sense of how this fi gure of human life and 
worth could be made to relate to questions of the body and of health at play in 
stem cell research. I had become increasingly troubled by what I have described as 
the “intellectual blackmail” attached to these debates: one was either for or against 
human dignity. What human dignity was as a term of political and ethical reason-
ing, where the term had come from, what kinds of practices it might or might not 
facilitate, and how it might or might not help make sense of, or intervene into, the 
contemporary political situation were questions that were simply not being posed 
among the major actors involved. Th is lack is somewhat surprising given that the 
fi gure of human dignity was not particularly new to bioethics, per se—although its 
ascendency to the status of a defi ning term for the governance of the sciences had 
only really begun in the early 1990s. With the formulation and expansion of the 
human genome projects in both the United States and Europe, the fi gure of human 
dignity had begun to take shape as a major site of bioethical concern and debate. 
Th is was obviously not the fi rst time the notion of dignity had been elaborated in 
response to developments in the biomedical sciences. As I will explain in the next 
chapter, in the early 1970s, with the early professionalization of bioethics, the ques-
tion of death with dignity, so-called, had intensifi ed. Also in the early 1970s, and 
in a kind of parallel fashion, the question of human dignity and the defi nition of 
life were posed in relation to in vitro fertilization technologies. Th ese debates were 
connected in quite a direct fashion to the legacy of Vatican II. Neither in the case 
of dignity and death nor the question of dignity and life, however, was there any 
attempt to formalize the notion of human dignity as an institutional factor in the 
regulation of the life sciences—at least not in anything like what would happen two 
decades later following genomics and stem cell research. Moreover, the question in 
168 Diagnostic Excursus
F6671.indb   168 9/16/15   10:39:04 AM
the 1970s really concerned the “human person,” that is, the question of what con-
stitutes “personhood.” With the advance of human genomics, and then the advent 
of somatic cell nuclear transfer (cloning), and then acutely with human embryonic 
stem cell research, the question of the relation of human dignity to the material 
body of the biotechnical sciences was made central.
It was as part of an eff ort to move beyond the polemics connected to the de-
bates over human dignity in bioethics that I fi rst began to take up the work of 
constructing something like a “history of the present.” It soon became clear to me 
that what I needed, more than a fully developed genealogy of human dignity and 
its attendant politics, was simply a clearer sense of how human dignity had been 
brought to articulation and made to function in key twentieth-century settings, as 
well as a minimal understanding of the logic of those articulations and those func-
tions. Hence my eventual focus on the venues within and through which the fi gure 
of human dignity was put into the play of serious discourse about the political and 
ethical excesses of late modernity. It was for this reason that I also began to think 
about human dignity as a “contemporary problem.” It seemed to me that most 
of those arguing in bioethics that human dignity was at stake in biotechnological 
manipulations of the human genome and human embryo were tending (analyti-
cally speaking) to operate according to an ethos of “tradition,” wherein biotechnical 
developments needed to be weighed against a longer history of respect for and com-
mitment to dignity. Th ose inveighing against the use of this term as a meaningful 
or useful response to biotechnology seemed to be operating according to something 
like an ethos of the “modern,” in the sense that they saw the rhetoric and politics of 
human dignity to be a tired mid-twentieth-century invention and a philosophically 
thin term to which any political or ethical position might be attached. In this way, 
as Rabinow had argued, “tradition” and “the modern” were not being opposed but 
paired in contrastive ratios.
My initial examinations of the early developments in the United Nations and 
the Second Vatican Council had suggested that neither of these dominant rhetorical 
positions nor their associated politics were illuminative of the historical character 
of the use of the term human dignity and certainly not of the place of these recent 
polarizations within and as part of that history. In that light, Rabinow’s concept of 
the contemporary seemed apposite and worthwhile as conceptual equipment for 
analytically moving beyond my impasse. Particularly helpful was Rabinow’s charac-
terization and critique of the tendency of twentieth-century “modernists” to fi xate 
on “the new” and the correlated resistance of “traditionalists” to such fi xation. 
Th e identifi cation and valorization of the new over the old have frequently been 
tied to a more or less explicit philosophy of history in which those involved posit 
that seemingly diverse domains of practice and history are actually held together by 
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certain defi ning characteristics—characteristics that warrant treating this diversity 
as a unifi ed and coherent epoch or era. As Rabinow argues, analytic dissatisfaction 
with such epochal thinking has become widespread, despite its persistence. Th is dis-
satisfaction has issued in, among other critical projects, historical studies aimed at 
demonstrating the contingencies and inconsistencies underlying the apparent unity. 
Another approach, one that Rabinow endorses and practices, is simply to abandon 
epochal thinking as an analytic a priori and begin instead to examine the ways in 
which, in many domains, “old and new elements coexist in multiple confi gurations 
and variations,” some of which might be coherent, widespread, and stable but are 
not thereby diacritics of epochs or eras. Th ese sights of coexistence and confi gura-
tion are what Rabinow designates the contemporary.
Whatever else might be said about the developments at the Vatican and the 
United Nations concerning human dignity and the eventual developments in U.S. 
federal bioethics, they were marked by the confi guration of old and new elements. 
Th e task and challenge for all three consisted in discerning how, in these situations, 
such diverse elements could be brought together and assembled. Th e analytic task 
for the observer of these confi gurations is to discern their distinctive form as well 
as the signifi cance of those forms. In this light, I began the work of recasting my 
approach to the religious politics of the stem cell debate and its connections to the 
history of eff orts to fi gure human dignity more as a matter of how to understand 
the logic of the present debates, and the way in which they form part of the specifi c 
character of the contemporary, and less as a matter of contributing directly to those 
politics in their present form.
Part of this eff ort to recast my work consisted in trying to identify contemporary 
thinkers whose work was related to the problem of human dignity, or other closely 
adjacent ethical and political themes, and whose intellectual dispositions might be 
characterized by something like a feel for the contemporary. It was in this spirit that 
I fi rst began reading the work of the so-called Radical Orthodoxy theologians and 
in a connected fashion other critical theorists working on the question of the reli-
gious and the political. Given that bioethics and the stem cell debate in the United 
States had, from the outset, been framed and elaborated as a matter of political reli-
gion, and given that the work of the Radical Orthodoxy group, and especially John 
Milbank, was, at that time, a fl ashpoint in political theology, it is hardly surprising 
that I would turn to that somewhat eclectic group of Protestant, Catholic, and 
Orthodox Christians as one possible resource for “getting outside” of the polemics. 
Th ese theologians, broadly speaking, were dedicated to something like a Counter-
Reformation agenda and were pursuing lines of work consonant with the legacies 
of Maurice Blondel and Henri Bergson very much in the spirit of the problematics 
raised at the Second Vatican Council; it did not seem a stretch to think that they 
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might have something to teach me pertinent to the politics of human dignity as 
they were unfolding in relation to the sciences.
Th e Radical Orthodoxy theologians had dedicated themselves to a thoroughgo-
ing rejection of “the modern,” or “the secular,” or “liberalism,” variously conceived, 
rendering each as a kind of post-Reformation pathology. Milbank’s writings were 
exemplary in this regard. His celebrated Th eology and Social Th eory had been styl-
ized as a kind of genealogy of the secular taken as an epistemological bastard of 
post- Reformation metaphysics of power, which, in Milbank’s view, had contributed 
directly to the rise and development of the modern state and its logics of govern-
mentality. A central claim of his work, one both explicit and tacit, is that his intel-
lectual project was to get beyond the limitations of the modern. To do this, the criti-
cal thinker, in Milbank’s view, must set aside “modern social theory” as a mode and 
tradition of thought. Social theory, on his assessment, is ultimately bound together 
and bound up with the presumption of a secular order in the world that is taken to 
be metaphysically autonomous from a religious or spiritual order and that therefore 
proceeds in assessing reality without reference to the transcendent. Breaking with 
social theory and the presumption of the secular allows the thinker to conduct a 
“skeptical demolition” of social theory as well as a “dismantling” of sociologically 
dependent philosophical and theological perspectives, generating an “idolatrous” 
acceptance of the view that the world can be understood without reference to the 
divine as the real source of political and ontological peace. Th is is not to say that 
Milbank rejects interaction with the social or human sciences out of hand; on some 
level his status as an intellectual elite has depended on such interactions, however 
polemic. It is rather that these interactions can only be undertaken with those who 
are suffi  ciently post-Nietzschean, in the sense that they have given up on the prob-
lematic enterprise of constructing secular theodicies, according to which “nature,” 
saturated with violent power relations, fi nds peace through the counterbalancing 
and management of those forces through politics. And, likewise, they need to be 
suffi  ciently post-MacIntyrean in that they have to have given up on the idea that 
the modern world can manage modern power relations through a supplemental re-
turn to ancient virtues, practiced nonetheless in a world of individuals that remains 
otherwise liberal.
Given his thematics, it seemed to me during the early phases of my project 
that Milbank’s work was worth exploring in connection to the politics of intrinsic 
worth, even if only as a kind of critical exercise by way of which my blocked situa-
tion in bioethics might be loosened up by running the elements of human dignity 
through the paces of Milbank’s diagnosis of the secular modern. Given my attempt 
to think about human dignity as a contemporary problem, however, Milbank’s diag-
nosis proved limiting twice over. First, his diagnosis of the modern was obviously 
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epochal, despite his frequent references to “history,” “praxis,” and “diff erence.” Sec-
ond, and by way of the fi rst, his epochalist reading of the modern was character-
ized by an ethics of denunciation in which modernity could never be anything 
other than a “fall from grace.” Taken together, Milbank’s work and self-stylization, 
it seemed to me, could easily lead one, as Foucault put it, to “despise the present,” a 
posture that could only issue in an ethos of disdain. Analytically and ethically such 
an ethos struck me as at best unhelpful.
It was in the midst of a growing unease with the Radical Orthodoxy project and 
its countersecular and counterliberal theological politics that I nonetheless decided 
to attend the session on philosophy and religion at the AAR meeting. On one level, 
the session served to reinforce my sense that these thinkers were not going to off er 
equipment for moving beyond the troubled polemics of the debate over human 
dignity. In this sense, attending the meeting might not have been worth my time—
other than the pleasures of seeing Žižek at his sardonic best and Milbank perform 
his acerbic rejection of the secular. However, Milbank’s presentation, quite unex-
pectedly, proved to be something of a catalyst. Th e question, it occurred to me, was 
less whether or not the work of these thinkers was helpful for studying the politics 
of human dignity. I was already clear that they likely would not. Th e question, 
rather, was: how is it, exactly, that they were not likely to prove helpful?
Th at day at the religion meetings Milbank off ered a working paper, which he 
ultimately published as “Paul Against Biopolitics.” Th e title alone sparked inter-
est; for the previous year I had been working with Paul Rabinow and Anthony 
Stavrianakis in thinking through the limits of the concepts of “biopower” and “bio-
politics” for thinking about the contemporary. It had seemed to us that, whatever 
Michel Foucault had meant by these evocative terms, they were not markers of an 
epoch in anything like the way in which they were being used by major fi gures 
in contemporary philosophy. Our question—which I will return to below—was 
how to get clear about the salient elements of these terms so as to test them against 
current developments in the world. Moreover, I had begun to suspect (although I 
would not characterize it using these terms until later) that the use of “biopower” 
and “biopolitics” had entered into the play of the “modern,” in Rabinow’s sense 
of the term—a moving ratio of the new and the old in which the new is valorized 
against the old. In the works of thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and the philoso-
phers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the “biopolitical” had been cast as a term 
of novel insight capable of opening up the secret nature of the age.
Milbank’s paper began with a summary of his core position. He sternly asserted 
that “liberalism” presumes and advances the idea that politics is fundamentally a 
problem of self-governance in which the challenge is the “capture and disciplining 
of natural forces of aggression and desire within the framework of a cultural game, 
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governed by civil conventions and instituted laws.” In this view of the nature of 
politics, a kind of paradox is at work. On the one side, liberalism imagines that the 
“naturalness of life” is always self-regulating, in that the play of forces calls forward 
and institutes mechanisms of management. On the other side, liberalism imag-
ines the world as “intrinsically wild and untameable.” Th rough this paradoxical 
framework a kind of threshold of order is crossed and a kind of secular and pagan 
theodicy achieved. Despite the play of violent forces, life can be managed, and, 
indeed, life is that which self-manages. Whether the form of liberalism is contract 
theory or Scottish political economy, the theodicy works itself out: “it is deemed 
that, by nature, a spontaneously competing and to a degree co-operating (through 
natural mutual sympathy) human multitude erects an artifi cial framework that will 
channel this spontaneity for further mutual benefi t. Life itself is seen as generating 
contract and law. Contract and law are seen as disciplining life, but only in order 
to further it.”
Up to this point, Milbank’s thesis was familiar and followed the lines of his pre-
vious work. Milbank, however, concluded his opening diagnosis by infl ecting the 
terms of his critical project, saying that given this paradoxical play of self-regulating 
life and the violent play of natural forces, liberalism is rightly thought of as “bio-
politics.” Unifying diverse voices under the sign of this term, Milbank stated, as 
though it were self-evident: “As Walter Benjamin and later Michel Foucault argued, 
liberalism concerns the biopolitical.” In his published article he would further add 
that from Darwin forward a biological account of life is coterminous with violence 
and that Foucault defi ned this set of events in terms of the “biopolitical paradigm 
in the sense that I am discussing it here.” As the climax of this opening foray, a foray 
that provides the setup for his theological reparations, Milbank proposed that “it 
is fi nally Giorgio Agamben who makes the crucial connection between biopolitics 
and the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt (ultimately it is a Hobbesian legacy 
that binds all this together).”
In his book Homo Sacer, published a half-decade earlier, Agamben had asserted 
that the notion of biopolitics reveals that there is a fundamental link between “bare 
life and politics” and that this fundamental link is the key to understanding how 
modern life is “secretly” governed. Contemporary politics are portrayed as funda-
mentally oriented toward the domination and exploitation of the “vital existence” 
of political subjects. Biopower, he proposes, names the ways in which modern poli-
tics bears on humans as mere living animals, a politics that fi nally drives toward 
death and elimination. Two points are noteworthy about Agamben’s proposal. 
First, he tells us that, by way of Aristotle, Benjamin, and Foucault, he (Agamben) 
has hit on and revealed the secret logic governing modern politics—and perhaps 
even the hidden logic of politics per se.
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Foucault’s 1977–1978 lectures on the art of government begin with the statement 
that the lectures should be received as a refl ection on “biopower,” suggesting that 
governmentality, and hence the form of power characteristic of the modern world, 
might be summed up in that term. His 1978–1979 lectures, entitled Th e Birth of 
Biopolitics, implicitly carry the thesis that the art of government characteristic of late 
modernity is “liberalism.” According to Agamben, Foucault’s thesis “needs to be 
completed” and brought through to its full implications. Citing an oft-quoted line 
from the fi rst volume of Foucault’s Th e History of Sexuality—“For millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for 
a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as 
a living being in question”—Agamben adds that “modern life is not so much the 
inclusion of zoē in the polis—which is, in itself, absolutely ancient—nor the simple 
fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations 
of State power.” Rather, the characteristic of modern life is that “exception [that is, 
taking human life despite human life being ostensibly sacred] everywhere becomes 
the rule, [and] the realm of bare life—which is originally situated at the margins 
of the political order—gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and 
exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into 
a zone of irreducible distinction.” It is in this sense that Agamben claims to have 
discovered that biopower is the secret of the age.
In one fell theoretic swoop Agamben covers over what had been Foucault’s subtle 
and incisive accomplishment. Th rough a detailed analysis of shifts in relations be-
tween modes of reasoning and modes of governing, Foucault had demonstrated that 
something quite unusual and unprecedented had emerged in the modern world, a 
relation between the state and the management of biological life that had never 
before existed in quite the same way. Loosening up Foucault’s terms and shifting 
the grounds of analysis from historical particularity to epochal essence, Agamben 
provides us with a total answer to the question of politics in the modern world. It 
bears acknowledging that, in the end, it is not altogether clear what analytic work 
Foucault wanted the terms biopower and biopolitics to do for his thinking about 
things modern. His few references to the terms cover over an unsettled range of 
meanings. Like many of his other highly experimental and highly generative con-
cepts, however, the worth of these two terms is that, minimally, they indicated new 
problems and problem spaces. Th ey facilitated inquiry into those problems and 
problem spaces precisely because, whatever their range of meanings, they referred 
to a very specifi c set of historical arrangements. Th ey did not—and Foucault is clear 
about this—reveal the essence of the age. Of course, according to Agamben, this is 
precisely what Foucault either missed or did not have the courage to embrace.
Th e analytic costs of presuming such a total explanation under the sign of “bio-
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politics” are, in my view, obvious, in that one no longer needs to attend to the 
specifi city of things. Th ere is, in addition to this, a somewhat less obvious pragmatic 
price to be paid for Agamben’s shift from inquiry to theory, one that I found in 
Milbank and one that I judged to be too high. In connecting Agamben’s epochal 
diagnosis of the biopolitical with his own integralist project, Milbank enjoys what 
he takes to be a kind of Foucauldian ratifi cation of his core thesis: the theological 
presumption of an ontological schism between nature and the supernatural carries 
over into social theory in the form of the “purely” secular as a space of political 
thought and practice in which power becomes concentrated on “bare life.” In the 
constructive portion of his paper Milbank goes on to suggest that Agamben, despite 
the prescience of his diagnosis, cannot fi nd a way out, insofar as he too retains the 
secularist and immanentist suppositions about the nature of the secular and the po-
litical. Milbank writes: “is there a secular, immanentist way out of the biopolitical? 
No, I shall now argue that there can only be an authentically religious route out of 
the biopolitical.” His proposal is consonant with that put forward at Vatican II: 
the Christian vision for the ecclesia as the community of resurrected life is the only 
way out of the biopolitical situation in which human life has been targeted as bare 
life in a state of permanent exception.
Th e problem is that, whatever else one makes of Milbank’s theological conclu-
sions, it is not at all clear that there even is a biopolitical situation human life 
needs to get out of—or at least not one of epochal proportion. It might be argued 
that Agamben’s claims to have revealed the secret essence of modern political life is 
meant to be a kind of fi ctive and productive overstatement. It is fi ctive, an advocate 
might say, because he does not intend for it to be read as a kind of map to empiri-
cal practices. And it is productive in that it nevertheless lifts out a kind of essence 
of modern politics in relation to which one must be alert and vigilant. Bios, life 
humanly lived, is in a state of permanent threat. Perhaps there is something to this 
reading of Agamben’s intentions. But whatever is the case on Agamben’s side of the 
ledger, through Milbank (and others), his revision and infl ation of the notion of 
biopolitics found its way into the ethos of the modern as part of the diagnosis of 
the contemporary world.
I say “found its way” and not “has found its way”—the latter implying that it 
is still with us. It is not obvious that it is, or at least not in the same fashion. Th e 
biopolitical understood as the key to the epoch seemed to hold the attentions of the 
philosophical and theological elite for roughly a decade, and although Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer and the Empire series by Hardt and Negri remain common references in 
certain circles of political thought, they are no longer en mode in quite the same way. 
Biopower as epoch, in this sense, was something of a brief norm in the modernist 
style: it thrived as a part of the moving ratio in which the new could be valorized 
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against the old. As theory, however, biopower and biopolitics are no longer new or 
fashionable. In this sense, the place of such theoretical renderings of these two terms 
today can be taken up and analyzed as part of the recent past being confi gured with 
the near future—that is, the fact of the declining fashion of the biopolitical is a fact 
of the contemporary: “Th e contemporary is a moving ratio of modernity, moving 
through the recent past and near future in a (nonlinear) space that gauges moder-
nity as an ethos already becoming historical.” Th e biopolitical as a master trope is 
already becoming historical. Or, said diff erently, one need not accept or reject the 
notion of the biopolitical as a master trope marking the signs of the time; one can, 
rather, take up the fact that it has served as just such a trope as part of understand-
ing the contemporary. Th e virtue of this contemporary view is that it might now 
be easier to take up the biopolitical as a term of analytic precision and not just as 
an attractor. In this way, one might be able to get clearer about the specifi c ways in 
which the fi gures of biopower and the biopolitical remain part of the contemporary 
world. Th e virtue of such clarity for my own project, in turn, is that it facilitates the 
work of thinking through the fi gure of human dignity as the marker of a distinctive 
event in the history of truth and power and not merely as a biopolitical or liberal 
remainder. Getting clear about the distinctions and connections between biopower 
and human dignity, moreover, is crucial for understanding how these fi gures and 
their attendant political equipment have been further troubled by developments in 
bioethics.
beyond biopower
After several years of frustration with the analytic dispersion and subsequent ana-
lytic devaluation of the concept of biopower, in 2006 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas 
Rose undertook eff orts to formulate a tighter and more conceptually rigorous defi -
nition. Rabinow and Rose noted that, thanks in large part to the publication of 
widely read works of political philosophy, the term biopower was increasingly 
being taken up not as a tool for the orientation of inquiry but as an explanation 
for the “nature and essence of the present epoch.” It was being assumed that bio-
power explains the way in which present politics bears on humans as mere living 
animals, driving certain populations toward death and elimination. In addition to 
the philosophical fault of explaining nothing by explaining too much, infl ated uses 
of the term seemed to suggest (1) that biopower is always pathological and (2) that 
liberal modernism, as a form of biopower, should also be seen as pathological.
Following several evocative but underdeveloped uses of the terms biopower and 
biopolitics in his lectures at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault off ered a 
relatively more systematic, if still somewhat general, elaboration of the concepts 
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in what has become a critically important ten-page section of the fi rst volume of 
his History of Sexuality. In that section he promised to refi ne the concepts in one 
of the fi ve projected volumes to come. Fundamental shifts in the orientation of his 
research, as well as his untimely death, cut short these eff orts. Foucault’s initial 
elaborations are well known: the terms formed part of his eff ort to conceptualize 
the ways in which human biological life and practices of governance had become 
connected and mutually formative in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
generating a regime of truth and power that could be distinguished from regimes 
associated with classical forms of state sovereignty. In an oft-quoted turn of phrase 
Foucault wrote that where the sovereign power of the classical age can be charac-
terized by the right to “let live and make die,” the new rationality of modern bio-
power can be characterized as the political obligation to “make live and let die.” 
Following from this distinction Foucault used the term to clarify a rather precise 
set of developments: the term biopower, Foucault explained, designates a set of ar-
rangements that brings two related but distinct objects—the disciplined individual 
human body and the normalized human population—into a single fi eld of political 
relations, regulated by a single, if general, political rationality.
In their article, Rabinow and Rose proposed that if the term biopower is to 
prove analytically fruitful, it would again need to be delimited by a specifi ed set of 
characteristics. Th ey argued, through a close reading of Foucault’s ten-page passage, 
that four characteristics are particularly important. A regime of power relations can 
usefully be referred to as biopower when it is marked by (1) a set of truth discourses 
about “the ‘vital’ character” of individual and collective human life, (2) experts au-
thorized to speak competently about such truth, (3) strategies and technologies of 
intervention advanced in the name of increasing life and health, and (4) modes of 
subjectifi cation by which individuals engage in self-formation, also in the name of 
increasing life and health. Although Rabinow and Rose specifi ed the term bio-
power in much stricter terms than is typical of its circulation in contemporary dis-
course, their specifi cations nevertheless retained a kind of fl exible generality useful 
for orienting research.
Since the publication of their article on biopower, both Rabinow and Rose have 
continued to work on economies of life, science, technology, and the politics of bi-
ology. Both doubt, however, that biopower, even when defi ned more carefully, is the 
most useful term for clarifying contemporary confi gurations. A few years after their 
article, Rose proposed that biopower might yet be useful for bringing into analytic 
view “a whole range of more or less rationalized attempts by diff erent authorities to 
intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence.” Taken in this sense, he 
would continue to use the term. But even defi ned as a somewhat broad orienting 
term, the notions of biopower and biopolitics have fallen away from the center of 
  Economies of Life and Power 177
F6671.indb   177 9/16/15   10:39:05 AM
Rose’s analytic attention. Rabinow, for his part, has moved through biopower to 
what lies, as it were, analytically beyond it—beyond not in the sense of a linear 
progression where one confi guration replaces another but beyond in the sense of 
giving attention to formations in the world today that simply cannot be explained 
as instances of biopolitics.
In our joint work, Rabinow and I began attending to contemporary events, 
formations, modes of practice, scientifi c objects, and sociotechnical venues, in 
which formerly biopolitical apparatuses have become vectors of ethical and sci-
entifi c contestation and transformation. In order ultimately to move beyond the 
term, we have proposed a still tighter reading of biopower: as a fi gure that desig-
nates assemblages of power and knowledge marked by a series of rather exacting 
characteristics. Above, all, analytically, one can say that biopower names con-
fi gurations in which modes and forms of power take populations and bodies as 
objects of normalization to the end of ameliorating health, wealth, and security. 
It is clear that whatever else is happening in the medical and biological sciences 
today their interfaces with ethics and power are no longer characterized primarily 
by the eff ort to normalize populations and bodies. Since the 1990s the genomic 
sciences and the so-called postgenomic sciences have been given a privileged role 
by governments and industries in defi ning the character of life and the vitality 
of humans and other beings. Alongside these biotechnical eff orts and sometimes 
in connection to them, talk of human rights as the locus of human and environ-
mental goods has continued to function as a predominant counter discourse in 
both national and international settings. Th e analytic work of bringing these two 
sites—bioscience and human rights—together and making sense of them remains 
a pressing task, one for which the concepts of biopower and biopolitics will likely 
be only partially helpful.
Approached in an anthropologically more careful mode, it seems clear that what-
ever else might be said about its logic and signifi cance, human dignity is not simply 
a liberal remainder or a biopolitical residual—and certainly not merely a point 
of resistance that marks out an otherwise biopolitical age. Th e analytic payoff  of 
a more careful specifi cation of biopower is that, even if biopower can be used to 
explore a certain amount of what is happening in the world today, it nonetheless 
can be seen to have an analytic outside. Although apparatuses of biopower might 
be connected to many things in the world—including the discourses and practices 
of human dignity—it does not comprehend those things. Whatever human dignity 
has consisted in—at least in the case of the constitutional work of the United Na-
tions or the Second Vatican Council—it is neither an ethics nor a politics indexed 
to the normalization of populations. Nor is it simply the external limit on such 
normalization. It consists, rather, in the call for a mode and form of practice in 
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which the archonic is simultaneously a point of limitation as well as a demand for 
new and positive actions.
An analytic move to the outside of biopower constitutes a challenge for a con-
temporary mode of inquiry in that it introduces objects and relations that remain 
underdetermined and in the process of formation. Foucault, recall, operated in a 
mode he called a history of the present. Th e problems and objects he took up in 
such a mode may continue to bear on the contemporary, but their forms have long 
since stabilized. Th e archive for Foucault, one might say, was closed. Keeping this 
modal distinction between an analytic of the contemporary and a history of the 
present in mind, there is nonetheless much to be learned from Foucault’s approach 
to biopower for thinking about human dignity today. In his 1977–1978 lectures 
Foucault proposed that the problem of the art of government began to emerge in 
response to a demand for “something more from power.” Th e epigraph from Fou-
cault opening Chapter 3 gave articulation to this point. Speaking of sovereign power 
in the sixteenth century Foucault wrote that “in relation to the pastorate, something 
more is demanded . . . something diff erent, something else. Th is is government. It 
is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is 
something other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which 
must fi nd its model, is the art of government.”
Taking this quote as a prompt, two important aspects of human dignity can be 
better diagnosed. First, something similar, though not identical, to the emergence 
of governmentality has happened with human dignity. In quite a direct and explicit 
fashion, with both the Second Vatican Council and with the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, something more is demanded from power. Where this demand is 
similar and not identical is that, in the case of governmentality, a “general economy 
of power” begins to take shape. Whatever else Foucault means by this idea of a gen-
eral economy, it involves a fundamental shift throughout multiple domains spread 
across multiple centuries. Whether or not the demand that human dignity become 
an object of care ever results in such a widespread and long-term shift remains 
to be seen. Initial indications are that such a shift would be unlikely. Although 
venues and practices are increasingly appealing to the fi gure of human dignity as 
a justifi cation and point of orientation, these venues and practices are frequently 
integrated into other apparatuses, governmental and nongovernmental. Moreover, 
unlike shifts concerning the art of government, the invention and reorganization of 
practices connected with human dignity is still under way and is arguably character-
ized by more destabilization and reconfi guration than the durability and stability 
implied by the idea of a general economy of power. Th at said, it is the case that 
human dignity continues to be appealed to as an object and objective of power 
across a broad range of domains and problem spaces; the archonic has proven re-
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markably susceptible to reinvention and remobilization. As is evident in the cases 
of the United Nations and the Vatican, this appeal to dignity has produced shifts in 
how to think about and care for things human, shifts “without a model” producing 
venues that “must fi nd a model.”
Another diagnostic point should be made in connection to the above quote 
from Foucault: this concerns the challenge of specifying the care of human dignity 
as an analytic “outside” of governmentality. At a particularly refl ective and refl ex-
ive moment in Foucault’s analysis, he poses the question: “Why should one want 
to study this insubstantial and vague domain covered by a notion as problematic 
and artifi cial as that of ‘governmentality’?” His fi rst answer: “in order to tackle the 
problem of the state and population.” He straightaway notes an objection: “but 
we know what the state and population are, or, at any rate, we think we do.” 
Th ousands upon thousands of pages have been written on the population and the 
state, so why introduce this obscure notion of governmentality? Foucault’s further 
response to his own question is to remind his listeners of his more general project. 
From the outset of his work as a historian, he explains, he has been interested in 
analytically “moving to the outside.” What he means by this is that from the fi rst 
he has been interested in a mode of analysis that gets outside of venues such as the 
asylum, the hospital, the prison, the clinic, and so forth in order to conceptual-
ize and diagnose the redistributions of power and knowledge within which these 
venues have taken their specifi c historical forms—the milieus within which these 
venues have taken form. With the concept of governmentality and the notion of 
the art of government understood as the “conduct of conduct,” Foucault is looking 
to make this analytic move to the outside once again. Here it is a question of mov-
ing to the historical milieus that allow one to take up an analytic position outside 
of the modern state.
Where does this take me with regard to the problem of human dignity? On 
one level, my approach to the problem of human dignity uses an analytic strategy 
Foucault means to avoid—I am moving to the inside of specifi c venues in order to 
see how they have constituted themselves in relation to human dignity. But such a 
diff erence in approach can be explained by the contemporary character of the prob-
lem space I am working in. As I have noted, the milieus within which the politics of 
human dignity is being formulated and responded to are still in motion, unsettled, 
and unsettling. On another level, however, I am seeking to elaborate an approach 
that borrows tools, at least in part, from a kind of “analytic of the outside,” one 
that is not dissonant with Foucault’s treatment of governmentality in that my aim 
is to understand better how human dignity has become an event in the history of 
thought and practice, to distinguish it from other modes and forms of practice, and 
thereby to put its worth and critical limitations to the test.
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reconfiguring pastoral power
As I explained in the introduction, in his eff orts to distinguish the modes and forms 
of power characteristic of the modern state from other economies of power, Fou-
cault proposes to characterize a logic and order of power that he took to be a vital 
antecedent to the modern, one whose breakdown, reconfi guration, and partial in-
corporation contributed to the emergence of governmentality. Foucault referred to 
this previous economy as “pastoral power.” Given the dominance of the notions 
of governmentality and biopower in critical theory and the human sciences over 
the past two decades, it is perhaps not surprising that Foucault’s concept of pastoral 
power has received relatively little attention. As I explained at the outset, it is an 
orienting proposition of this present study that this concept and Foucault’s initial 
analysis of it have provided me with a number of analytic variables that I have used 
in my research to help distinguish and characterize the distinctive features of human 
dignity. In the fi rst two cases presented in this book I proposed that human dignity 
today can be read as a reconfi guration of classical forms of pastoral power. In this 
excursus I propose to unpack that initial claim and meditate on its relevance for 
further inquiries into the politics of intrinsic worth.
With pastoral power Foucault, as was his habit, set out to render visible a histori-
cally and analytically specifi c confi guration of relations and practices. His introduc-
tion of the concept in his lectures was provocative and experimental. It amounted 
to a schematic outlay, which he described as an “extremely vague sketch, not of the 
history, but of some reference points . . . possible tracks for you, if you wish, and 
maybe for myself, to follow.” However underdeveloped, Foucault’s vague sketch, 
and the distinctions and the points of reference it opened up, put into play a series 
of analytic distinctions that are, in my view, fruitful for delineating the specifi city 
and signifi cance of the contemporary fi gure of human dignity.
In his February 8 lecture from 1978, Foucault begins with a question. He asks his 
auditors: what is the meaning or meanings of the term “to govern”? Passing through 
several nuances and variations, he proposed that, whatever else, “to govern” means 
“to conduct someone.” If (as Foucault would eventually argue during his course that 
year) the notion of governing, of conducting someone, of “conducting the conduct 
of conduct” of someone, became one of the dominant modes of exercising power 
in the West, then it is important to ask: where did this mode of power come from, 
what is the source of this kind of political logic? Off ering a very brief sketch of 
forms of rule in the Greek polis (which he later returned to in considerable detail), 
Foucault off ered this assertion: “generally speaking, I think we can say that the 
origin of the idea of a government of men should be sought in the East, in a pre-
Christian East fi rst of all, and then in the Christian East, and in two forms: fi rst, in 
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the idea and organization of a pastoral type of power, and second, in the practice of 
spiritual direction, the direction of souls.”
By the end of the February 8 lecture Foucault had tightened this assertion: the 
conduct of conduct as a mode of power characteristic of the West, a mode of power 
that fi rst takes form as pastoral power, is “introduced into the Western world by 
way of the Christian Church. Th e Christian Church coagulated all these themes 
of pastoral power into precise mechanisms and defi nite institutions, it organized a 
pastoral power that was both specifi c and autonomous, it implanted its apparatuses 
within the Roman Empire, and at the heart of the Empire it organized a type of 
power that I think was unknown to any other civilization.” Th e conduct of con-
duct, as an economy of power, is introduced through and is coextensive with the 
Christian Church.
Over the course of several lectures Foucault proceeds to enumerate a series of 
defi ning features of pastoral power. I propose to recapitulate those features here that 
I think remain especially salient for an inquiry into human dignity. I will lay them 
out as two sets of three variables.
Th e fi rst element in the fi rst set of features is that, as Foucault reminds his listen-
ers, the notion of the pastorate as a metaphor for political power derives from the 
shepherding cultures of the ancient Near and Middle East. Th e notion that God is 
the shepherd or pastor of things human is referred to frequently in these cultures, as 
is the idea that the king, as God’s representative, also serves as a kind of shepherd. 
Th is notion is particularly important in the Hebraic tradition; the Hebrew king 
represents God’s shepherding of the people. Foucault notes that this metaphoric 
connection between God and the king through the idea of the shepherd is not at all 
common to the Greeks. Th e ancient Greek gods are territorial gods, gods of privi-
leged places, towns, and temples. Th e Hebrew God, however, is a God of a people, 
of a multitude, a God who moves from place to place. It is a God who shepherds 
a fl ock.
Th e second element, the second feature of pastoral power, is that it is “funda-
mentally a benefi cent power.” Th e shepherd must look out for the good and the sal-
vation of the fl ock. Th is notion of power as fundamentally a matter of benefi cence, 
Foucault tells his audience, is again more typical of the Hebrew God than the Greek 
gods. Th e Greek gods exhibit a range of characteristics, including splendor and 
power. Of course, the notion of God’s power is part of the notion of the shepherd, 
who, after all, must look out for and protect the fl ock. But this power is a saving 
power and a power that acts in justice for God’s fl ock. Th e Greek sovereign may 
exercise power for the good of the people as well, but there is something particular 
about the notion of salvation when connected to the shepherd. Salvation here is fi rst 
of all a matter of subsistence. Th e shepherd tends to the daily needs of the fl ock. 
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Th e fl ock lives its daily life under the careful management of the shepherd. In other 
words, pastoral power is a matter of care. Th is also means that the king, in the place 
of God, has a duty to care for the fl ock. Th e obligation of the ruler in pastoral power 
is to care for and to be the salvation of the fl ock. Th is is the second feature of pasto-
ral power: it is defi ned by benefi cent care to the end of the salvation of the fl ock.
Th e third feature of pastoral power connects the fi rst and the second. Foucault 
suggests that pastoral power is “an individualizing power.” What he means by this 
is that the shepherd “counts the sheep; he counts them in the morning when he 
leads them to pasture, and he counts them in the evening to see that they are all 
there, and he looks after each of them individually.” Th is fact of counting the sheep 
is signifi cant. It means that the shepherd is not only responsible for the totality of 
the fl ock, which of course the shepherd is. But the shepherd is only responsible 
for the totality of the fl ock by way of caring for, looking out for, the salvation of 
each individual sheep. Th is notion of counting the sheep, of caring not only for 
the totality but also for each member of the fl ock, is a central and defi ning feature 
of pastoral power. It is a feature that I have argued connects the classical model of 
pastoral power to the challenges of caring for human dignity. Th is defi ning feature 
is, of course, the mandate of omnes et singulatim.
Th is mandate proves to be the great practical challenge for the Vatican as well 
as the United Nations. What does it mean to care for all and for each one at the 
scale of humanity? Th is was the great problem of tekhnē and paraskeuē, of the art 
of care and the form of care, for the power of the early Christian pastorate. In a 
diff erent form it will also be a problem for modern governance. But in the case of 
the state and the raison d’état the problem will not be so universal. Th e boundaries 
and diff erences—the autonomy—between and among states will set off  a kind of 
outside horizon to the governing responsibility of state. When the problem of omnes 
et singulatim is taken up into the Vatican and into the United Nations, by contrast, 
the object of care is a universal multitude, a universal multitude that must be cared 
for to the end of its salvation. With and alongside that multitude, alongside hu-
manity, is each and every human. Each human, which both exemplifi es and must 
be made part of humanity, must be cared for to the end of its salvation: omnes et 
singulatim as the object of care for a pastor who saves. Th ese are the fi rst three key 
features of the classical model of pastoral power that will bear on those responsible 
for the care of human dignity.
Th e second set of three features also bears on questions concerning the object 
and mode of care but concentrates more directly on the form of pastoral power. 
Foucault tells his listeners that the conduct of conduct as a mode of power typical 
and defi nitive of the West is, in the fi rst place, connected to and coextensive with 
the Christian Church. Although the notion of the pastorate might be a widely 
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circulated model of power in the ancient Mediterranean, pastoral power is given a 
form and refi nement in the Christian Church, which is quite unlike the notion of 
pastoral power elsewhere. Th ese diff erences concern the organization of power into a 
pastorate and the application of pastoral power in practices of spiritual discipline.
Foucault explains that formalization of the Christian Church brings about fun-
damental shifts in pastoral power specifi cally, and also in relations of power in the 
West more generally, when, as an institution, the church claims as its responsibility 
the need to “govern men in their daily life on the grounds of leading them to eter-
nal life in the other world, and to do this not only on the scale of a defi nite group, 
of a city or a state, but of the whole of humanity.” Pastoral power is refi ned and 
extended such that beyond a given domain, place, or people the Christian Church 
will take as the object of its responsibility “the whole of humanity.” Th e whole of 
humanity must be governed in the daily details of life. Put the other way round, 
pastoral power is imagined and constituted as a matter to be taken up within and 
by a very particular, which is to say unique, venue: the church.
Th is refi nement, extension, and institutionalization of pastoral power are car-
ried forward with regard to the second set of three key features. Reading through a 
series of texts Foucault takes to be crucial to the early development of the Christian 
pastorate, he proposes that the fi rst way in which the Christian Church refi ned, 
extended, and institutionalized the pastorate concerned the notion of salvation. 
Th e notion of salvation is, of course, central to pastoral power, as I have already 
noted. Its central and defi ning objective is to shepherd the individual sheep as well 
as the whole fl ock on the path of salvation. One of the crucial features of the idea 
of salvation in pastoral power is that there is a common destiny in the salvation of 
the fl ock and the individual sheep: it is a scandal (even if sometimes it is a necessity) 
either to sacrifi ce the individual for the fl ock or the fl ock for the individual. We saw 
this emphasized in the interlinked poles of the human and humanity in Gaudium et 
spes. But there is also a kind of reciprocal relation between the common destiny of 
the community and the individual with the pastor. Th e pastor is saved only to the 
extent that the community and the individual are saved.
Th is total reciprocity is distributed and carried out in a particular way in the 
Christian pastorate. Th e Christian pastor leads all and each one to salvation diff er-
ently. First, the pastor has an analytic and not only numeric responsibility for each 
sheep. Th e pastor must not only count every individual but must understand and 
account for the actions and states of grace for every individual. Th is means there 
is a need to devise mechanisms for a fi ne-grained understanding of each member 
of the fl ock. Th e second particularity is that the pastor shares in a transfer of merit 
and goods with the fl ock. Th e experiences of good and evil for each individual will 
be experienced by the pastor as his own experience of good and evil. And, on the 
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other side, the fl ock is also always vulnerable to the evils and demerits of the pastor. 
Th e question and problem of this transfer will, of course, be crucial to the multiple 
crises of authority and legitimacy in the history of the church, most consequentially 
in the Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation. A third particularity is 
thus a kind of sacrifi cial reversal: the pastor must be willing to die in the place of the 
fl ock or in the place of any individual sheep in response to their reciprocal burden 
of goods and evils.
So, the fi rst refi nement of pastoral power by the Christian Church concerns the 
problem of salvation. All of this is, of course, problematized and reproblematized 
throughout Christian history and particularly so in the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation debates with regard to the question of who can act eff ectively in the 
name of salvation, in what venues, and to what ends. Th is fi rst refi nement of pas-
toral power will also prove to be a site of signifi cant reconfi guration with human 
dignity. A fi ne-grained analytics of the soul, the transfer of merits, and the willing-
ness to sacrifi ce in the name of omnes et singulatim—none of these will be practices 
formally constituted at either the Vatican or the United Nations, but the shadow of 
the expectation of a salvational refi nement, of a salvational specifi city, transfer, and 
reversal, will remain present and a challenge to the legitimacy of these institutions 
in their claims to caring for human dignity.
Th e second refi nement of pastoral power in the institutionalization of the Chris-
tian Church concerns the relation of the pastorate to the law. Power obviously had 
a relation to the law before the Christian Church reconfi gured things. However, to 
quote Foucault: “for individuals and communities to earn their salvation, [pastoral 
power] must make sure that they really submit to the order, command, or will of 
God.” Among the Greeks the master speaks the law in order to persuade the stu-
dent, and the sovereign may enforce the law so as to preserve the city. But with the 
Christian pastorate a whole system or network of practices are put into place by way 
of which obedience to the will of God can be secured in a fashion that is an end in 
itself insofar as obedience is made to coincide with salvation. It is a crucial peculiar-
ity of Christianity in its self-diff erentiation from Judaism that it is explicitly not a 
religion of the law, but this does not mean it does not require obedience. Christian-
ity “is a religion of God’s will, a religion of what God wills for each in particular.” 
Th e benefi cent shepherding of the church must include practices to help the fl ock 
discern and follow God’s will.
Th ese practices of discernment and following—of obedience to God’s will—
include several key components. Th e fi rst is that, in addition to analytic and not 
only numeric care of each individual, the pastor needs to be able to treat each soul as 
a case according to its own specifi c needs. Th ere is no generic application of the law. 
Such specifi cation carries with it a kind of subordination in which each individual 
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must submit not only to the will of God but to one another and particularly to the 
pastor as the expert on the state or condition of one’s salvation. Th e model for this 
submission is, of course, the monastery, in which the monk is the person who obeys 
the subditus. Th e second key component is that these practices of submission to 
God’s will and to the mediating authority of the pastorate is not a form of practice 
with an end or discrete horizon; rather, it is a permanent form of life. One submits 
to God’s will not in order only to have obeyed; one submits in order to live a life 
of obedience. Foucault quotes St. Benedict on the fi gure of the good monk: “Th ey 
no longer live by their free will, ambulantes alieno judicio et imperio, in marching 
under the judgment and the imperium of another, they always desire that someone 
command them.” Th e third and fi nal key component of obedience is that it will 
include the problem of “the fl esh.” Th is problem is not simply a question of control-
ling the passions, as it is with the Greeks. But rather, as St. Augustine will argue 
at length, it is a question of managing the fl esh with the will as a means of and as a 
process through which one conforms to the will of God. Mechanisms for the renun-
ciation of the fl esh, and not only for the virtuous control of the passions, will need 
to be put in place in order to live the life of obedience successfully.
So, taken together, the relation of pastoral power to the law will shift in the 
church to be a matter of obeying the will of God. Further, this matter of obedience 
will be a mediated practice carried out through the course of one’s lifetime, involv-
ing submission to others and particularly submission to the analytic mastery of the 
pastor. Although the need to be obedient is a general and reciprocal rule (pastors 
must submit as well), it is a strongly individualized practice in which the individual 
must be constantly sure about the form of life. Th is includes all of one’s being, in-
cluding the alignment of the fl esh with the will of God through renunciation.
To repeat a point made above, this question of the complete obedience and sub-
mission of the object of pastoral power to the mechanisms of authority and obedi-
ence will be put in question with the Reformation and the Counter- Reformation. 
Th e question will certainly remain one of authority, but it will also be one of prac-
tice. Th e Reformation put the salvifi c capacities of the church—the ability of the 
church to off er salvation—into question. And once the salvifi c capacities of the 
church are put in question, the problem of the mediating practices of obedience to 
God’s will have to be rethought as well. Th is will play out, again, as a question of 
which authorities, in which venues, and which practices, to what end, and so on. All 
of which will need to be rethought again with human dignity: far from the object 
of pastoral care being that which must submit and obey to the mechanisms of gov-
ernance, the dignifi ed human in the United Nations, and in a diff erent way in the 
Vatican, is itself authoritative, and its needs must be obeyed. Th e human is archonic 
insofar as the human, in its primordial nature, is that which needs to be obeyed. 
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Th is obedience will be shifted from the object of care—the fl ock as obedient to the 
pastor—back to the pastorate who must live a life dedicated to meeting the needs 
of the fl ock. Th e pastorate, the one called to care for human dignity, will need to 
submit to the command of the archonic. Th e pastorate must protect human dignity 
from violation, and this protection, this obedience to the moral rectitude of the dig-
nifi ed human, must be taken up in a permanent and complete fashion. Th is is the 
way in which the pastorate’s responsibility for a benefi cent care for human dignity 
plays out: the dignifi ed human does not need to submit to obedience; rather, the 
pastorate submits and obeys, and this obedience is a permanent form of life.
Th e fi rst factor in the Christian Church’s refi nement of pastoral power as the con-
duct of conduct concerns salvation. Th e second concerns law and obedience. Th e 
third, Foucault explains, concerns a particular relation to the truth. Pastoral power 
in Christianity, as with other modes of the exercise of power, concerns a relation to 
the truth. Salvation and submission will turn on, be mediated by, and be oriented 
to the acceptance of particular truths. What changes with the Christian pastorate is 
the means by which the truth is approached, established, and practiced.
Th e pastor, of course, has a teaching task in relation to the fl ock. Th e pastor 
will be responsible for teaching the truth. Th is was clear in the analysis of the fi rst 
case. Th e problem, after all, was how to reconfi gure the teaching authority of the 
church so that it can serve a pastoral function. Th e teaching authority on one level 
has always been relevant to the pastorate. Th e challenge with Vatican II was how 
to change a model of the pastorate into a practice through which the church could 
speak the truth to those who are not, strictly speaking, part of the church but who 
are, by dint of being human, nonetheless objects of the church’s pastoral care. What 
is not new about the challenges at Vatican II is that teaching the truth has always 
been part of the pastorate. What is particular to the classic model of the Christian 
pastorate, a particularity that we see articulated in terms of the notion of the call 
in Gaudium et spes, is that the pastor must not only provide liturgical or theologi-
cal instruction. Th e pastor must also teach by example. Th e life of the pastor must 
embody the life of truth. All of the verbal teaching will be nullifi ed if the pastor’s 
life is not exemplary.
Again Foucault emphasizes three dimensions of this need for the pastor to be 
exemplary, dimensions that can be used to indicate something about the contem-
porary problem of human dignity. First of all, this exemplary teaching must be 
a matter of daily conduct. Th e pastor will need to teach what must be known and 
what must be done in general. But these general teachings will also need to be given 
form through daily modulations of practice; the daily integration of the truth needs 
to be carried out in a fi ne-grained and exhaustive manner. Connected to the analysis 
of the soul and practices of submission, exemplary teaching also must be turned 
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into a matter of practice and thereby integrated into the reciprocal life of the pastor 
and the fl ock.
Second, and following from the fi rst, this exemplary teaching will need to be 
carried out through practices of spiritual direction. Th ese practices too will fi nd 
their exemplary form, their model, in the monastery, forms that will ultimately be 
institutionalized and extended to all believers. Spiritual direction in the church will 
be characterized by the direction of conscience. Th e pastor is not only an example 
in his or her own life; the pastor is also the one who conducts the conscience of the 
believer. Th is means, among other things, that spiritual care will not be circumstan-
tial, not a matter of responding to diffi  cult times. Rather, it will be a permanent 
way of conducting one’s life. What is more—and this is the third element—insofar 
as spiritual direction is connected to obedience to God’s will, spiritual direction 
will not be discretionary. It is absolutely necessary that the Christian soul must be 
guided under the shelter of the shepherd’s direction. Finally, with regard to this 
question of truth and exemplary teaching, of pastoral power in the early Christian 
Church, if spiritual direction through the course of one’s life is absolutely necessary, 
then the pastorate will be required to establish a multitude of structures and tech-
niques by way of which work on the soul as the subject and object of truth and the 
exemplary life can be carried out.
Th is third element of pastoral power, involving careful integration of truth into 
the daily practices of Christian life under the guidance of the pastorate and to the 
end of salvation, this too will be put in question with the Reformation and the rise 
of the modern problem of governance. As is well known, a central question for the 
Reformation was the question of the extent to which the daily practice of Chris-
tian faith could be made to contribute to the end of one’s salvation. Th at question 
extended to and critically involved the authority and capacity of the pastorate as 
an aid to salvation. As I will discuss further below, the problem of salvation, which 
was central to Reformation and Counter-Reformation debates, was played out ac-
cording to the question of who was spiritually fi t, who was capable of caring for the 
soul. Martin Luther’s famous proposal that the fallen soul can only be saved by faith 
in Jesus Christ thus had tremendous eff ects on the practice of pastoral power and 
the regimes of direction and obedience connected to it. No pastorate, in this view, 
is spiritually up to the task of mediating salvation. Salvation is God’s work alone. 
Th e notion of a relatively unmediated relation with God implied in Luther’s view 
of salvation, as well as the notion that one could do nothing to participate in one’s 
own salvation other than to turn to God in faith, was as much a matter of working 
through the problem of pastoral power as it was a matter of confessing a diff erent 
theology. Th e question of who is fi t to care for and bring about the salvation of the 
human, of humanity, in view of archonic dignity refl ects a similar problematic in 
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that it involves a critical reworking of regimes that have a bearing on the aff airs of 
everyday life, as can be seen in the debates about the kind and number of human 
rights to be included in the Universal Declaration.
So, pastoral power as reconstituted by the early Christian Church and pastoral 
power as co-extensive with the institution of the church will not only be a matter 
of the shepherd’s benefi cent care for all and for each one—though it will certainly 
be this. It will also be a matter of inventing modes and forms of practice, as well as 
institutional structures, for the facilitation of practices concerned with salvation, 
obedience, and the truth. Salvationally, the analytics of the soul must be given a 
form. In terms of obedience, submission to one another and to God will need to be 
given a form. And with regard to truth, forms will need to be developed that allow 
for a kind of hermeneutics of the soul to be carried out under the pastor’s spiritual 
direction in a permanent fashion. Again, all of this will be put into question during 
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which is to say, during that period of 
time in which the art of government will begin to be as much a problem for the 
state and for the sovereign as it was for the Christian pastorate.
Th is classical model of pastoral power will similarly be reconfi gured within ven-
ues that take human dignity as their object of care and the care of human dignity 
as their objective. Th e demand for something more from power, something more 
from ecclesial power and something more from political power, was taken up as a 
question of how to be attentive to, how to organize one’s activities in light of, hu-
man dignity. Whatever we might say about what was going on at Vatican II and at 
the United Nations, we must recognize that this response to the demand that power 
be more, be something else, played out as a demand for a return to the mandate at 
the heart of pastoral power. It was a demand for a kind of benefi cent care for the 
salvation of “all and for each one.” Th e challenge connected to this demand was not 
unlike that faced by the early Christian Church or for that matter by the state in the 
face of the demand for an art of governance. It was a problem of modes and forms 
of practice that could be facilitated by specifi c kinds of venues.
More important, just as the problems of salvation, obedience, and truth changed 
with the Christian pastorate, they changed once again with the appeal to human 
dignity. In the fi rst place and with regard to salvation, unlike the soul or the fl ock as 
the object of care, the archonic will not need to be governed and cultivated in the 
daily aff airs of life. Rather, the archonic will only depend on the saving practices of 
the pastorate insofar as the archonic needs to be protected from those forces in the 
world that would compromise and violate it. Neither will the human as archonic 
be in need of a reciprocal relation of merits with the pastorate. Th e good of the 
pastorate is not transferred to the good of the archonic, or vice versa—although 
the legitimacy of the pastorate will certainly be in play. Human dignity for both 
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the Vatican and the United Nations is a primordial good. What matters is that 
this primordial good be attended to and cared for. Lastly, the archonic, unlike the 
soul, will not need to be analyzed in specifi c detail and in an individualized fashion 
relative to the will of God. Th e archonic will demand a kind of pastoral analysis, 
but not of itself. It requires an analysis of those things in the modern world that 
might violate it. A kind of pastoral hermeneutics will in fact be necessary, but only 
one that discerns the state and fate of the archonic in the face of contemporary de-
velopments. Of course the archonic, as the object of pastoral care, will not need to 
obey, as I have already said. Rather, a kind of reversal of authority takes place. Th e 
archonic will demand the moderation of practices in other venues (the CHR will 
declare that international peace depends on the recognition of, and hence a kind of 
obedience to, dignity). Th ose who would care for human dignity will need to obey 
the commands of the archonic. And the truth of the human insofar as it is a being of 
archonic dignity is neither that which needs to be exemplifi ed, nor is it that which 
needs to be instilled through the daily conduct of conduct. It is that which needs 
to be allowed to unfold into the actuality of what it is in itself. Th is does not mean 
that the archonic is autonomous. Human dignity does not obey and protect itself. 
Rather, the human as archonic is nomic. It commands the pastorate to protect it.
Th is demand for protection will be the central challenge for venues constitut-
ing themselves in the name of human dignity. What practices are suffi  cient to such 
a demand, especially when the forces weighing against it, whether the secular or 
the sovereign, outstrip and exceed these venues in terms of the daily exercise of 
power? Th ese venues will need to have a very particular relation to mechanisms of 
government and to the dynamics whereby the conduct of humanity is conducted. 
Th is particularity is constituted in part by the fact that human dignity does not 
require the conduct of conduct in order to be itself. Dignity is primordial. Human 
dignity, however, is fi gured as requiring that the forces of governance be understood 
and moderated such that it is not violated. Th is means that the venues taking hu-
man dignity as their object and objective of care need not themselves be sites of 
 governmental power. Th e church cares for the ecclesia ad extra. Th e United Na-
tions cares for humans insofar as their humanity exceeds their place in the world as 
 citizens. Th ey do need to have a relation with the powers governing everyday life 
such that the integrity and rectitude of human dignity can be assured. In the face 
of the demand for something more from power, something that will take account 
of the salvational care for all and for each one, the challenge for venues caring for 
human dignity consists in the problem of discerning or discovering appropriate 
modes of care and in discriminating or designing forms of care appropriate to the 
archonic.
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the critical limitations of pastoral power
I have made references to the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation as key 
juncture points in the history and formulation of pastoral power. My purpose in 
referencing these juncture points is to identify elements of a problem that I think 
has purchase for thinking about human dignity today. While recognizing the obvi-
ous diff erences, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation problem nonetheless 
resonates with the contemporary problem of human dignity in that questions of 
power relations, venues, and practices of care were being put into question through 
institutional breakdown and reconstruction. Th ese questions played out in relation 
to the church’s role in mediating grace, in relation to the limitation of human ca-
pacities for participating in their own salvation, in relation to the extent of human 
sin and human virtue, and all of this was connected to the question of what can be 
done, if anything, in the face of the desire for salvation. All of this has bearing on 
where we are today, not because the prior formulations or responses to these dif-
fi culties remain suffi  cient to our current problem but, rather, because the elements 
of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation problematic alert us to aspects of the 
present situation that we might have otherwise overlooked.
In the last of the 1977–1978 lectures devoted to the theme of pastoral power, 
Foucault posed the question: where and in what way did resistance to the classical 
model of pastoral power begin to emerge? What were the forms of “countercon-
duct” that were oriented against the practices of ecclesial governance? I think that 
Foucault’s answers to these questions not only tell us something about the critical 
limitations of pastoral power in the sixteenth century—in the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation—but they also indicate something useful about the critical 
limitations of eff orts to care for human dignity today. Specifying these critical limi-
tations, in however brief a manner, will orient us to the third case: the question 
of human dignity in bioethics, a case in which the critical limitations of pastoral 
power and the archonic begin to show themselves, leading toward a breakdown and 
reconfi guration of the practices of care formulated at the Vatican and the United 
Nations.
Foucault’s lecture begins with a proposition: in the late Middle Ages pastoral 
power in its classical forms began to shift locations and change form. Th e govern-
mental mandate of pastoral power, the obligation of the shepherd to conduct the 
conduct of the fl ock, began to break free from the Roman Church and reappear in 
other venues. As Foucault put it elsewhere, a major threshold for the modern world 
consisted not only in a separation between church and state but in the change in 
institutional settings for those who called themselves ministers. Th ese shifts, this 
loosening and reformation, certainly did not spell the end of pastoral power in the 
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church. But beyond the church pastoral power did begin to reconfi gure, allowing, 
among other things, for an intensifi cation of the demand for governmental power 
within the spaces of everyday life that would eventually fall under the purview of 
the modern state. Th e central thesis for Foucault is that a principal vector for this 
set of shifts and redistributions concerned the internal conditions and constitu-
tion of pastoral power itself. Certainly external factors such as developments in the 
European economy, the emergence and combat of extra-Christian and “heretical” 
sects, and the intensifi cation of nonecclesial state powers were a major factor in 
the repositioning of classical pastoral power. While acknowledging these factors, 
Foucault gives particular attention to those sites of resistance and transformation 
internal to Christianity and the practices of pastoral power which drove reassem-
blage from within.
Among these sites or zones of resistance Foucault identifi es “counterconducts” 
as particularly important. If the goal of pastoral power was the conduct of conduct, 
counterconducts constitute those places where existing forms of pastoral power 
were actively resisted. Foucault details fi ve forms of counterconduct that he takes 
to be particularly crucial. Each of these bears on and contributes to the problema-
tization of the three key elements of pastoral power as an extension of the Christian 
Church—salvation, obedience, and truth. Many of these sites of counterconduct 
are familiar and constituted the heart of Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
developments. Th e fi ve forms are: new forms of ascesis, or spiritual practice; doctri-
nal disputes turning on the question of how to constitute a Christian community; 
the rise and proliferation of mysticism and the authority of mystics; questions of 
eschatology; and the changing role and authority of scripture.
Th e particulars of the constitution of each of these forms and sites of counter-
conduct are less pertinent here than the conclusions Foucault is able to draw in 
examining them. Th e fi rst conclusion is that pastoral power begins to loosen not 
primarily because something from the outside infects the pastorate but because the 
exclusion of certain critical elements of Christian life can no longer be sustained. 
To pick a key example, the turn to the question of the authority of scripture and 
the spread of access to original scriptural sources ultimately served to undermine 
previous practices of submission to pastoral authority. Or to pick another example, 
the constitution of religious communities in relation to new ways of thinking about 
the ecclesia or salvation worked to disrupt the tight networks of institutional prac-
tice that had previously sustained pastoral power by reproducing its mechanisms of 
governance. Th ese limitations on pastoral power did not come from the outside but 
rather from internal modes of counterconduct.
Th e second conclusion Foucault draws is that the emergence of other modes 
and forms of practice as well as other venues within which new practices could be 
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conducted (and, eventually, the emergence of governmentality) takes place as much 
in response to the limitations of the church in the face of new internal demands as it 
does the dominance of external factors. Th at is to say that other modes and practices 
are called for when settled forms of pastoral power can no longer be sustained in the 
face of a whole series of exclusions (for example, counterconducts) by way of which 
they were originally constituted.
One of the diffi  culties faced by both the Vatican and the United Nations in 
conceiving how to care of human dignity is that they knew that they did not have 
recourse to the conduct of conduct in anything like the early church or the modern 
state. What this means is that if we are to begin to assess the critical limitations of 
pastoral power as it is being reconfi gured today, a primary analytic point of orien-
tation is not likely to be counterconducts. It is the case that since Vatican II and 
since the original development of the bases of human rights at the United Nations 
multiple adjustments have been made by these two institutions in response to the 
challenge of turning the recognition of human dignity into a practice. Th e Vatican’s 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, to pick just one example, has developed 
mechanisms for facilitating the kind of pastoral hermeneutic equipment proposed 
in Gaudium et spes. Th e United Nations has reworked their human rights apparatus 
in such a way as to move closer to the moderative demands of the Universal Dec-
laration, such as constituting the Offi  ce of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. In both of these cases, one could look for sites of breakdown in their ability 
to meet the universal demand to care for human dignity. For the sake of the analysis 
here, however, inquiry into such breakdowns would be premature. What needs to 
be attended to fi rst is how the formulation of dignity as archonic, whatever the 
other advantages of this fi gure as a point of universal critique, actually created a new 
range of diffi  culties for the actors in these venues.
In the case of the Vatican, the conditions of internal limitation connected to 
the archonic fi gure of dignity were obvious from the outset. Th e demand was for a 
form of pastoral care in which the teaching authority of the church could address 
itself to that which is not the church. Th e response to this demand was to conceive 
of things anthropological in such a way as to show how the human, per se, in its 
own being, is called to union with the divine and union with humanity. A feature 
of this anthropology is precisely to put in question the legitimacy of the secular as 
a space of absolute distinction and autonomy from the ecclesia. How does one care 
for that which is beyond the church? One shows how what is beyond the church, 
that is, humanity, is really constituted as what is proper to the church, or, more ac-
curately, that the church is proper to humanity: the called and the community of 
the called. Th e structural joint between the church and the world is the human as 
archonic. But for those who are outside the church this anthropological solution 
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simply denies the premise of the problem. Th ere really is no ecclesia ad extra, strictly 
speaking. Nature is folded into the supernatural. At the crux of this integration is 
the Christian notion of Jesus as the incarnate Christ.
Th e price to be paid for the Vatican’s archonic solution to the pastoral demand is 
that those who are not part of the church may not accept the church’s teachings as 
a “purely” anthropological proposal, which of course it is not. What is more, there 
are those within the church for whom the price to be paid for Vatican II’s integralist 
solution is too high. Some theologians read Gaudium et spes not only as the super-
naturalizing of nature but also as the naturalizing of the supernatural. Th ey read 
the constitution as a warrant for claiming that the church cares for that which is 
properly and immanently dignifi ed, and for this reason they called on Christians to 
make common cause with nonecclesial venues in the care of human dignity—even 
those who reject the notion of the supernatural altogether. Th e pastoral apparatuses 
of the church, in this view, certainly teach us things we might not otherwise know 
about the relation of the human and the divine, but Jesus as the Christ is more 
model than mediator.
In the case of the United Nations, the internal conditions of limitation are con-
ceptually less obvious but politically more straightforward. From the outset, the 
CHR had to contend with the fact that powerful members of the commission were 
committed to the preservation of the rights of sovereignty in the face of interpreta-
tions of human rights that might disrupt or diminish existing power relations. But 
the notion of human dignity and human rights clearly does pose such a disruption. 
Th is is clear in their turn to the archonic: relations of power are not just a matter 
of managing populations and citizens. Such relations also concern the dignifi ed 
human. And what is this dignifi ed human? It is that being whose violation will 
compromise peace and whose lack of recognition will cost us freedom. If the raison 
d’état is a form of practice in which the question of power is calibrated to the nature 
of the object being governed, governance must now attend to the nature of human 
dignity. But human dignity is not thereby integrated into the art of government. It 
does not become another principle of self-limitation within the logic of the raison 
d’état. Nor does it simply exist as a juridical outside to sovereignty—after all it is 
the member states themselves who are formulating the declaration. Human dignity 
is left in a zone somewhere between the outside and inside of government. Th e 
advantage of placing the archonic in such a liminal position is that it can be put 
forward as a means of moderating sovereignty in situations where rights are thought 
to be violated; as adjacent but not altogether internal it moderates the practices of 
government. Th e price to be paid for this liminality, however, is that the mecha-
nisms for the enforcement of human rights are easy to block. Th e claims of human 
dignity do not call for the constant management of state sovereignty; they only call 
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for monitoring the actions and inactions of sovereign states so as to identify the 
exceptional moments where intervention in the name of dignity is warranted.
In terms of internal conditions of limitation, we see in both cases that there is 
something basic that is underaddressed. Th e fi gure of the human as original, and as 
that which commands, produces situations in which internal conditions of limita-
tion become points of critical limitation. It is at these points that the fi gure of hu-
man dignity and the equipment attached to it are no longer taken to be adequate to 
the problem of power and human worth. Th ese situations and these points produce 
breakdown, as we will see in the case of bioethics. Th e fi rst point of critical limita-
tion is that the archonic, though seemingly robust as an anchor point for a wide 
range of practices styled as protective of dignity, does not fi gure the human as that 
being whose dignity must be fostered, elaborated, or cultivated. One of the char-
acteristics of bioethics, however, as I will discuss in the next chapter, is that since at 
least the early 1980s the work of the moral imagination has been cantoned off  into 
the far future. Insofar as dignity is put into the service of elaborating a future, then 
something more than protection is at stake. In this case it is no longer obvious how 
care for the archonic ought to be made into a practice. One eff ect of this point of 
limitation is to generate practices of the imagination in which futures that are taken 
to be counter to dignity are simply proscribed. Imagining how to proscribe futures 
that might violate human dignity becomes a proxy for the protection of human 
dignity. Th e question remains, however, of what one does about the fact that the 
question of human worth and human goods in these situations may not only turn 
on the primordial but also on the proleptic, that is, the question of how the foster-
ing of a bioethically good future places demands on the present. Th e second point 
of diffi  culty that will show itself in bioethics is that the archonic allows only those 
truths to count that cohere with the arkhōn, that is, with a mode of and form of 
being that justifi es itself and so must be recognized and declared. In the case of the 
Vatican this limitation is accommodated by making the practice of care consist in 
reading the signs of the times so as to adjust the aff airs of contemporary human life 
to the demands of the archonic. And in the case of the United Nations, the task is 
to elaborate new rights and to declare and protect those rights as an outward sign of 
the protection of the inward, that is to say archonic, reality of dignity. In the case of 
bioethics, a diff erent problem will appear: how to map the archonic onto the human 
biological body and biological future. What does it mean to say that the archonic 
is the character of that embodied being whose vitality and future are the object of 
biological technologies? Said diff erently: if human dignity is treated as the spiritual 
essence of the human family by the Vatican and the United Nations, the turn to 
dignity in bioethics will provoke the question of how it is that human dignity is the 
essence of the biological body.
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the question of critique
Foucault’s lecture on counterconduct and pastoral power was given on March 8, 
1978. A little more than two months later Foucault gave another lecture, this one to 
the French Philosophical Society. His lecture on that occasion was entitled “What 
Is Critique?” In that lecture Foucault suggested that one of the marks of the history 
of the Christian pastorate was that its eff orts to establish and sustain practices of 
spiritual governance leading to salvation were always accompanied by the critical 
question of whether or not to govern or to be governed in this or that manner. Th is 
critical question exploded with the proliferation of counterconducts in the fi fteenth 
and sixteenth centuries. Th e Reformation critique of pastoral power, after all, did 
not consist in the desire “not to be governed at all.” Rather, the critique turned on 
“how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with 
such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, 
not for that, not by them.”
At the critical horizon of the classical forms of pastoral power and the emergence 
of the art of government, the counterconducts of the Reformation and then the 
Counter-Reformation were constituted, in part, by an art of critique. Th is art of 
critique put into question and thereby put into play the problem of political spiri-
tuality. Luther—to pick perhaps the most visible fi gure—certainly contributed to 
the reformation of doctrine, but his attacks on doctrine took form as a fundamental 
rethinking of how, where, and under which conditions power could be legitimately 
exercised in secular and spiritual aff airs. Luther put the regnant modes of pastoral 
power into question by cracking open the politics of salvation: the question of 
legitimate modes and forms of salvational practice, the eff ects and countereff ects 
of such practice, and the venues within and through which such practice ought or 
ought not be facilitated. One of Luther’s defi nitive formulations of all this was his 
doctrine of the two spheres of creation, a demarcation and segregation of sacred and 
secular powers. Luther dealt with the problem of salvation, political spirituality, and 
pastoral power by reimagining the demarcations among and between spheres of life 
as fundamental. As the Catholic debate over integralism has shown, such a doctrine 
of separate spheres is no longer suffi  cient to address the problem of pastoral power 
in the modern world. Th at said, it may also be the case that the lesson learned from 
the history of counterconduct is that the wholesale rejection of the metaphysics 
of the modern world—liberal, biopolitical, or otherwise—won’t be of much help 
either. Th e question might be, rather: how should we think about things human 
today, which venues need to be reformulated or reconstructed, and which modes 
and forms of practice are called for in light of persistent problems of human worth 
and the exercise of power?
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In his paper “Paul Against Biopolitics,” Milbank, following Agamben, diagnoses 
the modern, tout court, as dangerous and excessive, summing up that excess in terms 
of biopolitics and connecting this biopolitical excess with secularism and state poli-
tics arranged under the sign of liberalism. Th e modern is biopolitical, it is secular, 
and it is liberal. And insofar as it is defi ned by these things it is taken to be spiritu-
ally and materially dangerous. Milbank connected his denunciation of liberalism 
to the broader diagnosis and repudiation of modernity off ered by Henri de Lubac, 
namely the proposition that the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation were 
a kind of theological “fall from grace” in that they imagined the world in terms of 
an ontological break between nature and the supernatural, paving the way for the 
discontents of the modern world. Milbank, in short, makes common cause with 
those who understand us to be living in a biopolitical age, one that is, in the end, 
dangerous and illegitimate.
A year after the event at the religion meetings, when Milbank published his 
paper, he proposed, in passing, that the notions of human rights and their secu-
lar connections to human dignity are nothing more than a biopolitical residue—
nothing more than a form of resistance to biopower that ultimately borrows so 
heavily from the presuppositions of the world it resists as ultimately to be defi ned 
by it. Th e fact that Milbank cast the world of today in terms of a modern epoch 
of the biopolitical, and the fact that he thereby obscures the need to pay attention 
to the character and logic of human dignity, is, on some level, inconsequential to 
the analysis developed here. His work, however, has served as an occasion in the 
development of my project. His easy dismissal of twentieth-century talk of human 
dignity as a biopolitical remainder served as an irritation and a prompt. To repeat 
the point made above, whatever else Foucault intended by the term biopower, he 
certainly did not mean for it to be used as the instrument of philosophical or theo-
logical epochalism—the sign of the times. For all of the talk of history and practice 
and diff erence in Milbank’s work and in the work of other “critics of the age,” he 
and they in fact do not off er us a feel for the particular. Rather, what is off ered is an 
exercise in what might be glossed as historical metaphysics—an exercise of presum-
ing that the modern world has an essence and that this essence is illegitimate and 
even pathological. It is not a far step from Milbank’s rejection of the modern as the 
bastard of a Reformation metaphysics of power and depravity to Agamben’s grave 
insistence that the epoch of biopolitics shows itself in the logic of the death camp. 
It is some consolation that the presumption that biopolitics is the diacritic of the 
age has itself become part of the recent past and therefore can be thought of and 
situated as part of the modern already becoming historical. Such resituating itself 
facilitates the work of thought.
I stated in the introduction and repeated in my examination of the Vatican and 
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the United Nations that much of the consternation over the phrase “human dig-
nity” has arisen in response to a demand for something more from power. If I have 
tried to think through the fi gure of human dignity as a distinctive response to that 
demand, it is in part because I think the signifi cance of human dignity in twentieth-
century thought and practice adheres precisely in the attempt to bring into being a 
diff erent kind of object, practice, and logic of power. Denunciation of the essential 
evils of the liberal or the modern or the biopolitical simply covers over these diff er-
ences, and it covers them over in the name of, on the one side, epochal continuity, 
and, on the other, the need for a radical break: the fall into the modern and the 
break toward a total exit. My project is attentive to events and discontinuity not as 
breaches in history that open up epochs or eras but rather as sites of indeterminacy 
at which the stakes of thinking and practice become unsettled and reconfi gured. 
Discontinuity in this sense is not only a mark of the modern; it is also a useful tool 
in the analysis of the relationship between truth and power.
Radical Orthodoxy theologians have called for a world made on a classical 
 model—the hope that “there can be again a cosmos, a psyche, a polis.” In this, 
it seems to me, their rhetorical fl ourishes risk obscuring what their work actually 
risks: it risks shifting analytic attention and energy away from the concrete practices 
by which and through which the politics of intrinsic worth connected to human 
dignity have been formulated and made to ramify. While recognizing that their 
reference to the “cosmos, a psyche, a polis” may be only provocation and styliza-
tion, the question of how to conduct inquiry into matters of truth and power today 
cannot be answered by a return to the ancients, however cherished they may be as 
philosophic friends.
Th e approach taken by Milbank and his cohort is not, as some critics have ar-
gued, “conservative.” Th ere is no real sense in which they are trying to preserve a 
tradition. Tradition for these scholars is, I submit, “a moving image of the past, 
opposed not to modernity but to alienation.” Th e question for this present study, 
by contrast, is not at all one of alienation. Th e question, rather, is how to establish 
a diff erent relation to the contemporary, one in which we might take stock of the 
fact that we are part of the history of ramifi cations attendant to the fi gure of hu-
man dignity, and the by now more or less stable problem of pastoral power that has 
been reconfi gured and put into play because of the politics of intrinsic worth. Both 
analytically and ethically, this contemporary relation demands more than denuncia-
tion and exit. It also demands a spirit of remediation in which and through which 
the problem of human dignity might fi rst be rendered through a diff erent analytic 
media (for example, case studies of knowledge and power) and perhaps thereby be 
made better—whatever that term might eventually mean.
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Bioethics and the Reconfi guration of Biopolitics
In the Diagnostic Excursus, working somewhat schematically, I sought to recapitu-
late and recompose the elements of human dignity in terms of pastoral power, and 
to do so with reference to the two venues I have examined thus far: the Vatican at 
the Second Vatican Council and the United Nations in its work on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. As I proposed there, it seems to me that the fi gure 
of human dignity and the eff ort to turn that fi gure into a practice can usefully be 
thought about as a restylization and reconfi guration of the principal elements of 
pastoral power as it was constituted in its classical form. I also pressed the point 
that my claim should be taken in a strictly technical and precise sense. In both of 
these venues, one ecclesial and one political, the challenge was to take up an ancient 
mandate: omnes et singulatim—care extended to all and to each one. Th e object of 
concern at the center of this mandate was not the Christian soul in relation to the 
fl ock. Nor was it the juridical citizen in relation to the nation. And the object was 
certainly not the biopolitical body in relation to the population. Rather, the object 
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of concern was the human in relation to humanity, understood as inherently and 
primordially dignifi ed.
Unlike the classical model of the Christian pastorate, the mandate to care for all 
and for each one was not carried out in connection to the traditional equipment of 
ecclesial and political governance. Th e goal, after all, was not to create technologies 
to cultivate or to regulate the daily conduct of conduct. Rather, and in consonance 
with the archonic, the goal was to discern and moderate those things that violate 
or compromise the essential character of things human so as to design practices 
whereby dignity might be protected and allowed to be. Human dignity is archonic, 
which is to say its moral rectitude and authority are immanent. Human dignity is 
nomic but not autonomic, one might say. It demands care but it does not care for it-
self. What it requires is that a space—conceptual and practical—be cleared in which 
the human can be what it is essentially. Traditional ecclesial and political equipment 
must be reformulated or new equipment invented so as to discern where human 
dignity is in danger and what range of other practices need to be restrained. In the 
case of Vatican II, the church was conceived as uniquely positioned to facilitate 
hermeneutic equipment: developments of the contemporary world must be read as 
signs so as to orient humans to a true ontological calling. In the case of the United 
Nations, human dignity was conceived in such a way as to call for equipment of 
recognition and self-moderation with the understanding that the United Nations 
could, through human rights, position itself to facilitate such equipment.
My proposal and working hypothesis is that actors in both venues faced a similar 
challenge: to constitute themselves as responsible for and capable of caring for hu-
man dignity. In the course of this challenge being taking up, human dignity was 
conceived as archonic. Conceived as archonic, human dignity was made the anchor 
point and object of a distinctive mode of reasoning about and caring for things 
human. Th is distinctive mode amounted to a reconfi guration of pastoral power. 
Human dignity, in an archonic mode, is a problem of pastoral power.
Th is brings me to my third case: the formation and development of the U.S. 
President’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE)—the U.S. federal bioethics committee 
constituted under the presidency of George W. Bush. I will begin this third part of 
my inquiry by saying a word about why I selected U.S. federal bioethics as a third 
case, about the signifi cance of the other cases in relation to it, and, fi nally, about 
how I will proceed.
By any of several measures the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics is not as 
signifi cant as either of the venues in my other two cases. No other event in the last 
century compares to the Second Vatican Council in terms of ecclesial transfor-
mation, with the possible exception of the rise of nondenominationalism in the 
United States. No other venue of international politics has the profi le of the United 
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Nations, recognizing that other multinational and nongovernmental organizations 
are obviously crucial venues of international power in connection to questions of 
dignity and rights. Th e President’s Council—or federal bioethics commissions per 
se for that matter—is not at the authorial apex of any worldwide community, nor 
is it global in scale or reach, despite the fact that many of its actions have served 
as a triggers for bioethical activities in other governmental settings. Moreover, the 
outcome of its legacy with regard to the care of human dignity is quite diff erent, as 
I will explain in this chapter and the next.
Keeping all of this in mind, however, the President’s Council does share crucial 
characteristics with the other two cases, characteristics that make it particularly 
interesting for my study. In the fi rst place, as I noted in the introduction, the PCBE 
was a venue that took up the challenge of constituting itself according to the double 
proposition that human dignity is a uniquely worthwhile object of concern and that 
the work of developing modes for thinking about and protecting human dignity 
is a uniquely urgent one. In the second place, although it did not take itself to be 
uniquely qualifi ed to care for human dignity in anything like the same way as the 
Vatican or the United Nations, the President’s Council did take its work to be mo-
mentous and exemplary. In quite a deliberate fashion, the council took as its fi rst or-
der of business the task of rethinking the meaning and purpose of bioethics, giving 
focused attention to the extent to which bioethics is capable of—in their words—
“securing human dignity.” Th e stated goal of this initial work was to demand some-
thing more of ethics in relation to science generally, and biology in particular, so as 
to invent a form of practice consonant with that demand. To quote the fi rst chair of 
the council, Leon Kass, the goal was to establish the terms and practices of a “richer 
bioethics.” Th e metric of that richer bioethics would be human dignity.
In the third place, and perhaps most signifi cantly, as of the early years of the 
twenty-fi rst century, bioethics had become a trading zone within which human 
dignity was being rethought and reconfi gured. Human dignity had, over the course 
of the last decade of the twentieth century, increasingly been invoked as a prin-
cipal mandate and guide for ethical and regulatory interventions into a growing 
array of bioscientifi c endeavors. Th is broad use of dignity, however, had generated 
a number of basic conceptual and practical blockages: attempts to connect human 
dignity to the objects and practices of the genomic and postgenomic life sciences 
served to problematize the term’s previous meanings and uses. On the one side, this 
problematization produced conceptual stasis and philosophical fragmentation. Yet 
on the other side, despite such stasis and fragmentation—or even by way of such 
stasis and fragmentation—the phrase “human dignity” continued to circulate as 
the object and objective of an ever expanding catalogue of possible practices. One 
outcome of all this is that prior conceptions of human dignity and the practices 
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connected to them began to be retooled and put to work in the name of problems 
that were ostensibly similar to those in relation to which the term previously had 
been defi ned. Th at is to say, if human dignity was said to be at stake in biology and 
biotechnology, this was assumed to be the same object of care that had been put at 
risk by sovereignty and secularism. Th e upshot is that the meaning and function of 
human dignity as a central object of ethical concern was put to work in relation to 
a new problem, and, thereby, its hermeneutic and politically moderative capacities 
were put to the test and ultimately reconceived.
Th e President’s Council on Bioethics is one particularly important site at which 
the logic of human dignity was taken up as the object of focused work on the rela-
tion of human worth and the biotechnical body, a site at which a concerted eff ort 
was made to design, develop, and carry out practices calibrated to this archonic 
logic. Where the Vatican off ered designs for ecclesial equipment in relation to the 
problem of interpreting the meanings of the modern world, and where the United 
Nations off ered political equipment in relation to governmentality and sovereign na-
tions, the President’s Council off ered designs for ethical equipment for work on the 
relation of the human body to the emerging life sciences and their technologies.
In both of the fi rst two cases I argued that, for diff erent reasons, human dignity 
was conceived according to a particular ontology: the archonic. With the President’s 
Council the archonic is once again characteristic, as I will show. And, like the fi rst 
two cases, the reasons for fi guring the human as archonic are likewise distinctive. In 
Gaudium et spes human dignity is conceived as archonic in response to the demand 
that the church’s magisterium be put to work as an instrument of pastoral care for 
the modern world. Human dignity, in turn, was defi ned by way of a supernatural 
call constitutive of human nature. In the Universal Declaration human dignity is 
archonic by way of a series of procedural exclusions. Human dignity is formulated 
as that object of care which speaks for itself in such a way that it need only be rec-
ognized and declaimed. In the work of the President’s Council, or, at least in the 
council’s early work, human dignity was conceived as archonic by way of another 
shift in the mode of reasoning: the council was faced with the challenge of demon-
strating an inner connection between the problem of human worth, the nature of 
nature, the character of contemporary biotechnology, and the problem of security. 
As I will describe, this confi guration of variables changes a bit in the council’s later 
work. But what the council’s work on and with the fi gure of human dignity demon-
strates throughout are the diffi  culties and tradeoff s attendant to thinking about and 
trying to defi ne human dignity in relation to the material body and the materiality 
of science.
In bioethics generally, and in the President’s Council specifi cally, the appeal to 
human dignity during the early part of the twenty-fi rst century was fi gured in such 
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a way as to require bioethicists to take up both types of equipment examined in 
the previous cases—the hermeneutic and the moderative—connect them, and give 
them cooperative form. In the fi rst place, the attempt was made to establish an 
interpretive framework through which the relative diff erences and correspondences 
between the essence of things human (“the truly human,” as the council put it) and 
the goals, practices, and contexts of biotechnology need to be discerned. In a fash-
ion similar to the Vatican, the challenge is something like “reading the signs of the 
times” so as to evaluate those signs according to a naturalized conception of the truly 
human—humans are called to be human, and science cannot be allowed to upset or 
violate that syllogistic dictum. In the second place, an attempt was made to situate 
human dignity in a position of critical adjacency to the apparatuses of government. 
In a fashion not dissimilar to the United Nations, the members of the President’s 
Council were quite deliberate in fashioning a conception of human dignity as that 
which ought to moderate and infl ect the practices of government. Th e members of 
the council embraced the notion that they were “not politicians” and were therefore 
free from the pragmatic constraints of government. Despite this, a politics of hu-
man dignity was nonetheless put forward as capable of modulating existing modes 
of governmental reason. To this extent human dignity, once again, was put forward 
not so much as an external constraint on governmental practice but as a point of 
self-limitation; human dignity was put forward as that object whose nature needs to 
be taken account of in the governance of science: the nature of human dignity will 
indicate to us whether our practices really can deliver the goods we think they can. 
Unlike the United Nations’ declaration, in which human dignity is connected to 
the goods pursued in the exercise of state power, the President’s Council on Bioeth-
ics put forward human dignity as an object and an objective of ethical intervention 
into contemporary scientifi c spaces as well as into the economic, academic, and 
political spaces in which biotechnological goods are promoted and pursued. In this 
sense, despite their refusal of identity with politics, the members of the PCBE put 
human dignity forward as crucial to the art of governing science. So the fi rst point 
of signifi cance is that the President’s Council formulates human dignity in an onto-
logical mode consistent with fi gurations at the Vatican and the United Nations.
Th e second point of signifi cance is that the President’s Council, from an analytic 
point of view, attempts to articulate and bring together hermeneutic and modera-
tive practices similar to what we saw elaborated in Gaudium et spes and in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. An important clarifi cation needs to be made 
here. Given these parallels, an obvious question is: to what extent did the members 
of the President’s Council draw on or otherwise model their eff orts on discourses 
and practices that originated with the United Nations and with the Vatican? On 
a simple level the answer has to be that the uses of human dignity formulated 
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in these venues had to have had some eff ect on the council’s deliberations, given 
their scope and importance. Th at being said, the extent to which one could draw 
direct explicit links to the formulations from these other venues is not an easy one 
to answer. One would need to take a more carefully historiographical approach 
to the question. For my purposes here, it is enough to recognize that the work of 
the PCBE can be thought of as taking place within a durational problem space 
shared with the Vatican and the United Nations: like these previous venues they 
problematized human worth through the language of dignity with the aim thereby 
of turning human dignity into an object of practice for the infl ection of power. No 
doubt the PCBE would not have proceeded the way they did if human dignity had 
not been enshrined in these other venues, but there are no linear lines of concep-
tual or pragmatic inheritance that can be drawn between the eff orts of the council 
and these previous events. Th is is, in part, because there are multiple intervening 
developments that shaped the council’s work. In addition to prior eff orts to defi ne 
human dignity, the council would simply not have taken up the problem of human 
dignity the way that it did if not for the debates in the United States and elsewhere 
over human embryonic stem cell research; the attempt to connect those debates 
to the abortion controversies, and thus to draw American evangelicals and Roman 
Catholics into a shared political orbit; the rise of the biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical industries as major forces in the development of the biological sciences; the 
completion of the fi rst stage of the human genome project; the widespread belief 
that DNA holds the secret to human identity; the increased profi le of bioethics in 
public life; and the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent attempt to 
connect bioethics to a rhetoric of security. So, though one can fi nd rather direct 
points of connection between the formulations of the Vatican and the United Na-
tions and the thinking developed by the President’s Council and its members, the 
infl uence of such points of connection cannot be disentangled from other events.
Hence, to take once again Foucault’s advice off ered in relation to other sig-
nifi cant “intersections between jurisdiction and veridiction”—and this is the third 
point of signifi cance—“I do not think that we need to look for—and consequently 
I do not think we can fi nd—the cause” of how and why the President’s Council 
took up human dignity in an archonic mode. We need to pay close attention to 
the range, infl uence, and interactions of the multiple conditioning factors in play. 
We must be willing to refuse the terms of what might be cast as a “Kantian analyt-
ics,” in which the goal is to identify necessary conditions of possibility. Th e goal, 
rather, is to examine these reconfi gurations of human dignity as the actualizations 
of possibilities among others. Th ese are contemporary events, which is to say that 
although constrained and formed by the recent past, they are also characterized by a 
measure of irreducibility in relation to that past. Perhaps it can be put this way: the 
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aim of analysis, as I am pursuing it here, is not simply the discovery of the condi-
tions of possibility for how human dignity has been fi gured but to characterize what 
has been made actual. In this way, my analysis might facilitate the further work of 
giving form to new possibilities. In this manner, the stakes of inquiry consist in 
diagnosing the logic according to which distinctive modes of thought and practice 
have been and are being produced, so as to discriminate the forms they have taken, 
the capacities and incapacities of those forms, and how they are continuing to shape 
contemporary life.
Having said all this, it is obviously important to keep in mind the fact that 
the past does weigh on the present, even if not to the point of overdetermination, 
and much of the material in this chapter will be genealogical. Th e ramifi cations of 
Vatican II and Gaudium et spes continue to shape contemporary Roman Catholic 
bioethics in direct and explicit ways, both in the United States and elsewhere. Th e 
United Nations has worked to formally connect developments in both genomics 
and embryonic research to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. And mem-
bers of the President’s Council spent time as prominent fi gures in both of these 
other venues. In this sense the conditioning eff ects of the Vatican’s work on hu-
man dignity, as well as the United Nations’ work, can be said to have had a rather 
straightforward infl uence on the work of the President’s Council.
Genealogical analysis of these ramifi cations and connections would no doubt 
bring to light other signifi cant dimensions of the contemporary problem space. 
Such historical analyses free up thought and multiply contingencies precisely at 
those places where historical or anthropological constants were most expected. Th e 
problem today, however, is diff erent from those taken up under what one might 
call a mode of “the history of the present.” Th e problem today is precisely that the 
concept of human dignity and the equipment associated with it has simultaneously 
been put in question while continuing to be mobilized in ever more diverse prob-
lem spaces. During the 1990s and 2000s bioethics was exemplary in this regard. It 
is in view of this mobilization and remobilization, as well as the conceptual and 
pragmatic breakdowns that accompany the use of human dignity in bioethics, that I 
have selected the particular cases in this book. I think that these cases not only tell us 
something about the way in which the fi gure of human dignity has been fashioned 
but also something about the shaping eff ect of particular conceptual and pragmatic 
circumstances on this work of fi guration, and the inter dependencies among human 
dignity, the venues in which it is thought and rethought, and the equipment that 
has been proposed as a means of turning human dignity into a practice. Th e work 
of the President’s Council, like Vatican II and the United Nations, is worth explor-
ing in this regard.
So, to put it more concisely: this third case will provide a brief and schematic ac-
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count of the rise and formalization of federal bioethics in the United States and will 
mark the particular shifts introduced by the President’s Council’s work on human 
dignity relative to that history. My account will describe modes, objects, and objec-
tives of ethical practice that were taken to be strategically appropriate to previous 
developments in biology and medicine and that were subsequently made generally 
normative for the practice of bioethics. A fi rst goal is to establish a set of analytic 
contrasts. Th e President’s Council attempted to move beyond what Leon Kass and 
other infl uential members cast as the perceived shortcomings of prior bioethical 
modes by trying to demonstrate the externalities and critical limitations of those 
modes—that is, showing what they leave out as well as showing the cost of such 
exclusions. Whatever one makes of the council’s work and the ramifi cations of that 
work, it is worth taking seriously the fact that in rethinking the practice of bio-
ethics, both in terms of the formulation of ethical obligations as well as activities 
and capacities, the council attempted to discern what a “bioethics commission” 
is and what it is not, as a venue capable of facilitating the governance of science. 
Moreover, council members attempted to understand what the price to be paid is 
when these limitations are overlooked, underappreciated, or overstated. Th is is re-
ally what was taken to be at stake in the quite deliberate, systematic, and sustained 
self- constitutional work of the President’s Council on Bioethics. Th eir stated worry 
was that the objects, modes of reasoning, and jurisdictional practices of bioethics 
had become dangerously insuffi  cient. Something more was demanded from power. 
Hence a proposal for a diff erent bioethics: one centered on human dignity.
Looking toward the concluding portions of my inquiry, I signal once again what 
I take to be at stake. Th e stakes of my analysis are not altogether dissimilar to those 
articulated by the President’s Council—though their fi rst-order aim of defi ning 
human dignity so as to care for it can only be said to be my own if it is recognized 
that I want to take up a second-order relation to what they have done. I think that 
the deliberations of the President’s Council (and my analytic deliberations too, for 
that matter) form part of what constitutes human dignity today. To cite Rabinow 
again: representations are social facts, mine no less so than the President’s Com-
mission. I also think that today it is time to put to the analytic test the functions 
and limitations of prior modes of ethical reasoning and practice, the truth claims 
produced by those modes, and the equipment connected to them, again, my own as 
much as others’. My aim is to diagnose the logic and limitations of human dignity, 
understood as archonic, not so much to embrace or denounce those limitations but 
to situate them as part of the historical event of human dignity. Th is means, among 
other things, getting clearer about the logic and eff ects of the archonic as it has been 
mobilized in new domains and connected to new practices. In this way one might 
be prepared to study the fashion and extent to which other ways of thinking about 
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things human, and other modes of care, might be given form and opened up as 
a result of the contemporary ramifi cations of the stated goal of caring for human 
dignity.
bioethics and biopolitics
Since the 1960s, concerns regarding the capacity of the life sciences to understand 
and cope with the ethical and ontological ramifi cations of their own developments 
have been brought to articulation by an increasing number of actors, individual 
and institutional. Speaking schematically, we can say that working through a series 
of events, problems, and venues from the 1960s forward, these actors began to con-
nect their concerns to a discrete number of topics and thereby began to consolidate 
their work, eventually creating regularized and authorized genres of discourse and 
practice. By the mid-1970s “bioethics” as a term and as a specialized domain of prac-
tice had been formally and institutionally situated alongside biology and medicine, 
and the bioethicist had been authorized, alongside the biologist and physician, as 
a specialist in thinking about the meaning and worth of health, the body, science, 
and technology.
In this section, I will review how these early bioethical formations developed, 
stabilized, and shifted. Proceeding in a manner that is no doubt too schematic and 
linear, and therefore that risks oversimplifi cation, I will examine three bioethical 
“ensembles” or “assemblages,” each consisting of events, problems, and venues in 
which the question was posed and reposed of how it is bioethics should be practiced 
and of how the norms of bioethical reasoning should be institutionalized and put to 
work in the world. Th e three ensembles that I will examine are (1) eff orts to think 
through and establish mechanisms for protection of human subjects of research in 
the 1970s, (2) developments connected to the human genome initiatives of the late 
1980s, and (3) responses to cloning and embryonic stem cell research in the 1990s 
and in the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century. My examination will be relatively 
brief given the scope of each of these three assemblages and given that there is 
already a large collection of work devoted to these three ensembles. My goal is to 
specify enough about each ensemble to throw into relief critical shifts in the modes, 
objects, and objectives of bioethics—shifts that preceded the work of the Presi-
dent’s Council and in relation to which the council often tried to distance itself. I 
will spend more time on the fi rst ensemble than on the other three. Th e reason for 
this relative weight is that several members of the President’s Council, Leon Kass 
in particular, picked out the developments connected to human subject research as 
the bioethical “other” in relation to which they called for new practices grounded in 
the defense of human dignity.
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Th roughout this section two points of orientation should be kept in mind. Th e 
fi rst is that although bioethics is occasionally discussed as if it were a timeless do-
main with stable and self-evident objects and objectives, it is—as is true of many 
disciplines today—a heterogeneous and contested collection of practices, institu-
tions, and actors. Bioethics fi rst coalesced around a specifi c number of problems 
and situations, and its initial methods and modes were elaborated accordingly. Its 
practitioners and institutions have since had to deal with a range of new problems 
and circumstances and thus have had to rethink core practices regularly.
Th e second point of orientation is that the rise to predominance of human dig-
nity as a term in bioethics has been neither inevitable nor straightforward. No doubt 
those who have worked to enshrine human dignity as the centerpiece of bioethical 
reasoning would disagree. It is true that since World War II the idea of dignity has 
frequently been set forth not only as an a priori limit on the moral and political 
excesses of scientifi c practice and as an anchor point for the elaboration of new, os-
tensibly more ethically sound, modes of practice. What is more, as I tried to show 
in regard to Vatican and the United Nations, human dignity had already been con-
ceived as immanent, absolute, and universally obligatory. Accordingly, the inven-
tion of hermeneutic and protectionist equipment had been in the works for at least 
several decades, and the eff ects of that invention, and the concurrent institutional 
transformations, had been felt globally. Many in bioethics had made the concept 
of human dignity central to their work from the earliest days of bioethics forward, 
especially those connected to Catholic traditions of moral theology. Th e President’s 
Council on Bioethics is distinctive, and its work is unprecedented in bioethics, how-
ever, insofar as it was the fi rst federal bioethics commission for which the protection 
of human dignity was put forward as a founding and defi ning mandate.
ensemble 1: humans as biomedical subjects
In the United States in the 1960s, serious discourse about the ethics of biological 
and biomedical research began to move from informal channels of communication 
among researchers to more formal and public interactions between select biologists, 
doctors, and philosophers and theologians. Th ese formal interactions consisted pri-
marily of conferences and published articles, the details of which have subsequently 
been catalogued by several of the major players involved. Th e early conferences 
were especially crucial to what would be the formalization of a new scholarly fi eld: 
by the 1970s the early participants, most connected to elite academic circles, began 
the arduous work of learning to adjust and remake settled practices of problem 
specifi cation and modes of thinking and engagement, with all such adjustments en-
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tailed in terms of self-formation, overcoming blockages, and the eventual creation 
of new forms of expertise and authority.
Assessing these early developments in quite general terms, it is fair to say that 
at the outset no one was equipped to deal with the questions being posed, which 
ranged from the moral salience of using artifi cial organs, to how to prioritize recipi-
ents for transplantation, to the meaning of death. Th e capacities needed to deal with 
these questions needed fi rst to be invented and then put to the test. Th e theologians 
involved, most of whom, initially, were Christian, concerned themselves with dis-
cerning the extent to which developments in biology and medicine raised genuinely 
new ethical and theological questions and hence the extent to which traditional 
theological resources and modes of analysis could simply be applied or needed to 
be more fundamentally reworked. Philosophers, for their part, found themselves 
working in problem spaces where the stakes and constraints of thinking were by 
and large more pragmatic and instrumentally consequential than work conducted 
in other academic settings. Obviously philosophers had long been concerned with 
practical matters. But with the exception of those few philosophers who had had 
occasion to contribute directly to other political situations, most of the scholars 
involved had been intellectually raised on metaethics as part of the dominant trends 
in U.S. philosophy departments in the mid-twentieth century. For the fi rst time, 
to quote Daniel Callahan’s rather pointed assessment, philosophers (among whom 
he counted himself ) had to “say something about real life.” Th e biologists and 
doctors arguably had to adjust most of all. Th ey had to confront directly the limited 
resources within their own disciplinary traditions for conceptualizing questions of 
signifi cance. In addition, they had the most to risk in terms of their established 
institutional authority by allowing nonbiologists and nonphysicians to help set the 
agenda. In short, the pragmatics and situational constraints of the ethics of biologi-
cal and biomedical research required the cultivation of new capacities for everyone 
involved.
In the early 1970s, forums of interaction were regularized, and normative prac-
tices began to stabilize. One case of this regularization and stabilization stands out 
as particularly important to the genealogy of the President’s Council: developments 
concerning biomedical research on human subjects. From the point of view of the 
council’s work, early thinking about the ethics of research with human subjects 
was cast as defi nitive of the purposes and frameworks for moral reasoning that 
would subsequently become “bioethics.” Said diff erently, when the members of the 
President’s Council called for a “richer bioethics,” they were, more or less, referring 
to bioethics as it was formulated in response to the problem of human subjects re-
search. In this light, I will outline elements of these prior developments that did, in 
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fact, become characteristic of a major segment of institutional bioethics, elements 
that members of the PCBE, its chair Leon Kass in particular, took as exemplary of 
its limitations.
Several events mark off  the problem space in which the ethics of research with 
human subjects took form. Particularly consequential were the revelations of decep-
tion and exploitation that characterized a series of government-funded biomedical 
studies. Of these the Tuskegee Alabama syphilis studies had particularly catalytic 
eff ects on the formation of bioethics, and they have since come to stand in for the 
dangers of nonregulated medical research. Prior to 1972, when a New York Times 
story about Tuskegee fi rst broke, a number of researchers and philosophers had 
thought about, and published articles on, the question of how research with human 
subjects should be conducted. Likewise, prior to 1972, there was a history of the 
regulation of such research, particularly in the wake of the Nuremburg Trials. But 
research with human subjects became a political problem of a diff erent caliber once 
the Times’ story was published. Where the ethics of the conduct of research with 
human subject had been taken to be a question for the scientifi c community, it now 
received sustained governmental and public attention.
Th e Tuskegee studies began in 1932 and lasted until they were framed as matter 
of ethical crisis and violation in 1972. Th e purpose of the study was to understand 
the “natural history” of syphilis in untreated patients. Th e studies were by no means 
secret. Th ey had been sponsored by the U.S. Public Health Service. Th e studies 
targeted over six hundred black men, mostly poor and mostly uneducated. Th e men 
involved were never told they were involved in a study of syphilis, never told they 
had syphilis, and never told that their conditions were treatable. As a result, not 
only did the men suff er unnecessarily, so did their partners and children.
As I noted in the Diagnostic Excursus, the term biopolitics has been made to 
circulate widely in academic venues, and as it has been used to explain such a broad 
swath of objects and events, there is some risk of analytic imprecision attendant to 
taking it up. Biopower can easily explain nothing by explaining too much. Keeping 
this in mind, carefully defi ned, the term biopolitics does seem to apply to the kind 
of power relations and veridictional practices characteristic of the Tuskegee aff air. 
Th ese power relations were characterized by a willingness on the part of researchers 
to let certain population groups die in the name of helping others to live. Indeed, 
when the principal researchers in the study were called to account for their work, 
the benefi ts to “society” were put forward as the justifying rationale. Th is tradeoff , 
made in the name of public health, was ultimately taken to exemplify the moral 
defi cits of a bioscientifi c mode of research that takes no account of the eff ects of 
research on the individuals directly involved. What came to be seen as particularly 
nefarious in all of this was that the bioscientifi c claim to generating health seemed 
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to have no intrinsic principle of self-limitation, other than what might be needed 
for the technical design of a successful study. As I noted in Chapter 2 with regard to 
governmentality more generally, biopower only fi nds its limits in the nature of the 
object and the ends of power: one only knows one has intervened too much or too 
little when one fails to achieve the amelioration of the health, wealth, or security of 
the population.
Th e aff ective response generated by the media coverage in 1972 was shock and 
outrage, exemplifying the changing American political ethos. Th e justifi cations of-
fered up by public health offi  cials for the Tuskegee studies were strongly countered 
by a mix of claims that the researchers had violated the subjects’ common humanity 
and civil rights. Th e New York Times story emphasized that “human beings” were 
made to serve as “guinea pigs.” Th e expression of outrage was compounded by 
the fact that the studies had been tracked by individuals in relevant research com-
munities through published results for almost half a century and had regularly been 
reapproved for ongoing funding. Th e tone and aff ect of the Times report was crucial 
to how the politics would subsequently unfold: it connected the treatment of the 
Tuskegee men by the U.S. government to widespread repulsion over Nazi medicine. 
Th e fact that the deception and exploitation of the Tuskegee studies had been justi-
fi ed in the name of public health at the cost of the individuals involved tightened 
the aff ective ties of this connection.
Other studies, such as research with mentally disabled children at the Willow-
brook State School in Staten Island, who were intentionally given hepatitis, were 
cast in the same moral light as Tuskegee. Th e revelations and their framing helped 
catalyze eff orts, already underway by members of the U.S. Congress, to form new 
oversight bodies dedicated to the ethics of research conducted with federal funds. 
Th e most meaningful of these proposed bodies were government bioethics com-
missions. Th e fi rst commission would fi nally be established in 1973: the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, or “the National Commission,” as it was subsequently called. Among 
other things, the National Commission was designed and brought into being to 
transform the aff ect of outrage and betrayal into practices of ethical analysis and 
regulation.
Th e work of the National Commission proved to be crucial to the founding 
of bioethics. It constituted the fi rst serious attempt by the U.S. government to 
establish ethics as a formal part of the government apparatuses concerned with the 
biological sciences. Previously, the U.S. government’s involvement in the creation 
of bioethical apparatuses had been limited and ad hoc. Questions pertaining to the 
appropriate conduct of research had certainly circulated through the internal chan-
nels of individual funding agencies, but these informal practices only began to be 
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formalized when Walter Mondale held congressional hearings, in which he (unsuc-
cessfully) called for the formation of a President’s Commission on Health Science 
and Society. Teddy Kennedy likewise sponsored senate hearings, which focused par-
ticularly on the question of research on human subjects and fetal research.
A question circulated throughout these early eff orts: to what extent should bio-
medical research be subjected to oversight and regulation in the name of goods 
beyond those of health, and if so, which goods, and what would be the price, sci-
entifi cally and politically, of such oversight? Th e Mondale and Kennedy hearings 
included a parade of elite biomedical researchers arguing that both public health 
and U.S. dominance in research would be compromised if mechanisms were cre-
ated in which nonmedical specialists were given power to intervene in research. 
“Bioethicists” from newly created research centers at Georgetown University in 
Washington, D.C., and the Hastings Center in Hastings, New York, also testifi ed. 
Th ese scholars recounted a litany of ethical problems that nonregulated research 
had produced. If scientists emphasized the goods of maximizing health and ac-
celerating U.S. wealth, bioethicists emphasized the rights of individual persons and 
vulnerable communities.
In the end, these hearings, along with the growing public outcry over Tuskegee 
and Willowbrook, intensifi ed the demand for a distinctive kind of venue capable of 
connecting ethics and the regulation of biomedical research. Th e practical question 
continued to be: what must a bioethical venue, constituted as a government com-
mission serving in the executive branch, be capable of doing? One initial answer 
was that such a commission must be capable of formulating “principles” that could 
be transformed into “regulations” that could, in turn, interface with the potential 
goods of scientifi c research. Such potential goods were framed by Senator Kennedy 
as consisting primarily in “society’s demands for the advancement of knowledge” 
and “the rights of its individual members.” What he meant by either “society” or 
“the rights of the individual” was not yet clear. Th e challenge, in any case, was to 
establish a venue capable of inventing bioethical equipment indexed to the goods of 
research and public health as well as the well-being of the individuals participating 
in research.
In 1974, Public Law 93-348 created the National Commission to take up the task 
of sorting out the terms of this challenge. Th e congressional mandate specifying the 
responsibilities of the National Commission, however, had the eff ect of overdeter-
mining how the members of the commission might go about their work. Among 
other things, the commission was asked to identify the criterion or criteria accord-
ing to which ethically “favorable” research on human subjects could be discerned 
from unfavorable research. It was expected that this would be done by discerning 
those principles that underlie research with human subjects when it is done ethi-
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cally and by formulating mechanisms for reforming research in view of such “im-
manent” principles.
One culmination of the commission’s work was the publication of the so-called 
Belmont Report. Th e report had lasting eff ects. Th e principles it enumerated be-
came standard for bioethics and were taken up and recirculated in research centers 
and authorized publications: if the principles laid out in the report began as prin-
ciples for the conduct of federally funded research on human subjects, they became 
principles of bioethical thought and practice per se. Th is legacy, on one level, is sur-
prising given the pains the authors took to be quite context specifi c in their design 
of the report. For example, the commission members actually delayed answering 
the question of which principles should be enshrined in regulations for their fi rst 
three years of work so that they could work through a series of specifi c cases of 
abuses of research subjects—for example, research with children, with prisoners, 
and with the mentally handicapped. Th e general principles articulated in the report, 
in short, were formulated through a careful meditation on the specifi c contours of 
the research domains that would be regulated through the use of those principles.
In the end, the Belmont Report off ered three principles for research, which, 
in turn, were connected to three regulatory practices thought to be appropriate 
to existing scientifi c and institutional practices. Th e principles were: respect for 
persons, benefi cence, and justice. Th e practices were: the requirement of informed 
consent, risk/benefi t assessment, and the just selection of the subjects for research. 
Th e philosopher Stephen Toulmin, a member of the commission, summarized the 
challenge at the heart of the commission’s mandate in this way: “the central ques-
tion is how to reconcile protection of individual rights with fruitful pursuit of the 
collective enterprise.” No doubt this is right—up to a point. How to reconcile a 
competing set of goods was indeed the core problematic. But more needs to be said, 
particularly in light of how human dignity would later be mobilized. Th e central 
question might also be put like this: Who is the human fi gured as a subject of re-
search? And, what needs to be done to care for that fi gure of the human? Framed 
this way, this question has three principal components, which form a single anthro-
pological grid: fi rst, the human needed to be defi ned; second, research needs to be 
defi ned; and, of course, the relation between them needs to be defi ned.
Th e fi rst question: what is the human as a subject of research? Th e fi rst answer: 
the human subject of research is a person, strictly speaking. Th is means that the 
human as the subject of research is not only a biological body or a statistical member 
of a population—although the human must be these as well for biomedical research 
to proceed. Likewise the human is also not just the subject of health and vitality—
although the practice of cost/benefi t analysis suggests that this way of thinking 
about things human must be a predicate of research as well. So, in addition to being 
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addressed as a biological body or part of a vital population, the human must also 
be an individual person. Th e history of thought on the ethical meaning of person-
hood since Kant need not be rehearsed here. It suffi  ces to say that, among other 
things, the person is that fi gure of anthropos defi ned by the capacity for and right 
to reasoned autonomy, reasoned self-rule. Th e research subject is therefore cast by 
the National Commission as an individual capable of making informed  choices. 
So, in answer to the question “what is the human as a subject of research?” the fi rst 
answer is that it is not just a biological body or part of a living population. Th e sub-
ject of research is also a person on whom research must only be conducted after a 
reasoned choice has been made to participate in research. A certain anthropological 
heterogeneity is in play, which needs to be tolerated and sustained—the human is a 
body, part of a vital population, and also a consenting person.
If the human as a research subject is a consenting person, the human is also a fi g-
ure and subject of justice. Research subjects are selected for inclusion in research 
and can be selected more or less justly. Th e outrage over Tuskegee, after all, was not 
only expressed in relation to the fact that human persons were deceived, though it 
was certainly this. It also was expressed in relation to the fact that the humans who 
had been deceived had been picked out for exploitation because they belonged to 
groups with less access to power. Anthropologically it follows that in the Belmont 
Report the human is not only an individual but also a member of specifi c collectivi-
ties. Th ese collectivities are themselves vulnerable to the excesses of power exercised 
through science. Th e report not only called for practices of informed consent but 
also for the just selection of research subjects. Justice and personal freedom are put 
forward as mutually balanced principles in the Belmont Report, and the two are 
not arranged in any kind of hierarchy, either ethical or anthropological. Perhaps 
this goes without saying, but the fact that the human is a fi gure of justice and not 
only a fi gure of reasoned autonomy is often overlooked in accounts of the work 
of the National Commission. For example, Albert Jonsen, a commission member 
whose writings have become a standard reference on the history of these events, 
recounts the arguments several of the commissioners put forward concerning the 
human as person, but the human as a concern of just selection is left more or less 
underexamined.
In any case, with regard to the question “what is the human as a subject of 
research?” the answer is that it is not just a biological body or a member of a vital 
population, but, in addition to these but without excluding these, the human is 
a person on whom research must not be conducted until that person has made a 
reasoned choice to participate, and the human is also a member of collectives that 
must be included or excluded from research on the basis of just access. What counts 
as ethically sound research, it is taken to follow, is not just technical breakthroughs 
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and medical advances. It is research that constitutes itself in reference to person-
hood and justice.
Again, an anthropological heterogeneity: the human is conceived as a single ob-
ject constituted of elements of heterogeneous scale and quality (individual persons 
and vulnerable collectives, as well as biomedical bodies and vital populations). Th is 
anthropological plurality is perhaps not surprising given the philosophical and po-
litical constraints within which these matters were taken up. As Jonsen put it, work 
on the commission, with its deadlines, diversity of members, and policy stakes, 
required a certain tolerance for theoretical indeterminacy as a means of facilitating 
practice. In this it diff ered from the consideration of the human in the constitu-
tional work of the President’s Council, as we will see.
So, the fi rst element of the question—what is the human as a subject of biomed-
ical research?—is a consenting person and, potentially, a member of a vulnerable 
population. Th is is the fi gure that needs to be protected from abusive research prac-
tices. But if bioethics is going to care for this human as a subject of research it must, 
of course, be capable of answering the question: what counts as research? What kind 
of goods are at play in research? How might these goods be understood such that it 
is clear what is at stake relative to the human who is the subject of research?
Jonsen, in recounting the commission’s history, makes a point, to which he does 
not give very much attention but that concerns a matter proving to be quite signifi -
cant. Th e point he makes is that when the National Commission took up the task of 
defi ning what constitutes “research,” they “implicitly abolished the long cherished 
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.” Jonsen reminds 
his readers that in other key works, such as the Helsinki Declaration, and even in 
other National Commission documents this distinction had been central. In the 
Belmont Report the question of whether or not the human needs to be protected 
from research does not turn on the distinction between therapy and nontherapy. 
Rather, the question turns on the goal of “the generalization of knowledge.” Why is 
this signifi cant? First: in the fi rst major publication of the President’s Council, this 
will be reversed. For the President’s Council, the question of research and protection 
will once again involve the distinction between therapy and nontherapy. Human 
dignity, as the council considers it there, requires this distinction, as I will show. 
Second: emphasis on the “generalization of knowledge” places the weight of ethical 
concern on a balance between the direct goods and rights of the individual person 
and the goods that can be derived more broadly beyond the individual involved. 
Th is metric of balance, which proves vital to the commission and their heteroge-
neous anthropology, does not appear in the council’s work on dignity; balance will 
not be an approach commensurate with the logic of dignity.
Th e question follows: what are the goods of research, and, relative to the indi-
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vidual subject, do they come at too high a cost; where does this balance lie and what 
does it consist in? Th e commission’s answer—which is framed as the defi nition of 
research—involves making a connection between the practice of cost/benefi t analy-
sis, the defi nition of research, and the free participation of the subject. Let me quote 
the defi nition: “ ‘Research’ designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, per-
mit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to the general-
ization of knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, principles and statements 
of relationships). Research is usually described in a formal protocol that sets for an 
objective and a set of procedures to reach that objective.” What is the objective 
of research? It will certainly vary from protocol to protocol, but if it is to count as 
research, it will include at least the goal of contributing to the generalization of 
knowledge. What is it then that the subject needs to be protected from? Paying too 
high a cost for the benefi t of generalizable knowledge. A contrast is made between 
the direct goods received by the individuals involved and the generalizable goods of 
scientifi c knowledge, and that contrast is fi gured as requiring balance.
Now, the third element: the relation between the human subject and research. 
Th e fi rst question is: what is the human? Th e second: what is research? Th e third is: 
how should we understand the relation between the human and research such that 
we know what to do? Several years before the National Commission took up its 
work culminating in the Belmont Report, a study of human experimentation was 
organized by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. As a result of this study, 
quite a famous article was produced and published by the philosopher Hans Jonas, 
in which Jonas attempts to lay out how the goods of research and the fi gure of the 
individual could be interfaced as a balancing of goods. All of the commission 
members were familiar with Jonas’s essay.
Jonas puts in question the notion that social and individual goods and rights 
exist in an ethical asymmetry of kind and not only degree. He argues instead that 
the individual should be thought of as the site of rights as well as freedom and that 
science should be thought of as a means by which goods are produced. Th e goods 
of research are melioristic whereas the rights of the individual are obligatory. Th e 
challenge in his view is not to pick one over the other but rather to interface them 
appropriately. And what does he propose? Very briefl y put: if the pursuit of science 
is not a right but rather a means of generating goods, then its pursuit is not a matter 
of obedience but rather is a matter of the exercise of freedom. Th is is Jonas’s point 
of emphasis: “participation in research must be seen, in all its aspects and for all 
participants, as an exercise in freedom.” It follows that “Society cannot infringe on 
individual rights for the production of its future goods.” What society means here 
is not clear, except that it is obviously a domain of goods distinct from the rights 
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and freedoms of any specifi c individual. Th e thing to be noted is the frame by way 
of which Jonas takes up the problem. Research on humans as subjects is, in the fi rst 
place, a juridical matter consisting of rights and freedoms. Th e challenge: how do 
these limit scientifi c research? Th ey limit research only in that science must proceed 
on the basis of the exercise of personal freedom. We might say that utility must 
result from the gratuitous exercise of the free individual.
So, if the relation of the human person and research is a matter of the exercise of 
freedom, if it is a matter of creating a situation of proper balance between not two 
kinds of goods but rather between rights and goods, what kind of ethical practices 
does this call for? No doubt several kinds of mechanisms might have been put 
forward as possible answers. But in line with the congressional mandate, the report 
off ers multiple principles. Th e human is that thing characterized by multiple and 
heterogeneous truths and goods: the human is a person of consent, a member of 
communities prone to justice and injustice, a biological body that can be studied, 
an element of vital populations whose health can be normalized. Th ere is a kind of 
elective affi  nity or even correspondence between this multiplicity and the multipli-
cation of principles. Multiple principles are advanced as metrics according to which 
judgments can be made about which research programs are to be pursued and how 
they are to be pursued. On an equipmental level, then, what is needed? Something 
like a hybridization of principalism and casuistry. On the one hand, how do we 
know subjects are protected? Informed consent. But how do we know if consent is 
informed? We must review protocols. How do we know research will be benefi cent? 
We must calculate anticipated benefi ts and costs. And so on. Th e point is that the 
relation of the person and research is mediated through the use of principles that, 
in a case-by-case fashion, will balance the multiple goods and truths bearing on the 
human as a subject of research.
Th e multiplication of principles generates two outcomes. Th e fi rst is the produc-
tion of a mechanism according to which favorable biomedical research could be 
discriminated from unfavorable. Th is means that the principles enumerated had a 
double status as both givens (these are the principles that underlie good research) 
and as objectives (research must be done in this way in order to be good). Th e prin-
ciples, then, are metrics of discrimination. Th e point is not that they function to put 
research in question, per se. Nor are they designed to make research thrive scientifi -
cally. Rather, they are a recalibration of the terms according to which research could 
proceed, and could proceed as both useful and legitimate. Th is means—and this is 
a second aspect—that the mode of bioethical reasoning and practice called for was 
not one that would stop research per se. Nor was it a matter of establishing a hier-
archy of standards whereby the “real” or “good” goal of research could be used to 
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trump other purposes (for example, the rights of the individual or the social goods 
of science). Th e multiplication of principles functions as a practice of discrimina-
tion and balance, as instruments of limitation and as well as reorientation.
Broadly speaking it is not surprising that the commission’s work centered on 
persons and the exercise of principles. It was, after all, carried out largely through 
the guidance of the philosophers on the commission, all of whom had been trained 
in liberal philosophical traditions (the inclusion of justice is a bit more surprising 
in this regard and can be attributed as much to the insistent work of Commissioner 
Karen Lebacqz and the aff ective eff ects of Tuskegee as to any other factor). As 
I pointed out in Chapter 3, and as is well known, since the seventeenth century 
the individual as a juridical fi gure, as the site of fundamental rights and freedoms 
(whether these are endowed by God, nature, reason, etc.), has been invoked as an 
external limitation on the otherwise nonlimited aims of biopolitical reason. Keeping 
in mind that biopolitical reason continued to thrive in the postwar years through 
the venue of the welfare state, it is nevertheless the case that important points of 
resistance formed at precisely those points at which biopolitics was taken to have 
become paroxysmal and excessive. Th at resistance was sometimes articulated in 
terms of the inner logic of governmentality (for example, government has done 
too much because our sciences were wrong, our implementations too hasty, and 
the like). But it was more often articulated by way of the appeal to a metric and an 
ethical outside. Human dignity was one of these. Th e judicial fi gure of the person 
as the bearer of rights and freedoms was another.
Th e work of the National Commission is distinctive in this regard. Th e multipli-
cation of principles operates not by way of setting the absolute and essential against 
the variable and normalizable. Th e challenge, keep in mind, was not how to establish 
the outside limits of research but how to orient research according to the nature of 
the object at play and at risk, that is, the human subject. Th e human person is not a 
conception of things human that sets fi xed limits on scientifi c practice. Th is is cru-
cial to keep in mind. With the exception of attention to the just selection of research 
subjects, no a priori limits were placed on research. Rather, variable limits were set. 
Further, the standard of variability is an ensemble of principles: respect for persons, 
benefi cence, justice. Unregulated research was taken to be vulnerable to the excessive 
exercise of power. And the standard for determining what counts as excess was obvi-
ously not limited to technical success. Rather, the individual person was put forward 
as that which can make a reasoned choice to limit the power relations embedded in 
the drive of scientifi c research by choosing not to participate. However, the human 
person can also choose to give herself over to the objectives of research. Th e person 
marks one passage point through which research can proceed and proceed legiti-
mately. A kind of parallel was created between judicial fi gures and biopolitical fi g-
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ures of things human: on the one side persons and communities, on the other bodies 
and populations. Th is parallel allowed for the principle of balance to be a mode of 
ethics by way of which the biopolitical was not undone but rather reconfi gured. In 
this way the individual person, conceived as both the object as well as freely consent-
ing threshold of medical research, is perfectly capable of simply reproducing rather 
than limiting or balancing out the biopolitical. As fi gures of biomedical research and 
participants in health care, subjects of research, as any number of sociologists have 
shown, are positioned such that the only choices that are allowed to count as reason-
able are those that conform to the goods of governmental reason—the amelioration 
of populations and the measured delimitation of that amelioration.
Th e point here is that emphasis on the human as a consenting person, at the 
level of the design of ethical practices, is a signifi cant fact that must be accounted 
for. A range of formative practices are made to follow from it. Th e form of the rela-
tion between ethics and biology is calibrated to it. And this form will have a certain 
functionality, certain outcomes, and, of course, certain limitations. In order for it 
to do what it does, it must forgo other possibilities. Th e biopolitical understood as 
the normalization of the social is put alongside of a juridical rationality centered on 
the person. Th e excess of events such as Tuskegee is not taken to call for absolute or 
fi xed limits. It is taken to call for the variable limits predicated on informed consent 
and just selection. Bioethics as a practice involving the identifi cation, articulation, 
and application of principles is made to be a way of producing a space of scientifi c 
practice and governmental regulation capable of balancing a set of goods and align-
ing those goods through the play of mutual production and limitation.
Jonsen points out that, in the end, the person as the object of ethical concern 
is as much a logical predicate of a certain ethical practice as it is an actuality. If we 
were to analyze the actual practices and situations that unfolded in relation to this 
emphasis on this choosing person, we might indeed fi nd vectors for the reproduc-
tion of the “neoliberal subject,” as the sociologists warn us we will, and hence very 
little real delimitation of biopolitical reason. But on one level that would be beside 
the point: at the level of design and the level of the invention of bioethical practice, 
in the face of a specifi c problem and a specifi c mandate, the human person needed 
to be not so much a given, an actuality—although it was certainly taken to be 
these—so much as a logical condition for the promotion and regulation of a specifi c 
set of goods and practices. Th e human person in research was the object and objec-
tive of ethical work.
Let me return to the question of human dignity for a moment in order to track 
the trajectory of my analysis. If the conception of the human at stake in human 
subjects research is the human as person, and if the defi ning characteristics of the 
human person are reason, freedom, and participation in particular communities, 
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then it appears perfectly consistent that the ethical practices advocated by the com-
mission, practices suited to the existing infrastructures of biomedical research, con-
sisted in informed consent and just selection. In this problem space and under this 
metric, such practices can be cast as both urgent and necessary, aff ectively suited 
to the conditions of excess to which the commission was, indirectly, addressing 
itself: there cannot be another Tuskegee. It is also clear how these practices could be 
reconciled with the goods of research: research must pursue the ends of generaliz-
able knowledge, but only if it passes across the threshold of an individual’s consent 
to participate. Autonomy, self-rule, must be assured in the course of research. Th is 
means that a certain anthropological multiplicity is accepted: the human can be 
treated both as a biomedical object and as a person.
Now, this calculation will change considerably with human dignity—a diff erent 
result following from a diff erent problem space and diff erent metric. Th e charge for 
the President’s Council, as we will see, will be a familiar one, one that has now been 
circulated for years in relation to biomedical controversies such as abortion: what is 
life such that it should be protected? What is dignity as a marker of human life? If the 
answers to those questions involve an archonic fi gure of the human, if the defi ning 
characteristics of things human are essential, self-justifying, and commanding, then 
the question will again be: which ethical practices must follow? But those that fol-
low will be those issuing from the command of dignity. Human essence will be that 
which cannot be violated and must be protected. And that essence will no longer 
be autonomy. Even the person will not be allowed, cannot be allowed, even by way 
of its free and consenting personhood to violate the archonic. Th e archonic, after 
all, is not autonomous. It is nomic. It commands, but it does not rule or protect or 
otherwise care for itself. It is not autonomous, and so it must be vigilantly guarded. 
What is more, because it is essential and primordial, the archonic does not tolerate 
any kind of anthropological multiplicity as a strategy of balancing principles and 
practices. If research violates it in any way, it must be categorically rejected. We can 
begin to see here why the distinction between therapy and nontherapy will matter to 
the President’s Council: the question will become “which forms of research violate 
the archonic?” It might be said with regard to the ethics of human subject research 
that the modes of power in play are characterized as a balance of the juridical and 
governmental. Th e question that will tacitly be taken up by the President’s Council 
will be whether or not the modes of power are suffi  ciently pastoral.
humans as genomes
In the late 1980s, human genomics was made to be the major focus and concern 
for bioethics. In the United States, the biggest government-funded research project 
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in molecular biology, the Human Genome Project, as a condition of funding, in-
cluded a designated percentage of funds to be dedicated to “Ethical, Legal, and So-
cial Implications.” As a bioethical problem space, genomics was not really a matter 
of human subject research. As such, in major publications, conferences, and com-
missions the problem of the human person as the object of ethical analysis and con-
cern began to recede from view. Of course it did not disappear from view, and 
questions of genomics, personal identifi cation, and the consenting of genetically re-
lated populations would continue to form a major part of the work and concern of 
professional bioethicists. But the question of experimentation with human subjects, 
the question of consent, the specter of paternalistic medicine, and the question of 
the just treatment of population groups would be dealt with through more or less 
stable institutional apparatuses, such as Institutional Review Boards. However, on 
one level with genomics the person is no longer the central object of concern. Th e 
protection of the person is no longer the only, or even in some cases, the principal 
objective. As such, the modes and forms of practice that are elaborated as pressing 
or appropriate are no longer predominantly calibrated to the balancing of personal 
freedoms and social goods. Or, to be more precise, while much of the infrastructure 
of bioethics continues to frame most problems as though they were questions of 
balancing freedoms and goods, a diff erent set of questions indexed to a diff erent 
fi gure of the human will begin to show the limitations of that prior framing and the 
infrastructures attached to it.
So, what was at the center of this infl ected problem space if it was not the 
human subject? It was the problem of human essence, now taken up as the 
question of the genome. On both biological and ethical fronts the object of 
thought, intervention, and care was not exactly “the human” or “humanity.” It 
was something closer to “humanness.” Past ethical anthropologies and practices 
were taken by many to be insuffi  cient to the prospect, and provocations intro-
duced by genomics cast it as the science that would “read the book of life.” A 
rather wide range of new bioethical formulations and solutions were proposed 
for how to move forward.
Of course the problem of human essence was far from new. To paraphrase what 
Jean-Luc Marion has said of his own work: one studies the human precisely because 
the human is that animal who has long been a mystery to itself. Indeed, even the 
problem of human essence in connection to the genetic sciences had a fairly long 
history prior to the genome projects. Th e theologian Karl Rahner called for caution 
in face of the “new powers” of molecular engineering during the buildup to the 
debates over Gaudium et spes. Th e challenge of trying to understand things hu-
man in terms of essences obviously has a long and venerable, if discontinuous and 
fraught, history.
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With genomics, however, something distinctive happened relative to this his-
tory. Th e blockages and diffi  culties were singular to the extent that the question was 
not exactly “what is the human?” or “what is human essence?” but rather: to what 
extent is the human, in its essence, a genome? And what should and should not be 
done in light of our answer to this? In what way is the genome a synecdoche for 
things human, found in its most essential form? Paul Rabinow put it rather nicely 
when he wrote that for more and more people around the world genomes are taken 
to “contain precious information that tells the truth about who they, and their pets 
and plants and food, really are and provides clues to what their future holds.” Th e 
question is: how did genomics become a matter of human essence, and how did this 
reconfi gure bioethics?
As with other signifi cant conjunctures involving shifts and recombinations of 
thought and practice, contributing factors could be proliferated at length: the rise 
of the biotech industry, the insertion of global capital into the life sciences, innova-
tions in computational technology, and the like. In all of this three factors stand 
out. First, the event most obviously central to this problematic was the proposal and 
funding of the Human Genome Project (HGP). Th e project was carried out over 
the last decade of the twentieth century by an international consortium of publicly 
funded labs led and coordinated by the United States but involving labs from many 
other countries. By 1998 the public project would have a private competitor, Celera, 
led by Craig Venter. Using diff erent technologies, and each imbued with a diff er-
ent ethos, the competitors nonetheless shared two central goals. Th e goal was to 
determine the sequence of the three billion base pairs that make up the DNA in the 
human chromosome. Th e second was to determine the position and spacing (that 
is, map) of the so-called expressed genes in the human body. Th ese fi rst two goals 
were basically technology challenges. Th e problem was creating and coordinating 
computational technology and facilities. It was widely expected (or at least widely 
proclaimed) that realizing these two goals would catalyze a revolution in the mo-
lecular biosciences generally and biomedicine in particular.
Th e second factor was the rhetoric of essentialism, which imbued political de-
bates about the stakes and signifi cance of the project from the outset. Th is rhetoric 
took many forms but almost always centered on the question I have already noted: 
to what extent is the genome the essence of things human and indeed the essence 
of all living things? Th e question was circulated, if tacitly, by those promoting as 
well as those challenging the project. Certain phrases and mantras appeared with 
increasing frequency: the genome as the “code of codes,” the “book of life,” “the 
blueprint” of human nature. Th is last was a particular favorite of the directors of 
the Human Genome Project. Writing in 2001, near the end of the project, Director 
Francis Collins off ered an extended metaphor that exemplifi es the notion that the 
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human genome was the essence of humankind: “It’s a history book—a narrative 
of the journey of our species through time. It’s a shop manual, with an incredibly 
detailed blueprint for building every human cell. And it’s a transformative textbook 
of medicine, with insights that will give health care providers immense new powers 
to treat, prevent and cure disease.” In the years since the end of the fi rst phase of 
the project, the rhetoric used to assess the signifi cance of the genome has taken on 
a decidedly more modest tone. Whatever the genome projects delivered, it was not 
the “code of codes,” at least not in the essentialized and determinative sense that the 
early breathless rhetoric implied. Th e accomplishments of the projects were signifi -
cant to be sure, but to paraphrase Sidney Brenner, it was the end of the beginning 
for genomics and certainly not the secret to life.
It bears noting that, as critics of genetic essentialism pointed out all along, the 
idea that the genome was the essence of human life was clearly a dubious one even 
to the biologists. It was well understood that there is no overly deterministic causal 
line running from the human genome, understood as the full complement of ge-
netic material, and the full range the physiological aspects of human life. Genetic 
material, whatever its signifi cance, does not overdetermine who we are in any strict 
sense. In February 2001, when the fi ndings of the Human Genome Project and 
Celera Genomics were concurrently published, the broader scientifi c community 
was surprised to discover that the human genome contains roughly thirty thousand 
genes; a far cry from the numbers predicted just years earlier. Among others, the 
network scientist Albert-László Barabási noted at the time that the worm C. elegans 
has twenty thousand genes and only three hundred neurons whereas “our extra 
10,000 genes have to account for the billion nerve cells present in our brain.” 
It was, as it were, not all in the genes, which was obvious to biologists but not to 
those listening to them. Nonetheless—and this is the crucial point here—those 
promoting the Human Genome Project as well as the critics of genomic and genetic 
intervention largely framed the terms of the debate as a question of discovering or 
protecting human essence. Even those who reject the notion that the genome was 
defi nitive were still caught by and in this framing. Th is meant that the ethical ques-
tion at the center of things, basically from the outset, was whether or not the human 
is in essence a genome, and what needs to be done about it.
Th e third factor in connection to all of this, as I’ve already mentioned, was the 
creation of a massive bioethics component connected to and funded by the Hu-
man Genome Project: the Ethical Legal and Social Implications project. ELSI was 
far larger and better funded than any other bioethics project to date. Th e goal of 
ELSI, obviously, was to consider what the range of nontechnical implications of the 
genome projects might consist in. ELSI was created essentially through a political 
deal made between Senator Ted Kennedy and James Watson, then the director of 
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the HGP. Th e deal was that 3 to 5 percent of the overall HGP budget, which at the 
outset was three billion dollars, would go to ELSI, to be distributed to ethicists, 
legal scholars, and others to think about and produce work (research papers, policy 
recommendations, PBS videos, and so on) telling us what the implications of re-
search might be. Th e word “implications” was crucial and defi ning. A second side 
of the deal between Watson and Kennedy was that the ethicists would do their work 
basically outside and downstream of the biological research. Th ose working on the 
ELSI grants could have regular interaction with genomic researchers, but the ethical 
research itself did not have any upstream role in shaping the scientifi c agenda.
Not surprisingly, the better part of the questions raised by the ELSI scholars 
were not new. As Eric Juengst and Al Jonsen, among others, argued at the time 
many of the core issues presented by the genome project had been thought about in 
other settings. Indeed, these issues had been a core part of bioethical discussions of 
genetic research and engineering at least since the publication of Splicing Life by the 
President’s Commission in 1982. Splicing Life in fact detailed many of the themes 
and problems that would form part of the core list of topics for the fi rst phase of 
ELSI grants. Among these were a set of very specifi c concerns, including govern-
mental oversight, public education, genetic screening and diagnosis, and somatic 
cell intervention.
Also included in the report was a discussion of what Jonsen called the “amor-
phous and vague feeling that we can do things we have never done before and 
that we may change the human species for the worst.” Th is amorphous feeling 
was articulated as a concern that geneticists were “interfering with nature” or 
intervening on “the sense of personal identity” or as concerns over limits to “the 
malleability of human nature.” Which is to say that Splicing Life did in fact put 
on the table, in a rather serious and direct way, the question of genetic science 
and the essence of things human. But Jonsen and Juengst overstate the similarity 
of the Human Genome Project and past work on the ethics of genetics insofar 
as the ethos and institutional situation within which this was all developing was 
distinctive. In familiar usage, ethos refers both to “an accustomed or cultivated 
venue” as well as “capable ethical practices.” Th e space of practice at the interface 
of bioethics and the cultural venue of the genome projects was not at all that of 
genetic engineering in the late 1970s. Practices, capacities, expectations, and 
conceptualizations had changed. Th ere is no doubt that, philosophically speak-
ing, the questions posed with the Human Genome Project had been posed before. 
But those questions had never been catalyzed and structured by the persistent 
and globally spread specter of what Ted Peters has called the “gene myth.” Th at is, 
the notion that genomes “contain precious information that tells the truth about 
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who they, and their pets and plants and food, really are and provides clues to what 
their future holds.”
humans as life
With the Human Genome Project we see a shift in bioethical emphasis from hu-
mans as subjects of research and the excesses of biopower to an emphasis on the 
problem of human genomes as essential and defi ning. Speaking broadly and sche-
matically we can say that another shift takes place with human embryonic stem cell 
research. With stem cell research other problems and questions are taken up as par-
ticularly urgent, with another set of objects and objectives. Again, as with genomics, 
the point is not that other questions and objects disappeared entirely, nor is it that 
the issues and debates connected to stem cell research are radically new. Rather, the 
point is one of emphasis, ethos, and the focus and form of practice.
In the November 6, 1998, issue of Science, James Th omson and his collaborators 
from the University of Wisconsin announced that they had successfully derived 
human embryonic stem cells (hES cells). Th e announcement was accompanied by 
two ethically signifi cant pronouncements. Th e fi rst was that derivation of hES cells 
represented a revolutionary step in the treatment of degenerative diseases. Th e cells 
off ered the potential of permanent repair of failing organs—“regenerative medicine” 
as it was coined. Th e prospect of regenerative medicine, as one researcher framed it, 
was styled as constituting “a totally new value paradigm for clinical therapeutics.” 
Th e second pronouncement came from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
given as testimony to the U.S. Congress several days later. Because hES cell research 
entails the destruction of the embryo, the bishops pronounced the research morally 
illicit. Th e therapeutic potential of the research represents a “good end” pursued by 
way of “an evil means.” Embryonic stem cell research must be judged “fundamen-
tally wrong.” Th e means were considered evil, of course, because the destruction 
of the embryo amounted to the destruction of human life.
Although the debate over stem cell research has proliferated ethical positions, in 
the United States questions amounting to a tradeoff  of lives cared for between the 
embryo and the patient remained central, until the creation of so-called Induced 
Pluripotent Stem Cells more or less took the need for the disaggregation of embryos 
off  the table. As debate over this tradeoff  unfolded and intensifi ed, diff erences of po-
litical consequence among “human life” as an object of ethical concern and “human 
persons” or “human nature” or “human essence” began to show themselves. Th ese 
various fi gurations had previously circulated in something of an interchangeable 
fashion in talk of bioethics, but with the problem of human life, particularly when 
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articulated as the question of the moral status of the embryo, the diff erences among 
these became a matter of pressing concern.
Two words of background. Th e fi rst scientifi c. Human embryonic stem cell re-
search is ontologically signifi cant, as is by now well known. It is a basic biological 
truism that all cells come from cells, as Rudolph Virchow fi rst asserted in the 1850s. 
Th e large majority of the cells in the human body are, as it were, highly diff erenti-
ated and developmentally fated. Th is means that they have highly specialized func-
tions within specifi c systems and limited life spans determined by a certain number 
of cell divisions. When embryonic stem cells were fi rst derived they constituted a 
class of cells that are neither developmentally fated (they are, as the biologists put 
it, “pluripotent”), nor do they die off  after a certain number of divisions (thus, 
the infamous designation that they are “immortal”). Th e point is that, given these 
particular ontological features, many researchers, particularly in the response to 
Th omson’s successful derivation, believed that embryonic stem cell research would 
bring about a revolution in medicine. Degenerative diseases would no longer need 
to be treated through the rather temporary measures of intervention and symptom 
amelioration but might be susceptible to regeneration. All that was needed, we were 
told, was the ability to direct and manage the capacities of stem cells.
A second fact about stem cells concerns the ontological status of the early em-
bryo. In order to derive stem cells, the early blastocyst needs to be destroyed. Th is 
destruction revealed something ontologically interesting: embryos not only have the 
potential to become babies; they also (or at least their same cellular material) have 
the capacity to produce cells that might save the lives of patients. For supporters of 
embryonic stem cell research, this ontological variability was a matter of relations 
and a matter of hope. It was a matter of relations in that Th omson et al. discovered 
that when placed in a medium other than the inside of the blastocyst, the cells of 
the early embryo exhibited capacities that they would never have exhibited if either 
left in a Petri dish or implanted in a womb. It was a matter of hope in that, given 
these remediated capacities, the lives of patients suff ering from degenerative disease 
might be saved.
Hence the second background point. For at least two decades prior to the deri-
vation of stem cells the Roman Catholic magisterium had been thinking intensely 
about the status of the early embryo. Th is was done fi rst in relation to the question 
of abortion, then in relation to in vitro technologies. In the course of this work 
a number of positions were established that became theological and ethical prec-
edents for evaluating stem cell research. Among the work produced was Donum 
Vitae, which directly addressed the question of the moral status of the embryo, and 
it did so with frequent reference to the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes. Do-
num Vitae, however, introduced a consequential shift in terminology. In Gaudium 
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et spes the question of human dignity was developed in relation to the human as in-
dividual on the one hand and as the community of humanity on the other. Human 
dignity was a matter of this relation human–humanity. With the embryo, neither 
individual persons nor communities appeared to be at stake. As such, the question 
of the human as a “unifi ed totality” of body and soul, and that which is called in its 
nature to union with the supernatural, had to be transposed from the object “hu-
man person” to the object “human life.” One of the subtleties of the early stem cell 
debate that was often overlooked by proponents is that the position staked out by 
the Roman Catholic magisteria, a position echoed by other Christian groups, was 
never that the embryo is a human person. It is that the embryo is a human life.
Th e shift that took the arguments of Gaudium et spes and applied them to the 
embryo does not need to be rehearsed in detail. It should only be mentioned that 
at the core of the matter were two propositions. First is that Donum Vitae defi nes 
human life as a union of the mother, father, and a divinely implanted soul. Second 
is that this union shows itself in a natural and self-directed tendency to union with 
God. Donum Vitae postulated that, although biology could never tell us when the 
soul is implanted by God, it does tell us that in the union of the gametes a novel 
genome is produced. It also tells us that this genome naturally directs the embryo 
down a developmental pathway toward personhood. Th is means that both origin 
and goal of the human are genetically united, in the broad sense of genetic as the 
unfolding of potentialities. Th e genome is a kind of proxy and image of the ar-
chonic. Of course, under closer scrutiny neither biological proposition really holds 
the philosophical weight put on it. Genomes are not always novel. And genomes 
do not direct the embryo in any strictly “self-directed” fashion; interactions with 
the mother’s body are vital to the fetus’s formation. Be this as it may, Donum Vitae, 
although drawing on arguments from Gaudium et spes, shifted the site of human 
dignity to human life as a kind of biological minimum.
Certainly the question of the status of the embryo was not the only question in 
play. As I mentioned, any number of positions, questions, and framings were set 
on the table. But, much like the question of the person in human subject research 
and the question of the essence of human life in genomics, the problem that came 
to dominate the stem cell debate centered on which form of human life should be 
saved: the life of the embryo or the life of the patient. Th e common object and 
objective in this was biological life. Was it licit or not to disaggregate the early blas-
tocyst in the name of saving the life of patients?
One of the more prescient insights of Professor Leon Kass, of the University of 
Chicago, was his diagnosis of the state of aff airs in biotechnology and bioethics as 
they were being transformed by the stem cell debate. He noted that the problem 
became not just an ontological or metaphysical matter proving or disproving the 
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moral status of the embryo but a political question of which form of life ought to be 
made to live. Kass’s assessment may not have accounted for the variety of discursive 
positions taken up in the debate over stem cell research, but it proved consequential 
on two counts. First, in rather neat terms, Kass summarized the principal block-
age point at the level of political and ethical practice in the stem cell debate and 
connected this blockage to quite a specifi c bioethical object and objective. Second, 
Kass took the state of aff airs in the debate over stem cell research to be exemplary of 
contemporary bioethics more broadly. Whether or not Kass’s generalizations were 
warranted was certainly debated. But they nonetheless served as a central rationale 
in his eff orts to constitute the President’s Council on Bioethics as a venue that 
would focus its bioethical eff orts on the care of human dignity.
the president’s council on bioethics
Th ree shifts of problem space and three shifts in mode of practice: the problem of 
human persons and the social good of research taken up as a matter of balancing 
principles; the problem of the nature of human essence taken up as a matter of 
opening or restricting research downstream of the human genome; and the ques-
tion of the worth of forms of life, addressed as the protection of the embryo or the 
amelioration of the patient. With all of this in mind I pose again the question raised 
in the introduction to this chapter: what changed with the President’s Council on 
Bioethics? Th e answer is presumed in my selection of it as a case: what changed is 
that human dignity was made the central matter of concern. But human dignity 
was already circulating in bioethics. Th e Vatican responses to stem cell research 
had invoked dignity. Th e U.N. declarations on genomics and cloning connected 
human dignity to the life sciences. So why focus on the President’s Council? Th e 
answer is that the council, in a manner comparable to both the Vatican and the 
United Nations, fi gured human dignity as both the object and means of their self-
constitution. Th e eff ects of that fi guration, as measured by a legacy of perpetuation 
and proliferation, however, proved quite diff erent.
It is worth rehearsing the immediate circumstances within which the President’s 
Council was created. Th ree elements are relevant. Th e fi rst is that, four years after 
the fi rst successful derivations by James Th omson, research on human embryonic 
stem cells was nowhere close to delivering on its core promise: to revolutionize 
medicine. Researchers were not surprised by this. Th e prophets of revolution had 
anticipated a long road from the outset. What this means is that the question of the 
medical worth of the research remained open and hotly contested.
Th e second element is that embryonic stem cell research had proven to be at least 
as signifi cant politically as medically. By 2001—the year in which the President’s 
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Council was formed—embryonic stem cell research had been given a place along-
side abortion and evolution as a political and moral litmus test among a certain 
religious segment of U.S. voters. What this meant, among other things, is that in 
the fi rst year of George W. Bush’s presidential administration, stem cell research 
became a fi rst order of business. His administration asserted that his political base 
as wanting immediate action on the restriction of federal funds for embryonic stem 
cell research, research that had been funded under the previous administration.
In August 2001 Bush gave his fi rst signifi cant policy address. It was on stem cell 
research. In that address he stated that he wanted his policies to “foster and encour-
age respect for life in America and throughout the world.” At fi rst glance, of course, 
this position does not seem at all surprising. It appears to reinforce a connection 
between stem cell research and abortion politics. But what makes it unexpected was 
that Bush did not appeal to the moral status of the embryo, or at least not directly. 
Rather, he advocated limiting federal funding on the basis of the idea that stem cell 
research per se (and not only because of the destruction of the embryo) made hu-
man life vulnerable to devaluation by making embryos eff ectively available to com-
modifi cation. In this way, he said, it made human life vulnerable to dehumaniza-
tion (and again, not just because the embryo was taken to be a human life as such). 
In that same address the president announced the creation of his bioethics council, 
to be organized and chaired by Leon Kass. Th e executive order stated a central man-
date: “fundamental inquiry into the human and moral signifi cance in developments 
in biomedical and behavioral science and technology.” It would only later become 
clear that Kass had, more than anyone else, shaped the mandate.
Th e third element that structured the work and development of the President’s 
Council, and thereby the development of bioethics under the council, is on one 
level quite obvious but nonetheless almost always overlooked. Th at is to say, it is 
a factor that does not show up in assessments of how and why they attempted to 
change the objects and objectives of bioethics. Th is third element is the events of 
September 11, 2001. Th e attacks of 9/11 served as a political vector that changed, or 
at least deeply infl ected, the stated rationale and problem space of most dimensions 
of governance in the United States. Th is includes bioethics. In the immediate after-
math 9/11, stem cell research was displaced from what had been a position of central 
public attention and concern for several years. In the ensuing months and years, the 
attacks and the security environment that they helped give rise to introduced two 
changes that bore on the commission’s reading of bioethics. Th e fi rst and most pro-
nounced is that biosecurity emerged as a problem comparable to and connected to 
bioethics as a site of sustained concern. Th e second (and this is what I will focus on) 
is that the post-9/11 security environment infl ected the terms on which bioethics 
could be justifi ed. Indeed, security remains a matter of central concern for bioeth-
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ics, as can be seen in the work of subsequent federal bioethics commissions. It has 
not, however, remained defi nitive, per se, except in as far as questions of “risk” are 
held up as especially pressing. In the case of the President’s Council, however, its 
mandate, its initial composition, and its set of tasks were brought to articulation 
within and through a security ethos generated by 9/11.
Th e fi rst meeting of the President’s Council was convened on January 17, 2002. 
Leon Kass opened that meeting and inaugurated the work of the council with a 
statement summarizing his assessment of the state of aff airs in biotechnology and 
bioethics therein. He began by arguing that the stakes of biotechnology and bio-
ethics and the stakes of a post-9/11 security environment are integrally connected. 
Of course, on one level his argument was a device, a rhetorical way back into the 
concerns of bioethics given a political situation in which security had been made 
the only matter of consequence. Kass acknowledged as much: “everyone today is 
paying attention to terrorism”; “the stakes of bioethics, which seemed so important 
only a few months ago, now appear to be less signifi cant”; “resources have been 
diverted”; and so on. But nonetheless Kass’s view of the connection between bio-
ethics and security was quite serious and needs to be considered as such. It was not 
only a substantive proposal for the reconfi guration of bioethics; it also became an 
offi  cial articulation of the council’s understanding of the diffi  culties and dangers of 
biotechnology today and the relative shortcomings of bioethics in the face of such 
dangers.
So, what was Kass’s proposal? It began with an acknowledgment, which was not, 
as it were, a concession. Most think, he acknowledged, that in a post-9/11 environ-
ment the work of the bioethicist will be more diffi  cult: resources and attention will 
be diverted, the familiar issues will seem to be relatively less signifi cant, and energy 
for policy disputes over biology will dissipate in the face of the “real” problems of se-
curity. Th e events of September 11, he pointed out, not only turned attention away 
from stem cell research, which had seemed so pressing for so long, but had delayed 
the organization and animation of the President’s Council itself, a delay that might 
be taken to indicate a diminishment of priority and concern for the place of bioeth-
ics in contemporary governance.
However, Kass asserted, things can be made to move forward diff erently, in a 
more relevant fashion, and the President’s Council can help facilitate this diff erence. 
Kass proposed to his audience that the events of 9/11 had brought a “new moral 
seriousness” to the United States. He suggested that Americans had for too long 
been debilitated by an unthinking and easygoing “relativism.” With 9/11, or since 
9/11, Americans could again see “evil as evil.” Th ey have a “deepened appreciation 
of human fi nitude and vulnerability.” He suggested that a kind of moral and politi-
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cal fog had been lifted, which has had the eff ect of putting Americans in a moral 
frame of mind such that they will not only be able to recognize the evils, threats, 
and vulnerabilities of international terrorism, but also the evil, threats, and vulner-
abilities presented by biotechnology. In the face of both the advance of terrorism and 
in the advance of biotechnology, a kind of alertness and moral vigilance is realized. 
Th is moral vigilance tells us that something fundamental is in danger that must be 
secured. And what is endangered? Our humanity. Or, as Kass put it, a “truly human” 
way of life. Th e post-9/11 ethos allows for bioethics to be carried forward with a new 
vigilance, a new object, and a new objective: the work of securing the truly human.
What warrants this diagnosis? Kass proposed that the life sciences and their tech-
nological powers constitute a threat, and he gravely suggested that the nature of that 
threat is not easy to identify. It is a subtle, ambiguous, and often hidden threat. Un-
like terrorism, this threat is not obvious. Why so? “Th e evils we face, if indeed they 
are evil,” are intertwined with a series of goods “which we keenly seek.” Research, 
he stated, is pursued in the name of “cures for disease, relief for suff ering and pres-
ervation of life,” “commitment to compassionate humanitarianism,” and “freedom 
of inquiry.” All of this is, of course, good. Th at is, so far as it goes. So what is the 
problem with research and its array of goods? “Th e greatest dangers we confront in 
connection with the biological revolution arise not from principles alien to our way 
of life but rather from those that are central to our self-defi nition and well-being.” 
Th is was the heart of Kass’s provocation: the goods that we seek through medicine 
and science, goods we take to be defi nitive of our form of life, actually, and quite 
despite ourselves, put us in danger.
Kass insisted that the problem we face is not proper to biology per se. Th e prob-
lem that we encounter in biology and biotechnology is created and made to op-
erate by the contemporary ethos within which technoscientifi c research has been 
elaborated. Th at ethos is market driven, oriented toward the mastery of nature, 
and characterized by the celebration of the individual. Actions and choices made 
by individuals, actions and choices made in the name of individual and economic 
goods, are likely to have aggregate eff ects that are both unexpected and tragic. Th ey 
are unexpected because we think we are acting in the name of core goods. Th ey 
are tragic because despite the fact that our motives are pure, the world fashioned 
through and by those motives will aggregate to self-destruction. Th e aggregate eff ect 
that Kass put forward and off ered up as the central and defi ning concern of bioeth-
ics is the erosion of those things constitutive of “truly human” life. Biotechnological 
research, conducted in the name of otherwise good principles, is “taking us down 
the dehumanizing path toward a brave new world.” We must be alert to the forces 
and practices taking us down this road and vigilantly steer another course. “Th us 
F6671.indb   233 9/16/15   10:39:07 AM
234 Human Dignity and the President’s Council on Bioethics
just as we must do battle with the antimodern fanaticism and barbaric disregard for 
human life, so we must avoid runaway scientists and the utopian project to remake 
humankind in our own image.”
So, the problem, the threat, for Kass is that free research, ramifying according 
to utopian images, is likely to culminate in the erosion of humanity. Th e problem 
for bioethics, then, is not, as it may have been with the question of human subject 
research, the balancing of the freedom of the person and the generalizable goods of 
science. And is not in this sense a matter of balancing the juridical and the biopo-
litical. After all, according to Kass, research is now a site of the exercise of freedom, 
the exercise of freedom in the name of both individual as well as corporate goods. 
Th e problem is that this exercise of freedom needs to be shepherded. Biotechnology 
is a pastoral problem. We cannot be allowed to remake humankind in the image 
of our individualized and immediate goods; such freedom is precisely what puts us 
in danger.
So who can shepherd us away from this slide down a dehumanizing path? Th e 
challenge must fall to bioethics. But what kind of pastorate is bioethics today? Can 
the apparatuses and practices of bioethics help secure us against the drive to remake 
humankind in our own image? Th e answer, of course, depends on what one takes 
bioethics to be. In his opening address Kass indicated two defi nitions. Th e fi rst 
concerned a domain of problems, the second a form of expertise. Kass noted with 
evident pride that “very few” on the council were bioethicists of the “expert variety.” 
Most members come to bioethics from other disciplines in order to engage a domain 
of problems that have a “supreme signifi cance.” Th ese are problems constituted “at 
the many junctions between biology, biotechnology and life as humanly lived.” 
Th e question, for Kass, was whether bioethics as a form of expertise was capable of 
infl ecting the biotechnological sciences away from a dehumanizing path.
Following and infl ecting a set of distinctions off ered by Hannah Arendt, Kass 
then proposed a brief etymological exercise. He asked those in attendance, what 
is this “bio” in the term “bioethics”? It means “life,” of course. Bioethics is the ethics 
of life. But what does the term life mean? Th e Greek bios, Kass went on, should be 
distinguished from the Greek zoe. Zoe is a term that designates life as such, animate 
or animal life. Bios by contrast is a term that designates a “course of life or a manner 
of living or a human life as lived.” Animals, Kass concluded, have zoe. Only humans 
have bios, “life lived not merely physiologically but also mentally, socially, culturally, 
politically and spiritually.”
Although not prominent in bioethics, the bios/zoe distinction had in other circles 
become a prominent one. Th ough fi rst introduced by Arendt, the distinction was 
taken up by Giorgio Agamben and made the turning point of his assessment of bio-
politics as the character of the age. Th e hidden truth about politics in the modern 
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world is that human life is subjugated to forms of power that target not “humans” 
as political animals, as Aristotle famously put it, not humans as animals with a bios, 
but rather humans as bearers of “bare life,” animals reduced to zoe. Th e use of the 
distinction by Kass to defi ne the stakes of bioethics was not altogether diff erent 
from Agamben’s. Th e “ethics of life,” he stressed, must not be only a question of zoe, 
a question of preserving bare life. Th e “ethics of life” must be made a matter of bios, 
of life as humanly lived, a matter of life composed of mental, social, cultural, politi-
cal, and spiritual and not only physiological aff airs. Bioethics must take seriously 
the work of producing truth about life humanly lived—the logos of bios. In a strict 
sense, the life sciences must not be the only form of biology in play.
On Kass’s rendering, the insuffi  ciency and even danger of bioethics was that it 
had become an exercise in the logos of zoe. According to Kass’s diagnosis, this had 
happened in large part through the debate over stem cell research. Both sides of the 
debate, as he framed them, had reduced the argument to the “life principle.” Th e 
“life principle,” he explained, presumes that what is really at stake in bioethics is the 
protection and preservation of life. Both those supporting and those rejecting em-
bryonic stem cell research lay claim to saving human life. Th ere are those who think 
that stem cell research saves the lives of patients. Th ere are those who think that we 
must save embryos that would be destroyed if research continues. In both cases, a 
sort of sheer “vitalism” consumes bioethics. Th e question in the stem cell debate is 
not actually whether life is at stake. Everyone seemed to agree that it is life that is at 
stake. Th e question, rather, is which life matters most. As such, Kass concluded, the 
stakes of bioethical reasoning and practice have been made to devolve onto zoe and 
not onto bios. If it is really “life humanly lived” and not “life as such” that is under 
threat today, then bioethics in a vitalistic mode will not do.
Kass acknowledged that bioethics as shaped by the stem cell debate is not char-
acteristic of all bioethics. But the “bioethics of the bioethicists,” as he cast it, the 
ethical discourse and practices of those assigned the role of experts, will not help us 
any more than the polemics of stem cell research will. In a book published shortly 
after he gave his opening address, Kass argued that the bioethics of bioethicists 
cannot help us preserve a truly human way of life because they take as the object 
of their concern the fi gure of the human as a person. Th e object and objective of 
establishment bioethics, on this account, is the human as elaborated in the contro-
versies over human subject research. Th is Kantian fi gure, as he described it, only 
bears on matters of reason, choice, and benefi cence—the very goods he had insisted 
become tragic when attached to biotechnological research. Bioethics, whether of a 
vitalistic or personalist variety, cannot help us, according to Kass’s diagnosis. Hence 
the need to reorient bioethics: neither the protection of life nor of persons will 
forestall dehumanization.
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So, what is the way forward? All of this was prolegomena to a question: “How 
ought we to do bioethics and do it well?” In the fi rst place, doing bioethics well 
would entail attending to “the deep character of human individual and social ‘bio.’ ” 
In the second place, it would entail attending to how this “deep character” inter-
faces with “fi ndings of biology and the technical powers they make possible.” Th is 
pre sents a series of challenges that Kass will insist the council take up before pro-
ceeding to work on any specifi c case of biotechnical development: what counts as 
a truly human life? What is the relation of the truly human and developments in 
biotechnological research? What future is likely to unfold, in an aggregated and un-
expected fashion, when the “truly human” is drawn into the space of biotechnology? 
And of course, what is to be done? How can the truly human be secured?
Th e fi rst answer, which Kass only alluded to in his opening address but which 
would be elaborated in the course of the council’s deliberations, is that bioethics 
must cultivate new forms of hermeneutical practice: the meaning of the human and 
the meaning of science need to be discerned. Th e second answer is that bio ethics 
must cultivate instruments of reorientation. Th ere is something not altogether dif-
ferent from a governmental logic in play: the goal of bioethics is to regulate science 
in the name of favorable and unfavorable outcomes. Such regulation should not be 
established on a juridical basis of rights and freedoms. Th e question is not whether 
science is legitimate or illegitimate. Th e question is: what is the nature of the object 
to be attended to, and what is the relative “naturalness” of the relations and practices 
that bear on that object? Th at object, of course, is the truly human. Science must be 
intervened on so as to produce futures in which the truly human is secure. A twist 
in all of this, and the basis for a claim to a unique capacity to care for things human, 
is Kass’s suggestion that science can violate the truly human without really know-
ing it. It is in this light that Kass challenged the President’s Council to (1) provide 
an account of the “truly human” so that (2) scientifi c practices can be evaluated as 
either contributing to or detracting from the human. As this challenge was taken 
up, the question would no longer be “does research contribute to generalizable 
knowledge?” but, rather, “is research a matter of therapy (that is, research that re-
inforces and sustains the truly human), or is it a matter of enhancement (research 
that risks taking us beyond the truly human and thus opening up the human to 
tragic violations and losses)?” Th e “truly human” will be summarized in the phrase 
“human dignity.”
In a fashion not dissimilar to the Second Vatican Council and the United Na-
tions, in his opening address, Kass proposed that bioethics (in my terms) must 
become a new kind of pastorate and that the President’s Commission must become 
an exemplary pastoral venue. Th e object of the pastoral power exercised by bioeth-
ics will be the “truly human” articulated as human dignity. Th e challenge will be 
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to demonstrate the nature of truly human life so as to establish the terms of such a 
life in the face of biotechnological developments that might otherwise compromise 
it. Among other things, such violation will turn on the distinction of therapy and 
enhancement, a distinction that proves quite diffi  cult to make given the frequent 
confl uence between the objectives of healing and amelioration. Th e danger in all of 
this, he insisted, is that bioethics will not be up to the task. Neither a commitment 
to persons nor a commitment to life will be enough. What’s more, it is precisely 
the attractiveness of these goods that might push biotechnology toward the path 
of dehumanization. If today biotechnology is both dangerous and tragic, so too is 
bioethics. Bioethics must take up a new mandate: the work of interpreting the truly 
human and the aggregate eff ects of science pursued in the name of other goods. 
Which is to say that the work of a new bioethics is to foster a pastorate of human 
dignity as that which must be secured.
Kass’s opening remarks turned on a connection between terrorism and biotech-
nology. Th e two on some level are obviously not the same kind of threat. But the 
stakes in his framing coincide and the mode of practice called for coincides as well. 
Th ere is a need for moral vigilance, and the challenge is to fi nd ways of giving form 
to such moral vigilance. Kass proposed that security opens a zone in which a single 
task must be taken utterly seriously: “safeguarding the human future.” If terror-
ism represents a threat to our humanity from without—an “antimodern fanaticism 
and barbaric disregard for human life”—biotechnology risks being a threat from 
within—a “utopian project to remake humankind in our own image.” How ought 
we do bioethics and do it well? In such a way that we remain vigilant in our atten-
tion to possible threats to human bios. Both the “inhumanity of Osama bin Laden 
on the one hand and the post-human Mustafa Mond, Aldous Huxley’s spokesman 
for the brave new world, on the other,” challenge bioethics to safeguard “the good 
life, of humanization and dehumanization.” Th e task of bioethics does not need 
to be the balance of personal freedom and social good, not the manipulation or 
protection of the genome, and not a vitalistic calculation. Perhaps all of these have 
their places, albeit secondary ones. Th e primary task needs to be to secure what is 
truly human. It is not incidental that Kass’s title was Life, Liberty, and the Defense of 
Dignity. Working out the terms of such a defense was the constitutional task of the 
President’s Council.
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Th e Biopolitical Pastoral:
Beyond Th erapy
Th e purpose of the previous chapter was to begin to characterize the problem space 
within which a specifi c venue—the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics—was 
asked to take up human dignity as central to the practice of bioethics. I certainly 
could have chosen other venues in which human dignity was brought to bear on 
biology and ethics. Th e phrase “human dignity” circulates in the bioethical writ-
ings of the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, for example, or in 
the UN commissions on genomics or cloning. Th e German government faced the 
question of human embryonic stem cell research and human dignity when they 
were asked to take up the question of whether the embryo was legally protected by 
their constitutional commitment to “inviolable” human dignity. What is distinc-
tive about the President’s Council, and one reason why I selected it as part of this 
series of cases, is that the work of defi ning and securing human dignity against the 
dangers of bioscience was put forward by the PCBE as the unequivocal and defi n-
ing task of bioethics and therefore as a matter of self-constitution: what modes and 
forms of bioethical practice are adequate to the defense of human dignity?
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In the previous chapter I also set out to indicate three characteristics of this self-
constitutional challenge, which I think are signifi cant. Th e fi rst is that the problem 
proposed by Leon Kass to the President’s Council diff ered from the problems ad-
dressed in other bioethical venues. Ultimately this meant that the mode of practice 
proposed diff ered as well. In the 1970s, a core problem was how to protect research 
subjects without unduly compromising the general goods of research. In the 1980s 
and 1990s a core problem became how to decipher the extent to which genomics 
were determinative of things human and therefore the extent to which the human 
genome should be intervened on. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s a core prob-
lem concerned the moral status of the embryo and whether or not the embryo as a 
locus and bearer of human life ought to be destroyed in the name of saving patients’ 
lives. In all three of these bioethical moments the task and challenge was diff erent 
from the task and challenge put before the members of the President’s Council. 
Although the phrase “human dignity” had certainly circulated in all of these previ-
ous bioethical venues (in connection with issues of end-of-life care, for example), it 
was not taken as the central problem or principle of organization in anything like 
the way Leon Kass proposed. So, a shift in problems and modes: this is the fi rst 
characteristic I want to highlight.
Th e second characteristic is that the President’s Council articulated the challenge 
of securing human dignity as a problem of discerning and sorting out goods of 
higher worth from among goods of lesser worth or goods of only apparent worth. 
In this way, it was proposed, it might become possible to orient biology in the name 
of those higher goods. Th e diffi  culty for bioethics, as Kass framed it, is precisely 
that biotechnology is not advanced in the name of any evident evils. Rather, it is 
advanced in the name of goods such as freedom of inquiry and medical benefi cence. 
And though under the conditions of late capitalism these goods may be defensible 
in individual instances, the danger is that they are likely to aggregate to overall 
dehumanization.
Kass thus posed the question: is bioethics capable of deciphering the character of 
modern biotechnology in such a way that dehumanization can be avoided and the 
goods of a “truly human life” secured? Th e answer, he thought, would turn on the 
extent to which bioethics can be made to discern the diff erence between the ethics 
of “life as such” and the ethics of “life lived humanly,” so as to develop modes and 
forms of practice determined by the latter. All of this left the President’s Council 
with three questions. What constitutes truly human life? What is the character of 
the biotechnological sciences today? And what needs to be done about the relation 
between them? Bioethics taken up in response to these questions would seem to 
call for two sorts of ethical equipment: hermeneutic equipment that would allow the 
council to discern the truly human so as to diagnose the relation of the truly human 
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and developments in biotechnology and moderative equipment that would allow 
it to help redirect any forms of research that seem to be putting human dignity 
at risk.
Th e third characteristic of the challenge to secure human dignity is that bioethics 
under these conditions can no longer be considered as a matter of balancing the ju-
ridical and the biopolitical. Securing human dignity will not consist in the multipli-
cation of principles through which the rights of the individual are balanced against 
the goods of the health of the population or the general expansion of knowledge. 
Rather, bioethics needs to be a kind of pastoral exercise. Th is pastoral exercise will 
consist in orienting the work of the life sciences to the nature of human dignity. But 
something changes here that we did not see with either the Vatican or the United 
Nations. Th is pastoral exercise will come to resemble something much closer to a 
kind of governmental power, what one might call a sort of “biopolitical pastoral.”
Recall that in my excursus on pastoral power I pointed to a double fact: (1) that 
with human dignity the classical mandate to take care of all and of each one was 
taken up and reconfi gured but (2) that it was constituted, for both pragmatic and 
conceptual reasons, without direct recourse to the instruments of the conduct of 
conduct. With the President’s Council this double fact remains in place, but it is 
troubled on both sides. On the fi rst side it is no longer clear whether or how the care 
of human dignity will require attention to the good of all or each one. Concentra-
tion on the “truly human” and the aggregate outcomes of biotechnological research 
are articulated as a matter of caring directly for “life humanly lived” and less directly 
for individuals living life. On the second side, although the stakes will once again 
concern human dignity in an archonic mode, and therefore human dignity as that 
which cannot be cultivated but only defended, a more direct eff ort will be made 
to regulate a zone of activity directly. Th at zone of activity is biotechnology. So, 
although it remains the case that human dignity is not an object of the conduct of 
conduct, it is nevertheless also the case that, in the name of human dignity, biotech-
nology is such an object. Th e catch, however, is this: in an eff ort to defi ne the human 
of human dignity as integral to, and as identical with, the body understood as the 
object of biotechnological intervention, the council eff ectively elides the prior view 
that it is the milieu within which human dignity resides and not human dignity per 
se that needs to be interpreted and intervened on. Th is drawing together of what 
one might call the spirit of dignity and the body of biology produces a generative 
eff ect: it catalyzes a prolifi c debate about the defi nition of human dignity and its 
relative usefulness as a term of bioethical art. Unlike in the cases of the United Na-
tions and the Vatican, however, this bioethical conjuncture of dignity and the body 
did not prove generative in nondiscursive registers; that is, it did not prove helpful 
in the work of turning human dignity into a practice.
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Th e proposed warrant for the council’s eff orts is Kass’ assertion that bioethics has 
not previously been a matter of caring for bios understood as the human life lived in 
a truly human fashion. Bioethics therefore needs to be made into a practice accord-
ing to which and by way of which the logos of bios can be more eff ectively discerned, 
articulated, and made into an instrument for the regulation of biology. Bioethics in 
this strict etymological sense is already a matter of biology. Th e mandate to create a 
“richer bioethics” can be put like this: the life sciences should be conducted in such 
a way that they contribute to the security of biology understood as the truth of life 
humanly lived. Human dignity is thus fi gured as an external principle of limitation 
in the conduct of the life sciences. But it is also fi gured as an internal metric for 
calibrating the life sciences, a metric according to which certain programs, activi-
ties, and applications must be pursued. I suggested that in the case of the United 
Nations human dignity was never actually integrated into the raison d’état. Nor was 
it simply a point of juridical delimitation. It was, rather, positioned in a liminal 
space alongside of and in view of governmental practice. Kass’s proposal for a richer 
bioethics moves beyond this liminality. It brings human dignity closer to the center 
of things. Bios, the human life in its multiple senses, needs to be made the governing 
object of care. Bioethics needs to be made into the self-moderation of biology.
beyond therapy
Th e hermeneutic side of Kass’s call for a richer bioethics occupied the council in an 
immediate and sustained way for the fi rst eighteen months of its work. Th e ques-
tions of what constitutes a truly human life, how such a life relates to biotechnology, 
and what should be done about this relation were introduced in the fi rst meeting in 
January 2002 and occupied a place on the monthly agenda until September 2003. 
Th e council worked at an intense pace. Within the fi rst two years they published 
three major volumes of work. Th e second of these three, Beyond Th erapy: Biotech-
nology and the Pursuit of Happiness, published in October 2003, constituted the 
council’s fi rst systematic statement of what bioethics of a “richer” sort might consist 
in. In it they gave sustained attention to the question of the character of biotech-
nology. Th ey also gave sustained attention to the question of what constitutes a 
truly human life. Th ey also set out criteria on the basis of which biotechnological 
developments might be conducted diff erently and, relative to human dignity, in a 
more secure fashion.
In what follows, I propose to recapitulate the arguments developed in Beyond 
Th erapy. Before doing this, however, it bears repeating that this volume is only one 
among the many produced by the council. In this sense it does not have any special 
standing or authoritative status in the corpus of their work. It is not constitutional 
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in anything like the same fashion as the Universal Declaration was for the United 
Nations’ activities on human rights or Gaudium et spes for the Vatican on pastoral 
care for the modern world. Th is means that Beyond Th erapy is neither the key to the 
council’s formulations nor a defi nitive statement summarizing the essence of their 
work. However, the volume constitutes an important published outcome of the 
council’s eff ort to address directly the constitutional problem introduced by Kass’ 
opening address. Th eir response to this problem required them to answer the ques-
tions of what human dignity is such that it is put in danger by biotechnology, what 
biotechnology is such that it should endanger human dignity, and what bioethical 
practice will need to be invented in order to mitigate all this. Beyond Th erapy can be 
read as one of the council’s major attempts to answer these questions.
For the purposes of my analysis, two chapters of Beyond Th erapy warrant particu-
lar attention. Th e fi rst chapter in the volume provides an account of the problem 
being addressed. It also presents and justifi es the mode in which this problem is 
taken up. Th e last chapter in the volume—in view of four cases presented in the 
course of the book—provides a set of summary and orienting conclusions. It also 
lays out the case for why the stakes of bioethics are particularly high today. In re-
capitulating the formulations developed in these two chapters I will refl ect on the 
reasons off ered and the evidence marshaled in support of the core assertion Kass 
made at the outset: that in the face of biotechnology a truly human way of life is in 
danger and needs to be preserved.
I will focus attention on a particular diffi  culty faced by the council: demonstrat-
ing human dignity. Unlike the United Nations, the President’s Council does say 
something about the origins of “human nature and human dignity.” And unlike 
the United Nations and the Vatican the council attempts to provide a substan-
tive defi nition of human dignity, or, more exactly, a substantive defi nition of that 
which is truly human and thus that which can be taken to count as “the human” in 
human dignity. Th e analytic question that can be posed to their work is this: what 
happens to what Klaus Dicke calls the “founding function” of human dignity? 
What happens to the “archonic settlement,” when an attempt is made to demon-
strate and defi ne human dignity in substantive terms? What kind of work can this 
fi gure do once it is demonstrated and not simply declaimed? Richard McKeon pre-
dicted that philosophic unanimity with regard to human dignity and human rights 
would compromise unity of political action. At the Vatican the question of the 
source of dignity is answered by way of a nonsubstantive notion of a call into being 
that produces ontological continuity between nature and the supernatural. In the 
case of United Nations the question of the source and substance of dignity created 
a problem of competing frames of reference and modes of reasoning, which was 
resolved by way of simply declaring human dignity and excluding the question of 
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origins. Despite these diff erences, in both cases the result was the production of 
an archonic rendering of things human. In Beyond Th erapy, in distinction to each 
of these, human life is defi ned through an exercise in what might be called a natu-
ralistic demonstration of human dignity or, to put it more precisely, an exercise 
in verifying human dignity. Th e content of the truly human, it is argued, can be 
shown to consist in a set of tensions between the limitations of body, mind, and 
soul on the one side and “the deepest human desires” on the other. Th ese tensions 
are susceptible to demonstration, to verifi cation. Human dignity is susceptible to 
verifi cation.
In addition to examining Beyond Th erapy, I will also off er a brief examination of 
the President’s Council’s 2008 book Human Dignity and Bioethics. Given the title 
of this later work, I should perhaps make it more central to my study. Th e principal 
reason why I am giving it less attention is that Human Dignity is, in my estimation, 
something of a response to—a solution for—the conceptual diffi  culties and even-
tual polarizations opened up by the council’s earlier work. It is, in this sense, one 
ramifi cation of the attempt to constitute bioethics as a matter of human dignity. As 
such, although it consists of a set of essays written by council members and other in-
vited philosophers, it is less of a constitutional or orienting statement of the council’s 
work and more an attempt to deal with the agenda and partial blockages that their 
orienting work had produced. Th at said, it is important to give some attention to 
the way in which the council’s work began to ramify and fragment after seven years 
of intense engagement. It is also important that this later volume was commissioned 
by a new council chair, Edmond Pellegrino, and not by Leon Kass. In any event, 
for seven years the concept of human dignity held a strategically crucial place in the 
council’s work. In their examination of topics ranging from cloning, to stem cell 
research, to death and dying, the concept of human dignity is used to name what 
is at stake and serves to calibrate the council’s practical recommendations. In all of 
this, it bears underscoring, the defi nition of “human dignity” was never formally 
settled—although, as I will discuss at length, the specifi c terms of a “truly human 
life” were carefully defi ned and put forward as a kind of proxy defi nition for human 
dignity. In this way, the fi gure of human dignity was made to function in a more or 
less regular and coherent manner throughout the course of the council’s work under 
Kass. One of the important legacies of that work is that the eventual demand for 
more defi nitional precision produced cacophonous philosophical debate, exempli-
fi ed by the council’s own volume of essays.
I have paid particular attention to several characteristics of the council’s concep-
tion of human dignity. First is the fact that they often used the phrase in an under-
defi ned manner. Th is is not remarkable and basically coheres with how the term has 
been deployed in other settings. However, it continued to be deployed regularly and 
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continued to operate in a fairly consistent manner in part because the notion of the 
human to which it was attached was, in fact, given a more or less stable defi nition. 
When the term was given direct and concerted philosophic attention in 2008 it 
began to fragment; this marked a threshold in the council’s ability to work with the 
term. It is worth thinking through how it is that a lack of direct conceptual clarity 
did not impede ethical and political activity, at least not for the council itself, as 
well as how it is that when the council decided to refl ect in a sustained way on the 
concept of “human dignity,” rather than on “the truly human life” as a proxy for 
human dignity, the outcome was the generation of a set of fragmented and contesta-
tory essays. A certain coherence and operability gets lost in the scrutiny. Th at being 
said, a more central consideration for my purposes is the fact that the defi nition of 
the human at play in the early writings of the council, especially in Beyond Th erapy, 
eff ectively combined the archonic and the governmental in the name of a richer 
bioethics. Th e attempt to put an archonic fi gure of the human to work as the basis 
for a governmental logic of human life ultimately constitutes a shift in the politics 
of intrinsic worth connected to the history of human dignity.
In the introduction to Human Dignity and Bioethics Adam Schulman, a member 
of the council’s staff , posed the question of whether or not the term human dignity 
is a useful one. On some level the question should strike us as strange: it obviously 
is; it had helped facilitate a considerable amount of work throughout the council’s 
tenure up to that point. Such usefulness is exemplifi ed by the positions elaborated 
in Beyond Th erapy. Th e “truly human” life, under threat from biotechnology, is the 
central fi gure in Beyond Th erapy. And it is clear in that book that for the members 
of the council (insofar as the book can be said to represent their view of things) the 
fi gure of the truly human is precisely the site of dignity and hence precisely that 
which needs to be protected. Th e interesting question, then, is not whether or not 
the fi gure of human dignity is a useful one. Th e question is, rather, how is it used 
and to what eff ect.
beyond the formal: specifying the truly human
Th e end of the introductory chapter to Beyond Th erapy poses this question: “What 
does and what will [biotechnology] mean for us—as individuals, as  members of 
American society, and as human beings eager to live well in an age of biotechnol-
ogy?” Th e text explains that this is the “fi rst” question, the question that orients the 
method and spirit of the inquiry which will follow. Th e question serves well as a de-
vice for specifying and analyzing the elements and relations of the council’s broader 
proposal for a richer bioethics as imagined under Kass’s leadership. Five elements 
stand out. I list them in the order I will take them up. Th e fi rst element is “human 
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beings.” At the center of the council’s eff orts is the proposal that a richer bioeth-
ics will consist of an account of the “full human meaning” of biotechnology. Th e 
“human being” is put forward as a core metric for bioethics. Th e second element is 
“eager to live well.” Th is element has two sides. Th e fi rst side is aff ective. Th e text 
states that the mode of inquiry will be to examine “desires and goals” that drive bio-
technology. Th e second side is ethical, in the sense of practices that give form to life. 
Th e council’s ethical inquiry will involve a question of the relation between aff ect 
and the ordering of life. Th e third element is “age of biotechnology.” Th is element 
has two sides as well. Th e council will need to defi ne biotechnology in such a way 
that its challenges are clear. And they will also need to answer to the question of how 
these challenges are intensifi ed by an “age,” which is obviously a comprehensive and 
totalizing term. Th e fourth element is “American society.” Th e council argues that 
the dangers of biotechnology are connected to a broader American ethos. How this 
ethos constitutes a “society” and how such a society catalyzes the stakes of bioethics 
is put forward as a critical matter. Th e fi fth and fi nal element concerns the question 
of what biotechnology and bioethics might “mean for us.” Here the council tells us 
what kind of challenge it is taking up and what kind of practice it is engaged in. Th e 
challenge centers on the question of meaning. Th e Letter of Transmittal to the Pres-
ident reads: “biotechnical powers may blind us to the larger meaning.” It follows 
that the mode of practice the council is engaged in is, on some level, hermeneutic; 
it consists of “interpreting and making sense of something.” Bioethics begins with a 
hermeneutic practice. Th e signifi cance of this claim, and the ways in which such a 
hermeneutic practice might be translated into mechanisms for the governance of 
biotechnology, remained a central problem.
1. Human Being
In a subsection of the introductory chapter the council proposes to make “the case 
for public attention” to biotechnology and to do so by casting biotechnology as a 
“problem of power” that takes medicine and the manipulation of the human body 
“beyond therapy.” I will take up what they mean by “beyond therapy” and “bio-
technology as power” momentarily. Here I want to specify the terms of the case 
they off er up. Th e council is concerned by what its members take to be a lack of 
attention in “public bioethics” to questions raised by eff orts to “improve on human 
nature.” Th ey state that they are disquieted by the fact that many bioethicists either 
think that there is no such thing as “human nature” or, if there is, that “altering it 
is not ethically problematic.” Th e council acknowledges that specifying the “nature, 
shape, and content” of human being and specifying the questions raised in trying 
to improve human being are diffi  cult, if not ultimately elusive, tasks. Nevertheless, 
in something of a tone of self-attributed courage, they propose to take up these 
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tasks, which make up “some of the weightiest questions in bioethics.” Th ey are the 
weightiest because they bear on matters of human fl ourishing, the threat of dehu-
manization, and the meaning of what it means to live as a human being.
Although the text does not provide anything like a philosophically systematic 
anthropology, it does elaborate several defi ning anthropological features. Th ese 
features can be characterized, in turn, as ontological, aff ective, and ethical. I will 
examine the ontological fi rst and the aff ective and ethical in the next subsection. 
On the ontological level two sets of terms are emphasized. Th e fi rst set consists in 
“natural limits,” the second in “natural gifts.” In a section of the text entitled “Be-
yond Natural Limits,” the council advances a series of distinctions that guide the 
elaboration of these two sets of terms. First, they tell us that the familiar distinction 
between therapy and enhancement off ers a certain conceptual advantage for their 
work. Th e advantage is that it underscores the notion that medicine addresses itself 
to a “natural human whole” in relation to which actions that exceed therapy could, 
in principle, be specifi ed. Th erapy is said to fulfi ll “human wholeness” and en-
hancement to exceed it. Second, however, they tell us that the distinction between 
therapy and enhancement turns out to be less helpful when thinking ethically than 
it does when one is thinking medically. It is less helpful in the fi rst place because 
the ethical boundaries are notoriously diffi  cult to specify. More important, it is less 
helpful because “the human being whose wholeness or healing is sought or accom-
plished by biomedical therapy is fi nite and frail, medicine or no medicine.” Even if 
medically whole, the human will be marked by limitation and therefore, as we will 
see, marked in its very being by the temptation to try to exceed limitation.
Finite and frail: at several points the text emphasizes that human existence is 
defi ned by what the council describes as “natural limits.” To this extent the human 
being is like the rest of the natural world. Th e body wears out. Th e mind slows 
down. Th e soul has unrealized aspirations. “Even at its fi ttest, the fatigable and the 
limited human body rarely carries out fl awlessly even the ordinary desires of the 
soul.” Whatever is meant by “the soul,” the point is that the human is limited in 
all dimensions of its being and that these limitations are constituted by “nature,” 
by which the authors sometimes seem to mean “biology”—“highly complex and 
delicately balanced as a result of eons of gradual and exacting evolution.” Complex 
and balanced but limited and frail all the same.
Yet, according to the text, these natural limits, despite the problems they at-
tend, are not altogether problematic. Natural limitations may include such things 
as “smallpox and malaria, concern and Alzheimer disease, decline and decay.” And 
natural limitations can be the source of the experience of inequality; some hu-
man beings, after all, are more limited than others depending on one’s standard. 
However, and this is a crucial point for the council, the natural limits of psyche 
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and soma “are the source of its—our—loftiest aspirations, whose weakness are the 
source of its—our—loftiest aspirations.” Natural limitations are the predicate of 
human striving. Human striving is the predicate of human excellence. Human ex-
cellence is the predicate of human fl ourishing. And this, they conclude, constitutes 
a life “humanly lived.” So, a double-sided ontological claim is made: the human is 
limited and these limits are a predicate of fl ourishing.
A second set of ontological terms concerns what the council refers to as “natural 
gifts.” Th e council proposes that there is another aspect, or point of emphasis, to 
consider with regard to the idea that human existence is characterized by natural 
limits. Th is is that these limits and predicates are given. Th at is to say, they are 
not cultivated. Human beings are not simply limited; they are limited by nature. 
To the extent that human excellence depends on a prior set of limitations, these 
limitations, these predicates of excellence, are naturally given. Th e council puts it 
this way: human bodies, minds, souls, powers, and talents “are not wholly our own 
doing.” Th e world is “gifted” by nature. Th is may seem an obvious point, but the 
council underscores it precisely because it will be vital to their archonic rendering 
of human life.
Why should the council take time to emphasize the fact that limits are given 
by nature? Because they think that the notion of natural givenness cum giftedness 
carries with it a tacit ethical mandate. Th e mandate consists in a call to adopt an 
attitude of respect and gratitude for what is given. Th e call is not only a matter of 
respecting a kind of sanctity of nature—though it is certainly that as well: the man-
date is part “religious sensibility” consisting in the admonishment to be “nature’s 
servant” and not “her aspiring master.” But the mandate is also cast as a matter of 
prudence, and it is this part of the naturalistic mandate that proves decisive. Th e call 
to humility and gratitude in the face of naturally given limits is an ethical exercise 
that will allow humans to cultivate a capacity for discerning between those things 
that can be “tinkered with”—the council’s term—and those that “should be left 
alone.” Th e exhortation to respect giftedness is not so much a moral metric that 
could, itself, indicate which things to intervene on and which not to, which natural 
limits to ameliorate and which to respect. It is, rather, something closer to a virtue 
that needs to be cultivated so as to establish a “humanly proper” disposition.
What then is the metric that would allow us to discern which limits to respect, 
if it is not the “naturally given”? Th e answer is “human ‘givenness.’ ” It is not en-
tirely clear what the accent on “human” means or adds in substantive terms for 
the council. However, as a kind of formal principle, the council writes that human 
givenness or a given humanness is that which could be “perfected without ceasing to 
be itself.” Th is is crucial and is the point on which richer bioethics as proposed in 
the text fi nds its center. Th e question of what should be altered by biotechnology 
F6671.indb   247 9/16/15   10:39:08 AM
248 Human Dignity and the President’s Council on Bioethics
and to what degree can be answered by appeal to, by reference to, a “given human 
nature.” Th is given human nature, or gifted nature, is, we are told, “inherently good 
and dignifi ed.” Why this is the case we are not told, other than the circular fact that 
without this given human nature we could not be ourselves. Nevertheless, and this 
is really the point, the ontological fact of given limits as the predicate of human 
fl ourishing is that which is both the site of human dignity and that which must not 
be violated.
2. Eager to Live Well
Th e fi rst claim about human being is that it is limited, that limits are given, and the 
human is therein dignifi ed. Th at is to say, of course, that human being is archonic. 
A second anthropological feature concerns aff ect: the linking of desire and purpose. 
Human beings, recalling the quote above, are “eager to live well.” In the opening 
pages of Beyond Th erapy the council members indicate that an analysis of desires 
and purposes is part their strategic orientation. If the purpose of the book is to 
refl ect on biotechnology “beyond therapy,” then the core ethical questions revolve 
less around specifi c technologies and more around “the desires and goals of human 
beings.” According to the text, biotechnology is signifi cant because it is a mode of 
power through which diff erent forms can be given to human life. (I will return to 
this below.) Th is means, among other things, that what counts ethically are not the 
specifi c techniques but how they are put to use. Th e question of use, on the view of 
the council, is a question of desires and goals.
At two key junctures in the text, the council inserts comments in footnotes that 
are presented as asides but that on examination seem rather important. Th e fi rst is 
a brief note on the title of the volume. Th e footnote tells us that the title Beyond 
Th erapy was chosen for two reasons. First, it indicates a point of entry into, and 
delimitation of, the question of the uses of biotechnological power, a question that 
might otherwise be open-ended. Second, it both calls to mind and points beyond 
the familiar distinction between therapy and enhancement. Th e footnote tells us 
that this familiar distinction, in turn, has two limitations. Th e fi rst limitation is 
that it is notoriously diffi  cult to pin down. Th e distinction depends in large part 
on what one considers to be “normal” health. It is an easily observable fact that as 
the techniques and technologies of medicine and public health evolve the norms 
of health evolve. Th e council writes that “ordinary experience . . . recognizes the 
diff erence between ‘restoring to normal’ and ‘going beyond normal.’ ” But because 
all therapeutic interventions are ameliorative and therefore overlap with those inter-
ventions that might be a matter of enhancement, the “ordinary” diff erence cannot 
be specifi ed in general terms. Th ere is a second limitation, however, that is more 
signifi cant still. Th e second limitation is that the distinction between therapy and 
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enhancement is usually taken to be a matter of distinguishing various kinds of uses 
to which medical techniques and technologies can be put. Th e ethical question, 
however, turns less on the purposes of technology and more on the relation of “hu-
man beings and their purposes.” So, we are told, the title Beyond Th erapy is meant 
to indicate that what is at stake is that something more than therapy is going on 
but also that this something more should be specifi ed through an examination of 
human purposes.
So, to which purposes should we pay attention? Here I turn to the second foot-
note. It reads: “By his very nature, man is the animal constantly looking for ways 
to better his life through artful means and devices; man is the animal with what 
Rousseau called ‘perfectibility.’ ” What does this mean? Minimally, it means that 
human being is not only defi ned by naturally given limitations but also by the as-
piration and desire to overcome those limitations. Th is desire is implied by the no-
tion that limitations are the predicate of fl ourishing but that this needs to be given 
explicit attention: “As a result of these infi rmities, particular and universal, human 
beings have long dreamed of overcoming limitations of body and soul, in particu-
lar the limitations of bodily decay, psychic distress, and the frustration of human 
aspiration.” Th is inclination to overcome naturally given limits is as crucial to 
what it means to be a human being as the ontological fact of being limited.
All this is seems to be to the good on the council’s estimation. Human desire, 
formulated as human purpose, becomes the possibility of human excellence. Th e 
problem is that the dream of overcoming limitations becomes the dream of over-
coming all limits. Th e text cites a classical term that frequently circulates in ques-
tions of biotechnology: the Greek hubris. Th e council provides a two-part defi ni-
tion. Hubris is, in the fi rst place, the desire for the perfection of the gods. In the 
second place, it is the fact that this desire emerges where there is insuffi  cient wisdom 
guiding human desire and purpose. Th e drive to hubris, the text reminds us, is the 
crux of Greek tragedy. Achilles and Prometheus are cited. And what is the source 
of wisdom that impedes this drive and saves us from tragedy? Th e wisdom of the 
givenness of nature—respect for and defense of “what is naturally human,” “hu-
manly dignifi ed,” “for what is naturally and dignifi edly human.”
Th e council here presents a diffi  culty. How can humans discern between those 
dreams of overcoming limitation that are proper to “truly human life,” and that 
therefore fall short of hubris, and those dreams that are a drive to perfection and 
therefore tragic? Th e council admits that a general rule is diffi  cult to formulate and 
apply, except to say that those desires that would take us past the point at which 
we would “cease to be human” should be forbidden. Th ey suggest that the distinc-
tion between human desires and purposes and “super-human” desires and purposes 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Such case work, in fact, constitutes the 
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bulk of the book. Th e council examines four cases of biotechnical zones within 
which the human impulse to perfection can become tragic: better children, ageless 
bodies, superior performance, and happier souls. Th e details of these cases are quite 
interesting, but the general conclusion to draw from them is what concerns us here: 
the council advises that in cultivating desires and purposes we must be sure that our 
ends can be achieved by “natural” and not only “unnatural” means.
If the distinction between therapy and enhancement is diffi  cult to specify and 
maintain, certainly the distinction between “natural” and “unnatural” means is all 
the more problematic. Th e question of natural and unnatural, it turns out, does 
not turn on the diff erence between “the given” and “the cultivated,” as one might 
expect. What the council suggests instead is that “natural” means of striving for ex-
cellence are those means in which the connection between the mode of intervention 
and the outcome is constituted by a “knowing and striving subject.” Human eff ort 
in human achievement by way of meaningful activity can be distinguished from in-
terventions in which the subject is a passive recipient. On one level the point seems 
to be that natural means of overcoming limits are a matter of the subject working on 
herself as a subject, a situation of nonestrangement in which “the relations between 
the knowing subject and his activities, and between his activities and their fulfi ll-
ments and pleasures” coincide and cohere. On another level all of this may seem 
terribly problematic. Conceptually, what does it mean to say that ethics should be 
concerned with “the possibility of natural, unimpeded, for-itself human activity” 
and that this concern should illuminate our relation to biotechnology?
Whatever one makes of the ethical appeal to “natural means” of human striving, 
the anthropological point that the council wants to make is clear. Th e human is 
that being who is naturally limited and who strives to overcome these limits. Th is 
striving is the source of human excellence but can also be the site of human tragedy. 
Th e Promethean impulse must be tempered with the wisdom of the givenness of 
human being and the drive to perfection curbed. Th e payoff  of all this for bioethics 
is the specifi cation of what counts as the “truly human” and thereby what counts as 
dignifi ed human life: the assurance and protection of dignifi ed bios. In rather poetic 
terms, an anthropological summary is off ered, some of which I have already quoted: 
“It is to see the human being as a creature ‘in-between,’ neither god nor beast, 
neither dumb nor disembodied soul, but as a puzzling, upward-pointing unity of 
psyche and soma whose precise limitations are the source of its—our—loftiest as-
pirations, whose weaknesses are the source of its—our—keenest attachments, and 
whose natural gifts may be, if we do not squander or destroy them, exactly what 
we need to fl ourish and perfect ourselves—as human beings.” Or, to off er another 
evocative quote, this one from a volume published two months later: “What is it 
about us, unique among the species, that enables our suff ering to be (at least par-
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tially) redeemed? What is it about us, unique among the species, that enables us to 
strive upward against the downward pull of necessity or to meet the world and our 
fellow creatures fully and directly, actively and honestly, feelingly and truly? Th e 
name we give to this excellence is ‘human dignity.’ ”
Th e balance of striving and limitation. Th is is the bios that is at stake for the 
ethics of life. If we are to ask the question: what danger does biotechnology pose 
today? Th e council’s fi rst answer must be: a danger to the human as that being 
whose dignity lies in the balance of limitation and striving. Th e problem with the 
“age of biotechnology” in “American society,” we might anticipate, is precisely that 
this balance is likely to be upset.
3. Th e Age of Biotechnology
Now to the third element: “the age of biotechnology.” “Biotechnology” fi rst, and 
then “age.” In the fi rst pages of the volume, Kass, addressing the reader as the chair 
of the council, writes that biotechnology off ers both relief for the sick as well as 
the prospect of becoming more “perfect.” Th e trope is familiar: biotechnology is 
a concern of dual use. What Kass makes of that trope is quite interesting, however. 
Biotechnology, he suggests, is a matter of capacities. It is a mode and form of power 
that works to give shape to human life. If ethical inquiry takes as its point of focus 
the scientifi c basis of the “uses” of biotechnology, this is not simply because bio-
technology is, after all, instrumental. It is, rather, a question generated by the fact 
that biotechnology intensifi es capacities. Moreover, it is a question generated by the 
fact that the source of intensifi cation is not merely technoscientifi c breakthrough 
but also the ways in which humans order their lives by way of these intensifi ed 
capacities.
It is, in this light, that the authors give sustained attention to the defi nition of 
biotechnology in the volume. Th e key feature of their defi nition is that they do not 
develop it by way of the question “What is biotechnology?”—as though one could 
specify its essence. Th eir approach, rather, is to pose multiple questions concerning 
the telos of biotechnology: “What is biotechnology for?” “Toward what ends is it 
taking us?” and “What should it be for?” Th e question of biotechnology, then, is 
less one of processes and products (although the council does take these seriously as 
well). Th e question instead is how biotechnology manifests a form of ethical prac-
tice and outlook, how it serves as a way of working on and working over human life. 
Biotechnology is a question of power and orientation: what is biotechnology such 
that it allows us to give human life one form rather than another?
Th e question of power and orientation exposes four “complications,” the council 
tells us. Th e fi rst complication is that biotechnology, taken as a power that intensi-
fi es the capacity to give form to human life, is a means with variable ends. Th is fi rst 
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complication is familiar. Th e same biotechnology can facilitate diff erent kinds of 
interventions on ourselves and others. Th e question of whether or not to intervene 
cannot be sorted out on the technological side of the ledger. Th e second complica-
tion concerns the metric for orienting and evaluating these new capacities. How do 
we know which aspects of human being should be made the target of intervention? 
Th e answer: those that allow us to remain truly human. As we have seen, such an 
answer entails evident diffi  culties. But let us say these diffi  culties can be managed. 
Let us say we have specifi ed those things about being human that are defi nitive 
and therefore precious and that will serve as a standard to guide intervention. 
A third diffi  culty inevitably arises: what if, in our interventions, which all appear 
worthwhile according to the goods we have chosen to pursue, we fi nd that the in-
terventions do not redound to a better human existence? Th is third diffi  culty is not 
a matter of unintended consequences. It is a matter of the problem of the relation 
between apparent goods and actual goods. Our interventions might proceed in the 
name of apparent goods but actually ramify in such a way that we fi nd ourselves less 
well off  relative to actual goods.
Th e fourth complication is more subtle and presents a more fundamental dif-
fi culty than the other three. Th e fourth concerns the mutually conditioning relation 
between capacities and desires. Th e council argues that as biotechnology intensifi es 
the capacity for intervening on limitations it also generates ever greater desire for 
such capacities and interventions. Two cascading eff ects ensue. Th ings that once 
might have been taken as naturally given and therefore as sites of natural determina-
tion are reconceived as insertion points for technological self-determination. And 
things that might once have been taken to be exotic become not only normal but 
necessary and urgent as well. Human striving, a “natural” and dignifi ed part of be-
ing human, is technologically catalyzed and the impulse to perfection intensifi ed.
Th e analysis of this dynamic is familiar fare of medical sociology, as the council 
notes. It is something like the process of “medicalization” writ biotechnically large. 
On the council’s usage, medicalization describes a dynamic wherein the expansion 
of biomedical capacity both drives and is reciprocally driven by an increase in the 
range of human experiences and phenomena which can be conceived as problems 
susceptible to and calling for medical resolution. If it is the case that the increase of 
biotechnological capacities reconfi gures human experiences, practices, conditions, 
and limitations as sites of biotechnological resolution or enrichment, then the ethi-
cal question becomes: what does such an intensifi cation entail? First and foremost 
it entails carrying human desires and purposes beyond what the council takes to 
be the natural balance of limitation and striving. Th e human is that fi nite creature 
that strains against limits. “Biotechnologization” works progressively to undo the 
predicate of “given humanness,” both at the level of desire and at the level of actual 
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practices. Th e desire for the elimination of the predicate of the naturally given is the 
desire for the elimination of the predicate of human excellence.
So, the fi rst answer to the question “what is biotechnology?” is this: biotechnol-
ogy is a power that intensifi es the capacity to give form to human life. Th e second 
answer is that it is a power that intensifi es the desire to eliminate all human limita-
tions. We can say that for the council biotechnology is not only a catalyst for hubris 
but also holds the prospect of actualizing a series of never-ending attempts to elimi-
nate limitations and the never-ending process of seeing each new limitation as an 
imperfection in need of elimination. Th at is to say, of course, that on the council’s 
view biotechnology brings with it the prospect and danger of dehumanization.
Two factors make all of this a matter of particularly urgency for the council. 
Th e fi rst is their conclusion that ours is a “biotechnological age.” Th e second is that 
the biotechnological age is catalyzed by the excesses of liberal democracy. I will ad-
dress the second in the next section. Th e council writes: “By all accounts, we have 
entered upon a golden age for biology, medicine, and biotechnology.” What does 
the council mean by this? On one level the statement is a criticism of the hype con-
nected to biotechnological innovations. By any number of measures the account 
of a golden age does not add up. Th e council obviously does not take things to be 
“golden.” What is more, if one takes seriously Kass’s claim that we live in a world 
marked by insecurity on multiple fronts, then biotechnology can hardly be thought 
of as an “age” at all. It is one threat among others.
On another level, of course, the council seems perfectly comfortable proposing 
that we live in something of an “age” and that biotechnology is its diacritic. Th e 
form of that diacritic is not simply that biotechnology is more ubiquitous today 
than ever before. It is not just that the last decades of the twentieth century saw 
the movement of biotechnological sciences beyond a small number of elite U.S. 
centers to universities and industries around the world. It is not that the expansion 
of the worldwide use of the Internet means that knowhow and materials of biology 
are ever more accessible, and it is not a reference to the fact that the fl ow of global 
capital into the biosciences runs into the many billions of dollars. All of these things 
certainly contribute to the fact of a “biotechnological age,” but these do not capture 
what the council means by this term. Th e contemporary world is characterized as a 
“biotechnological age” because the expansion of biotechnology has normalized the 
logic of “biotechnicalization.” Today, we are told, “biotechnologists are steadily in-
creasing our power ever more precisely to intervene into the workings of our bodies 
and minds and to alter them by rational design.” We live in a biotechnological age 
because the ostensibly ageless desire for “healthier bodies, decreased pain and suff er-
ing, peace of mind, and longer life”—“all perfectly human”—is being rethought as 
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a problem of biotechnological intervention. Biotechnology has become a privileged 
site for rethinking “our very humanity.”
Given the heterogeneous character of the contemporary world, the idea that we 
live in an age of any kind, biotechnical or otherwise, might seem diffi  cult to sustain. 
Nonetheless, the term “age” is crucial to what the council takes to be the theme 
and stakes of its work: the problem at hand is cast as a total problem. As to theme, 
the council’s work bears on a dynamic of humanization and dehumanization. Th is 
problem is taken to be at the heart of the logic of biotechnology itself. Because of 
this biotechnology is a fraught loop of saving ourselves, losing ourselves, and saving 
ourselves from ourselves. It is in this sense that biotechnology will take us “beyond 
therapy.” As to the stakes, the term “age” is used because biotechnologization is a 
total problem. Nothing falls outside of it. All aspects of human life are potentially 
open to biotechnical intervention, and all biotechnical practices, at least potentially, 
raise the specter of dehumanization. Other desires—the freedom of inquiry, the 
social goods of medicine, and the like—are recast as, at best, distractions, at worst 
indirect means of reinforcing the problem.
Th e real warrant for referring to these dynamics as a biotechnological age is that 
it allows the council to off er a totalizing claim about the dystopic trajectory of the 
current state of play: the prospect of “fl at, empty lives devoid of love and longing” 
like those imagined almost a century ago by Aldous Huxley. Th e council takes 
Brave New World as a kind of prophesy to be heeded. Biotechnology is a problem 
calling for ethical refl ection because it is a power that can upset the balance between 
human limits and striving and because today we face the dystopian prospects of 
an age of a biotechnologically facilitated drive to increase our psychic, somatic, 
and spiritual capacities. All of this is cast as deeply tragic: biotechnology is driven 
forward on the hope of human self-amelioration. Human dignity, in an age of bio-
technology, is threatened with the best of intentions.
4. American Society
In the “fi rst question,” quoted above, the council states that the work of a richer 
bioethics concerns not just human beings generally but “American Society” in par-
ticular. No doubt this particularity is underscored in part because of the council’s 
setting and mandate—it is an advisory council to the U.S. President, after all. Th e 
emphasis on America, however, turns out to be a matter of more substantive con-
cern. Biotechnology is not only a concern because of the variable purposes and ca-
pacities of the technologies themselves. It is not only a concern because it is a power 
to “rationally design” human life according to specifi cations of our own making. 
And it is not only a concern because it lends itself to the increase and technologiza-
tion of a desire for limitlessness. All of this is a matter of considerable concern to the 
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council. Besides and beyond all of this, however, biotechnology is a problem today 
because of the character of the world within which it is developing. On the council’s 
diagnosis bioethics faces something like the challenge confronted by Vatican II: hu-
man dignity is in danger not solely because biotechnology is developing but because 
biotechnology is developing in the late modern world. And what is this late modern 
world that constitutes a problem for bioethics? “American society.”
Th e term “society” is ubiquitous in bioethics. Th e concept and the referent, how-
ever, are rarely clear. If the term “human” is notoriously diffi  cult to defi ne, “society” 
may be equally problematic. Strictly speaking, of course, “society” is the object and 
objective of the modern welfare state and is not the universal and self-evident cat-
egory it is often taken to be. When the term is discursively invoked as the concern 
of bioethics, it serves as a kind of underdefi ned gesture to “all those who are likely 
to be eff ected by scientifi c developments.” And when the term becomes an object 
of bioethical practice, such as in the European Union’s eff orts to create forums for 
“science and society,” the practical problem of picking out who counts as “society’s” 
representative remains a constant diffi  culty.
Despite these familiar underdeterminations and practical diffi  culties, the term 
“society” indicates something quite specifi c for the council. Society in Beyond Th er-
apy is the aggregate counterpart to the fi gure of the liberal individual. Society is an 
incorporation of individuals who make their “own free choices” about what to do 
with and about biotechnology. Of course—and this is a matter of some concern 
for the council—society is not just the sum of individuals making free choices. It 
is also a matrix that determines those individual choices and a vector of amplifi ca-
tion in which matters that might be of little concern in any individual case become 
troublesome. If society, or “the social good,” was occasionally cited in the debates 
over human subject research as that which threatened the individual, the council in 
Beyond Th erapy off ers something of an inversion. In an “age of biotechnology,” the 
freely consenting individual is both a source of trouble as well as a tragic victim. In a 
kind of circular fashion, through the amplifi cation of individual choices determined 
by “society,” biotechnology threatens to undermine the social good. Biotechnology 
in “American society” thereby poses a threat to humanity. Put schematically: the 
problem is no longer how to protect the individual from the social. Th e problem, 
rather, is how to protect the social from the individual.
Th e council’s diagnosis of “American society” is not unfamiliar. It resonates with 
the philosophies sometimes described as neoconservative and so was coherent with 
much of what was happening in Washington at the time Beyond Th erapy was com-
posed. Th e diagnosis has the feel of Kass’s own project, articulated in his work Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Dignity, and it largely conforms with a working paper 
he wrote for the commission entitled “Beyond Th erapy: Biotechnology and the 
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Pursuit of Human Improvement.” Th e familiarity of the diagnosis, however, does 
not detract from its signifi cance in the context of the council’s work. It constitutes 
a more or less coherent and comprehensive, if underdeveloped, theory of American 
political and economic life. Th is theory, as much as anything else, functions as the 
warrant for the double claim that with biotechnology human dignity is in danger 
and that bioethics of a more familiar sort is not capable of providing security.
Th e diagnosis consists of several parts. Th e fi rst concerns the basic makeup of 
“American society” and the connection of that basic makeup to commerce and in-
dustry. Th e second concerns the relation between “medicalization” as a drive beyond 
therapy and bioethics as a response that needs to take up a critical position outside 
such a drive. Th e third concerns “American society” and the “meaning” of ideals. 
“American society,” we are told, consists of “private individuals looking to realize 
their personal dream of a better life, for themselves and for their children.” It is cru-
cial that bioethics take account of this fact. Where early work in bioethics had been 
conducted in response to the biopolitical threat of “central planners looking to real-
ize some dream of a more perfect future society,” the threat today has become, on 
the council’s account, more insidious. It is more insidious in that it is more subtly 
and slowly destructive. Where the threat of biomedicine and biotechnology had 
consisted the sacrifi ce of the lives of some individuals in the name of helping others 
to thrive, the threat of a biotechnology driven by the choices of “private individuals 
looking to realize their personal dream of a better life” is that the aggregate eff ect 
of these “countless private choices” may result in biological inequality, biotechnical 
narcissism, and the biotechnical production of a trivial and shallow form of life.
One important driver for such possible aggregate outcomes is the linking of the 
life sciences and commerce. Th e council notes a basic fact of biology and biotech-
nology today: for good or for ill, biological research is increasingly conducted under 
the mandate to produce instrumental goods. And the metric of what counts as an 
instrumental good is generated by the “free market.” Th e “free” here has two refer-
ents. Th e fi rst is free inquiry. Biology is driven, we are told, by researchers anxious 
to leverage the freedom of inquiry for entrepreneurial gain. Th ese biologists and 
engineers are “leery of public scrutiny” and regulation. Th e second is the freedom 
of industry to manufacture desire. Industry markets biotechnology as the solution 
to the problem of a more perfect life and as the quick answer for the satisfaction of 
desires we did not even know we had. Th ese forces, animated in the name of the 
virtues of “freedom,” risk redounding to the undermining of truly human life.
Such a state of aff airs catalyzes and is catalyzed by the dynamics of medicaliza-
tion as a central feature of biotechnological development. Th e council enumerates 
the causes of medicalization. Certainly there is the expansion of medical capacities. 
But there are also, therein and thereby, the rising expectations of patients: the desire 
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to take embodied life not as a given but as an object of mastery. Th e point that the 
council draws out is that many of these causes, taken on their own, might be in-
nocuous. Taken together, and catalyzed by the freedom of entrepreneurial science 
and the interests of industry, all of it adds up to a drive “beyond therapy.” Beyond 
therapy, to repeat what I noted above, is not simply a shift from therapy to enhance-
ment. Rather, it refers to a dynamic in which the norms of necessary and urgent 
medical intervention evolve through the mutual acceleration of medical advance 
and desire.
Th e danger here is that “there is a risk of viewing everything in human life—not 
only human frailties, disappointments, and death itself, but also human relations, 
pride and shame, love and sorrow, and all self-discontent—under the lens of disease 
and disability.” Worse still is “the risk of attacking human limitation altogether” as 
a widespread social norm. If in fact humans are and will always be frail and fi nite, 
such a line of attack can only pass through cycles of disappointment and calls for 
still more forceful advances. Th e council’s recommendation in the face of these 
dangers is to step back from health as a “lens” for viewing what counts as a human 
good. Th e call, one might say, is to resist and refuse to think of ourselves as bio-
political individuals, or, to use Nikolas Rose’s terms, to refuse “molecular politics” 
and the ethics of “somatic individualism.” Th e motor driving the maximization of 
health may no longer be “central planning.” But the motor is driving nevertheless.
What view of the human good should we take, then? Th e answer is already clear: 
the mutually sustaining tensions between limitation and striving. Th is means that 
in the face of the promise of biotechnology to revolutionize psychic, somatic, and 
environmental domains of human life, a position of relative deprivation must be 
taken up: accepting relatively shorter lives, weaker bodies, less happy souls, and 
perhaps less superior performances and children as the price to be paid for ensuring 
“lofty aspirations” and “keen attachments.” Weakness as a matter of natural gifts 
needs to be allowed to fl ourish.
Th is also means, of course, that the position of relative deprivation is only ap-
parent. It is actually a mode of preservation and assurance, or, more exactly, a mode 
of security. Th e council closes the text by suggesting that such a mode of security 
entails or facilitates a distinction between “American ideals” on the one side, includ-
ing “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and the “power of free markets and 
the prestige of medicine” on the other. Th e former must moderate the latter, and the 
latter must be kept from defi ning the former. Th is means resisting the proposition 
that life, liberty, or happiness are goods that can be preserved or achieved through 
biotechnological maximization of health. It means taking life, liberty, and happi-
ness as sites of the testing and moderation of biotechnology in the name of the 
“humanly” good life.
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A key thought off ered in what can be characterized as the council’s closing ad-
monition is that bioethics, taken as a matter of securing things “truly human,” 
demands that makers and users of biotechnology forgo the impulse to the mastery 
of biology as the correlate of the drive to make ourselves into an image of perfec-
tion. Th e admonition echoes a point made throughout the text. Referencing C. S. 
Lewis, the council argues that the drive to mastery without a sense of proper ends 
is a form of enslavement. Indirectly evoking the excesses of Nazi medicine, the 
council instructs us to resist the “despotism of man over man, with powerful new 
technology serving as the whips of new slave-masters.” Th e task is to moderate the 
power of biotechnology and thereby moderate desire. Such moderation provides a 
means to “savor some of the fruits of the age of biotechnology without succumb-
ing to its most dangerous temptations.” What does this amount to in terms of 
practice? What does bioethics need to be in the face of biotechnology? It needs to 
be a hermeneutic practice that is capable of contributing to and orienting practices 
of moderation. Hermeneutics and moderation together form the means needed to 
secure human dignity.
5. What It Means
If the task is hermeneutic and moderative, what is the challenge? Th e challenge the 
President’s Council puts forward for bioethics is not unlike the challenge articu-
lated by the Council Fathers at Vatican II. Th e challenge in Gaudium et spes was to 
discern the archonic in the midst of the contemporary such that those features of 
the contemporary that contribute to a true human calling could be picked out and 
reinforced and those that did not contribute could be blocked. Th e question was 
ontological and temporal. Amid the fl ux of the contemporary world, the primordial 
substance of human being must be discerned and defended.
A similar ontological and temporal dilemma is in play for the President’s Coun-
cil. If bioethics is to be made adequate to the stakes of an “age of biotechnology,” 
it must be capable of discerning the defi ning and enduring features of the “truly 
human” within a fi eld of underdefi ned and evolving norms and practices. Th e hu-
man here is certainly not ahistorical, but it is essential. It is defi ned by a way of 
being in the world that must be preserved as essential if it is to “be itself.” Amid the 
variability of human experiences and conditions the council seeks to identify those 
characteristics and patterns that are an enduring source of good—enduring, that 
is, if they are not compromised by the power and desires facilitated by biotechnol-
ogy. Th e trouble is, then, that the human is an object of ethical concern that has a 
defi ned essence on the one side but that is vulnerable to deviating from or upsetting 
this precariously balanced essence in the name of biotechnological goods. Th e es-
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sentially human way of being must be discerned in such a way that it can be made 
clear where the nonessential is becoming dangerous.
Th e strategy for thinking through this ontological and temporal dilemma is 
closer to an Antique model of ethical equipment than it is to the model formulated 
in Gaudium et spes. Th is Antique equipment, to simplify, consisted in the exercise 
of true discourses in the face of future events whose form could not be known in 
advance. Th is technique of exercising one’s thought in the present so as to prepare 
oneself for an unknown future is taken up and reworked by the President’s Council 
as a mode appropriate to a “richer bioethics.” Th ere is a short passage in the intro-
duction to Beyond Th erapy that spells this out in dense but clear terms. Th e passage 
bears on the question of how truth claims in ethics are turned into practices. Read 
schematically, the council’s reanimation of Antique equipment consists of three 
major elements, the third of which is more complex than the other two. Th e fi rst 
element is an emphasis on the uncertain future as the site of ethical refl ection. Th e 
work of bioethics needs to consist in thinking about how goals and practices today 
might aggregate to dangerous outcomes. Th inking about these possible outcomes 
provides a diff erent point of reference from which to evaluate current practices. But 
these imagined futures beyond the changing norms of therapy are only possibilities 
among others. Th e goal then cannot be to prophesy or even to forecast, because the 
exercise of thought is speculative: the testing of biotechnological goals and practices 
against the “truly human.”
Th e second element follows from the fi rst. If the goal is not to prophesy or to 
forecast, what is the goal? Th e goal, we are told, is educational. Education here refers 
to pedagogy and not to rote training. Training would require memorizing standard-
ized and settled knowledge. Pedagogy in this case is a matter of capacity building. 
Th e goal of bioethics in thinking about possible futures is to “help us shape our 
thinking” in the face of futures we might have to face. Th e goal is to prepare us for 
the future.
Th e third element consists of an analytic and equipmental grid. Th at is to say, it 
consists of specifi c categories of ethical inquiry and the kinds of practical outcomes 
such inquiry is designed to facilitate. Th e council explains that Beyond Th erapy is 
not a “research report” but rather “an ethical inquiry.” Th e council proposes to take 
up a series of four cases through a set of four points of inquiry. Th e four cases consist 
of sites of desire: biotechnological eff orts to produce “better children,” eff orts to 
achieve “superior performance” through biotechnology, eff orts to produce “ageless 
bodies,” and eff orts to produce “happy souls.” Th is fourfold selection of cases is ana-
lyzed in terms of four questions. What are the “goals” being pursued? What are the 
“means” of pursuing those goals? What are the “implications” for individuals? And 
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what are the “implications” for “broader society?” Th is four-by-four grid of sites 
and goals is constituted as a space of practice. And what is the form of that practice? 
Again a fourfold. Th e practice of inquiry consists in (1) helping to “shape our think-
ing.” (2) Th is aid in thinking does not apply to everything; it only applies to types 
of a particular sort, namely, “a range of powers” that “we are likely to face in the 
future.” (3) Th is aid in thinking about types will make us (philosophers, biologists, 
policy makers, social scientists, publics, etc.) better able to identify “sorts of ques-
tions.” (4) And, of course, the sorts of questions concern a truly human future.
All of this is intended to facilitate a form of bioethical practice adequate to 
securing human dignity against two things. Th e fi rst is “humankind’s deep dissat-
isfaction with natural limits and his ardent desire to overcome them.” Th e second 
is the impulse to take up science-based powers as a means of remaking “ourselves 
after images of our own devising.” Th e fi rst is only problematic in view of the 
second, and the second would not be dangerous without the fi rst. What is more, all 
of this matters because human beings are the kinds of beings that can in fact choose 
and strive to be other than they are but should in fact not choose and strive to be 
other than they are. Th e archonic, after all, may not be able to secure itself, but it 
is precisely what commands us to be exactly what we are and not otherwise. In a 
rich bioethics the longstanding philosophical question of what counts as a good life 
needs to be modulated into a practice of discerning the truly human and thereby 
moderating biotechnology.
declamation and demonstration
In Chapter 3 I explained that a crucial factor in the formulation of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights was the impasse concerning the question of the 
nature and source of dignity and rights. Not only were the members of the CHR 
unable to come to an agreement on this question; they were not even able to agree 
on the philosophic terms by way of which such an agreement might be worked out. 
Some members appealed to reason, some nature, some God, some the nation, and 
so on. Th e solution to the impasse was pragmatic. Th e question was bracketed, and 
human dignity was simply declaimed.
A number of thinkers have remarked on the signifi cance of this turn to declama-
tion as a means of formulating the fact and terms of human dignity. As I described 
in Chapter 2, Doron Shultziner’s work is useful on this point. Shultziner argues 
that for the CHR, as well as for several other subsequent commissions working on 
the question of human rights, the concept of human dignity served as an anchor 
point and integrating term for what might otherwise have been an ungrounded 
and heterogeneous list of rights. Shultziner echoes a key point made by the 1947 
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UNESCO study group when he explains that although international commissions 
might be able to agree to a list of rights and might even be able to agree to treat these 
rights as fundamental, they are likely to be less capable of agreeing to specifi c de-
tails about how and why these rights should be selected over others and justifi ed. 
Human dignity in such a situation can serve as a political and philosophic, not to 
mention rhetorical, anchor.
What fewer thinkers have noted, and what I emphasized in chapter 3 is that 
this turn to declamation as a means of formulating human dignity indirectly gen-
erates an answer to the question of content and origin. Declamation of human 
dignity might be a strategy. But it also becomes a mode of veridiction taken to be 
adequate to the self-evident character of dignity. Declamation is a mode that treats 
dignity as if it were self-referential, which is to say archonic. Th is means that there 
is a certain price to be paid for declaiming human dignity. Th at price is that hu-
man dignity becomes formulated as the kind of thing that must be defended and 
not the kind of thing that must be elaborated. Th e price of the archonic is that 
it positions human dignity neither outside of governmental apparatuses as a kind 
of juridical limitation nor within governmental apparatuses as a principle of their 
functionality. Th ese alternatives were taken to be the basic conceptual sticking 
point between the United States and the Soviet Union. Th is price was not taken to 
be too high by the CHR. If declamation left the question of the content and ori-
gin of human dignity vulnerable to being determined indirectly by a list of rights, 
it also facilitated a kind of coherence of thought and action. Th e task of drafting 
an acceptable Universal Declaration could be completed, and although it would 
be decades before any political and judicial equipment was in place to facilitate 
the implementation of those formulations, the declaration established a minimal 
politico-anthropological point of reference for subsequent work on human rights. 
Much of that subsequent work was carried out in venues better suited for turning 
thought into practice.
Th e President’s Council on Bioethics found itself in a position where the CHR’s 
pragmatic solution to the problem of human dignity was no longer really available 
to them. A supposition of the council’s work, or at least the council’s work under 
the leadership of Leon Kass, was that the human was the bearer of intrinsic dignity 
and that this dignity was put in danger by biotechnology. And although there might 
be something to the claim made by Kass’s replacement, Edmund Pellegrino, that, 
until 2008, the council had never really engaged in sustained refl ection directly on 
the concept of “human dignity” despite its ubiquity in their work, it is in fact the 
case that the council gave sustained attention to the question of what this “hu-
man” is that is the bearer of human dignity. What is more, the idea of the “truly 
human” served, from the outset, as a stand-in and alternative for the term human 
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dignity. Th e anthropological conclusion to Beyond Th erapy is that the human, the 
truly human, is the fi gure marked by a tension between naturally given limits and 
the excellence fostered in striving to overcome those limits. And this defi nition is 
precisely the defi nition of “human dignity” off ered in the council’s subsequent work 
Being Human.
In any event, by asserting that “truly human life” was put in danger by an “age 
of biotechnology,” the council could not escape facing the question of what might 
be called the material stakes of dignity: what is the human such that developments 
in biology and biotechnology should be so fundamentally threatening? Whatever 
else the response to this question, it is clear that strategic appeal to sheer declama-
tion could no longer suffi  ce. Th e council needed to say something more about the 
substance of human dignity.
Th is presented a diffi  culty that the CHR tried to sidestep and that the Council 
Fathers at Vatican II took up in a quite direct fashion: what mode of reason could 
possibly be adequate to the task of demonstrating human dignity in relation to 
a contemporary problem? What kind of truth claims are adequate to an account 
of the inherent dignity of the human being as an object of ethical concern? Th e 
demonstrations of natural law? Metaphysical speculation? Pragmatic reconstruc-
tion? Statistical inference? As I explained in Chapter 1, at Vatican II this problem 
took form as a debate over the relative weight to give to the social sciences within 
a theological evaluation of the modern world. But the problem was neither so 
explicit nor so relatively straightforward for the President’s Council. Unlike the 
Vatican, the President’s Council was not working within a formal tradition (al-
though obviously all of the members of the council were working within or along-
side diff erent traditions of thought, and the precedents of prior federal bioethics 
commissions). Two additional factors made the challenge still more diffi  cult. Th e 
fi rst was the claim of the chair and of other key members that bioethics needed 
to fundamentally rethink its objects, objectives, and mode of practice. Th e second 
was the fact that the problem of human dignity and biotechnology was a question 
of this-worldly goods. Th e signifi cance of that fact is that it raises all of the famil-
iar modern questions about how to establish absolute norms for moral discourse 
without appeal to the transcendent. After all, the council explicitly rejects either 
the appeal to the biopolitical goods of health and wealth or the Kantian appeal to 
a transcendental person.
We have seen that the council gives a two-part answer to the question of the 
“truly human”: naturally given limits and striving to excel in response to those 
limits. Th e dynamic tension between these is taken to be both an anthropological 
and historical constant. A crucial feature about this two-part answer is that it is for-
mulated using modes of reasoning similar to those of the modern human sciences, 
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which is to say, using what I referred to in Chapter 2 as “an analytic of fi nitude.” 
Th is term, recall, refers to a mode of reasoning in which the aim is to verify one’s 
claims through the movement between an array of particulars and general patterns 
drawn from those particulars. Th is mode of reasoning is one in which only those 
truth claims count in which particulars can be indexed to predictable patterns 
or regularities. In the modern human sciences this mode of reasoning has both 
positivist and hermeneutic poles. Th e positivist pole consists in ongoing the accu-
mulation of data. Th e hermeneutic pole consists in the synthesis and formulation 
of that data in terms of general theories. Th ese general theories, in turn, provide 
reorientation back to the collection of data. Verifi cational reasoning of this kind 
thus implies an incessant and never totally stable movement between particulars 
and patterns. All of this, it is important to add, passes through a series of cases that 
are taken to be exemplary and useful for the further generation of generalized truth 
claims, cases that in turn are positioned as examples of the general theories they 
helped articulate.
It is important to see that a mode of reasoning that resembles an analytic of 
fi nitude is at work in Beyond Th erapy and to understand what such a mode allows 
the council to do and to not do. On a fi rst level, this mode facilitates a kind of veri-
dictional parallel between the council’s analysis of the “naturally given” aspects of 
the “truly human life” and the living objects of the biotechnical sciences. Th e hu-
man is examined through the positivist move of accumulating instances of naturally 
given limitations. Taken up as natural, these sites of limitation are also the sites of 
biomedical intervention. Th e human then is examined through a positivist move 
of accumulating instances of desires and goals wherein those naturally given limi-
tations become objects of striving. Th e instances of desire can then be correlated 
with the rationales for biotechnical innovation and intervention. All of this is then 
passed through the hermeneutic pole of the analytic: the tension between limitation 
and striving is interpreted as the site of human longings, attachments, and excel-
lence. Th is tension is then taken to be a point of inherent worth or dignity.
Once that point of inherent worth is specifi ed, a critical shift takes place. Th is 
shift is the second important point about the verifi cationalist mode of reasoning in 
the council’s work. Th e shift consists in a move from the analytic to the evaluative. 
Th is shift, per se, is not remarkable. Th e veridictional modes in the human sci-
ences, after all, developed, in part, under the exigencies of the biopolitical demand 
to improve the norms of health and security of populations. Th at is to say that 
a verifi cationalist mode of reasoning produced the knowledge by way of which 
techniques to normalize populations could be developed and deployed. So, a shift 
from analytics to evaluation is not unusual in this mode: verifi cation is part of nor-
malization. What is distinctive about the work of the council, however, is that the 
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evaluative is not calibrated to norms. Norms, after all, are statistical mechanisms 
for maximization and minimization. Taken in this etymological sense we can say 
that the normative is always relative. Th e outcome of verifi cational analysis on the 
part of the council, however, is not relative at all. Th e metric at play in the shift 
from the analytic to the evaluative is an absolute metric: human dignity. Equipped 
with this metric, the council’s movement between the positivist and hermeneutic 
poles in their determination of the “truly human life” freezes, becomes resolutely 
non-normative (again in the etymological sense), and is thereby put forward as 
an absolutely nonrelativistic metric by way of which the biotechnical sciences can 
be tested and, where needed, moderated. Th e test will not consist in determining 
whether or not the biotechnical sciences are maximizing the goods of public health 
or minimizing harms to individual persons. Th e test will consist in determining 
whether or not the biotechnical sciences, in a biotechnical age, are compromising 
a “life humanly lived.”
What counts in the fi nal analysis is this shift to an absolute metric within a veri-
fi cationalist framework. It is this unusual coupling that allows the council to make 
good on Kass’s call for a mode of ethical practice, an ethics of bios, that on the one 
hand can account for developments in the biotechnical sciences but can account 
for them in such a way as to not be seduced by a set of false and relative goods. 
Th is coupling of verifi cation with a metric of the truly human establishes the terms 
according to which the council can continue to take seriously the details of the 
biotechnical sciences while being attentive to where they pass beyond the threshold 
of therapy. Th is mode of ethical practice can be thought of as the hermeneutics of 
the archonic.
Th e hermeneutics of the archonic reconfi gures pastoral power yet again, as I 
noted in the introduction to this chapter. On the one side, the hermeneutics of 
the archonic reduces the mandate to care for all and for each one to care for the 
essence of the human. In practice this means that bioethics takes as its object and 
objective not the protection of the individual person in face of the threat of claims 
to the general goods of science but rather the protection of life humanly lived from 
the excesses of either individual choice or the medicalized collective. Th e human is 
distilled out of the individual and the collective and posited as that which instructs 
us as to which practices to take up and which to set aside. Th is suggests yet another 
side of the reconfi guration of pastoral power. I have pointed out several times now 
that one of the crucial features of an archonic understanding of the human is that 
it focuses upon the inherent and primordial character of human worth. It follows 
from this focus that the mode of jurisdiction taken to be both appropriate and 
necessary is one of protection. I have tried to show that this protectionist mode 
disarticulates pastoral power from the conduct of conduct, either of a governmental 
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or ecclesial variety. Human dignity cannot be cultivated, and for this reason it is not 
conducted in anything like the way the fl ock or the population might be. However, 
all of this is infl ected with the President’s Council. Although it remains the case that 
the dignifi ed human is not the object of direct intervention, the conduct of conduct 
is reinserted into the pastoral equation. What is conducted is not the human but 
rather those biotechnological developments that might upset the balance between 
limits and striving.
Th e human understood as bios, as the truly human life, must be secured from 
the dehumanizing forces of biotechnology. Biotechnology, thus, is that which must 
be conducted in such a way that its aim is no longer the logos of zoe but rather the 
logos of bios. And bioethics is that which must do the work of discerning the terms 
of that conduct through a hermeneutics of the archonic. In this way governing ap-
paratuses, such as the U.S. government, and the management of biotechnological 
corporations, multinational institutions, and the like might subsequently become 
capable of regulating biotechnological practices in the name of the truly human. In 
the name of human dignity bioethics can thus become a venue of hermeneutic and 
moderative equipment.
In attempting to demonstrate the terms of human dignity on grounds that are 
taken to be adequate to a reading of “the natural,” “natural means,” “natural gifts,” 
and the like, the council enacts the style of veridictional adequacy between multiple 
meanings of biology, in the fashion that Kass did in his opening address—the logos 
of bios as a contemporary technical science and the logos of bios as the truth about a 
life humanly lived. Two meanings of biology, one mode of veridiction. Th is verid-
ictional adequacy suggests the possibility and prospect of a jurisdictional adequacy, 
namely that the truth about a life humanly lived will be adequate to the task of 
governing a contemporary biotechnology that will otherwise give shape to our lives. 
But the truth about a life humanly lived is archonic, however much verifi cational-
ist reasoning played a role in specifying that archonic truth, and the contemporary 
technical sciences are anything but. However successful the appeal to a kind of 
veridictional adequacy between a “richer bioethics” and biology might be, it is far 
from clear how the archonic can be operationalized as the basis of governmental 
practice. Even within the council’s own tenure it was far from clear whether they 
would be able to turn dignity into a practice in any fashion adequate to their pas-
toral fi gurations.
dissipation and resilience
In 2008, six years after Beyond Th erapy, under the chairmanship of Edmund Pel-
legrino, the council published a volume of essays entitled Human Dignity and 
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 Bioethics. I have already noted why I did not choose this volume as the centerpiece 
of my analysis, despite the obvious connection to the theme of my study. Th e book 
did not serve to constitute the practices of the President’s Council so much as react 
to it. It is a collection of essays in which individual authors were invited to provide 
their own defense or rejection of the notion and to put one another’s defi nitions 
to the test. Th e essays diverge in many of their core claims, which, while not sur-
prising, is nonetheless important. Th is meant that Human Dignity and Bioethics 
exemplifi ed what came to be a curious fact about the fi gure of human dignity in 
bioethics: a strange interplay of the dissipation and contestation of philosophical 
defi nitions, on the one side, and the continued resilience of the concept as a metric 
of thinking and practice, on the other.
In his “Letter of Transmittal” for the volume Pellegrino underscores two aspects 
of the book. Th e fi rst is that although the commission has used the concept of 
human dignity in strategically important ways throughout the course of its delib-
erations, they have never really given sustained and direct attention to this critical 
concept—despite repeated calls for such clarifi cation on the part of the council’s 
supporters and detractors alike. Th e second is that the volume makes it clear that 
“there is no universal agreement on the meaning of the term.”
Pellegrino’s fi rst point is not altogether obvious, as I have already suggested. It 
is certainly the case that the Human Dignity volume gives direct and sustained at-
tention to the concept of human dignity per se in a fashion unlike other volumes 
published by the council. However, it is equally the case that the term had func-
tioned in consistent ways throughout the council’s work. Human dignity appears at 
strategic junctures as that which is both the object of concern as well as the stakes 
of bioethics. I have made this point repeatedly, and Pellegrino acknowledges that 
the term has “fi gured frequently.” What Pellegrino fails to take seriously enough, in 
my estimation, is that the concept of human dignity has been defi ned by its use and 
its connection to the assiduous defi nition of what counts as the “truly human,” if 
not by direct philosophic consideration. As Gilbert Meilander notes in his chapter 
of Human Dignity, although the council may not have analyzed the concept to the 
extent desired by its critics, it had in fact used the term to open up problem spaces 
that may have otherwise gone underexamined. Human dignity was consistently 
evoked as that which allows one to identify the point at which biotechnology can 
be seen as excessive and dangerous. Th is means that although philosophically the 
council’s use of the term “human dignity” can be understood in a variety of ways 
(and I will get to this in a moment), the council consistently used it as a means of 
opening up an examination of the relation between what counts as a humanly lived 
life and developments in biotechnology and biomedicine. A consistent strategy in 
this opening up, as Meilander explains, is the hermeneutic exercise of passing bio-
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technology through the light of the proposition that the human is, in his words, 
a creature “in-between.” Moreover, the “in-between” character of things human is 
calibrated to this elusive idea of “nature” or the “naturally given” or the “naturally 
human” way of pursuing excellence. Th is may not settle the matter of how human 
dignity applies in particular cases. And it is the case that this means that human 
dignity is usually invoked simply to signal the need to vigilantly prohibit violations. 
Nevertheless, the use is consistent, and the archonic remains the norm. So, although 
the volume recognizes that there are many traditional approaches to the problem of 
human worth and human dignity, it is in fact the case that within the council’s own 
corpus, human dignity was almost always deployed in a mode “of constraint,” to 
quote Meilander again. And what is crucial about this mode of constraint is that 
it is not a relative position. It is not a precautionary mode, in the simple sense of 
“proceeding with caution.” And it is not a term of balance, in the sense of trying not 
to weigh certain goods a bit more than others. Rather, it is a constraint arising out of 
a determination or set of determinations about what it “means to be human.”
A more important insight needs to be lifted out of Pellegrino’s statement. De-
spite questions about how sustained or direct the analysis of the concept of human 
dignity has been in the course of the council’s work, discursively speaking the term 
functioned just fi ne. Whatever else ensued as a result of underdefi nition or confused 
usages, it was not the disruption of practice. A conclusion can be drawn from this 
not altogether diff erent than McKeon’s assessment over a half-century earlier. Th e 
conclusion is that whatever else the fi gure of human dignity was or is in bioethics, it 
is not a term whose defi nitions need to be specifi ed in order for it to function. Th is 
is particularly the case of human dignity in an archonic mode. If human dignity 
simply signals that point at which violations are to be vigilantly watched for and 
defl ected, then the practical use of dignity, or the use of dignity as an ethical prac-
tice, can proceed apace. To put a point on it: the President’s Council on Bioethics 
used the term human dignity across seven years without publishing a volume on its 
meaning (although, as I have argued this was eff ectively a core outcome of Beyond 
Th erapy). Th eir bioethical practices did not break down as a result, even if those 
practices were exclusively discursive. It might be argued that they used the term 
loosely and even that as a result the regulatory practices their work recommends 
were insuffi  cient. But even if these arguments stood up it must still be noted that 
for the council human dignity was a term that continued to function while being 
underspecifi ed in a philosophic register. Th is also means that human dignity was 
also a term whose meaning could be unfolded in a partially casuistic manner. After 
all, the hermeneutics of the archonic may involve an absolute moral standard, but it 
is a standard that is needed only because the world can be approached as an evolv-
ing series of cases.
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Pellegrino’s further point—that “there is no universal agreement on the meaning 
of the term”—brings me back around to where I started my inquiry. Th ere are two 
parts of this point that need to be picked out. Th e fi rst concerns lack of universal 
agreement. It is a curious fact about human dignity that multiple thinkers in bio-
ethics and theology, and in a diff erent way in international law and human rights, 
have given it sustained attention for several decades. It is a second curious fact that 
these thinkers are almost all off ering claims about dignity’s universality, either to the 
eff ect that it has a universal status or to the eff ect that universality is questionable. 
In either case, an ever-proliferating series of rather global claims are being made, few 
of which seem to converge. Others have commented on the strangeness of this dou-
bling before me: a universal nonconvergence. Th is doubling has inspired doubts 
about the usefulness of the term. But it would seem that the opposite conclusion 
can be drawn. Anthropos, as Rabinow has put it, seems to be that creature with too 
many truth claims about itself—a creature of hetero logoi.
But if human dignity is a site of universal claims that often do not converge or 
even cohere, this suggests that we need some way of specifying its signifi cance that is 
not simply a theory for the reconciliation of other theories. What seems to be needed 
are practices of inquiry that might aid us in understanding how to know what is 
being done with the concept and what the concept is doing. We need to know what 
human dignity is as a matter of practice and what happens when it is made a matter 
of practice. Of course, the truth content of human dignity matters as well. Human 
dignity, even as a concept, should not be reduced to a series of discursive functions; 
too much is at stake in the domains where it is being mobilized. If we are going to 
examine what human dignity is in terms of practice, we have to attend closely to 
the truth dimension of that practice. What is more, if we are not indiff erent to the 
kinds of relations of truth and practice (whether analytic, ecclesial, political, ethical, 
etc.) anchored in the phrase human dignity, then we will also be concerned with 
the question of venues. Practices do not happen out of space and time; they are 
facilitated. Th is is why even though a major concern of my inquiry has been the 
study of contemporary equipment connected to human dignity, I have centered my 
examination on the venues in which that equipment was fi rst proposed.
I insert these comments here in order to lift out a fi nal crucial feature of the book 
Human Dignity, a feature Pellegrino alerts us to. Th e collected essays in this volume 
do not all represent eff orts to elaborate the concept of human dignity as a problem 
for practice within a specifi c venue. Many of them take up the concept as a theme 
that can be considered outside of any particular demand for, or expectation of, put-
ting the term into practice. Th is is not to say that the question of practice is absent. 
Indeed, a crucial diff erence among the essays is the kind of mode of ethical practice 
that is called for as either urgent or necessary, inappropriate or worthwhile in the 
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name of human dignity. But this discourse of urgency can be distinguished from the 
way in which the council tried to put the concept to work in their other volumes. 
Th is suggests that when the pragmatic constraints are lifted, defi nitions proliferate, 
a fact that poses something of a conundrum for those in bioethics who have argued 
that human dignity is in crisis today and that what is needed is clearer defi nitions. 
If clearer defi nitions result in the proliferation of meanings and the ever-widening 
discursive expansion of the term, then the pragmatic horizon of ethical equipment 
might fade into an ever-receding horizon. Of course this recession is precisely one of 
the interesting answers to the question of what human dignity is doing today.
Th is brings us to the second half of Pellegrino’s point. Th e problem, he tells us, is 
not that there are no universal agreements, per se. Th e problem is that there are no 
universal agreements about meaning. Richard McKeon proposed that the problem 
with thinking about the history of terms is not just that we have words whose con-
cepts and referents are unstable and change over time—though we certainly have 
this. Th e problem with human dignity in particular is that we have a term whose 
meaning is in doubt. Th is suggests once again that the stakes are primarily herme-
neutic: here is human dignity; we need to know what it means. Th is also suggests 
that perhaps there is a stable referent behind all of this apparent disagreement, and 
we just need to uncover or conceive it. Or perhaps it tells us that there is no stable 
referent, and therefore a more exacting term is called for. One might wonder how 
the engagements over human dignity would change if the stakes were not primar-
ily taken to turn on the hermeneutic questions, the question of the meaning of the 
term, as Pellegrino suggests, but rather the question of signifi cance. If nothing else, 
the question of signifi cance (which must include the truth question) might take us 
back into the venues within which human dignity is being mobilized in order to 
determine what the character of the problem is, what mode of practice is called for, 
and what other forms of practice would be worthwhile to design and implement.
human dignity and the production of conceptual stasis
Th e volume Human Dignity served to reinforce what many in bioethics already took 
to be the diffi  culty at hand with human dignity, namely that its meanings could 
not be stabilized. Th ere was during the time of the council’s work fairly widespread 
agreement among bioethicists that human dignity was both a conceptual and prac-
tical problem for thinking about and responding to developments in biology. But 
there was no agreement as to what kind of problem it might be, outside the polar-
izations of those calling for better defi nitions and those calling for the term to be 
set aside. Taking note of the chapters in Human Dignity and characterizing them as 
a set of heterogeneous if universal claims, it seems fair to conclude that, as Dewey 
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might have put it, if the fi gure of human dignity in bioethics has not issued in the 
same heterogeneous range of practices that the fi gure has in other settings, it has 
certainly been capable of generating both ontological indeterminacy as well as ethi-
cal discordancy.
Pellegrino suggests what others have stated: in bioethics, conceptual stasis is the 
problem. In what was briefl y something of a notorious bioethical essay, Ruth Mack-
lin, refl ecting in part on the work of the President’s Council, argued that “human 
dignity” had become a useless concept. Th e thrust of her argument was that unless 
or until human dignity can be given more precise defi nition it should not be in-
voked as a justifi cation for the regulation of research. On one level, given the chorus 
of protest occasioned by the work of the President’s Council among professional 
bioethicists Macklin’s assessment is hardly surprising. On another level, however, 
her argument can be judged curious. Th e question, as I’ve already stated, is not so 
much whether human dignity is useful. Clearly for the council it was. Th e multiple 
volumes of the council’s work are a testament to the utility of the concept—however 
one judges the council’s work. Th e question is: how is it used, and to what eff ect?
Macklin is hardly the fi rst person to worry about conceptual fragmentation and 
stasis in connection to the concept of human dignity. Within bioethics others had 
voiced similar concerns, not to mention critics in law, politics, philosophy, and 
anthropology. Moreover, her concern was not new. In 1971—just to pick out one 
example—the philosopher Herbert Spiegelberg argued that human dignity was in 
crisis in part because the concept was confused and that therefore political action 
could not be eff ectively mobilized. Th ese arguments were similarly unsurprising. 
As I discussed in the case on the United Nations, the 1947 UNESCO study group 
recognized that whatever the fate of human dignity as a matter of political, legal, 
and ethical practice, it was unlikely that philosophic unity was going to be among 
its hallmarks. All of which is to say that conceptual fragmentation and stasis have 
been characteristic of the eff orts to institutionalize and turn human dignity into a 
practice since it became an explicit concern of power relations in the twentieth cen-
tury. Whatever the problem of human dignity in bioethics, it seems to me, it is not 
exactly conceptual stasis. Rather, the problem is what to make of conceptual stasis 
as part of the history of the fi gure of human dignity.
In the end, the President’s Council’s proposed coupling of verifi cational defi ni-
tions with a metric of the truly human stalled out. Th e council had attempted to 
transform dignity as a hermeneutic practice into dignity as a matter of the gov-
ernmental regulation of biology. Th is attempt to bring into being what might be 
called a “biopolitical pastoral” not only intensifi ed the conceptual and discursive 
cacophony surrounding the notion (which it certainly did); it also turned the fi g-
ure of human dignity into something whose practical dimensions were no longer 
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generative. Unlike what happened in the other venues, the council, despite its series 
of publications in which the fi gure of human dignity regularly appears, never suc-
cessfully turned dignity into practice in a fashion that proved self-sustaining or self-
proliferative. Indeed, once Kass stepped down from the head of the council, Pel-
legrino almost immediately reopened the question of dignity, recasting it precisely 
as a problem of philosophic defi nition. On one level this too was not surprising: 
after all, the council’s eff orts to defi ne the “truly human” and deploy it as a metric 
for the regulation of biology had provoked intense criticism. On another level, it 
is a curious turn: in the Vatican and the United Nations, after all, there had been a 
diligent refusal to ground dignity in anything beyond itself; dignity, in both cases, 
was ultimately put forward as identical to itself, albeit, in the case of the Vatican, 
identical to itself as part of nature’s relation to the supernatural. Th e defi nitional 
labor that took place within the council, the attempt to render human dignity as a 
term of substance, had the eff ect of producing a fi gure of human dignity that ulti-
mately suff ered the burdens of self-justifi cation, a fi gure made to account for itself, 
a fi gure no longer standing outside of history awaiting recognition and off ering 
guidance. Th e attempt to defi ne dignity as adequate to biotechnology, in sum, had 
the eff ect of undoing a certain fl exibility and generativity. Giving up the archonic 
pastoral in favor of the biopolitical pastoral came at the price of losing a certain 
ability to transform dignity into a practice.
In retrospect, we can say that the work of ethicists, theologians, and others on 
the problem of human subject research remained conditioned by a “modern equip-
mental mode.” What I mean is that from the outset bioethicists addressed in a 
direct fashion the excesses of biomedical research conducted in a biopolitical mode. 
Biopolitics, whatever else is meant by the term, indicates a mode of political power 
in which bodies and populations are targeted in the name of the health, wealth, and 
security of the social. In appealing to the human subject of research as a person and 
as part of communities prone to justice and injustice, the National Commission 
took as its task the work of balancing multiple goods through the articulation of 
multiple principles. What this accomplished, among other things, was a demon-
stration of possible limits within the practice of science itself. Th e goal, after all, 
was to identify those principles on the basis of which scientifi c research could be 
conducted. Th e work of the National Commission was not antiscience. Rather, they 
recalibrated those goods in the name of which science could be made to operate. In 
this way their work could be interpolated into the narrative of science and society 
and thereby reconciled with biopolitical operations.
Said diff erently, the objects of ethical concern addressed by the National Com-
mission’s work on human subjects functioned in a rather straightforward fashion 
as the regulatory guardians of the objects of biopower. Where biopower targets 
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the health of populations, the question of the just treatment of communities was 
brought to bear. Where biopower targets the individual body, the consent of per-
sons was off ered as a counterbalance. With the rise of genomics and other develop-
ments in molecular and developmental biology, however, this set of arrangements 
became problematic. Well before the explosion of ethical and regulatory discourses 
in response to the Human Genome Project, a number of ethicists had begun to 
worry that molecular genetics and genetic engineering put something more than 
persons and communities in danger. Human nature and even humanity itself be-
came a widespread object of concern. Th e question was whether or not something 
essential about the human was at risk in genomics and whether or not anything 
needs to be done either to constrain or direct genomic research. With stem cell 
research and cloning things were infl ected once again. For many, the question of 
the essence of the human now began to coincide with the moral, metaphysical, and 
biological status of the embryo. Th e question was not whether or not the embryo 
is a person, nor was it really whether or not the embryo was a human by virtue of 
possessing a genome—though both of these questions circulated. Rather, the ques-
tion was whether or not the embryo constitutes a human life whose worth could be 
measured over against other human lives.
All of this set the stage for the work of the President’s Council. From the outset 
Leon Kass argued that the debate over stem cell research had transformed bio-
ethics into a practice concerned with zoe, with simple vitality, and not with bios, 
understood as a life humanly lived. What this meant for Kass is that bioethics was 
not yet fi t to secure the truly human against the excesses of biotechnology. What 
is more, he thought a return to the virtues of the human person and the freedoms 
of individual consent only exacerbated the problem. As such, bioethics needed to 
constitute a new venue and a new kind of practice. Th is practice would discern the 
truly human and think about the fate of the truly human in view of possible rami-
fi cations of biotechnological research. As the centerpiece of bioethical reasoning 
and practice, human dignity is taken to function as a bulwark against the danger of 
dehumanization.
But as the volume Being Human makes clear, whether or not the concept of hu-
man dignity can be made to function as such a bulwark in bioethics is not obvious. 
Th e problem, in part, is that the tensions produced by demands for discursive and 
philosophic unanimity and the demands of practical and political mobility con-
tinue to intensify. Whatever else is clear about human dignity, the mode of reason-
ing about it determines the ways in which diff erent courses of action are justifi ed as 
urgent or necessary. An additional challenge for Kass and the President’s Council 
was the fact that prior ways of thinking and practicing in bioethics, the biosciences, 
and within regulatory apparatuses remained present to what they were attempting 
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to do. Th is means, among other things, that bioethics as a matter of human dignity 
had to be articulated into existing structures and habits. Schematically, we can say 
that in attempting to transform bioethics into a domain of thinking and acting 
centered on the protection of human dignity the elements of a reconfi gured mode 
of pastoral power were interpolated into and therefore began to reassemble the ele-
ments of a biopolitical apparatus. But what it means to take bios as a truly human 
life and how to constitute biology as a science that takes account of such a life in its 
practices was never settled. Human dignity, introduced as a solution to the problem 
of bioethics, remained a problem.
What is clear is that the work of the President’s Council served to reactivate 
bioethics as a zone of turbulence in which metrics and modes of reasoning are dis-
puted in view of metrics and modes of jurisdiction. Whether or not such turbulence 
and the conceptual fragmentation that it seems to entail will prove to be a site for 
the emergence of a new fi gure of truth remains to be seen. In the meanwhile, the 
fi gure of human dignity in connection to the genomic and postgenomic biotech-
nical sciences has proven to be as much a site of breakdown as proliferation. Th e 
contemporary uses of human dignity in bioethics, the logic of its formulation, and 
its appropriate range of application have never been specifi ed in a fashion widely 
found to be satisfactory.
Th e Second Vatican Council took up human dignity as a matter of the divine 
call on the human formulated as an inner connection between nature and the su-
pernatural. Th e price to be paid for this was an opening to the possibility that 
human dignity could be read as fully immanent and therefore the object of an inte-
grist politics. Th e United Nations turned human dignity into a formal principle by 
bracketing the question of origin. Th is shift to the declarative brought with it the 
costs discussed in Chapter 3 and in the Diagnostic Excursus, namely the situating of 
human dignity in a kind of liminal space between mechanisms of government, on 
the one side, and the juridical claims characteristic of early rights discourse, on the 
other. In these fi rst two cases what was fashioned was a mode of pastoral power in 
which the mandate to care for all and for each one could be taken up without direct 
recourse to existing apparatuses of the conduct of conduct. Th e archonic human, 
after all, needs to be protected, not cultivated.
Th e President’s Council began to shift beyond this confi guration of pastoral power. 
Its formulation of bioethics as a practice concerned with the protection of the “truly 
human” introduced a shift in which it is neither the human nor humanity that is the 
site of human dignity but some kind of essence in between. And it is no longer the 
declarative that allows for us to invoke this essence, but, rather, dignity can be dem-
onstrated through verifi cational processes. And if it can be demonstrated through 
verifi cational processes, it can be brought to bear on the conduct of science. 
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Th e verifi cation of human dignity was intended to serve as the metric for the reg-
ulation of biotechnology, that is, as the standard by which certain practices would 
be allowed to proceed in the spirit of a “truly human life.” But it is precisely at this 
point of ethical judgment where the council’s substantive account of dignity proved 
most cumbersome and most dissatisfactory to its critics. How can the balancing of 
limitation and striving be operationally mapped onto eff orts in the biotechnical sci-
ences to minimize and maximize aspects of living systems, including those systems 
that make up human bodies and populations? Th e question indicates a site of fun-
damental ethical discordancy: biotechnical and biomedical interventions function 
as a means of normalizing living systems; dignity, as archonic, is precisely that fi gure 
of the human which is not susceptible to either minimization or maximization but 
is, rather, a universal absolute. Biotechnology and human dignity might be shown 
to coincide analytically, but they could not in the end, despite the council’s eff orts, 
be made to share a regulative logic. Given that point of noncoincidence it was never 
clear how, exactly, to turn human dignity into a practice of governance.
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Methodological Epilogue:
Toward an Anthropology of Figuration
I have been guided in this book by the proposition that the turn to human dignity 
in the last half-century marks out a shift, or a series of shifts, in relations among 
conceptions of human worth, modes of exercising power, and the elaboration of 
ethical equipment. Equally important has been the conjoined proposition that this 
series of shifts was put into motion by breakdowns in prior ways of imagining and 
acting on these relations. In each of the three cases I have tried to provide a sketch, 
however minimal, of the situations wherein these breakdowns and shifts occurred. 
To be more precise, I have provided a sketch of situations wherein concerned actors 
in key venues began to bring about a shift in these relations by problematizing vari-
ous domains (the secular, the sovereign, and the scientifi c) in terms of a breakdown 
in care for human dignity.
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human dignity as an event
By giving focused attention to shifts in the conception of relations among truth 
speaking, power, and ethics I have attempted to grasp the theme of human dignity 
as the marker of an event. I have tried to grasp human dignity as a marker of an 
event insofar as the eff orts to problematize this fi gure drew together, gave name to, 
and helped produce an ensemble of complex historical and imaginative processes: a 
heterogeneous object of study whose elements and rationality, though diverse and 
even diff use, can nonetheless be located in specifi c venues and specifi c situations. 
I have taken it to follow that any suffi  cient analysis of human dignity will need to 
include the study of specifi c institutions, the modes and forms of knowledge used 
by the actors in those institutions, the eff orts of those actors to rationalize their 
work and their institutions in view of those modes and forms, and the attempts to 
articulate a politics of care that might facilitate intervention. Among all of these 
variables I have chosen to focus on one aspect that I think has been more or less 
overlooked, or at least overlooked as a constitutive part of this historically specifi c 
event: the refl ective practices undertaken by concerned actors to give articulation 
to what human dignity means, signifi es, and requires. Th ese refl ective practices 
constitute one crucial matrix through which the fi gure of human dignity and the 
politics of intrinsic worth have been actualized. To put a sharper point on it (and to 
introduce a term that is a bit awkward insofar as it is unfamiliar, if accurate), I have 
focused on the practices of fi guration at play in the event of human dignity. Insofar 
as human dignity names and marks out an event, it is an event wherein concerned 
actors were (and still are) actively trying to constitute human dignity as the axiologi-
cal element in what one might cautiously refer to as a “global moral imaginary,” as 
well as the rationalizing element of this imaginary. Human dignity has been made 
to constitute (simultaneously) the outside, the limit, and the principle of order for 
the activities and rationale of enculturated secularization, of state sovereignty, and 
of the biological sciences. However “global” the formulations of these concerned 
actors, it is crucial to remain true what has become a basic rule of thumb in the 
interpretive human sciences: never to lose sight of the fact that these problematiza-
tions of human worth and power, formulated as universals, were actually given form 
by way of a number of specifi c episodes that can be identifi ed and characterized, 
even if they cannot really be summed up. On one level, this may all seem obvious 
and thus go without saying. But given the long history of human dignity as a term 
of philosophical art in which the universal has been put into play at the expense of 
the particular, it strikes me as worth underlining.
Implicit in all of this is that I have treated the practices of fi guration connected 
to human dignity as though these practices were more or less discontinuous with 
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the histories of reasoning about human dignity that preceded the eff orts undertaken 
in the three venues I have examined. I chose to proceed in this fashion for both 
strategic and stylistic reasons. It is the case that existing work on human dignity 
has often presumed too much continuity in the history of the defi nition and use 
of the term—the long and complex history of dignity as part of broader eff orts to 
articulate humanisms of both the left and the right. For this reason, it seemed to 
me that it was worth lifting out and emphasizing discontinuity, even at the risk of 
underemphasizing those points at which the concerned actors involved did not, in 
fact, break from older traditions. Th e actors in each of these venues, in diff erent 
ways and to varying degrees, were, of course, well aware of the traditions of thought 
and practice within which and in view of which they were problematizing human 
dignity. Indeed, there was a sense among almost all of the participants that they 
were bringing human dignity to articulation not only as part of a tradition but that 
in talking about dignity they were merely pointing to a permanent and defi ning 
feature of human reality.
Put diff erently, human dignity can be thought of as a contemporary event, taking 
the term in the technical sense I have discussed. To say that human dignity is con-
temporary is to say that it is an ensemble made up of characteristics, relationships, 
and elements both old and new. Perforce, human dignity, even when studied as an 
event marked by institutional change, unexpected breaks in political form, and the 
invention of new modes of reasoning, exists in a dependent relation to the history 
of previous eff orts to think about human worth and the exercise of power. Th e chal-
lenge I have tried to take up is to make sense of these relations between the old and 
the new in such a way as to be able to determine better the logic and signifi cance of 
the resulting confi guration. As one means to a similar end, Rabinow, taking a cue 
from Michel Foucault (who himself follows Immanuel Kant’s lead on this point), 
has proposed a conceptual strategy for distinguishing among modes of historical 
being in order to facilitate the work of discerning how elements within a given situ-
ation get assembled and how their signifi cance gets constituted. He has proposed 
that we understand “the modern” as an ethos term, designating a refl ective mode of 
relating to the present rather than as a term that marks out a specifi c epoch. In this 
way, we can think of the modern as a moving ratio of the new and the old, in which 
the metric of signifi cance is the extent to which the new breaks from and supersedes 
the old. In a parallel fashion, one can say that “the traditional” can also be thought 
of as an ethos rather than a prior period of time. In this way, one can think of tradi-
tion as a moving ratio of the old and the new in which the metric of signifi cance is 
the normativity of the old triumphing over the new. In distinction to both of these, 
Rabinow insists that today there is a need to undertake inquiries into “the contem-
porary” understood as an ethos in which ensembles of new and old elements are 
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stylized in such a way that signifi cance adheres neither in the triumph of the new 
over the old nor in the pull of tradition slowing down the impulsive thrust of the 
new. Th e contemporary, rather, is a stylization of the new and the old in which the 
resulting assemblage and its signifi cance is determined by how it constitutes, and 
allows one to contend with, heterogeneous and unsettled problems.
Human dignity, it seems to me, is just such a contemporary assemblage: an as-
semblage of discourses, practices, and relationships that can be characterized as “a 
moving ratio of modernity, moving through the recent past and near future in a 
(nonlinear) space that gauges modernity as an ethos already become historical.” 
Understood in this sense, any suffi  cient study of human dignity will need to include 
the genealogical work of showing how such an event is not only discontinuous with, 
but also a response to and an extension of, prior assemblages.
In terms of my own eff orts, further work on the contemporary norms and forms 
of human dignity clearly remains to be done. In this book I have explored some of 
the primary conditions and rationales, defi nitions and logics, within which human 
dignity, over the past half-century, has been brought to articulation as a response to 
previous breakdowns. I have not yet undertaken the work of jumping to the other 
side of those breakdowns so as to discover where, precisely, the old elements in con-
temporary assemblages came from. Nor have I run these formative events forward 
in order to determine how elements ramifying out of each of the three cases are 
being re-formed as part of other contemporary assemblages—though these ramifi -
cations have been very much on my mind. My focus in this book on discontinuity 
in the recent history of human dignity has nonetheless been warranted. Several 
aspects of the politics of intrinsic worth today suggest that human dignity may 
in fact be as much a “modern” feature of reality as a contemporary one, in that its 
“new” conceptual and institutional features have been primed. Th ese features were 
advanced vigorously by the primary actors involved—even if they were advanced 
in a manner that seemed to take for granted continuity with the older forms of 
reasoning. Perhaps more importantly, over the previous few decades, human dignity 
has continued to be asserted as a rationale for political and humanitarian action 
into new domains and situations in such a way that its archonic character puts 
in question existing power relations and in such a way that the archonic and the 
practices of care connected to it need to be reworked and reinvented. Indeed, actors 
in domains from bioethics to global health continue to invent practices through 
which the “archonic settlement” can be remobilized. Th ese strategic mobilizations, 
however, are putting the limits of that previous settlement to the test. I explored 
one example of this putting-to-the-test in my third case study: the use of human 
dignity as a term for governing contemporary biology. Other similar examples of 
breakdown that might have been taken up in this book include such events as the 
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militarization of humanitarian interventions that has taken place over the last few 
decades, the articulation of so-called preemptive war in the logic of action against 
“terrorists,” and the shifts in the international governance of climate change, which 
simultaneously invoke the intrinsic politics of human dignity, the normalizing 
politics of biopower, and the sovereign politics of national self-determination. In a 
fashion parallel to writings in bioethics, these uses of human dignity have excited 
a number of discursive exchanges in which, yet again, the defi nition of human 
dignity and its self-evidence have been taken up: a fi ght over the defi nition of hu-
man dignity as a means of deciding to take military action (or not), or curtailing 
the excesses of global industry (or not). Developments in global public health and 
second-generation human rights work need to be rethought in this light as well. A 
challenge in each of these cases is to determine where the extension of the “archonic 
settlement” might be leading: where it might prove to be generative of new ethical 
fi gures of human and nonhuman life, where it might occasion the invention of new 
discursive and political practices, and where it might, in the end, fail to sustain the 
politics of intrinsic worth. In either case—reconfi guration or breakdown—it seems 
clear that human dignity continues to be an event whose shifting features warrant 
sustained attention.
the recent past and the near future
In each of the cases which I have examined, human dignity marks a moment of 
signifi cant institutional constitution or reconstitution. In these cases, even where 
human dignity is presumed to be a continuous or permanent feature of reality, and 
even where actors appeal to older legacies of thought, such as with the Vatican, 
there is something new put in play that must be accounted for. I have tried to 
make the case that in undertaking the work of establishing themselves as capable—
even uniquely capable—of caring for human dignity, the actors in each of these 
venues defi ned human dignity and defi ned their own capacities and obligations 
in a fashion that was historically distinctive. Nonetheless, and despite my eff ort to 
treat human dignity as an event, I take seriously a basic insight of inquiry into the 
contemporary: in contemporary assemblages such as those formed by human dig-
nity the old plays as signifi cant a role as the new. Given this, questions of historical 
continuity and therein historical causality remain open to further exploration. To 
that end it would be worth addressing the contemporary forms of human dignity 
in a fashion keyed to those places where the activities of the central actors involved 
depended on, and conformed to, prior histories of discourse and practice. It is 
worth considering, for example, the extent to which human dignity, as brought to 
articulation within these institutional settings in the twentieth century, connects 
F6671.indb   279 9/16/15   10:39:09 AM
280 Methodological Epilogue
to and diverges from conceptions of the dignity of persons in nineteenth-century 
philosophical, judicial, and social theory. In the case of the Second Vatican Council, 
the notion of dignifi ed persons is frequently used interchangeably with the dignity 
of humans, or with the dignity of human persons. Few if any of the participating 
theologians, however, conceived of dignity as grounded in those features of person-
hood famously called out in Kant’s work, features such as rationality or autonomy. 
Th ey did, however, connect their notions of human dignity to the rise of Catholic 
social thought of the late nineteenth century. In a similar fashion, members of the 
Commission on Human Rights as well as the President’s Council on Bioethics ex-
plicitly distanced themselves from an ethics of the rational person in their eff orts to 
get clearer about how dignity is absolute and does not derive from any specifi c fea-
ture of human life. Nonetheless, despite such self-conscious distancing on the part 
of some of the participants involved, the relation between twentieth-century fi gures 
of human dignity and the complicated legacy of nineteenth-century thinking about 
the dignity of persons needs to be examined more carefully.
Similarly, it would be fruitful to think through the relation of the contemporary 
fi gure of archonic human dignity to notions of the “dignity of man” as conceived in 
the romantic philosophy of the early nineteenth century and the Marxist and other 
socialist philosophies of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Socialist 
assessments of dignity, and the conditions under which such dignity can be brought 
to historical actualization, played an infl uential role both in the formulations of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the politics of the Second Vatican Council. In 
the former case, disagreements over the extent to which direct remediation of eco-
nomic conditions is necessary for the cultivation of dignity were a primary blockage 
point in relation to which the procedural decision not to “defi ne” human dignity 
was ultimately taken. In the latter case, members of the clergy representing strongly 
socialist parts of the world diff ered considerably in their assessment of the relative 
worth of modernity. Insofar as the authors of Gaudium et spes set out to interpret 
the “signs of the time,” their reading of modernity set the terms according to which, 
from Vatican II forward, theologians were able both to connect their thinking to a 
socialist political agenda and to reject the political excesses of state-centered com-
munist thought. Th e legacy of South American liberation theologies, and their use 
of notions of human dignity, the connection of those uses to early Catholic social 
thought, as well as the Vatican’s strong theologico-legal response to the Cold War 
suppression of the Catholic Church, are examples of where a deeper history of 
thinking about the dignity of man might illuminate contemporary notions of hu-
man dignity.
Similar to these two—the dignity of persons and the dignity of man—I believe 
it would be valuable to rethink the relation of contemporary fi gures of human dig-
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nity to those understandings of dignity fi rst brought to articulation in late medieval 
humanist philosophy. Pico della Mirandola’s De hominis dignitate has been cited 
as the fi rst time the notion of human dignity, per se, is brought to articulation. 
Pico’s rendering of the human as a fi gure standing between “gods and beasts” has 
been taken up by at least one contemporary thinker closely involved in the work 
of the PCBE. Th e diff erences between the kind of actions and communities that 
are taken to follow from classical notions of human dignity and those put forward 
in recent years are striking. In Pico, the human is capable of relative ascension and 
decline, and dignity remains a kind of nascent possibility that only comes to actu-
alization through regimes of striving and cultivation. It is, in this sense, articulated 
both as a kind of universal and permanent truth about the human reality, but one 
infrequently actualized. Understood in this way, Pico’s vision for human dignity 
might be compared both to the formulations from Gaudium et spes and Beyond 
Th erapy. Th e diff erence—and it is not an incidental diff erence—is that dignity in 
Pico’s rendering is not an actuality that is present and thereby susceptible to viola-
tion. It is, rather, a possibility that must be achieved; the dignity in human dignity 
is an achievement and not a given.
In light of this last point, it seems to me that it would be especially worthwhile 
to think through how the contemporary fi gure of human dignity fi ts within a wider 
horizon of the history of humanism. Th e worth of such an undertaking goes up, in 
my estimation, to the extent that such history can be examined as a series of criti-
cal interventions, that is, an examination of the ways in which humanisms of both 
the left and the right have been used to enact ethical and political intervention. In 
Foucault’s inestimable essay “What Is Enlightenment?” he suggests that a history 
of humanism presents a particularly diffi  cult undertaking insofar as the humanistic 
thematic is too supple and diff use to serve as a stable axis for refl ection. Th e key 
term is thematic. Humanism, on Foucault’s account, is a theme in the history of 
thought. Th is theme, he suggests, can be contrasted to an event, such as, in the case 
of his essay, the Enlightenment. Th e salient diff erence, he asserts, is that as an event 
the Enlightenment is characterized by a “principle of a critique and permanent cre-
ation of ourselves in our autonomy.” Th e theme of humanism, or the set of themes 
that can be designated as humanism, although critical—for example, humanism as 
a critique of religion, humanism as a critique of science, of politics, and so on—al-
ways ends up falling back on conceptions of “man” borrowed from religion, science, 
or politics. Its diff erence is that it recasts these conceptions in a valuative fashion. 
So, on the one side, Enlightenment can be thought of as a permanent critique and a 
practice of self-creation, and on the other, appeals to the nature of man constitute a 
means by which humanity might be conceived and defi ned in a range of ways, but 
it is always given and valorized.
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From the standpoint of those elaborating human dignity, one can acknowledge 
the incisiveness of Foucault’s assessment. But it seems to me that from the stand-
point of the history of thought and its critical relationship to power, Foucault’s 
assessment leaves something out. What it leaves out is the fact that in the case of 
contemporary conceptions of human dignity, whatever the intentions of the pri-
mary actors involved, the eff ect of their actions was precisely to put in question the 
existing set of relations between truth and power. In this respect, these technicians 
of human dignity did, in fact, produce a set of artifacts and historical eff ects that 
can plausibly be cast as a practice of critique wherein a new fi gure of the human 
was invented. Th is fi gure was certainly not brought to articulation as a practice of 
self-invention on the part of the actors involved; they were not, to use Foucault’s 
language, engaged in a critical ontology of themselves so as to free themselves from 
their own histories. From the standpoint of those who now live in the worlds that 
they helped create by institutionalizing an archonic form of human dignity, how-
ever, these actors did put into play a set of possibilities that have ramifi ed globally. 
One can certainly agree with Foucault that humanism should not be confused with 
the Enlightenment understood as a critical practice of freedom. But it might prove 
worthwhile, nonetheless, to think through human dignity and its contemporary ef-
fects as part of a somewhat more continuous history of humanisms—not so much 
to identify the contemporary fi gure of human dignity with other themes in that 
history but to see what insights might come of reading that history as a series of 
critical events and not only as an enduring thematic.
Such an exercise might help focus attention on the role of human dignity in 
the play of the autopoetic and the themitical—to return to James Faubion’s distinc-
tion. As I suggested in the introduction, it is reasonable to claim that over the 
past half-century the archonic fi gure of human dignity has become “themitical” 
insofar as it has become a relatively homeostatic dimension of ethical and political 
fi elds of practice and has thereby become available for recalibration, reproduction, 
and reuse in and across disparate domains of contemporary life. Faubion’s term, 
recall, is meant to mark out for anthropological investigation a dimension of the 
study of ethical life that has sometimes been overlooked by those who proceed in 
something like an Aristotelian fashion, that is, in a fashion particularly attentive to 
practices of self-making or autopoesis. Faubion argues that if ethics is taken to be a 
practice of freedom leading to work on one’s subjectivity—practices of the care of 
the self—that practice is often facilitated by and enacted through relatively stable 
ethical traditions. Analytically speaking, practices of self-making can be examined 
as mediated through and dependent on traditions while also intervening in and 
reworking the historically contingent life of those traditions. Of course, this is just 
analytically speaking; in any concrete situation things are likely to escape any clean 
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distinction between the reproductive and the self-making. Th ese designations, after 
all, are simply points of orientation and therefore an aid in studying the cacophony 
of human aff airs. Th ey are neither explanations nor conclusions. All of this is to 
say that however homeostatic the archonic logic of human dignity has become, it 
has also and simultaneously become a site of regular reinvention and elaboration, 
leading, in some cases, to breakdown. Dignity’s susceptibility to proliferation and 
remobilization is a vector for its reconfi guration; the task is to account for these 
reconfi gurations and their eff ects.
I assert here—and I only assert—that the attempt to bring together the biological 
sciences and human dignity under the sign of governance has proven to be one such 
vector of reconfi guration and perhaps even a privileged one. One reason for this is 
that this conjuncture of biology and dignity brings a humanitarian apparatus and 
dignitarian politics into an essentially biopolitical problem space. “Th e dignifi ed 
human,” introduced as an ethical norm and solution to problems of the biological 
body, instead has become a problem. Th e fi gure of human dignity in these cases has 
become a trading zone within which discourses and practices associated with the 
development of the medical and biological sciences have begun to be reassembled 
such that the objects, discourses, and practices of biopower are being interpolated 
into and put in tension with the objects, discourses, and practices of dignity. Unwit-
tingly, within this zone, other problems and practices have arisen that have proven 
to be beyond the metrics of either biopower or human dignity. Bioethics is a case in 
point. To borrow the title of a prominent article on these themes, transformations 
in the logic and practice of human dignity at the interface of the biological and 
biomedical sciences seem to be opening up multiple new forms of the “politics of 
life.” Or, to be more precise, they are opening multiple new politics of anthropos. 
Multiple scholars, after all, have indicated places where the prior logics of biopower 
are being reworked and hence where a new fi gure, bios, is becoming available to 
the operations of power. If one can say that human dignity is not simply a residual 
of the biopolitical but has, in fact, introduced an alternative, if critically adjacent, 
political and ethical rationality, then one might also say that the breakdown of the 
archonic logic of human dignity today may be serving as a site for the constitution 
of new fi gure of anthropos.
Th is seems to indicate that any anthropologically suffi  cient account of human 
dignity will need to situate its energies and attentions somewhere between stabi-
lized conceptions of moral order and the apparatuses calibrated to them, and the 
practices of freedom that allow for the invention of ethical and political possibil-
ity. I have suggested that the biosciences represent one privileged site for such an 
undertaking; there are no doubt others. Perhaps it goes without saying, but such 
practices of freedom, insofar as they include what I have called, for lack of a better 
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term, “practices of fi guration,” must not be confused with “mere discourse.” Rep-
resentations, after all, are social facts. Human dignity is not a kind of rhetorical 
remainder either of a longer history of humanism, a concern for justifying human 
rights, or of biopolitical reason. One ought to resist the temptation to think that 
the only real anthropological action connected to human dignity lies in the ex-
tradiscursive activities of those institutions that justify themselves by appeal to it. 
Th e micropolitics connected to talk of human dignity ramify in signifi cant ways. 
Moreover, in the case of the three venues I have examined, the discursive problem 
is not only conceptual. Th e problem, rather, is how to bring to articulation and 
thereby give possible institutional form to something like “programs” for reality. 
Such calculated attempts to reimagine moral order and its institutional dimensions 
are rarely identical to the actual practices that develop in connection to them. In 
this sense, if talk of human dignity is not identical to the real-world apparatuses that 
have developed in connection to that talk, one needs to take care not to disregard 
such talk as utopian. Th ese programmatic renderings of dignity are, rather, some-
thing closer to “fragments of reality that induce such particular eff ects in the real 
as the distinction between true and false implicit in the way men ‘direct,’ ‘govern,’ 
and ‘conduct’ themselves and others.” Even for the actors most closely involved 
in its fi guration, human dignity, as a way of “dividing up the true and the false so 
as to produce a diff erent way of exercising power,” is always simultaneously treated 
as a given (human dignity is primordial) and that which is in need of actualization 
(human dignity is under duress). Both premise and obligation: hence, the analytic 
challenge of specifying the eff ects on the real being produced today by the fi gural 
and institutional play of human dignity.
coda on dignity and the body
Within a remarkably short period of time after James Th omson’s announcement 
that his team had successfully derived human embryonic stem cells, the religious 
politics of the aff air had intensifi ed worldwide. Th e research excited policy de-
bates and political blockages well beyond the Catholic Church and American vital 
politics, both nationally and internationally. Eventually even the United Nations 
sounded in. And although it is unsurprising that the aff air played out diff erently 
across diff erent cultural and juridical contexts, the frequency with which stem cell 
politics returned to the binds of human dignity and the body is remarkable. For 
those committed to fi ghting over the terms of human dignity—what it means and 
what it demands in relation to human vitality—these binds ultimately redounded 
to a tacit intellectual blackmail. In the end, one either had to be for or against hu-
man dignity.
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Th e terms of that blackmail are not unique to the ethics and politics of biotech-
nology, and they need to be refused. Th ey need to be refused because they are part 
of the blockage and breakdown that troubles the contemporary. Human dignity 
and its unsettled relation to questions of intrinsic worth cannot reasonably be made 
the object of a simple polemic. Th e notion of human dignity is a social fact of our 
recent history, and the politics of intrinsic worth have shaped the current topology 
of life, ethics, and power. Th e game of being told one must either support human 
dignity as an inescapably intrinsic feature of human reality or denounce it as the 
residue of an opportunistic politics is entirely misplaced. We would be wise to take 
another word of advice from Michel Foucault, who once suggested that in order to 
think clearly one must refuse everything presented in the form of “a simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative.”
In composing this book I have proceeded in a manner commensurate with that 
maxim. I have done this by taking up human dignity and its contemporary break-
downs as an event of our historical ontology. I have sketched this event across re-
ligious, political, and scientifi c domains. I have attended to the ways it has shaped 
these domains: the ways they have been imagined, talked about, valorized, and 
resisted. More or less all of the actors and institutions I studied as part of this book 
take human dignity utterly seriously. Th e proposition that human dignity must be 
made a norm for the critique of modern forms of truth and power remains crucial 
to how they conduct their ethics and politics. For a signifi cant portion of them, the 
only question is where and how that norm should be given form. Th e question that 
they have left unanswered, however, is the second-order one: how, exactly, have they 
gone about this work of giving form to human dignity? What has their form giving 
done? And what is yet to do?
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